As things stand, the IAF will, at best, have a full Tejas Mk1 operational unit only in 2019 and a Tejas Mk II squadron around 2025. In view of the uncertainty and further delay with the LCA there is a need to accelerate procurement of the MMRCA. Also, a specially selected, well-paid professional ‘Task Master’ needs to be appointed to head and fast-track the LCA programme. From its current strength of 34 squadrons, the IAF must quickly reach the authorised strength of 42. With rapid depletion of IAF assets, further delays will have serious implications for flight safety and national security.
The LCA Mk I variant still had 53 ‘significant shortfalls’ requiring 20 permanent waivers and 33 temporary concessions…
The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) designed, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) manufactured, multi-role, single-engine, tail-less delta, Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) ‘Tejas’ Mk I was formally handed over by Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar to Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief Arup Raha for induction into the IAF on January 17, 2015 with Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) status. It was promised that the Final Operational Clearance (FOC) would be achieved by end 2015.
An indicting Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report released early May 2015 raised serious questions on the operational readiness of the aircraft. In the severe criticism of the over three-decade old project, it was pointed out that the LCA Mk I variant still had 53 ‘significant shortfalls’ requiring 20 permanent waivers and 33 temporary concessions. These have reduced its performance as well as survivability and the aircraft does not meet the IAF’s operational requirement. The IAF had issued Air Staff Requirements (ASR) in 1985 for a light-weight, multi-mission fighter aircraft to be inducted in 1994 to replace the MiG-21s in service. But the LCA achieved IOC only by December 2013 and the FOC requirements as stipulated in the Service Qualification Requirements (SQR) can be met only by LCA Mk II which is expected only by 2018-end the report said.
Large delays also forced the need to introduce newer weapon systems that necessitated design changes and further delayed integration. Listing the shortcomings, the CAG said that the aircraft fails to meet the Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities as the Self-Protection Jammer could not be fitted on the aircraft due to space constraints. Also, the Radar Warning Receiver and Counter Measure Dispensing System faced performance issues.
The indigenous development of systems such as the Kaveri engine and Flight Control System Actuators could not be achieved successfully…
Other shortcomings included increased weight, reduced internal fuel capacity, non-compliance of fuel system protection, frontal pilot protection and reduced speed, all of which are expected to be rectified only in the LCA Mk II. The indigenous development of systems such as the Kaveri engine, Multi-Mode Radar, radome, Multi-Functional Displays and Flight Control System Actuators could not be successfully achieved resulting in the LCA’s continued dependence on imports, the CAG said.
Although DRDO had quoted the aircraft’s indigenous content as 70 per cent, the actual figure is less than 35 per cent as on date. Due to delays in procuring plant, machinery, tools and construction of production hangars at HAL, only four aircraft can be produced per annum against the envisaged requirement of eight. Repair and overhaul facilities for 69 LRUs have yet to be set up and that could lead to maintenance bottlenecks. The delay had forced the IAF to undertake “alternative temporary measures” such as upgrade of aircraft such as MiG Bis, Jaguar, MiG 29 and Mirage 2000 at a cost of Rs 20,037 crore and reschedule the phasing out of MiG-21s.
The Design and Development (D&D) project was originally sanctioned Rs 583 crore in 1983, but delays escalated the costs to Rs 10,397 crore, the report stated. The CAG cost escalation figures are, of course, being contested by ADA. Yet the audit body had a word of appreciation about world class work centres developed by ADA. Of the five critical technologies identified by ADA, two have been successfully imbibed. These are development and manufacture of Carbon Fibre Composite (CFC) structures and integration of modern glass cockpit.
The CAG also blamed the IAF for taking too long to identify a Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile…
The report assumes greater importance as it comes from the CAG who had earlier served for many years in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) including at key posts of Defence Secretary and the Director General (Acquisitions). The CAG has only placed in open domain what the IAF has been cautioning for years. A few DRDO advocates who tried publically to counter the IAF’s apprehensions by blaming the latter for not backing the LCA program have now gone quiet. The CAG also blamed the IAF for taking too long to identify a Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile. In view of this damning report, there is a need to take stock of this most ambitious defence Design and Development project.
Evolution of the LCA
The LCA, one of the smallest and lightest fighter aircraft of its class in the world, first flew on January 04, 2001. The IAF requires 200 single-seat and 20 twin-seat aircraft to replace its ageing MiG-21s, and the Indian Navy (IN) requires 40 to replace the Harriers. 16 of these have been built till date including prototypes. The LCA is India’s second D&D fighter aircraft project after a not-very-successful attempt with HF-24 Marut in the 1960-1970s, 147 of which flew with the IAF. By 1975, the IAF was looking for an air superiority combat aircraft with secondary ground attack role.
In 1983, the IAF had clarified that it required a replacement for MiG-21s, which comprised 40 per cent of the IAF’s inventory when they were to be phased out. The IAF released the SQR in 1985. To better coordinate and build core state-of-the-art aerospace technologies, ADA was formed in 1984 to manage the D&D of the now designated LCA. Though HAL was to finally manufacture and deliver the system to the IAF, ADA with a consortium of defence labs and industries was to prove the aircraft. The D&D process did help Indian aviation community to master a few new technologies mostly related to glass cockpit architecture, mission computers and the Carbon Fibre Composites.
In 2004, the Kaveri engine failed its high altitude tests in Russia, putting an end to any hope of it powering the Tejas…
The HAL and the Electronics and Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) have not been able to produce viable airborne multi-mode radar (MMR), efforts for which began in 1997. By 2006, when it was clear that the indigenous MMR cannot meet performance and development timelines, acquisition of an “off-the-shelf” foreign radar as an interim option was exercised. Similarly, the Kaveri engine program launched by Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) in 1986 faced serious delays and technology shortfalls. At an early stage, it was thus decided to fly the LCA with a proven engine and General Electric (GE) F404-GE-F2J3 was selected. Finally, in 2003, the upgraded variant F404-GE-IN20 was selected for series production aircraft.
In 2004, the Kaveri engine failed its high altitude tests in Russia, putting an end to any hope of it powering the Tejas. In 2006, despite help from French aircraft engine maker Snecma, it became difficult to retrieve the project and in 2008, the Kaveri engine was delinked from the LCA and the program shelved altogether later. Fine tuning of the Control Laws for this “relaxed static stability” aircraft was a massive time consuming task. The initial support from Lockheed Martin was terminated after 1998 Indian Peaceful nuclear tests as part of the US embargo. The task was then taken on by National Aerospace Laboratory (NAL).
The Automatic Flight Control System as it finally evolved has been highly praised by all the test pilots. NFTC test pilots feel the aircraft compares in some ways to the IAF’s upgraded Mirage-2000, and is far superior to the MiG-21 it was originally meant to replace two decades ago.
Based on the IAF’s SQRs, the original schedule was for the LCA’s first flight in April 1990 and service entry in 1995…
The Actual Timeline
Based on the IAF’s SQRs, the original schedule was for first flight in April 1990 and service entry in 1995. This was obviously ambitious even by American standards. The tail-less delta wing design was frozen in 1990. The ‘Proof of Concept’ phase which included the design development and testing of two technology demonstrator aircraft (TD-1 and TD-2) began in April 1993 and was completed in March 2004 at the cost of Rs 2,188 crore. Prototype Variant PV-1 flew in 2003 and the two-seater PV-5 completed its maiden flight in end 2009.
In March 2005, the IAF had placed an order for 20 aircraft, with a similar order for another 20 aircraft to follow. All 40 were to be equipped with the F404-GE-IN20 engine. The higher-than-envisaged aircraft weight reduced the thrust-weight ratio and it affected the aircraft performance including sustained turning rate, maximum speed and angle-of-attack range and could not meet the SQRs. The more powerful GE F-414 was then chosen as the replacement for the F-404 engine. The new engine is larger and heavier and will require major changes in intake size and affect weight and CG dynamics.
With the new engine, the LCA Mk II will effectively be a new aircraft requiring considerable fresh testing. 99 such engines are planned to be initially acquired. In December 2009, Rs 8,000 crore was sanctioned for the production aircraft for the IAF and the Indian Navy. In April 2010, the third production aircraft (LSP-3) flew with a hybrid version of the ELTA EL/M-2032 multi-mode radar. The Naval Variant NP-1 was rolled out in July 2010. The weapons tests including bombing began in September 2011, at the Pokhran range and were followed by missile firing tests at Goa. RAFAEL’s Derby fire-and-forget missile will serve as the initial medium range air-air armament for the Tejas which has completed testing free-fall bombs and precision bombing with laser-guided 1,000-lbs bombs.