Indian Defence Review

Come January 2019, insurrection in Kashmir will turn thirty. How do we assess the present status of this insurgency in the Valley?  Indeed, insurgents are setting the narrative in Kashmir. A report compiled by the J&K Police, in August 2018, establishes this reality. Over the last decade, the number of active insurgents hovered around 200, even touching a low of 78 in 2013 – lowest since 1990. Police report projects their present figure to be 327 of which majority, 211, are locals. While Hizb-ul- Mujahideen(HM) and Lashkar-e-Toiba(LeT) – estimated cadres 141 and 128 respectively- retain their dominance, Jaish-e-Mohammed(JeM) too have strengthened its base this year1. In the backdrop of high attrition rate, 200 in 2017 and 130 thus far this year, these numbers are ominous.

The insurgency in the Valley has had its lows- periods of relative peace- yet it has sustained all this while an end to this conflict seems nowhere in sight. Over the last three decades, Kashmir has evolved – in terms of its politics, discourse, insurgency, the form of external support, perceptions and probable solutions. On the other hand, Indian establishment, ensnared in outdated response-templates, has thus far been outsmarted in this battle of wits by mainstream politicians, separatists/hardliners, insurgent leadership, external forces or even by the common Kashmiri alike. Today, slogans like‘Kashmiriyat-Jamooriyat- Insaniyat’, ‘developmental agenda’, ‘sky is the limit’ or even ‘alienation of youth’ are all expired coinage in the Valley.

Sustaining Insurgency

Ever since 1990, insurgents have constantly upgraded their modus operandi. Effective use of social media is the latest addition to their armoury. Conceptually too, the insurgency has undergone metamorphosis.

•  Independence for Kashmir-Kashmir Banega Khudmukhtar:

In initial stages of current insurrection, Azadi (independence) slogan enamoured hordes of Kalashnikov-wielding young men who roamed streets of Srinagar and of other towns in the Valley. The sounds of gunfire and explosions mingled with chants of Azadi emanated from demonstrations composed of people from all strata. This phase was spearheaded by Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), an organisation that believes in sovereign Kashmir, independent of both India and Pakistan. Whether by coincidence or by design, JKLF flag bears resemblance to Palestinian national colours. As insurgency caught imagination of the public, strains of   Muslim Kashmir as an independent entity – a seed sown by Sheikh Abdullah during 1931 revolt against Maharaja of J&K -started manifesting itself. This made Pakistan uncomfortable and compelled her to course correct the conflict. 

•  Accession to Pakistan-Kashmir Banega Pakistan:

It is reported that 5,119 insurgents were killed between 1990-1994 2and many times more injured. Pakistani military’s Inter-Services- Intelligence (ISI) – which provided weapons and training to the Kashmiri Insurgents since its inception in the 1980s- cut off its aid to JKLF and fully supported HM. By 1996, HM, a pro-Pakistan outfit, emerged as the dominant group in the conflict. The narrative in Kashmir thus shifted from the slogan of JKLF – ‘Kashmir Banega Khumukhtar’ – to that of HM- ‘Kashmir Banega Pakistan’.  Pakistan thus fully controlled the levers of conflict in Kashmir, both ideological and assets on the ground.

•  Suicide- Fidayeen – Attacks:

It was now natural for Pakistan to upgrade the conflict to the next level. Fidayeen  offensive in Kashmir commenced after Kargil conflict in 1999. Thereafter, the period up to 2002was marked by 55 Fidayeen attacks, costing Security Forces (SF) 161 precious lives and leaving 90 Fidayeen dead 3. Such attacks were carried out by small teams of two men each who would penetrate high-profile targets, like SF headquarters, State Legislature etc, and blow themselves up causing immense damage to life and assets. These attacks left a tremendous psychological impact, raising the costs for SF in terms of enhanced vigil while insurgents regained public adulation. 

Fidayeen, save for in odd cases, were mostly Pakistani recruits of LeT or JeM, both radical religious organisations based in Pakistan. Thus far, this has been the bloodiest phase of the conflict in Kashmir. Pakistan, emboldened with their success, also orchestrated similar attacks in mainland India –  in 2001 a failed assault on India’s Parliament and a bloody one by LeT on Mumbai’s Hotel Taj that left 166 civilians dead.

•  Massacres to Scare Non-Muslims and Scuttle their Return to the Valley:

In 1990, there were targeted killings of Kashmiri Pandits (KPs) by insurgents to scare them out of the Valley. By late 1990, insurgents had achieved their aim with only a minuscule number of KPs staying back in the Valley. Insurgents perpetuated ghastly massacres even on these residual members to completely purge the Valley of all non-believers. Seven KPs were butchered in Sangrampora in 1997, in Wandhama 23 of them were massacred in 1998, while 24 members of this community were brutally killed in Nadimarg in 2003.  These massacres were also aimed at scuttling any attempts of return and rehabilitation of KPs in the Valley.

Sikh population in the Valley too was targeted. 35 Sikhs were massacred in Chittisingpura in 2000. Even Hindus in Muslim majority Doda Distt., South of Pir Panjal, were not spared. 25 Hindus were killed in Chapanari and 26 of them were butchered in Prankot in 1998 while 35 Hindus were massacred in Doda in 20064. These massacres too were aimed at triggering mass migration of Hindus from these Muslim majority areas in Jammu region. 

•  Scuttling Peace process:

Violence in the Valley receded post-2003 as Kashmir was then witnessing attempts, first by Atal Behari Vajpayee and later by Manmohan Singh, to broker peace with Pakistan and the insurgents. During the ‘peace process’ era  number of causalities decreased significantly – from 4,507 in 2001 to 377 in 2009 5. It also ushered in an atmosphere of hope in the Valley when SF footprint reduced in Srinagar and it infused a sense of change in the public mind. However, these ‘peace’ deliberations split the secessionist leadership into hawks and droves. There was stiff opposition to this process from the hardliners like Sayed Ali Shah Geelani and the insurgent leadership. Conflicting opinions about the ‘peace process’ brought extreme radical views in Kashmir to the fore. The apprehension that the peace process might itself end up becoming a resolution to the conflict sealed the fate of this process 6. As efforts to broker peace did not deliver, violence returned to the Valley.

•  Agitational Terrorism-Intifada:

Parvez Musharraf, then President of Pakistan and architect of ‘Four Point Formula’ for resolution of Kashmir issue, was voted out of power in 2008 and that put paid to ‘peace process’.  Amarnath land row, in 2008, acted as a trigger to mobilise tens of thousands of Kashmiris on roads seeking a political resolution to the Kashmir issue. Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, then Chief Minister (CM), looking to consolidate his own position, toppled the state government by pulling out of PDP-Congress alliance.   Even shrewd Mufti misread the public mood to be voted out of power. National Conference (NC)- Congress combine was voted in and Omar Abdullah took over as the CM. 

In 2009, rumours about rape and murder of two young women in Shopian resulted in a long agitation. The build-up for a major crisis began with a story of a fake encounter at Machil, in North Kashmir, gaining currency. In 2010, public erupted again and more than 100 civilians were killed. Kashmir remained shut for months. These two public mobilisations, in 2008 and 2010, brought up new images of violence in Kashmir –  of stones replacing AK-47. Insurgent leadership had deftly managed to bring the international focus back on Kashmir, this time as a case of popular uprising 7.

Now a new phenomenon has emerged in Kashmir. Thousands gather at the sites of encounter between SF and insurgents. Civilians then resort to pelting of stones at SF engaged in combat with the insurgents and, at times, latter manage to escape from the SF dragnet.  Even during the funeral of slain insurgents, thousands gather for their last rites when some armed men appear on the scene to offer a gun salute to their departed comrades. On October 3, 2015, about 20,000 people attended the funeral of Abu Qasim, LeT commander, who had killed Sub. Insp. Mohammad Altaf, a local. This high-pitched support for a slain Pakistani terrorist showed that there was a wide swath of support for the Lashkar’s religio-insurgent zeal 8.

A new dynamic has already crept in Kashmiri society. Earlier people used to wait for the dead bodies of insurgents to be handed over by the police. Now they rush to the encounter sites to save them. That is why insurgent killings now are also accompanied by civilian killings, offering an excuse to separatists to accuse SF of human rights abuse.