Indian Defence Review

Victory in any event, be it a playful game or a bloodthirsty war, is a joint effort of all the members. How one orchestrates this effort is Integration. These fundamentals are universal. These do not require proof or QED.

Yet, quite often, while dealing with inter-services matters, in the desire to promote enhanced jointmanship and integration, one comes across decisions, which do not lead to true jointmanship. While there may be extensive amount of joint training, the same may contain insufficient or inappropriate training content for Jointness. Some of the measures may appear specious but turn out inappropriate because the end results do not seem at all commensurate with the input effort and time. This may be the result of insufficient analysis for enhancing Jointmanship.

So let us begin by first understanding what is meant by Jointmanship? Various organisations and individuals have explained it differently.

“You take the most gallant sailor, the most intrepid airman and the most audacious soldier, put them at a table together and what do you get? The sum of their fears!”

— Winston S Churchill

Jointness or Jointmanship is not a word in Concise Oxford Dictionary. However, following Institutions define/explain it thus. A definition coined at DSSC in 2001 explains Jointmanship as, “Integrated planning and application of military power at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels, with proper sequencing of combat power of the three Services in time and space as per requirement and in relation to the enemy’s centres of gravity and culmination points is a must to win a war. Cooperation is a time-tested principle of war and would need to be exhibited in full measure by the services to prosecute our combined military strategy. Good jointmanship will result from proper joint training, understanding of each others capabilities and limitations and mutual trust, confidence and respect for each other.”

The air war mandates firming up of plans as early as possible. To be able to decide on targets and, thereafter, gather intelligence on the target, i.e. very precise intelligence to match the highly accurate PGMs, requires a lot of lead-time. Lead time is precisely what the army commander cannot give with respect to his plans.

Whereas “Joint Operation” at DSSC is: defined as, “Operations planned and executed by two or more services, operating under a single designated Joint Task Force Commander. Joint Operations are normally mission oriented and have specific objectives. The joint task force stands dissolved on attainment of its objective or as specified in the operational directive. Joint forces normally operate within two distinct chains of command – one for operations and the other for administration and logistics”.

The American term to express Jointmanship is “Jointness”. The aim of Jointness as per US Joint Doctrine is to, “coordinate the combat capabilities of the Services and allies or coalition partners to achieve the greatest possible military advantage. This is accomplished through the creation and execution of plans which maximise the unique capabilities of each of the Services.”1 Another expert Michael C. Vitale (US Navy) defines Jointness as, “a holistic process that seeks to enhance the effectiveness of all military operations by synchronising the actions of the Armed Forces to produce synergistic effects within and between all joint integrators at every level of war.”2

“Jointness defies consistent definition. The GoldWater Nichols Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and students of operational art all view jointness differently. What will be the result of divergent, often opposing concepts of jointness? GoldWater Nichols mandated jointness by structural reforms; General Powell sees jointness as inter service team – work; Senator Nunn hopes jointness will be a mechanism for eliminating what he considers to be redundant roles and missions”.3

…in the wars of today and tomorrow, the impact of the three instruments of war machine i.e. the three services will generally apply in the following order. Air and Space power will have the maximum impact in all three domains of warfare, and will be the first to be used.

Recently Pentagon likes to call “Jointness” as the concept which connects all systems in a seamless network for warfighting.4 An example being the US special forces in Afghanistan on horse back connected to UAV imagery.

In all of the above definitions/explanations few fundamentals emerge which can be called the sine quo non of Jointmanship. These are, two or more players, their combat capabilities, meshing of these capabilities to attain war aims with better results than would be the case otherwise.

If ‘Seamanship’ is about the wisdom of seafaring and sea warfare; and ‘Airmanship’ is about flying and air warfare; then ‘Jointmanship’ should represent the wisdom about fighting together.

The wisdom of warfare is based on the entire history of warfare. The span of warfare covers about 5500 years of recorded history; of this about 3000 years has been documented in some form or other. In these 3000 years of history land warfare occurs in all the conflicts and predominates the major portion of conflicts except in the last decade. While ships were used even in the ancient times to transport the armies and sometimes to ram into each other, the proper naval warfare with decisive results emerged only in 18th & 19th century. Thus, the span of naval warfare dealing with ‘Sea Control’ occupies only about 200 years out of the entire history of warfare. Last on the scene, the air power made its beginning in World War I. It’s war experience amounts to just about 100 years of history.

Even today, despite a century of combat aviation, there often is a clash of war of wisdom between the three Services i.e. the land warfare wisdom versus the naval warfare wisdom and both versus the air warfare wisdom?

There is now a universal acceptance that in the wars of today and tomorrow, the impact of the three instruments of war machine i.e. the three services will generally apply in the following order. Air and Space power will have the maximum impact in all three domains of warfare, and will be the first to be used. Thereafter, the sequence and amount of utilisation of other services would be a function of prevailing situation and concerned medium.

When we consider the accumulated wisdom of warfare, we notice that the maximum wisdom pertains to land warfare, and least to air warfare. This poses a great dilemma to enhancing jointmanship. Though unintentional, the wisdom of the land warfare tends to be superimposed on the wisdom of air warfare. If this tendency is not corrected, the resultant “Jointmanship – the wisdom about fighting together” becomes misconceived. It is akin to constructing a building on unsound and weak foundation. The moment the joint structure is subject to the unpredictable and unforeseen forces of actual war, it will collapse. As happened so catastrophically to Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and to Taliban in Afghanistan.

Aim

This paper proposes to analyse and recommend a pragmatic framework for enhancing jointmanship, of the nature that should withstand the grave pressures of a modern precision warfare and thereby serve the intended purpose.

Togetherness is Jointness?

There is a strong and popular, misconception that spending time together leads to great deal of jointness. This perception is valid if we consider everyone fighting together as a team simultaneously all the time. That is as part of a section/platoon/company or even a battalion. But the moment you bring in say support from an artillery regiment to the concerned group, the need for intimacy of being together reduces markedly. At this moment what is most important is that the artillery support be accurate, timely and of the required amount. If the artillery guys have spent time physically together with the troops being supported but cannot deliver accurate fire power, then togetherness in the past has not served its intended purpose. Thus, straightaway we see the professional outlook being more important than camaraderie alone by virtue of being together. Whereas, in case of a platoon by itself, camaraderie is more important than anything else.

In the above example let us replace the artillery support by air support. The same logic still applies. If I were one of the troops in need of air support during critical times, I’d rather have a thorough professional from the air force. Even though I may have never met him. I’d rather prefer a pilot who can attack accurately and precisely rather than the one who knows me and knows something about land warfare, but in the bargain his own professional capability is not as good as of the former guy.

 Flying, more so combat flying is an extremely demanding life-time profession. It requires extensive amount of training. To safely and gainfully fly a modern combat aircraft, costing millions of dollars one must thoroughly understand the system.

Ideally I would love to have a pilot who is equally proficient in air warfare as well as land warfare. But am I being realistic? We need to answer this question most candidly. Being an airman I can definitely vouch for air training. Flying, more so combat flying is an extremely demanding life-time profession. It requires extensive amount of training. To safely and gainfully fly a modern combat aircraft, costing millions of dollars one must thoroughly understand the system. To master the difficulties posed by small, camouflaged, mobile targets to a pilot moving dynamically in a fast jet requires even more training. May I say – entire lifetime training!

But when jointness is indirect by way of fire support without the need to physically see or know each other, the so-called teamwork by being together contributes little. Far more is the contribution of highly professional personnel excelling in their chosen field. And well versed with practical nuances of the synchronisation required with other service at the time of execution. Such an aim will be served more by the process of live training.

To a modern air force, the entire hostile nation including its armies, navies, industry, economy, leadership and population stands exposed as targets. Air power makes the war ““ a Total War.

More the indirect and impersonal way of modern war with all its complexity and time synchronisation, more is the relevance of professional experts who evolve from the crucible of live training. Trained as a result of realistic war like training rather than just being together in benign classroom but with little actual war like training misses the requirement of joint training.

Purpose of War

We fight to win. We win to impose our will over the adversary. We must fight jointly so that winning is made easier and the cost in terms of attrition to manpower and equipment is minimum. This must be the benchmark to promote jointness. Whatever facilitates above, we must incorporate, whatever does not we must reject.

There are multiple routes to winning a war. Even today, despite a century of combat aviation, there often is a clash of war of wisdom between the three Services i.e. the land warfare wisdom versus the naval warfare wisdom and both versus the air warfare wisdom? Each service seems to feel, most sincerely, their role to be the primary one. Sometimes analytical minds do accept the reality of increasing dominance of the air arm in winning wars quickly, precisely and with least cost. But as soon as the clouds of war are blown away by the winds of serene peace, the clash between the services wisdom resurfaces.

We cannot really proceed on the path of jointness unless we truthfully answer the question regarding winning modern wars.

“A tectonic shift in the nature and character of how ground forces fight.” So said Major General Robert Scales, former head of the US Army War College, in describing the use of ground forces in Afghanistan to support air operations (rather than vice versa) by revealing the location of an enemy or forcing it into open… He amplified: “The purpose of a manoeuvre force is to find the enemy, to locate him, to determine the outline of enemy force, to find those specific points on the ground that are most vulnerable to attack by fire, to observe it, to separate civilians from military, deception from the real targets and then to superintend going after those targets.5 Another author states, “In this new construct (of warfare), the traditional roles of ground and air power are reversed – making ground the supporting element and air the now decisive force.” 6

Why is the attitude of each service towards warfare so? In answer I would ask why this shouldn’t be so? If my lifetime profession is land warfare, how can, then, I not consider it supreme? If I am a sailor for life and that too a result of my deliberate choice, how can I accept other service more relevant then mine? To accept thus is against the very human nature. It is against what is taught in each service. It runs contrary to the very existence and continuance of a service. It is basic human nature to further one’s organisation. It is the reason to protecting the turf. So turf wars are inevitable – definitely in peacetime. However during the shooting war, the compulsion to win forces us to accept the reality. In the last century, USA has had extensive experience of actual war and integrated fighting. Yet when it comes to planning at strategic level and correct prioritisation, service interest takes over. That is why in the 1980s in USA the proposed force structure was a 600 ship Navy, an 18 division Army, an Air Force with 40-air wings.7

 The advances in the ability of air power to apply fire power on multifarious targets has been most remarkable when compared to naval or land power.

We cannot really proceed on the path of ‘jointness’ unless we truthfully answer the question regarding winning modern wars. Of course the spectrum of modern wars is far too wide for one set of answers to fit all the extremes. Yet, broad trends are clearly evident.

As long as warfare was only land centric, the route to winning was via the defeat of the hostile army. In the earlier days of Dharma Yuddha, the king fought mounted on a Chariot/Elephant/Horse and was clearly visible. If the King was defeated/killed, his army would accept defeat. In some outstanding cases like that of Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan the fame of these outstanding Generals was sufficient deterrence. Many countries accepted their suzerainty rather than fight them militarily.

In the 18th and 19th century, the quantum improvements in ships metal hulls and steam turbine, resulted in proper naval warfare and the era of Sea Control dawned. Thus, the British navy in concert with the British army created an as yet unsurpassed British Empire, all over the globe. The Battleship reigned supreme and represented the military might of nations.

All this changed in the 20th century. As the aircraft and the air doctrines evolved, the air power dimension came to dominate the battlefield and the space above. The rate of improvement in air powers ability to reach and rain it’s might far and wide, its ability to find, fix, locate, track, attack and assess the result has been phenomenal. The advances in the ability of air power to apply fire power on multifarious targets has been most remarkable when compared to naval or land power. The improvements with either the land power or naval power have been in contrast quite limited in the aspects of range, reach, quantum, accuracy, flexibility and mobility.

Today a modern air force can engage most of the targets simultaneously. This is called “˜Parallel War. USAF is working towards a “˜Hyper War capability. Thus in modern wars the enemy nation is denied the chances of recuperating and fighting again.

“The airplane in the only weapon which can engage with equal facility land, sea and other forces”, said Maj Gen Frank M Andrews in 1938.8 In USA, Joint Force Command’s (USJFCOM) concept of joint operations is, “Rapid Decisive Operations” (RDO). In a war game called Unified Vision 2001 it tried for RDO… “In describing the experiment, the participants used a number of terms and concepts with a clear Air Force pedigree… Instead of attacking his war fighting capabilities, we attack his war-making capabilities.”9

To a modern air force, the entire hostile nation including its armies, navies, industry, economy, leadership and population stands exposed as targets. Air power makes the war – a Total War. This characteristic of air power opens multiple routes to defeating enemy. Routes suited to the demands of each peculiar situation. In some cases leadership may be the prime target, in some other industry and economy. However, in most of the cases it will be a combination of multitude of targets as a route to victory. Earlier, when air power was less accurate the target destruction was sequential and slow. That is first destroy enemy air power, then his army and then may be the industry or leadership as the particular situation demanded. Air Campaigns of World War II illustrate this.

Today a modern air force can engage most of the targets simultaneously. This is called ‘Parallel War’. USAF is working towards a ‘Hyper War’ capability. Thus in modern wars the enemy nation is denied the chances of recuperating and fighting again. Also there is not enough time and opportunity to make mistakes, realise own folly and then correct it to emerge as final winner. “Also the modern war transitions from a concept of annihilation and attrition warfare that places thousands of young Americans at risk in brute, force-on-force conflicts to a concept that … seeks to directly attack the enemy’s strategic and tactical Centres of Gravity”

The following table shows the likely scenarios in warfare in today’s conditions. These are only relative and simplistic for this paper.

Therefore, we need to consider the roles and missions for the three instruments of military power. Which service is best suited to what tasks? And what are the variations in tasks when dealing with either extremes of the spectrum of warfare? That is from total war against a nation state on one side to internal security against insurgencies on the other extreme.

Jointmanship is the art of integration and synchronisation of various arms and services within a Service and similar arrangement between the three Services as per the demands of the situation. To be able to do so optimally we need to understand how each service and its component functions.

Continued…: Jointmentship in the Military – II