A few month’s back, Bharat Verma, Editor of the Indian Defence Review, in an article, had predicted that China may attack India by 2012. Frankly, at that time, I did not agree with this prophecy, because in my opinion China would not want a war till it becomes a true super power by 2050,and in any case the Chinese, in my opinion, would only go to war, if they had a 100 percent chance of success.
Also China has now become India’s leading trade partner, and common sense dictates that good economic relations are a logical antidote against war. Finally, in the event of war in the next five years, the Indian Navy would be in a position to wreck havoc with China’s oil tankers, ferrying homewards, the Middle East oil, through the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombak straits. The IAF, too would be utilised, and the Chinese”cake walk” of 1962, would not be possible.
As a nuclear specialist, it is my opinion that lots of luck would be needed to get a complex thermonuclear prototype device to function properly the first time, and even if it did, it would need atleast two more successful, confirmatory tests in a rugged militarised form.
However, two recent events have caused me to rethink, though I still feel that an Indo–China war is not likely, specially if India urgently reverses the current decline in its defence capability. The first event was the recent early September 2009 Chinese firing across the LAC (the first since 1986, and the first since the 1996 “no firing agreement”), in Kerang (northern Sikkim) where two ITBF jawans were reportedly injured (this report has been denied by the Indian Foreign Ministry).
The second event was the firing on 12 September 2009, of five 107 mm rockets, by the Pakistan based Lashkar e Toiba (LeT), across the international border at Indian villages near Amritsar. Are these two firing incidents linked, coming as they do on the background of very disturbing reports of border incursions by our two hostile nuclear armed neighbours?
While the Pakistani terrorist based actions are not new, the Chinese activities, sound similar to the ominous activities prior to the disastrous 1962 war.
Another serious mistake we are making is assumimg that the United States will pull our chestnuts out of the fire, by deterring China and pressurising Pakistan. While our broad national interests do generally appear to coincide with Washington, we must remember that no country will go to war against nuclear armed foes, unless directly threatened. Given Pakistan’s undeniable geostrategic location, we should not expect the Americans to “take out” or “neutralise” Pakistani nuclear weapons, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the terrorists. Neither should we assume that America has joint control over Pakistani nuclear weapons. It is good to have close ties with the USA, but it’s prudent not to outsource our national security to any external power.
Musharraf’s latest admission on 14 September, about Pakistan diverting American aid to beef up its defences against India, and how he ensured Pakistan’s strategic weapons programme was “speeded up”, and China’s latest border incursions, should finally clear the cobwebs from the minds of India’s leadership. Why do we continue to suffer nasty surprises at the hands of Pakistan and China. Some 47 years after 1962, India has again been repeatedly surprised by China in Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh and in Uttarakhand . About nine years after Kargill, and 15 years after the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts, India was surprised by Pakistani terrorists taking the searoute to cause a bloodbath in Mumbai on 26/11 in 2008.
Indias foreign ministry should stop justifying Chinas daily incursions by talking about “the differing perceptions on the Line of Actual Control”. China will stop its incursions only when its deterred by Indias conventional and strategic defence capability.
The fact remains that India’s lack of strategic culture has been repeatedly exposed, and its military has been required to fight under very disadvantageous conditions because our politico–bureaucratic leadership, has allowed defence preparations to fall below critical levels, while following a policy of “passive , low reactive defence” which relies more on diplomacy than military strength. Hopefully the restrictions imposed on the Indian Army not being allowed to patrol some “sensitive areas” on the Indo–China border will now be lifted before the Chinese grab more of our territory. Also hopefully, the Government will think about inducting the long delayed 155 mm artillery, and raising more mountain divisions before it’s too late.
Their should be no doubt as to why Pakistan and its terrorists will always aim to cause mayhem in two places in India, viz Mumbai and Vadinar. Mumbai (its stock market turnover is four times Pakistan’s GDP) and Vadinar port in the Gulf of Kutch (it has three refineries with 99 million tons capacity and over two million tons of fuel storage). Yes, attacking foreign tourists in Goa will gain a lot of international publicity, but Mumbai and Vadinar are India’s economic jugular, and attacking these will keep India economically hyphenated to Pakistan. Fortunately the Coast Guard’s new North West Command, for Gujarat, headquartered at Gandhinagar has become functional, and is expected to be formally inaugerated by the Defence Minister in October. Hopefully, this new Command will urgently receive additional vessels and aircraft to ensure the safety of Gujarat, including Vadinar, because nothing can be more dangerous than creating a “paper force”.
What is the second best method to attack Mumbai and Vadinar,after terrorism? The answer is cruise missiles with land attack capability, launched from ships, submarines and Maritime Patrol aircraft like the P-3C Orion. Theoretically, the 120 km range, Harpoon anti-ship missile with a 250 kg warhead fits the bill perfectly for Pakistan as an interim system, while its ratcheting up the production of its larger Chinese gifted, 500 km range Babur cruise missiles to build an estimated stockpile of 450.
The long term aim of the Pakistani Babur cruise missiles (these can be delivered by fighter or Maritime Patrol aircraft to extend their range) is to counter India’s over publicised Ballastic Missile Defence System (BMDS) and give Pakistan a “cheap”, massive first strike capabilty which may overwhelm India’s nuclear retaliation capabilty. Right now, Pakistan’s nuclear capability is designed to counter India’s superior conventional military power, but the Babur cruise missile along with new miniaturized plutonium warheads, will put Pakistan in a different league altogether.
The newer versions of the Harpoon, which Pakistan is hoping to acquire from the USA, already has a secondary land attack capability built in. What it has now apparently tested a few months back is the older anti-ship Harpoon, (about three dozen of these were acquired from the USA in the Reagan era). Given todays miniaturised Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and Global Positioning Systems (GPS), any missile specialist should be able to convert the vintage anti-ship Harpoon to a land attack capable missile with reasonably accurate chances of hitting the Oil refineries at Vadinar and the various installations in Mumbai port.
Being masters of the art of long term strategic planning, the Chinese game plan is obviously to keep India tied down by the triple threats from China, Pakistan and Pakistani sponsored terrorists.
The only problem would be how to replace the 250 kg conventional warhead in the 53 centimetre diameter cylnderical Harpoon missile with a plutonium miniature nuclear warhead. Most Indian scientists will tell you that it is impossible for Pakistan to achieve this. In my opinion India should expect China to transfer the technology of a proven miniaturised nuclear weapon which would fit the larger Babur, and possibly the Harpoon cruise missiles.
What are the launch platforms for the modified land attack Harpoon missile ? The answer is simple. The two older French built Agosta 70 submarines and the half a dozen American P-3C Orion aircraft are the ideal launch platforms. The missile has sufficient standoff range to hit Vadinar and Mumbai.
Global experts believe that “low tech” nuclear powers would need 8 kg of Plutonium 239 (PU 239) to make a bomb, while “medium tech” powers would need about five kgs, and “hi-tech” powers (including China) would need 3 kg of PU 239.The media has given enough details of the new Khusab 2 and 3 reactors , which will be expected to produce about 15 to 30 kg of Plutonium for 3 to 10 miniaturised nuclear weapons per year to Pakistan. Latest media reports indicate that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons stockpile has now grown from 70 to 90. I have no idea about India’s nuclear weapons stocks, and am uncertain about how many Agni type missiles India can produce per year. China will take Indian deterrence seriously only after we induct the 5000 km Agni 5.
The recent controversy about the 1998 thermonuclear tests “fizzzle” has not cleared the air. I am not a nuclear weapons designer, but as a nuclear specialist, it is my opinion that lots of luck would be needed to get a complex thermonuclear prototype device to function properly the first time, and even if it did, it would need atleast two more successful, confirmatory tests in a rugged militarised form. Detterence works best, when it’s based on hard realty, and not ambigious discussions. Also deterrence works best when the enemy leadership is itself threatened with annihilation by a politically firm Indian Government.
The real threat from the sea will come after early October, when the monsoon subsides, and the seas become calmer for permitting small boat terrorist operations.
The Chinese, as expected have kept the pressure on India, with the latest news of its forces violating Indian territory in Ladakh, Sikkim and Uttarakhand. Being masters of the art of long term strategic planning, the Chinese game plan is obviously to keep India tied down by the triple threats from China, Pakistan and Pakistani sponsored terrorists. India’s foreign ministry should stop justifying China’s daily incursions by talking about “the differing perceptions on the Line of Actual Control”. China will stop its incursions only when it’s deterred by India’s conventional and strategic defence capability. We will need to change our “no first use” nuclear policy, and increase our defence expenditure from the present measely 1.99 percent of the GDP to atleast three percent of the GDP.
Ofcourse, the immediate threat to India is from terrorism by land, air and sea. In August, I was pleasantly surprised to see that the normally chaotic fishing vessel traffic in Mumbai port was now more disciplined. It was also heartening to see the Navy and Coast Guard maintaining round the clock vigil from boats and helicopters. Numerous visitors, enquiring about my health, also assured me that there was now unprecedented co-ordination and co-operation between the Navy, Coast Guard, Police, Customs, Intelligence Agencies and the port authorities.
The real threat from the sea will come after early October, when the monsoon subsides, and the seas become calmer for permitting small boat terrorist operations. The recent 12 September rocket attacks from Pakistan on Indian villages near Amritsar, along with terror strikes in Srinagar, are pointers that things will only get worse, unless India responds firmly.
Given the decades of neglect, national security (including strategic deterrence) will need sustained funding for the next decade. The Prime Minister, while focussing on 9 percent GDP growth, and countering drought, will need to keep a very watchful eye on national security.
Given the decades of neglect, national security (including strategic deterrence) will need sustained funding for the next decade. The Prime Minister, while focussing on 9 percent GDP growth, and countering drought, will need to keep a very watchful eye on national security. The only insurance against any future disastrous, though unlikelym wars with China or Pakistan lies in deterrence, based on India investing heavily in conventional, counter terrorism and nuclear defence.
If India fails to invest sufficiently on national security and displays palpable lack of political will, then there is a risk of minor border incidents spiralling out of control, and tensions escalating. The only danger this time, lies with Pakistan and its terrorists, also joining this unlikely doomsday scenario. We must have excellent economic and diplomatic relations with China, but we must also keep our powder dry. Our foreign policy should be backed by sufficent military power — something akin to a steel fist in a velvet glove.
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