Indian Defence Review

The fate of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty according to the statement issued after a meeting amongst foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 04 December is nearing its death after remaining crucial in upholding security and strategic stability in the Euro-Atlantic Theater for over 30 years. Analysts remain unclear as to why this successful agreement is being revoked at this point in time and wondered the rationale behind this decision in the absence of an alternative agreement[1]. Far away from the European Theater, Japan – a crucial US security ally – has called this move led by the United States (U.S.) – shameful[2].  

After its unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on 13 June, 2002, the United States (US) is now near certain to withdraw from INF Treaty[3] along with plans to place Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) in space and withdrawal from the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)[4]. The INF Treaty required destruction of (the Parties’) ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges in between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support structures and support equipment within three years after the Treaty enters into force. After its coming into force on 01 June (1988), the INF Treaty succeeded in eliminating a total of 2,692 missiles[5].

Prior to the US temptation to withdraw from INF Treaty, Russia expressed such a desire to withdraw in 2006-07 citing concerns that the INF Treaty’s missile ban applies to Russia but not to neighboring countries [Western Europe][6]. According to President Putin, the genesis of this strategic problem is not recent as the US congress had already approved the budget for research and development of intermediate and short range missiles and hence the US decision in this regard has already been made[7]. For Russia, its major concern stems from the termination of ABM Treaty and the US deployment of intermediate and short range missiles in Europe bringing back the situation as it existed in 1970’s and 80’s with the deployment of Pershing II missile. Furthermore, Russia believes that the US had already violated the INF Treaty by deploying anti-missile systems (Romania) as the associated Aegis launchers can not only launch anti-ballistic missile but ballistic missile itself and the unmanned aerial combat vehicles (UCAV) tantamount as intermediate and short range missiles and hence tantamount to violation of INF Treaty[8].

An unclassified report prepared by the US Department of State (July, 2014) determined that the Russian Federation was in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles[9]. Since 2008, Russia has been testing a medium range cruise missile (R-500 Iskander –K) that is suspected to violate the provisions on range and launch vehicles of the INF Treaty (Article I, Para 1 of Article IV, Para 1 of Article VI, Para 1 of Article VII, Para 2 of Article VII, Para 4 of Article VII, and Para 11 of Article VII)[10]. Furthermore, US analyst remain in doubt about the exact Russian missile system in question and at times have misunderstood it to be the two stage (solid propellent) RS-26 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) covered within the New START (2010). Removal of one stage can potentially bring RS-26 range limits within in the purview of the INF Treaty (500-5,500 Km)[11]. The RS-26 was twice tested at a distance of about 2000 km—launched from Kapustin Yar (Astrakhan region), targeting a test field at Sary-Shagan (Kazakhstan)[12]. Though the R-500 Iskander –K is designed as a Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM), it was ground tested and existence of such a ground launch vehicle was thought to be in violation of the INF Treaty (Para 1 of Article VI)[13].At the NATO foreign ministers meeting on 04 December, the 9M729(SSC-8, Novato) mobile launched (9P701 TELr) GLCM with a range of 2,500 Km was concluded to be in material breach of the INF Treaty and operational since 2017[14]. According to the Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats (30 November, 2018) Russia had tested 9M729 to distances well over 500 Km from a fixed launched followed by tests from mobile launchers at ranges below 500 Km[15].

The Operational Context:

The INF Treaty was guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability, reducing the risk of outbreak of war and strengthening international peace and security[16]. Abandoning INF Treaty will allow US and Russia to develop and deploy intermediate-range [Ground Launched Ballistic Missile (GLBM) or a Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers] and shorter-range [GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers] missiles disturbing the strategic balance upon which Euro-Atlantic security architecture rests. According to Article III, the INF Treaty sought to terminate the following missiles;

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However Article VI stipulates “each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that, that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.” According to Article VII, if a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply. In other words INF Treaty sought to address and limit the offensive part of strategic stability equation despite its inextricable linkage with the defensive part. The equation of strategic stability rests on the integrated notions of offense-defense with both dimensions being consequential to each other. The non-limitation of defense related capabilities now warrants a revision of INF Treaty by both the US and Russian military planners. While the US is focused on developing long-range precision strike weapons and missile defense systems with the intension to realize an offensive doctrine, Russia is focused on anti-access and anti-denial at much shorter ranges in line with its penchant for a defensive doctrine.

Furthermore, the idea governing the arms control with respect these particular kinds of nuclear capable delivery vehicles (GLBM and GLCM) within INF Treaty was restricted to the spatial aspects of the strategic problem – Range, measured in terms of distance (500-5,500 Km). The temporal aspects were overlooked and stand transformed since the signing of the INF Treaty. Both GLCM and GLBM not only transverse from point A to B, but do so at super to hyper-sonic speed. For example, a joint venture (12 February, 1998) in-between India and Russia – Brahmos- to develop world’s first super-sonic cruise missile (2-3 Mach) was limited to a range of 290 Km given India’s former status as a non-signatory of the Missile Transfer Control Regime (MTCR) of which Russia was a member. The revolution in hyper-sonic delivery platforms reduce the total time of flight and increase the offensive capabilities of the missile exponentially.This impact of temporal (time) aspect on the spatial (distance) allows for a limited defense capability by reducing the time for reaction by advanced air defense system altering the traditional notions of deterrence[17]. Hence the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) at the tactical and operational level calls into questioning the strategic consequences of strict adherence of INF Treaty by both the US and Russia as it affects their respective doctrines – offense-defense – and the dependent strategic stability that rests on it.

The Strategic Context:

At the time of signing the INF Treaty the US and Soviet Union varied in their respective strategic disposition towards missiles addressed within this treaty. The call for negotiating a treaty to eliminate GLBM and GLCM was first initiated by the US to which Soviet Union remained less enthusiastic given the difference in their respective geo-political and geo-strategic environment. Such difference informing their respective strategic perception persists as evident from public statements by Sergey B. Ivanov (Kremlin Chief of Staff) questioning the value of INF Treaty – “the Americans have no need for this class of weapon, they didn’t need it before and they don’t need it now….they could theoretically only attack Mexico and Canada with them, because their effective radius doesn’t extend to Europe[18].” He further included potential threats from China and Pakistan in this regard[19]. For example, while Soviet Union had deployed 387 short range missiles, the US had none[20]. The details of missiles that the INF Treaty sought to eliminate from the US and Soviet inventory as mentioned in the MoU regarding the establishment of the data base for the INF Treaty is as following;        

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The immediate cause for negotiating a treaty was the Soviet Union deployment (1977) of the SS-20 in the European U.S.S.R. – a modern, mobile, nuclear-armed intermediate-range ballistic missile with three independently targetable warheads and the range to target all of Western Europe[21]. The Russia SS-20 deployment was a counter reaction to NATO’s approximately 7,400 tactical nuclear warheads deployed in Europe and the following additional deployment of Pershing IA (Short Range INF) in Germany (1983). After a decade long grueling negotiations in mid-1987 Soviet Union accepted the US proposal of “global double zero” which called for the total elimination of all U.S. and Soviet SRINF — as well as LRINF — missile systems including deployments in Asia and 72 Pershing IA missiles in Federal Republic of Germany. After completion of INF eliminations in May 1991, the US President and Soviet President made declarations recognizing major changes in the international military landscape to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from sea launched platforms (surface ships, submarines, and aircraft carriers) and air launched platform respectively[22].

Since the INF Treaty was Europe centric, the consequences for USSR and the US varied upon its execution. Such variations were by and large due to the geo-political situation confronting each. Russia’s status as a continental power was drastically different to the US status as an extra-regional maritime power in the West European Theater. The military strategy adopted by both therefore could not be addressed by a common framework such as the INF in long-term. The ability of the US to project power far away from its shore in defense of its allies in Europe from a nearby Russia created a need for dissimilar strategies. Russia as a continental power was inclined towards a denial strategy, whereas the US was geared to defeat this denial by seeking offence and forward presence as the chosen strategy. Apart from this structural problem, the bilateral nature of INF that restricted the US and Russia in fielding GLCM and GLBM did not impose any similar limitation on other powers and in particular China.

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Conclusion: Reconstruction after Destruction

Since the end of the cold war era, the international security situation stands transformed. Apart from defense budget constraints, proliferation of ballistic missile has induced drastic changes to the in-vogue security situation.[23]When the U.S. and USSR agreed on the INF treaty in 1987, a handfulof countries possessed IRBM and SRBM. However, nowadays, 31 countries possess ballistic missiles.[24] While the U.S. has developed credible anti-ballistic missile systems such as SM-3 and THAAD, Russia has limited anti-ballistic missile systems – S-500 [not yet operational]. In order to adapt to this emerging strategic situation in March 2018, President Vladimir Putin unveiled a new array of ‘invincible’ nuclear weapons and an operational doctrine for its employment in military crisis over Ukraine and Crimean Peninsula. Furthermore, unlike in the past the bi-polar nature of the strategic situation stands expanded to include China.

Arguably, China’s ballistic missiles are one of the main reasons behind the U.S. decision to withdraw from the INF treaty.[25] Since the INF treaty is a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Russia, there are no restrictions on China in fielding INF compliant missiles, launchers and support systems. According to President Donald Trump, “If Russia’s doing it and if China’s doing it and we’re adhering to the agreement, that’s unacceptable.” According to the Military Balance, China possesses 405 ground-launched ballistic/cruise missiles that have 500-5500km range.[26]

China’s DF-21D and DF-26 are “missiles of concern” to the US. The DF-21D is a derivative of DF-21, and is the world’s first Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM). The DF-21D is designed to destroy a warship, especially the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier. According to the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, the DF-21D missile has a maximum range exceeding 1,450 km. Thus it can cover areas within the first island chain. In April 2018, the PLA Army unveiled the DF-26 IRBM with anti-ship strike role, and called it “Carrier-Killer” or “Guam Killer.” According to various reports, the DF-26 has a maximum range exceeding 3500 km, and strike targets within the second island chain – Guam.[27] These ballistic missiles constitute China’s A2/AD strategy and aims to prevent an adversary’s access or contest adversary’s freedom of movement within the second island chain. According to the Military Balance estimates China possesses 18 DF-21D ASBM and 16 DF-26[28].

While China has developed various IRBM, the U.S. does not have an effective counterplan given the restrictions imposed by the INF Treaty. The U.S. has however developed various anti-ballistic missile defense systems, but these systems cannot intercept the missiles perfectly and thus lacking in an effective counterplan vis-à-vis China’s IRBM. At present, China’s deployment of IRBMs in North East Asia as part of its A2/AD strategy seeks to build “sanctuary” within the first or second island chain, like the Okhotsk Sea of the Soviet/Russia. The U.S. recognizes China’s ballistic missiles as an obstruction to its offensive military operations in East Asia andhas noted China’s ballistic missile development as one of the reasons for the U.S. withdrawing from the INF treaty[29].

Thus the U.S. need for IRBM’s as a counter-measure to China’s A2/AD strategy will require the US to field such weapons either at its military bases in the western Pacific or that of its allies which is likely to trigger a Russian response in this area.

The shift from Euro-centric geo-politico-economic world order to Asia-Oceanic holds true for international security architecture as well. According to the SIPRI, the global military spending in 2017 was $1.7 trillion at an increase rate of 1.1% – the largest after the Cold War era – with Asia-Oceania and its increase rate of 3.6% largely driven by China.[30] According to Chief of Naval Staff (CoNS, Indian Navy) – “no country in the last 300 years has invested so much of capital in the development of the Navy –that’s the Chinese navy”. It is with an intention to arrest this development outside the Euro-Atlantic security architecture that the US desires to terminate the INF Treaty. With no stated alternative to the INF Treaty, the strategy behind this decision seems to be “hope”. The instability induced in the system by terminating the INF treaty “may” lead to a new point of stability that accounts for China’s Strategic Missile Forces which possesses 475 missiles (405 of them are the IRBM and shorter-range missiles).

Having termed both Russia and China as enemies[31], the eagle seems to be killing the INF Treaty to hunt both the bear and dragon by relocating its position of attack around North-East part of the forest.