Indian Defence Review

The Indian armed forces need not match the numerical superiority of the PLA in terms of manpower and equipment. There is no need for India to get into an arms race with China and match its inventory weapon for weapon. India needs to concentrate on maintaining a technological asymmetry to deter China from any attempts at coercion or to resolve disputes by use of force.

In any future war against India, China will deploy its People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in Tibet to bring targets in India within range of its strike aircraft. But Tibet has very few airfields and till recently, these did not have bomb-proof shelters for safe parking of fighter aircraft. Perhaps this was due to China’s threat perception being more focused towards Taiwan, Japan, North Korea and now South China Sea. Apparently, China considered the chances of conflict with India to be low. But, recent press reports (Hindustan Times October 03, 2018) indicate that China has built “underground bomb proof shelters” to park fighter aircraft at Lhasa’s Gonggar/Kongka Dzong airfield. While this small news item did not receive the attention it deserved in the Indian media, it is a message to India that China is preparing for a conflict.

The Lhasa airfield came up in 1968 and for almost 50 years, the Chinese never thought of making blast-pens for their fighter aircraft. Now, suddenly they have realised their short-coming after the Doklam showdown in 2017, in which Chinese and Indian troops were engaged in a tense 72-day stand-off in the tri junction area of India, Bhutan and Tibet. The Doklam crisis seems to have rattled the Chinese; India stood its ground and did not waver despite China’s bellicose attempts at psychological warfare with provocative statements in state media which fell on deaf ears in India. The situation was finally resolved diplomatically with both sides deciding to disengage troops from the area.

This article discusses the implications of developments in Tibet and analyses the PLAAF capabilities in a shooting war against India. The main argument in the article is that while the PLAAF may be preparing for a clash, the Indian Air Force (IAF) must maintain its technological edge to deter China from any attempts at military coercion.

PLAAF Fighter Fleet

Since the 1990s, the PLAAF has been modernising at a rapid pace and today has a strength of around 2,100 combat aircraft (including those of PLA Naval Aviation) against 759 (Military Balance 2017) of the IAF (includes 45 Mig-29s of Indian Navy). But numbers do not tell the full story. China may be having a large air force, but only a small fleet of these aircraft can be deployed against India due to the limited number of airfields in Tibet. Almost 30 per cent of the PLAAFs combat aircraft force is of old generation fighter/attack aircraft such as the J-7 (Mig-21) and J-8. These old aircraft will be replaced in the next few years with new fourth/fifth-generation aircraft. The PLAAF has a strength of around 600 fourth-generation fighter aircraft such as the J-10, SU-27, J-11/ SU-30 and this number is likely to increase in the coming years with the PLAAF soon becoming a majority fourth/fifth generation fighter fleet.

China has built a new stealth fighter called the J-20 which entered service in September 2017, and another stealth aircraft, the J-31 is under development. The J-20 is a single seat, twin-engine fifth-generation fighter. It is bigger and heavier than the American F-22 Raptor and the Russian PAK FA T-50/SU-57. Not many details are available about the J-20’s performance, but from open source information and imagery, a brief assessment can be made of its capabilities. The chined nose and flat lower fuselage can reduce the J-20’s frontal Radar Cross Section (RCS). The J-20’s design also includes front canards which increases its RCS. Canard design is used to improve manoeuvrability, but the disadvantage is that its moving surface increases the radar reflecting surface. It is for this reason that no stealth aircraft such as the F-22, F-35, or SU-57 has canards.

The RCS of any aircraft is different from each side of the airframe. While the J-20 has frontal stealth features it will not be very stealthy from other sides of the airframe. Another problem the J-20 faces is of aero-engines. China’s aviation industry has not been able to develop high performance jet engines for their advanced fighters. The J-20s first flight was with Russian AL-31 engines and they are now powered by indigenous WS-10B as a stop gap measure till the under-development and more powerful WS-15 engine is ready. The WS-10B is not powerful enough to provide supercruise capability whereas the WS-15 can. China tried to procure Russia’s supercruise capable Saturn 117S engines for the J-20 but the Russians were hesitant to offer them knowing the Chinese tendency to reverse engineer. China therefore, decided to buy 24 SU-35 fighter aircraft from Russia to give them access to the SU-35s Saturn 117S engines. China has received 14 SU-35s from Russia and the balance ten aircraft will be delivered by end-2018. The SU-35 is a single-seat, twin-engine air superiority Russian fighter aircraft. It is an advanced version of the SU-27SK and SU-30MKK models which China had previously procured from Russia.

The induction of SU-35 by China marks the first time that Russia has supplied China a more powerful fighter aircraft compared with what it has supplied to India. In the past, the opposite was the rule. For example, the Su-30MKK fighters Russia sold to China were no match for the Su-30MKIs supplied to India at about the same time. The Chinese planes had inferior radar and without the thrust vectoring engines that the Indian version had. This time, the situation has been reversed with the SU-35 having more powerful engines and more sophisticated radar, weapons and avionics compared to the SU-30 MKI.

Till about 2017, the technological asymmetry between the IAF and the PLAAF was in India’s favour with the SU-30 MKI of the IAF being superior to China’s SU-30 MKK. But the induction of SU-35 and J-20 has tilted the balance in favour of China. The balance will again tilt in favour of India with the induction of the Rafale in 2019. The Rafale with its advanced Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, Meteor BVR missiles and super cruise capability will be superior to both the SU-35 and J-20. While the J-20 has frontal stealth, it could be exposed from the sides. The Rafale can be employed to attack from beam quarters to get more RCS for radar pick up.

Once China succeeds in developing the WS-15 engines for the J-20 it will again give the PLAAF a technological advantage. India will have to fast track its own fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project and deploy counter-stealth systems to face the challenge from the PLAAF. With the tardiness with which HAL has produced aircraft for the IAF, one can be sure that the AMCA will not see the light of day in a finite timeframe. Therefore, some bold and quick decisions have to be taken. India has already floated a requirement for 114 single/twin engine fighter aircraft. Whoever wins this contract must also be involved in the AMCA project with a commitment to produce it in a defined timeframe. Secondly, since India cannot be on a perpetual buying spree to meet its advanced arms requirements, indigenous design and development need to be promoted. Linking the single/twin engine contract to AMCA development in a joint venture, will boost indigenous capabilities.

Assessment of the PLAAF’s Capability Against the IAF

The PLA is organised on a regional basis with the country divided into five Theatre Commands – Northern, Southern, Western, Eastern and Central. The one opposite India is the Western Theatre Command (WTC), which is the largest and has its headquarters at Chengdu. Earlier, China had seven Military Regions (MRs) with two MRs opposite India – Lanzhou MR and Chengdu MR. These two MRs have now been combined to form the WTC. As part of China’s military reforms and to improve joint operations capability, the theatre commands were created on February 01, 2016. The WTC covers Xinjiang, the Aksai Chin sectors and the Tibetan region.

Tibet is a high altitude plateau with the airfields mostly at heights of over 3,000m. At these high altitudes, aircraft operations suffer from load penalties due to the reduced density of air. This will be a serious limitation for the PLAAF considering that their tanker fleet is also limited to just ten aircraft of H-6 class and three IL-78s. China has built a new heavy-lift transport aircraft, Y-20 which can be modified for tanker role. Once that is done and it is produced in sufficient numbers, the PLAAF’s aerial refuelling capability will be substantially enhanced. In Tibet, the main airfields are Gonggar/Kongka Dzong (South of Lhasa at an elevation of 3,570m, the main runway length is 4,000m and the second runway length is 3,600m) and Hoping which is close to Shigatse city and is about 160km West of Kongka Dzong (elevation 3,809m, runway length 5,000m).

There is one dual-use civil and military airfield in Ngari Prefecture of Tibet, Gar Gunsa (elevation 4,274m, runway length 4,500m) which serves the city of Shiquane. The airfields opposite the Northeastern part of India are Bangda/Pangta (elevation 4,334m, runway length 5,500m, it is the world’s longest paved runway) which is about 170km from the Indian border and Linzhi in Nyingchi prefecture. Linzhi is a civil airfield at an elevation of 2,949m, runway length 3,000m, which was opened in 2006, it is just 30km from the Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh. In addition to these, there are two airfields in Xinjiang- Kashgar and Hotan. Kashgar is a civil airfield and is about 570km from Leh. From this distance, the PLAAF can launch counter air strikes but for sustained air support to the PLA land campaign, the large distance will be a limitation. Hotan and Gar Gunsa airfields are closer with the distance to Leh being about 350km.

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Airfields for fighter aircraft operations have to be located at reasonable distances (approximately 200 to 300km) from each other so that they are mutually supporting. The three airfields in the Northern sector – Hotan, Kashgar and Korla, are not mutually supporting. The distance between Hotan and its nearest airfield, Kashgar, is 450km; between Hotan and Korla is 750km; Hotan to Gargunsa is 550km. Thus, there is no mutual support between these airfields. In Western Tibet, there is only one airfield, Gargunsa and has no supporting airfield. If this one airfield is bombed by the IAF, there will be a distance of almost 1,500km between Hoping and Hotan thus severely denting PLAAF operations in Western Tibet.

In the Eastern sector, opposite Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, China has made major investments in developing infrastructure for airfield construction. A majority of the airfields are within 300km from the LAC. Hoping/ Shigatse and Kongka Dzong/Gonggar/ Lhasa are two well developed military air bases with Linzhi and Pangta also operational as dual use airfields. Hoping and Kongka Dzong are mutually supporting with the distance between them being just 160km. From this we can infer that Eastern Tibet seems to be the most strategic sector from China’s viewpoint. PLAAF airfields supporting this sector include Gonggar (Lhasa airfield), Hoping, Linzhi, and Pangta.

Other than Gonggar airfield, none of the others has blast pens for safe parking of fighter aircraft. Gonggar can park about 36 aircraft in tunnels dug in nearby mountains. The PLAAF had such facilities along its airfields on the Russian border and now these are in Tibet on the India-China border. This is a major development and has serious security implications for India. For sustained air operations, China will have to develop blast pens at other airfields in Tibet also. India will have to keep a close watch on these airfields and monitor developments.

According to Xinhua, China’s official news agency, China is going to build three new airfields in Tibet for which work is going to start in 2019, and is planned to be completed by 2022. These new airfields are at Shannan (also called Lhoka), Xigaze (Shigatse) and at Ali (Burang). All these airfields are at an elevation of over 3,900m and although these civil airfields, these can also be used for military purposes. Shannan is opposite upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh and Burang is near the trijunction of Nepal, Uttarakhand and Tibet, and both are just 60km from the LAC. Shigatse already has an existing dual-use civil and military airfield. It seems the new facility will be developed as a helicopter base. Burang is at a distance of about 220km from Gargunsa and from a military point of view, it will provide mutual support to Gargunsa. Therefore, the IAF will have to target both these airfields to create a gap of 1,500km between Hoping and Hotan. These three new airfields will be available to the PLAAF for logistics purposes, but their use for offensive air operations will only be possible if the PLAAF builds the necessary infrastructure for sustained fighter air operations.

While China has built tunnels for fighter aircraft in Gonggar and is planning to construct new airfields, the PLAAF will still have limitations for carrying out sustained air campaign against India. Firstly, with the limited number of airfields, the PLAAF has the capability to deploy only about 250 to 300 combat aircraft against India. Secondly, as mentioned earlier airfields in Hotan, Kashgar, Korla and Gargunsa are not mutually supporting due to vast distances between them. Thirdly, the limitations of flying at high altitudes will impose restrictions on carrying full bomb-load. Fourthly, the PLAAF has to build blast pens at all their airfields opposite India to protect their combat fleet from the IAF’s counter air strikes. With these limitations, the PLAAF is unlikely to achieve air superiority against the IAF.

In contrast to the PLAAF, the IAF has the advantage of operating from most of their airfields in the plains from where they can take off with full bomb load. The IAF has a sufficient number of airfields in Western Air Command and Eastern Air Command to sustain the air campaign against China. India has also upgraded its Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) at Walong, Mechuka, Tuting, Pasighat and Ziro in Arunachal Pradesh.

Likely PLAAF Concept of Operations

The PLA has a large number of Air Defence (AD) weapons to provide cover not only for the armoured formations but also for the infantry, artillery and other elements of the PLA army in the TBA. The PLAAF has a robust Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) with mobile Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs), Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) guns and army AD elements integrated into the system. The PLAAF’s concept for air defence of the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) is based on the Soviet model of deploying a multi-layered mix of different weapons of varying performance capabilities and features so that there is dense coverage from low level to high level and extending into enemy air space. The Soviet concept was to give full freedom to Ground-Based Air Defence Weapon Systems (GBADWS) in the TBA. Anti-aircraft guns with very high rate of fire such as the Schilka ZSU-23 were also deployed in this mix to tackle low level targets. The PLAAF will also follow a similar concept in the TBA, with a with dense mix of mobile HQ-9 class of advanced long-range SAMs for area defence, medium-range HQ-16 SAM, Tor M-1 short-range, quick reaction SAM, HQ-7, shoulder-fired IR guided SAMs and a high rate of fire AAA guns.

Keeping the limitations of airfields in Tibet in mind and their reliance on SAMs and AD guns, the PLAAF is likely to rely heavily on GBADWS to achieve air superiority and move its army formations under heavy air defence cover. The airfields in Tibet are likely to be deployed with small numbers of interceptor aircraft for area air defence of gaps in the missile cover. While the PLAAF may consider reliance on GBADWS to be a good strategy, the system will have its limitations. The mountainous terrain and undulations in the Tibetan plateau will constrain the effectiveness of AD and fire control radars due to line-of-sight limitations. The concept of using GBADWS to gain air superiority is not new. It was used by Egypt against Israel in the 1973 War with impressive initial gains but the final result was disastrous for Egypt.

In this war, the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal under dense over lapping layers of lethal Soviet SAMs and AAA with their MiG fighters also flying in the same airspace. The Egyptians inflicted heavy losses on the Israeli air force, but fratricide due to poor air space management led to the Egyptians shooting down 15 to 20 per cent of their own aircraft. The Egyptians lost a total of 450 aircraft in the war out of which 60 to 90 aircraft were shot down by their own air defence system. Apparently, the coordination between the Egyptian Air Defence System and the Egyptian Air Force was not up to the mark. After the initial losses, the Israeli Air Force developed counter measures for the Egyptian SAMs and carried out extensive Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (DEAD) to gain air superiority. Once the Egyptian AD system was neutralised, the Israeli army counter attacked and had the Egyptian army on its knees.

In the India-China context, China is likely to use the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) conventional ballistic and cruise missiles as the main weapon for long range precision strike against India. This will leave the TBA airspace free for GBADWS to operate with full freedom without fear of fratricide. Fighter aircraft are likely to be used selectively for counter air with proper coordination with the AD organisation. It will be a daunting task for the IAF to attack the PLAAF AD cover. To target the mobile SAM sites, the IAF will require 24-hour ISR on enemy targets. If this capability is not there, then the IAF needs to build up this capability now and train to attack targets in mountainous terrain. The IAF will have to invest heavily in DEAD/SEAD to neutralise PLA missile cover.

Conclusion

The construction of tunnels for fighter aircraft in Lhasa airfield is a signal for India to get its act together. The political slugfest on the pros and cons of the Rafale deal needs to be resolved so that the IAF gets the required number of fighters promptly to cover its depleting numbers. The main advantage, that the PLA has, is in its Rocket Force’s conventional capability. However, given the diversity of airfields available to the IAF, and the accuracy required to shut down these airfields for an adequate period of time, the PLARF does not have the numbers to pose a significant missile threat. The IAF has proved it during Exercise ‘Gaganshakti’ that it has the capability to absorb Chinese missile attacks and operate from alternate airfields.

The Indian armed forces need not match the numerical superiority of the PLA in terms of manpower and equipment. There is no need for India to get into an arms race with China and match its inventory weapon for weapon. India needs to concentrate on maintaining a technological asymmetry to deter China from any attempts at coercion or to resolve disputes by use of force.

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The induction of Y-20 heavy transport aircraft in PLAAF as an aerial refuelling tanker, in the coming years, will significantly enhance its long range strike capability. This is a trend which India will have to watch out for. Indian strategists need to plan for suitable counter attack capabilities against the PLAAF tanker and fighter bases in the rear areas. With the limitations of carrying out sustained air operations from Tibet, the PLAAF may not be able to achieve air superiority against India. The IAF has been the dominant air force in the India-China context due to advantages of geography, technological superiority and better training. The induction of the SU-35 and the J-20 into the PLAAF has given it a temporary technological advantage which may change in India’s favour once the Rafale aircraft enter service in the IAF in 2019.