The world has watched most of the last year and the one preceding, the Iran-US confrontation, at times with baited breath as the two seemed to be on hair trigger alert from time to time. The battle of nerves has ebbed and flowed over the last two years and mostly away from the US. Thanks to the badly configured and unfinished war in Afghanistan, the foolish misadventure in Iraq, and the inability to control Pakistan in the so-called Global War on Terror, the mighty US has today been reduced to trying to fend off a regional power, Iran, from acquiring precisely the same kind of stature that Bush’s National Security Doctrine seeks to prevent – that a regional power becomes strong enough to challenge US interests. As a result of the ill advised and ill planned interventionism that has been the singular feature of Bush’s foreign policy, other players like Russia and China today have a role in the region.
Both the Iraq and Afghanistan projects of deconstructing first and then reconstructing, have floundered badly. A secular Iraq has now been replaced by Shia militants, Sunni Salafist fundamentalists and Kurdish separatists. Yet some can argue that in Iraq this may have been partly mitigated if one considers that US oil interests for the future may have been safeguarded somewhat regardless of the cost (US $ 500 billion) to the US exchequer. There is no such perceived counterveiling benefit from the Afghan imbroglio. In fact the spectacular growth of the heroin trade is an alarming consequence.
The author of the book World War III: the Long Struggle Against Islamofascism, Podhoretz had met Bush in New York last October where he outlined his case for air strikes against Iran. Republican Presidential hopeful Rudy Giuliani also joined this chorus where the refrain was “˜bomb Iran using cruise missiles and bunker busters.
For an American President battling desperately for at least one foreign policy success in the winter of his political career, the Iranian refusal to blink even in the midst of all threats that were held out to them, including nuclear attacks, must have been most exasperating. The neo-con belief that extraordinary military prowess could deliver results, did not take into account that after the dismal display of limitations of military power in neighbouring Iraq, no country was going to take these threats seriously. Even the combined pressure of the British, the French and the Germans has not helped. The Arab street was not going to buy the new line, there was something of a regional pride in this defiant anti-Americanism and for Iran it was also civilisational. It was a case of national pride with strong Islamic overtones, a quest for regional security if not dominance in an area traditionally known to be hostile to them.
A defiant Iran finally decided to go ahead with its oil bourse in Euros and not deal in the dollars that Ahmadinijad had described as a scrap of paper. Besides China and Russia, the other members of the P-5 and emerging players in West Asia, were on Iran’s side. The Iranian defiance, has led to the most important development of the 21st century, that the US has reduced itself to losing a war of nerves with Iran, which until recently was an extremely weak power in the region, surrounded not only by hostile or suspicious Arabs, but also American armoury in all its might, and a hostile Israel.
The battle Washington has waged is not just about a regime change in a rogue state, but ultimately to ensure energy security for itself and its European allies, regional security for Israel, and maintaining global dominance in a world, where there are new and aggressive players challenging America’s writ. The new players on the scene are the resurgent Russians under Putin, challenging American interpretation of the scene in West Asia, and the emerging Chinese seeking a role for themselves as they search for energy security to sustain their double-digit growth. Putin became the first Russian President, ever, to have visited Iran last September and he followed this up with a visit to Saudi Arabia. He was obviously making in-roads into traditional American territory. Besides, members of the Gulf Co-operation Council have made overtures to Iran. President Ahmedinijad visited Saudi Arabia on an invitation from the Saudi King Abdullah for Haj and the two held cordial discussions.
The drum beats were louder for some time in September and October last year and were accompanied by loud rhetoric, but the march was mostly out of step by then. Condoleezza Rice had threatened to cut off Iran’s “malignant activities” in Iraq, informing the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee in October that Iran would not be allowed to use “the international financial system to move its ill-gotten gains from proliferation or terrorism around the world.” The Secretary of State dutifully described Iran’s policies as constituting “perhaps the single greatest challenge to American security interests in the Middle East around the world,” and adding that El Baradei was wrong on Iran – and this is despite 2700 person hours of inspections including numerous snap and intrusive visits by the IAEA inspectors. It is true that Iran is not entirely innocent in all its dealings, especially the A Q Khan connection, but neither is it as guilty as the West makes it to be. It was when the French-British-German reneged under US pressure after first agreeing with Iran in 2005 that forced Iran to resume enrichment the next year.
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In autumn last year, however, Seymour Hersh wrote in the New Yorker that the war in Iraq was being redefined as a strategic war between Iran and the US. The summer hysteria about Iran possessing a nuclear bomb, had changed to Iran wanting to possess one, and finally to the allegation that the Iranians had the knowledge to make a bomb. Iran was now threatening to destabilise Iraq by aiding the Shias there, and Revolutionary Guards of Iran were declared as a terrorist organisation. Iran was at that time threatened by surgical strikes instead of the earlier bombing blitzkriegs that were openly talked about. There were unsubstantiated allegations that Iran was helping build a Hezbollah type of insurgent organisation in Iraq. An element of the plan was to provoke Iran into some action that would require an immediate US response. The Iranians did not bite.
Bush himself had said that “Ive told people that if youre interested in avoiding World War III, it seems you ought to be interested in preventing them (the Iranians) from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.”
Nevertheless, towards the end of October neo-con gurus like Norman Podhoretz were urging shock and awe from the outside, while Vice President Dick Cheney echoed this re-commendation from within. Recipient of America’s highest honour, the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2004, and the author of the book World War III: the Long Struggle Against Islamofascism, Podhoretz had met Bush in New York last October where he outlined his case for air strikes against Iran. Republican Presidential hopeful Rudy Giuliani also joined this chorus where the refrain was ‘bomb Iran using cruise missiles and bunker busters’.
Bush himself had said that “I’ve told people that if you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems you ought to be interested in preventing them (the Iranians) from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.” It seems that there is cause enough for shock and awe if the Iranians have the knowledge to make a bomb, later redefined to even thinking about making one. This has led to a change of strategy. Iran remained the rogue because it was now abetting terrorism and smuggling IEDs into Iraq for use against US forces. This claim was designed to get approval from a sympathetic Congress for intervention in Iran. Apparently they were also pre-empting the uncomfortable findings in the yet to be released NIE report.
It was fairly clear by late summer 2007 that the strategy to deal with Iran would have to change as the nuclear story was no longer selling. At the same time it was not easy to give up the rhetoric – only the stress had to change. Condi Rice’s statements need to be viewed in this changed context, for she was no longer talking about mushroom clouds but about impediments to US policies in West Asia. US Congressional sources have said that the 16-agency National Intelligence Report of 2007, made public on December 3, 2007, was actually delayed thrice, and as Seymour Hersh says, Vice President Cheney was instrumental in this delay. The report essentially made the following observations couched in elliptical verbiage at times. It said that Iran had suspended its nuclear arms programme in 2003, that if it does resume this it will be based on uranium enriched after its had resumed its operation of enrichment in 2006, that Iran would have major technical problems in operating these reactors, most of which are in Natanz, that the earliest possible date by when Iran could have a bomb is 2009-but more realistically it would be 2015, and, finally, that the Iranians do not have the capability to take the plutonium route.
The reactions in Israel and the US were predictable; the former was livid with rage, and the latter mostly confused, except for the extreme right wing who denounced the report and the spin doctors in Washington became active. Some Iranians on the other side of the globe sounded smug after the report was published, feeling vindicated, while a section was not impressed by the NIE findings suspecting that there was a hidden agenda in this and that the report could still be used by the US to create an international consensus on the need to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran.
Mossad aims to prove that despite having discontinued their nuclear arms programme in 2003, the Iranians are still developing a third secret programme that has been kept hidden so far. They still adhere to their intelligence assessment that Iran could have the bomb”¦
Various lobbies got active, and there was consternation in the US that the NIE would be the reason to dampen efforts to isolate Iran, and the earlier attempts to say that Iran was on its way to make a bomb suddenly seemed to be going awry. True, the French tried to help by saying that war between Iran and Israel could break out. Speaking to Le Nouvel Observateur, President Sarkozy feared that “The problem for us is not so much the risk that the Americans launch a military intervention, but that the Israelis consider their security to be truly threatened… The only debate is about whether they will develop a military capacity in one or five years.”
Israeli strategists and most analysts have refused to accept the NIE as the final word on the subject. “Words do not stop missiles,” was what Defence Minister Ehud Barak said. While they would not go so far as to say that this was a political report meant to get the US off the hook, they do assert that the report is inaccurate. Mossad aims to prove that despite having discontinued their nuclear arms programme in 2003, the Iranians are still developing a third secret programme that has been kept hidden so far. They still adhere to their intelligence assessment that Iran could have the bomb by 2009 or 2010. While even the Iranians assert that there is still a threat of an attack, other analysts have pointed out that since the Israeli invasion of Sinai in 1956, without US approval, when President Eisenhower rapped Israel hard on the knuckles, it is doubtful if Israel would today launch a military offensive in the region without unequivocal backing from the US. It seems that so far not much heed has been paid to the suggestion made by Efraim Halevy, the former Mossad chief that Israel should enter in a dialogue with Iran.
Despite the NIE report, President Bush has said “Iran was dangerous, Iran is dangerous and Iran will be dangerous if they have the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.” His National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley claimed that the US decision to pursue the sanctions route had made the Iranians change their policy in 2003 and it was necessary to pursue the same strategy to ensure that Iran remained on course. Hardliners like former US Ambassador to UN, John Bolton led the charge against the NIE saying that the report could be misread, the report was internally contradictory and insufficiently supported by facts and that Iran could use the report for disinformation.
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However, whichever way these statements may be interpreted, the Bush administration has certainly been made to look awkward and clumsy in all this with its credibility taking another knock. The NIE report has become a major obstacle to those advocating the military option. Sensing this and the direction the Annapolis conference had taken in its attempts to isolate Iran, Arabs in the region have begun to make overtures to Iran. Qatar invited Ahmedinijad to speak at the GCC, while the Egyptians sent a high-level delegation to Iran, for the first time since they broke off relations in 1979. Ahmedinijad was in Saudi Arabia at the invitation of the Saudi king to perform Haj. It is possible that all three being strong US allies probably had prior approval for these overtures but these regimes are worried that should the military option gain approval in Washington, the consequences for them could be grave and avoidable. The GCC states would want to stay on Iran’s right side following a decline of US policy in the region.
According to the Iranians, Indian companies have shown interest in exploring 17 oil blocks. But India is a small and doubtful player. Apart from voting at the IAEA twice, the gas pipeline is in the doldrums. The State Bank of India has disallowed LCs on Iranian banks and Essar steel pulled out of a steel project in favour of installing one in America.
With crude selling at US $ 100 a barrel, energy dependent Italy and Austria have signed deals with Iran for the supply of gas. Iranian gas would transmit to Italy through Turkey and Greece. The Khomein Petrochemical Complex and the Italian company Basell also signed a 20 million euro contract for transfer of technology. The Iranians and the Austrian Oil and Gas Group were discussing a project for the transfer of oil and gas to Austria. The French giant Total was ready to invest 12 billion dollars in an LNG project, Royal Dutch Shell and the Spanish Repsol also have interests in Iran’s two main LNG projects; the Italian company Eni has no intention of pulling out of Iran. The Spanish energy company Fenosa, along with its subsidiary Socoin was awarded a 32.5 million euro engineering contract for the Iranian LNG project, while the Austrians OMV were still negotiating a similar contract, while a US $ 30 billion contract was separately signed for the import of liquid gas from Iran. The last round of discussions between Pakistan and Iran ended on December 21 and according to the Iranians, Indian companies have shown interest in exploring 17 oil blocks. But India is a small and doubtful player. Apart from voting at the IAEA twice, the gas pipeline is in the doldrums. The State Bank of India has disallowed LCs on Iranian banks and Essar steel pulled out of a steel project in favour of installing one in America. These decisions may be justified in strict economic terms, but coming as they do in the present circumstances, it does not look good.
Iran is not as isolated as the US would have it. The biggest buyer of energy is China. SINOPEC, the largest refiner in China, will increase its purchases of crude from 60,000 bpd in 2007 to 160,000 bpd in 2008 – a nearly three fold increase. Another Chinese state owned company, Zhuhai Zhenrong Corp will buy 400,000 bpd in 2008 and this will account for six per cent of China’s total crude demand. Apart from this, after three years of negotiations, China also signed a $ 2 billion deal to develop the Yadavaran oil field. The world’s second largest consumer of oil is obviously in a close strategic relationship with Iran. Obviously China is not going to allow the US to have a free run of the place; nor will Russia.
Even though the Russians are gas rich, they have been moving aggressively into the region under Putin, who has countered American moves on Russia’s periphery and in Europe by carrying the battle to West and Central Asia. Having been beguiled into winding down the Warsaw Pact in the Nineties, to be replaced by an eastward expansion of the NATO, The Russians under Putin have aggressively moved closer to China, reacted by abrogating missile treaties with US and strengthening the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. The Iran theatre is in some ways an extension of the US-Russia rivalry in Europe and Russian suspicions about the now well known American moves into Poland and the Czech Republic setting up radar and missile defences. Putin withdrew from the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty in retaliation to American insistence to go ahead with their plans in Poland and the Czech Republic. In the decade ahead, both China and Russia, in competition with each other, or jointly in asymmetric opposition to the US, will seek geo-strategic space in Central Asia, West Asia and the Caspian.
US attempts to wean away the energy rich Central Asian states by having pipelines from these countries bypass Russia en route Europe. The Americans are worried that the Russians could translate their energy monopoly into untenable foreign and security influence that could hurt US-Europe relations. An example of this was when the Russians struck a deal with Austria when the two countries entered into a partnership which would allow Gazprom to have a base for further expansion into Europe.
Given the EU dependence on Russian energy sources, the West would need to tap into Iran’s vast hydro-carbon reserves – the world’s second largest gas reserves after Russia and the second largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia. Add to this, is Iran’s geo-strategic location atop the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Having successfully checkmated US approaches into Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Putin has begun to move into traditional American territory in West Asia. The Russian naval flotilla led by the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov was recently in the Mediterranean off the Syrian port of Tartous. In terms of size the Russian fleet was extremely small compared to what the Americans have put together in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. But it is a beginning.
The Russians will continue to oppose the invasion of Iran, which the Arabs also do not want, but it will be careful not to alarm the Arabs by being too supportive of Iran. Indias geo-strategic, economic and political interests, especially its energy requirements in the next few decades, demand that India remains friendly with both Russia and Iran while managing its relations with the US.
The Russian support for Iran against unilateral sanctions, and the decision to supply fuel to Bushehr nuclear power plant indicates a coming together of the two countries. Russian experts had arrived in Iran in December to install TOR-M1 air defence batteries at Iran’s nuclear facilities. Putin has visited Saudi Arabia (another first for a Russian President), Jordan and Qatar in February 2007 and later Iran in October that year. He would rather have the Chinese access West Asian, including Iranian, gas and oil rather that Central Asia which would increase its influence far too close to Russia. Both Iran and Russia are opposed to US led trans-Caspian pipeline schemes. Iran needs Russia for the development of the massive South Pars gas fields and the Russians would want Gazprom to move into Iran.
Putin was not going to let the Americans have a free run of the place, and assessing that there has been a decline in US prestige following a string of foreign policy disasters, it was necessary to control or influence the producers of energy in the years ahead. The timing had to be right. Vladimir Putin’s moves in election year in the US, as he moves into the space being vacated, will also be interesting to watch. The Russians will continue to oppose the invasion of Iran, which the Arabs also do not want, but it will be careful not to alarm the Arabs by being too supportive of Iran. India’s geo-strategic, economic and political interests, especially its energy requirements in the next few decades, demand that India remains friendly with both Russia and Iran while managing its relations with the US.
The struggle in Iran is not about its nuclear weapons programme. The struggle is for its oil and gas, and for dominance. Unless the Americans agree to dialogue with the Iranians fairly soon, the game could well slip away from them.
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