Indian Defence Review

The Maoist rebellion is a phenomenon, an adverse one of course, in which bands of armed local inhabitants, led by firebrand ‘area commanders’, assume a role that should truly lie within the constitutional mandate of the state. The role of the third element of this phenomenon, the far-ensconced communist ideologues, is limited to legitimising the rebellion with a political, if rabid, cause for the rebels to indulge in societal mayhem. The rhetoric of installing a ‘people’s government’ over the country through armed revolution apart, their interim objective is to impose their ‘system’ over such territories where the state administration has nothing more than a notional presence. In this, the Maoists have succeeded in establishing a fair degree of control, mainly over economic activities in areas remote, sparsely inhabited and undeveloped but endowed with mineral and forest wealth; the void of state administration makes it relatively simple to do so.

One is often confronted with the query, “How can the Maoist problem be solved? After all, we have done so much to control it and yet nothing seems to work!” This question is rooted to a perception among the policy makers that there is a popular demand to stamp out the Maoist rebellion, and that it is possible to achieve that end in a matter of few years through application of some formulae.

As with all simplistic questions, this one too is difficult to answer. Indeed, the simplicity of the query itself betrays a superfluous understanding of the fundamental characteristics of the Maoist rebellion. Resultantly, notions of certain ‘formulae’ that would supposedly bring remedy in quick time are entertained. Factually, to chart a course towards ultimate relief from this violent rebellion, policy makers have to de-link it from their election cycle and appreciate the conditionalities and complexities that overarch the gamut of the problem. Therefore, in our quest to find the appropriate answer to the query, it is proposed to discuss two propositions. First, that the Maoist rebellion is a ‘phenomenon’ which may not be ‘defeated’ in the true sense of that expression; second, the goal should be to ‘address’ this phenomenon in a manner as to ease it into irrelevancy and subsume it over time within a benevolent, fair realm.

An Adverse Phenomenon

The Maoist rebellion is a phenomenon, an adverse one of course, in which bands of armed local inhabitants, led by firebrand ‘area commanders’, assume a role that should truly lie within the constitutional mandate of the state. The role of the third element of this phenomenon, the far-ensconced communist ideologues, is limited to legitimising the rebellion with a political, if rabid, cause for the rebels to indulge in societal mayhem. The rhetoric of installing a ‘people’s government’ over the country through armed revolution apart, their interim objective is to impose their ‘system’ over such territories where the state administration has nothing more than a notional presence. In this, the Maoists have succeeded in establishing a fair degree of control, mainly over economic activities in areas remote, sparsely inhabited and undeveloped but endowed with mineral and forest wealth; the void of state administration makes it relatively simple to do so.

Of course, the Maoists neither possess the constitutional authority duly acquired through sanctified means nor are they bound by constitutionally farmed rules. They do not suffer accountability to the people and enforce their arbitrary diktats by the barrel of gun. The phenomenon, therefore, is unconstitutional and anti-state. No doubt, the Maoists are outlaws; if the nationhood is to be preserved, they must not be permitted to challenge state power and have their way.

However, the narrative cannot be separated from its context. In the past, these remote areas had been administered more as a exception than as a rule. The situation changed with the commencement of industrial ventures in the early part of the twentieth century, when these mineral-rich areas turned into pivots of economic development. Thereafter, what little administration the state undertook to perform, it was with the purpose of brokering natural resources rather than elevating the local tribal and neo-tribal inhabitants’ lives. Even in the post-Independence period, the polity has shown little interest in local affairs due to the short voter lists, while the state functionaries have brazenly ridden roughshod over the simple, voiceless folk, divesting them of their traditional land rights and snatching away what little forestry they possessed. With accelerating industrialisation over the past fifty years, as more and more areas went under mining, mass displacement of the people rent their society; living as a tribal and neo-tribal became a curse. As alienation gained ground, the ever-tormented rural folk, who had been consigned to ‘exist’ in the feudal societies, found a common cause and joined in to provide impetus to the rebellion.

Maoists have taken advantage of that long trail of systemic atrocities. They have occupied a vacuum that the state had perpetually left out of its administration. Furthermore, they have assumed the responsibility of protecting the people’s concerns, a mandate which the state had failed to fulfil while penetrating these areas just to gather natural resources. Notably therefore, Maoists have not really usurped but occupied vacant systemic space to assume an unattended role – that of arbitrators of the people’s concerns such as fair wages, land alienation, displacement and compensation and relief from highhandedness of revenue and police officials. Besides, Maoists have implemented their own version of equitable land distribution, irrigation rights and fair trade of nature’s produce in areas under their control – a case of constitutionally ordained missions being implemented by unconstitutional methods. Obviously, these steps have allowed Maoists to earn the people’s support.

On another plane, the Maoists have, with pretended seriousness, ‘ordered’ activation of the few health centres and schools there are, asking the paramedics and teachers to either attend to duty or pay absence fees. They have also undertaken to ‘monitor’ government projects particularly where the money bag is fat. Under their threat, various schemes of employment guarantee, rural roads, mother-child care (Aanganwadi) and mid-day meal are spared from comprehensive loot; the Maoists partaking a share in the misappropriation that remains mandatory yet to keep the systemic wheel lubricated. Even on this plane, people are inclined to prefer the rebel’s arrogance and greed to crass unscrupulousness of state-functionaries, contractors and mining conglomerates.

Resultantly, people living in Maoist-influenced areas do not view Maoist control as an aberration; neither do they long to be released from their rebellious clutch. To the locals, Maoists are their youngsters who live among them, observing the same culture, not adding to but solving some of their difficulties particularly in securing better income from their trade and safety from official harassment. Conversely, the State is represented just by occasional visitations of the police, patwaris and prospectors. The State’s other public service departments have never made appearance in any case – earlier because of the State employee’s propensity to avoid work, and presently on the excuse of Maoist threat. Furthermore, whenever the State functionaries did appear, they made a nuisance of themselves – labour unpaid, hospitality forced upon, bribes demanded, chicken eaten, women harassed. Obviously, people are least bothered by the Maoist’s unconstitutional acts – extortion and murder of persons they do not relate to.

In summation, the rebellion is a phenomenon that has engulfed entire societies in the affected areas. Thus, there are rebels everywhere – the uniform clad People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) in the jungles, the armed militia in remote settlements, couriers, levy collectors and informants in villages and towns, and profiteering traders all over, right up to the capital. Then there is the multitude of farmers, students, teachers, state-employees, business houses, contractors and politicians who are, in some manner or the other, linked to the rebellion either to fill their pocket or to stimulate their ambitions. Among the plethora of ‘rebels’ of different shades whom will the state triumph over? How will it control in quick time an omnipresent phenomenon that has been wantonly permitted to gather momentum over two decades?

Addressing the Phenomenon

There is concurrence that the Maoist rebellion is anti-state and that it must be addressed with alacrity. The point to note is that the goal should not be set at defeating or destroying the Maoist rebellion if one does not intend to tear the society apart. Therefore, there are certain considerations to factor into the State’s strategy to deal with the rebellion. This is a call of rationality that has the best chance of diluting, and then liquidating the rebellion over time. One may evaluate these considerations:

The Maoists do not seek secession nor are their demands, formally at least, any different from what the constitution guarantees to the Indian citizens. Yes, they wish to change the system of governance, not by democratic means but by the unconstitutional use of violence. That makes them anti-nationals albeit politically oriented ones with substantial ideological following. In dealing with this kind of movement, the state has to be extremely circumspect with regard to inevitability of state high-handedness, adversarial propaganda, social polarisation and international scrutiny.

Barring occasional forays to attack the state administration, Maoist activities are so far confined to those areas where state administration has never existed. Truly, the Maoists have taken control of the vacuums left by the state but are yet far away from displacing the state authority where it exists. There is, therefore, no imminent threat of collapse of the state.

There seems to be little of serious concern amongst the public leaders and of course, the public themselves, regarding an early deliverance from the Maoist clutch. No one in particular seems to be highly disturbed by it. Villagers continue to live as they did before maybe a deal better under Maoist protection. The state-functionaries, under the threat of Maoist ‘punishment’, spend a better part of the allocations, after institutionalised graft is satiated, on development works. Traders, transporters, contractors and miners continue to thrive while paying ‘levy’ to the rebels which comes cheaper than the bribes they had to pass onto various government functionaries and local dons. In fact, the situation permits the traders and transporters to fix exorbitant rates, contractors to violate contractual stipulations and miners to denude areas many times more than the allotted blocks.

Many unemployed have found sources of income through a gigantic industry of illegal mining, theft of explosives, gun running, rebel logistics and information network. Some entrepreneurs have ventured into tailoring, printing, supply of bottled water, batteries and medicines for the rebels. Politicians depend on the rebels to garner votes and yet go unaccountable on the pretext of Maoist threat. Even top industrialists and ‘class enemies’ of the communists continue to thrive in ‘Maoist-affected’ areas by their offerings of fiscal inducements.