Indian Defence Review

The experience gained by US and the path it adopted may hold some valuable lessons for India, though their methods and policies would have to be suitably modified to suit Indian requirements and objectives. The concept of ‘jointness’ in the US Armed Forces, though replete with examples in many campaigns of World War II, really took shape after the War ended, with the passing of the National Security Act in 1947. Prior to 1947, the separation of the three Services was embodied in a cabinet structure with separate war and navy departments. Some of the worst inter-service wrangling took place after 1945, mainly due to diminishing budgets and a lack of a focused threat. However, the legacies of joint victories of World War II led the US Armed Forces to continue with the concept of unified commands. The establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) further reinforced the concept.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986, passed to further unify the Armed Forces, has the following main objectives2:-

• To reorganise the Department of Defence (DOD) and further strengthen civilian authority within the Department.
• To improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council and the Secretary of Defence.
• To place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of the missions entrusted to them.
• To increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning.
• To provide for more efficient use of military resources.
• To improve joint officer management policies.
• To enhance otherwise the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of DOD.

Prior to suggesting changes, it would be pertinent at this stage to examine the objectives in the context of Indian higher defence management.

The first objective is to strengthen the ‘Civil Authority’, which in India’s case, refers to the Defence Minister. The US organisation is quite clear that civil control does not necessarily mean control by civil servants. The Secretary of Defence exercises control by a ‘Defence Planning Guidance’ (DPG) document that includes national security objectives, policies, priorities of military missions and the resources that are likely to be available for the projected period. The DPG is prepared in consultation with the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff and is instrumental in initiating the DOD Planning Program and Budgeting System. The document is lucid in detail, displays expertise and is not the handiwork of half-informed bureaucrats.

In India, the national security objectives have not been stated clearly because the National Security Environment, spelt out in the annual MoD Report, is itself outlined in general terms. The planning and budgeting has been an annual exercise without the benefit of any central guidance.

The Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) is another form of a guidance document that the Secretary of Defence uses to spell out the general and strategic areas of interest to the Administration. Based on the CPG, which is also prepared in consultation with the CJCS, contingency plans are drawn up by the military that are then vetted by the NSC, before final approval by the President. The DPG and CPG, therefore, ensure that overall civil control is maintained in the entire planning process. In India’s case, one can only wonder if any such mechanisms exist. This is in spite of having being involved in two major contingent operations, Sri Lanka and Maldives.

The second objective of the GNA, and of importance to India, is to improve the quality of military advice offered to the President from a single point (Prime Minister in the Indian context). This is precisely what the GoM Report on restructuring of the Indian higher defence organisation, i.e. the appointment of a CDS, has recommended and which has been shelved after perusal, pending wider consultations with all political parties for a broad consensus. The existing COSC needs consensus in order to make any recommendations and has the drawback of the Service Chiefs advocating their ‘Service’ viewpoint while also attempting to sacrifice for the common good of joint considerations. What is required is to follow the American example where the Service Chiefs are subordinate to the CJCS and yet have the right of access to the President, should there be any dissent. Such a system has worked well in the US and provides adequate checks and balances. In India, there is a nagging fear in the minds of the Civil Services and fed by them to the political leadership, that a CDS with powers of centralised advice, may become too powerful and subvert the democratic process. The idea has been rooted ever since independence and reinforced by events in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

The CJCS in USA has tools available at his disposal to ensure efficient use of resources for instance, Integrated Priority Lists, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, authority to evaluate the preparedness of combat commands, responsibility to develop joint doctrines for the Armed Forces, role appraisal, missions and functions of Services and a regular review of the force structure. In performing these tasks he is assisted by the VCJCS, the Chiefs and a dedicated staff. The American experience and system needs to be studied in depth and suitably modified to the Indian environment before embarking on any changes.

Getting back to the topic of Indian defence management, a notification was issued by the Government on May 23, 2002, ‘designating’ the Service Headquarters as ‘integrated’ departments of MoD with a view to dispel any misconceptions that they do not participate in policy formulation. A major flaw in the GoM Report that it merely designated the changeover but did not provide for any mechanism for the transformation, was much to the chagrin of the Armed Forces and to the satisfaction of those manning the desks at MoD.

Conclusion

K Subrahmanyam, Chairman KRC was disappointed and said so in an interview published in the ‘CLAWS Journal’ (Summer 2009), that neither the KRC nor the GoM Reports were tabled or discussed in Parliament. The reasons are too obvious to be stated. Whatever little has been implemented has yielded results, though not to the desired levels but a beginning has been made and today, the three Services are better harmonised. However, measures for integration of the Service Headquarters with the MoD and the appointment of a CDS have not been initiated. The former would be strongly contested by the bureaucracy, who maintains that “there is nothing wrong with the present system”.

In the prevailing security scenario, there is a need to make the Chairman COSC, if not all members of the Committee, a permanent invitee to the Cabinet Committee of Security. Can it be done? Yes. Will it be done? No. But the answer to the question should be in the affirmative because it is required for the efficient working of the system and is not just a demand for another four-star appointment in the Armed Forces. As of now, the mechanism and working relations between the MoD and the Service Headquarters have remained unchanged over the years, though necessity-driven arrangements have been made whenever required. In UK, the MoD is not just the Department of Defence but also the Headquarters of the three Services. In the US, the DoD is composed of the office of the Secretary of Defence, JCS, Joint Staff, Departments of Army, Navy and Air Force besides the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands. In the Indian context, regrettably, such an arrangement has not been acceptable to the politico-bureaucratic establishment class, there by sidestepping the required level of integration between the MoD and the Service HQs.

Given the apprehensions associated with the type of integration recommended by the Task Force on Defence, it was expected that the least would be a beginning towards a partial integration, possibly at the functional level with the lateral exchange of appointments at the Joint Secretary/Deputy Secretary level. This would have assisted the senior bureaucrats with professional advice from the military officers and vice versa. Alas! Nothing happened. Leave alone transfers, Joint Secretaries, as members of some of the long-standing Committees do not even attend scheduled meetings, citing non-availability due to pressure of work. The reasons are, of course, well understood! Cosmetic changes were initiated and the Service Headquarters was renamed as ‘Integrated Headquarters. Initially, as an after-effect of the GoM Report, a bureaucrat from the IAS/IFS was posted to Headquarters IDS but was withdrawn soon thereafter, never to be again posted.

The Standing Committee on Defence, in its Annual Report of 2008-2009, has adversely commented upon the non-integration of the Service Headquarters and MoD, and not for the first time! The MoD claims adequate involvement of the Service Chiefs in the decision-making process by citing the example of the Defence Minister’s weekly meeting with them and interaction at lower levels. The bureaucracy believes that further integration would obfuscate the independent analysis and re-evaluation of policy before implementation. There is obvious reluctance towards integration due to mistrust and unfounded fears. Despite repeated demand from the strategic community and critical remarks in the Reports of successive Standing Committees on Defence, mere lip-service continues to be done towards the integration of MoD and the Service Headquarters.

As an emerging power, nuclear India is in the midst of important happenings in the world, all of which demand replacement of the antiquated higher defence management system with a new structure responsive to the dynamics of geopolitical realities. The four pillars of a modern regional and a world power are political stability, economic strength, scientific and technological development and military capability. In India, all the pillars are weak. The problem of lack of foresight in the politico-bureaucratic establishment in so far as military matters are concerned, is compounded with the latent fear of a military coup as was manifest in the recent case reported in a prominent national daily. Movement of two military formations towards Delhi was misconstrued as a takeover plan. Besides exploiting inter-service rivalry the bureaucracy has conveniently delayed the process of reforms.

Ongoing trends in conflicts clearly indicate the changing nature of war. Real time intelligence, seamless communications, accuracy and lethality of weapons systems and an increasingly automated battlefield demand that the Services need to be structured, trained, equipped and brought to bear in an integrated manner. These complexities demand well-deliberated decisions and sound advice to the Government on the full range of military issues through reforms in higher defence management, one of which is the integration of the Service Headquarters with the MoD.

Corrective measures have been long overdue. The changes must be viewed in totality; a restructured MoD with clearly defined roles and accountability for the political leadership, bureaucracy and the Armed Forces. The need of the hour is not mere statements but a sense of urgency and a sincerity of purpose on the part of the government to set the entire process in motion.

Notes

1. Jaswant Singh, ‘Defending India’, (Bangalore: Macmillan India, 1999), p 109.
2. C Lovelace Jr, Series of ten essays on “Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986, Department of Defence Reorganisation Act”, available on the Internet.

References

1. Wg Cdr R Venkataraman, “India’s Higher Defence Organisation and Management,” KW Publishers, 2011.
2. Air Mshl BD Jayal (Retd), “Higher Defence Management for India in the 21st Century:Challenges and Prospects – Pt I & II”, Defence Watch, June and July 2005.
3. Lt Gen PC Katoch (Retd), “Integrated Theatre Commands for Jointness & Integration of the Military”, SP’s Military Yearbook, 2011-12.
4. Brig Vinod Anand (Retd), “Integrated Defence Staff for Jointness in the Armed Forces”, SP’s Military Yearbook, 2011-12.
5. Gp Capt Rajiv Mata (Retd), “National Security and Strategy – Getting the Basics Right”, Defence and Security Alert, November 2009.
6. RSN Singh, “A Sordid Tale of India’s Strategic Culture”, Defence and Security Alert, November 2009.
7. Adm Arun Prakash (Retd), “The Three Invisible Men”, Defence Watch, February 2012.
8. Lt Gen SK Sinha (Retd), “Marginalising the Defence Services”, Defence Watch, January 2012.
9. Air Mshl BD Jayal (Retd), “Inter-Service Turf Wars- Time for Professionalism to Prevail over Parochialism”, Defence Watch, December 2011.
10. Shitanshu Mishra, “Higher Defence Management in India”, Indian Defence Review, Jul-Sep 2004.
11. “Direction or Drift in India’s Higher Defence Management”, A Paper written by the Author, as a Group Captain, while attending a post-Graduate Course in National Security Strategy at National Defence University, USA, 2000-01.