Indian Defence Review

Counter-insurgency is a complex phenomenon demanding a complex solution. Any attempt at reductionism can be an invitation to disaster. Although it is very much a form of warfare fitting into the description given by Jomini as ‘wars of opinion’ or Clausewitzian ‘wars of resistance’, these are inadequate definitions and it is better to treat insurgency as armed politics and a distinct form of warfare that needs a separate set of principles of war.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, there was euphoria about a peaceful world. The Cold War had ended and the world saw spurt in economic growth rates and globalisation as the inevitable destiny of mankind. Some even went on to claim the ‘End of History’. But within a year, dreams of peace were shattered with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in the US on September 11, 2001 plunging the world into turbulence. The ensuing conflict was described as a ‘Global War on Terror’ or even, a clash of civilisations. One way to look at happenings of the last decade is to see it as an Islamist insurgency against the world order. The sheer spread of conflicts to countries from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Russia and the Middle East, justifies this rather broad title. The insurgents used tactics of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. The assassination of Osama Bin Laden on May 02, 2011, may not signify an end to this insurgency. In light of this challenge, a deeper understanding of the phenomena of insurgency and counter-insurgency is essential.

Unlike conventional warfare, counter-insurgency is a highly regulated affair with rules and boundaries. Use of unbridled force is not an option. Counter-insurgency may be considered akin to sports such as tennis or golf, where skill and subtlety count for more than brute force.

The very nature of the problems of insurgency that has contextual peculiarities precludes any kind of formulation of rules or laws. The case studies of the Naga and Mizo tribes in North East India, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, the Maoist insurgency called Naxalism in the heart of India, problems of Northern Ireland and South African insurgencies show clearly that there is no possibility of formulating any template for universal application, say in Afghanistan, Thailand, Philippines or Iraq. But the various co-relations that these studies unearthed and certain commonalities that were observed, can help formulate the principles of counter-insurgency. These are on the same lines as the Principles of War that most armies follow and are a concept that was originated by German military thinker, Clauswitz.

Creation of a ‘No-Win’ Perception

It has become a popular cliché to describe insurgency and counter-insurgency as ‘the struggle for hearts and minds’. But it is also a struggle between the hearts and the minds, a conflict between lofty goals and realistic expectations. Thus, instead of this nebulous catch all concept, the author prefers more precise aim – creation of perception of ‘no win’.

‘Selection and Maintenance of Aim’ is the crucial first Principle of War. Insurgents aim at ‘regime change’, the counter-insurgents, at ‘behavioural change’. Counter-insurgency operations are fought primarily to win the population over to one’s own point of view. Aims such as destruction of enemy or his resources or capture of territory are not applicable. In fact, there is no enemy, only misguided elements. But for the insurgents, total destruction of the regime is the aim and thus there is an inbuilt asymmetry at the level of application of force. Yet it would be incorrect to call this an ‘asymmetrical warfare’ as many do. Essentially, both insurgents and counter-insurgents envisage and accept the use of force. A truly asymmetrical conflict would be the Gandhian ‘non-violent protest’, where one side completely abjures the use of force.

Insurgents and counter-insurgents both aim to create a ‘no win’ situation for the other side. The counter-insurgents hope that the insurgents give up violence and change their behaviour. While on the other hand, insurgents hope that if the adversary state feels that it cannot win, it would lead to the collapse of the system, rebellion in the military and eventual victory of the insurgents.

The creation of a ‘no win’ perception in the minds of leaders as well as followers or soldiers is a major concern even in conventional warfare. ‘Morale’ is a major target and Napoleon is quoted as having said that it is three times more important than the physical factor. But in the case of counter-insurgency, it is even more seminal since physical destruction of the adversary is not the aim.

While the creation of a perception of a ‘no win’ situation is a psychological concept, it has both physical and psychological dimensions. Here, the skilful management of perception is as important as the physical factors.

The first and the foremost dimension of the ‘no win’ situation is obviously the military one. Results of an insurgency depend on this psychological battle. If the insurgents believe that they are in a ‘no win’ situation then sooner or later, the counter-insurgents will succeed. But if, on the other hand, as in the case of the South African Apartheid regime, the counter-insurgents come to this conclusion, then the insurgents win and effect a regime change. When the ‘no win’ is mutual, a compromise is possible through negotiations that would involve give and take and partial attainment of objectives for both the sides. If negotiations take place when a clear ‘no win’ situation has not been created, often they are mere tactical ploys to gain time. The history of numerous failed negotiations in insurgency situations is a pointer in this direction.

Strictly from a theoretical point of view, the American strategy of ‘shock and awe’ in the Second Iraq War was a correct formulation. The problem is that once the insurgents embark upon a guerrilla war, the definition of victory changes. The occupation of territory or display of superior fire power produces neither shock nor awe. The guerrillas retreat into the population, survive the assault and continue to fight.

Since almost by definition, the insurgents take recourse to tactics of guerrilla war, a massive use of force for a short duration can seldom produce the military ‘no win’ situation. Insurgency and counter-insurgency are like a long duration slogging match, where endurance and resolve to stay on course matters more than the sophisticated arsenals at the disposal of the counter-insurgents. Shock and awe in a traditional sense is not an option in counter-insurgency as there are severe restrictions on the kind of force that can be used. Technically, when insurgents hide in an urban area termed concrete jungles or in actual jungles, the counter-insurgents do have the option to blast the entire locality at least in urban areas, in forests even that option is not available. But the issue of human rights of the innocents preclude this in urban complexes.

Use of massive force, disproportionate to the task at hand, also violates the ‘principle of legitimacy’. This may appear contradictory but so are the Principles of War in use of force when one talks of concentration of force and economy of force in the same breath. Since the aim of use of force is to effect behavioural change, this cardinal difference has to be clearly understood, as from this flow the strategy and tactics that severely circumscribes the use of ‘blunt’ instruments and weapons of mass destruction. This also automatically lends primacy to psychological and not physical effect of force. The counter-insurgents have to be extremely careful that in exercising force and coercion, they do not reach a psychological ‘point of no return’ after which force, instead of changing behaviour in desired direction, produces desperation. This suggests that use of force must alternate with periods of peace. Thus, in order to achieve the psychological goal of convincing the insurgents/counter- insurgents that they are in a ‘no win’ situation, the force used has to be neither minimum (as in a situation of civic unrest) nor maximum as in the case of an all out war between two states but should be legitimate as well as adequate in terms of quality, quantity and duration.

If one looks at the history of counter-insurgency and counter guerrilla wars of the last several decades, one can clearly discern an inflexion or ‘tipping point’. An event or an occurrence that changed the ultimate outcome in favour of one or the other side is the result of perception of ‘no win’ by one side. In most cases, the inflexion point was the beginning of process of perception that it was a lost cause. Looking at the cases where the insurgents or the guerrillas came up trumps in Vietnam, in Afghanistan against the Soviets and in South Africa, one can clearly see the impact of these turning points. In case of the two-decade long Vietnam War, it was the Tet Offensive in January 1968. Coinciding with the Vietnamese New Year, during which generally both sides observed ceasefire, the Vietnamese guerrillas launched a successful attack on all the provincial capitals in South Vietnam as well as Saigon and Hue, the biggest cities in South Vietnam. The attack shook the Americans in its scope and breadth.

The earlier optimism of the Americans gave way to pessimism and domestic opposition to the war mounted. Militarily, the Vietnamese guerrillas suffered heavy casualties and American forces quickly regained the cities but the perception that they could not win the war took root, both in the minds of the military and general public in the US. After this it was a matter of time before Americans withdrew from Vietnam. The Tet Offensive succeeded in creating the perception of ‘no win’ in the minds of the Americans. The end however came only in 1975 when the North Vietnamese forces finally captured Saigon on April 29, 1975 that is seven years after the Tet Offensive. The end was hastened when South Vietnamese regular forces defected or surrendered en masse to the North Vietnamese and Vietcong guerrillas. The Vietnam War was lost, not in the paddy fields of Mekong delta, but in the drawing rooms of America. The unprecedented television coverage brought the horrors of war right into the American homes, and it is the withdrawal of public support for the war that ultimately led to military disengagement. The Tet Offensive had succeeded in creating a situation of ‘no win’ in the minds of the general American public.1