India’s Strategic Culture or the Lack of it
“Strategic culture is that set of common beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.”[8]
The weakness does not lie in the failures, of which there have been many, but more in the fact that India has learnt little from her recent military history and tends to repeat mistakes with disappointing frequency.
Independent India’s strategic culture remains amorphous and not only is it difficult to define, it is complex to understand and this is essentially due to organisational inhibitions to define strategic aims and objectives. Having said that, the quote above is important to benchmark a course for the future and it is recommended that clarity on matters of such import is essential to chart the course to the future. An objective analysis of how the Kashmir conflict has been handled thus far, highlights persistent infirmities in the manner vital issues of national ‘security,’ ‘strategy’ and ‘matters military’ have been addressed by independent India. The weakness does not lie in the failures, of which there have been many, but more in the fact that India has learnt little from her recent military history and tends to repeat mistakes with disappointing frequency. In view of major power games and re-alignment of forces taking place, India needs to reflect on certain fundamental issues and also on the stance taken by her to chalk out her future; issues that require a re-visit are flagged for consideration.
The Concept of Defence versus Security
At the conceptual level, independent India has invariably favoured ‘defence’ rather than seeking ‘security;’ the difference between the two is fundamental and it is this that afflicts the nation’s approach on matters strategic. Though there are many reasons for following this approach, at the fundamental level, the malady lies in having a ‘reactive’ mindset. Conceptually speaking, by its very nature, defence can only provide ‘prophylactic’ security, but this can never be ‘all-inclusive’ and while visible security tends to be comforting, it is generally illusionary. In the ultimate analysis, nations are required to ensure security for her people, and defence which is essentially a reaction, is incapable of providing ‘holistic’ security. Any reaction is against an action(s) and the initiative always remains with the other side – this has been the common thread of the military history of the nation; barring the exception of 1971 on the Eastern Theatre, India has always reacted, never seized the initiative over the adversary/ potential challenger.
Nations who are clear of their aims and objectives seek security through preventive action(s), and the concept of ‘Pre-emption’ advocated by the USA and ‘Active Defence’ as advocated by China exemplify this approach. Since they consider themselves to be strong nations in military, diplomatic and economic terms, this becomes their natural response, and they prefer to ‘act’ rather than ‘reacting.’ India has never acted in this manner, even in the regional context and the paradox lies in the fact that it has been Pakistan who has followed a preemptious approach and it has been India who has reacted. It is this that gifted her operational advantage – the examples of Op Gulmarg, Sledge, Venus, Gibraltar and Badr, in the not too distant past, can be recounted to substantiate the point.
…it is important to predict the future and to take anticipatory actions – this is an essential difference in the approach and for that to happen, there is a requirement for the Indian ‘reactive’ mindset to change.
Security is derived by ‘presumptive planning’ and by well thought through action plans in anticipation of meeting the challenges of the future, and to change/moderate/shape the outcome ‘beforehand.’ Pre-emption is all about seeking success ‘prior to the event’ as was done by the Chinese against India in 1962, and in a way, in the manner how Bangladesh was liberated by India. Thus, it is important to predict the future and to take anticipatory actions – this is an essential difference in the approach and for that to happen, there is a requirement for the Indian ‘reactive’ mindset to change.
Strategic Culture and Approach to Matters Military
India’s post independence stance taken on security alliances has been marked by ‘neutrality’ or in baser terms, the avoidance of ‘entangling (strategic and/ or military) alliances.’ ‘Non-Alignment’ was the Nehruvian plank for maintaining linkages and despite the ongoing conflict with Pakistan and even the traumatic Chinese War, there is no real reason to deviate from this path and India needs to conserve her strategic autonomy and remains important in the ongoing US-China strategic competition.
In any case, India cannot afford to make the mistake of the past to apply diplomacy without the corresponding ‘capability based’ military to back the effort. Combining these along with concurrent economic prowess could herald the coming of age of resurgent India in geo-strategic terms and make her a lead player – modern India has to make her own destiny.
Integrated Approach to Intelligence Generation and Analysis
The Kargil intrusions were only the latest in a series of failures. In 1948, Pakistan surprised India by Op Gulmarg and again by launching Op Sledge. In 1965, the dismal showing was again a result of India being unprepared, first in Kutch followed by Kashmir. Though this national weakness was theoretically plugged by the creation of R&AW, yet even in 1971, there was a paucity of actionable intelligence. The traditional Indian weakness in intelligence gathering and running of operations persists, especially when seen in relation to the ISI of Pakistan. This was apparent when the Kashmir insurgency erupted and this malady continues – the attack on the Indian Parliament and later in Mumbai bear testimony. This is not to say that the Indian Intelligence establishment is not capable, it is, as proved by the timely interception of the telephonic conversations between Musharraf and his CGS in 1999. However, this coup was an exception rather than the rule, hence the surprise in Kargil.
…“there is no mechanism of tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality…As it happened in Kargil, 9/11 and the Mumbai attacks, there is never enough of intelligence – human and/ or technical.
The report on Kargil rightly “draws attention to deficiencies in the present system of collection, reporting, collation and assessment of intelligence. There is no institutionalised mechanism for coordination or objective-oriented interaction between the agencies and consumers at different levels.” More importantly, “there is no mechanism of tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality. Nor is there any oversight of the overall functioning of the agencies.” As it happened in Kargil, 9/11 and the Mumbai attacks, there is never enough of intelligence – human and/ or technical. It is not that information of the intent, timings and outrages are not picked up. More often than not, they are, the failure lies in deciphering the patterns and by the time the dots are added and the dashes are drawn, the event is generally over. Deficiencies in net assessments and predictive scenario building, which is based on extensive fieldwork and co-relating actions based on predictive models require creative fusion of research and fieldwork, and it is where the weakness lies. This needs correction as suggested by the committee and analysis and predictive models prepared by research teams working as per the requirements of a rejuvenated and empowered JIC must be part of an overarching intelligence and security structure with an institutionalised role in the security planning of the nation.
More important is the requirement of building confidence in running of Intelligence operations – both for keeping a finger on the pulse of the adversary and for being in a position to create situations on his turf and the situation in Af-Pak, Gilgit-Baltistan, Baluchistan and Sind are tailor made for ‘cooperative’ running of intelligence operations. At the same time India needs to ensure that she has adequate assets in neighbouring countries so that neither China nor Pakistan can exploit their territory without India coming to know and be in a position to take timely actions. Robust intelligence capabilities on the part of India being the dominant power in South Asia, will not only reduce the threat to India but also to her neighbours; this should be ‘mutually beneficial,’ and done in a subtle manner.
The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
India’s defence structure suffers from a major colonial hangover when the English ruled India through her military – the clogging of channels and obscuration of plans even in the current dispensation is a legacy from the past. It is vital that modern India has a ‘National Defence HQ’ for synergising the three Services and for providing a single point expert advice for matters military. As pointed out by the committee; “India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces HQ are kept outside the apex governmental structure. The Chiefs of Staff have assumed the role of being operational commanders of their respective forces rather than the more important task of being Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. They simultaneously discharge the roles of operational commanders and national security planners/managers. Most of their time, is, however, devoted to the operational role, as is bound to happen. This has led to negative results and futuristic planning has invariably suffered. ”[9] While the modalities of a workable model can be debated, what is beyond discussion is the fact that the weaknesses are overcome and synergy in civil-military actions is ensured in an institutional manner.
In view of the emerging ‘multi-dimensional’ threat from China and Pakistan, the Army’s Northern and Eastern Commands along with the Navy’s Eastern and Western Naval Commands need to be made tri-service.
Force Structuring and Inter-Service Priorities
Lack of synergy between the services is a familiar story that has been highlighted in all the wars thus far. Though this did not manifest in 1999 due to the limited nature of operations, yet the lack of synergy was discernible. The services fighting their own wars in 1965 and even 1971 is well known, and could have been obviated with the creation of a CDS structure. However, even if this gets resolved, the problem remains at the theatres or at the command level and below. The creation of India’s first and only Tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar (ANC) Command was supposed to be a trendsetter and after its success, this experiment is required to be taken further. In view of the emerging ‘multi-dimensional’ threat from China and Pakistan, the Army’s Northern and Eastern Commands along with the Navy’s Eastern and Western Naval Commands need to be made tri-service. In addition, the Strategic, Space and Cyber Commands must not only follow the Tri-Service model but must also involve technical experts, making these commands truly ‘Integrated.’ This will go a long way in synergising the services and lead to better combat power generation and in the application of forces.
The army, by its very role, structure and size is not the ideal service for effecting deterrence and for ensuring speedy punitive response(s). Pragmatically speaking, only the air force and the navy have the inherent capability of initiating ‘Cold Start’ in the Indian context and hence their ‘multi-dimensional’ capabilities for doing so need to be built up. At the same time, the army must be re-structured, tailored and equipped for making punitive territorial gains, and the practice of tying down of the bulk of the force in defensive tasks need to be re-visited.
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In the era of downsizing, this throws up the larger question of the operational role of Border Defence forces like the BSF, ITBP, Assam Rifles and the like. These forces who operate under the Ministry of Home Affairs, need to be empowered and must be given the ware withal for being able to undertake ‘defensive’ (military) operations, and by so doing so, free the regular army for offensive operations. This is the practice followed by both of India’s adversaries and the world over, and if effected, will make a significant change to the forces ratios, at no/ little additional costs and requires serious debate which is able to transcend turf wars.
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Well Brig what you point out is the malady and this malady is known and has often been flogged to no use. The fact of the matter is:-
The Military planning in India is in itself is defeatist and reactive. It still continues to be so. Our war games smack of the impoverishment of a military mind. It appears the military brass just passes time till the situation blows up in somebody’s face. If the Civilian Government doesn’t have any strategic sense, it doesn’t mean that the Army should also follow the line. The reason why we didn’t react in any other way except for launching frontal attacks was because we actually had nothing up our sleeves. We have never war gamed scenarios where we would react to a given situation differently or to say offensively. All we do is discuss counter attacks to a meaningless end.
The Government or to say the Bureaucracy will never let the CDS happen in totality, they loath to see the concentration of power in our defence forces.
Everyone knows what the malady is – what’s the solution. How does the cat get belled?
Very insightful analysis highlighting the lessons that to be learned from the tactical victory at Kargil and what could have been, and should have been, a strategic victory.