Indian Defence Review

Optimising Technology: The NATGRID still appears few years away and needs to be connected to the Global Intelligence Grid (GIG). The NCTC appears to have been lost amidst promises by the government to review it. The NCTC was required a decade ago and should be connected via the NATGRID to State-level Counter Terrorism Centres (SCTCs) in ‘all’ States, not just chosen few. Intelligence from ground level (HUMINT) is equally or rather more important in countering terrorism and insurgencies and upward flow can only be ensured through effective SCTCs with links down to district and below levels.

Within the NATGRID, the priority of establishing it must go to the security sector. While the Indian Army is going in for Battlefield Management System (BMS) and Battlefield Surveillance Systems (BSS), these are required pan the security sector (with adequate checks for need to know basis) replete with a Common Operational Picture (COP). A decision support system is required that can enable short, medium and long term assessments.

While an effective state-of-the-art Geographic Information System (GIS) is needed, the irony today is that we are years behind mapping and their updating even to cover the areas of Maoist-infected insurgency because of corruption and lack of accountability and prioritisation in the Survey of India. The Indian Navy’s National Command, Control & Communications Intelligence Network has just been launched that would track ships at sea, for which the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) was recently inaugurated by the Defence Minister at Gurgaon. Although being integrated with some 20 countries, will it be capable of picking up the type of small vessel used by terrorists during 26/11? And how come a foreign vessel slipped through the Coast Guard recently close to Mumbai?

The Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) is still far from linking all police stations in the country. Then is the issue of tackling the use of cyberspace by terrorists and terrorist organisations for propaganda, recruitment, funding and targeting which requires Private-Public Partnership in a major way. Having just taken baby steps in this direction, we have a long way to go. Optimising technology for 24×7 surveillance is essential. Integrating the database of the security sector itself is a herculean task. Presently, the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI) is not even interfaced with the concerned government agencies.

CAPF: The blunt fact that we refuse to acknowledge is that our CAPF by and large, are poorly manned, officered, trained and equipped for the type of threats that we face. That part of the CAPF, which is tasked for counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations, must be reorganised on the lines of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) or the Assam Rifles (AR). These two models have been effective on the ground all these years; but governments have continued with the stupidity of merely going in for raising more and more CAPF battalions without giving thought to their reorganisation.

Also, CAPF like the CRPF battling Maoists must be given officers from their own cadre (especially at senior levels) rather than being given IPS officers who are experienced in law and order but not in counter insurgency. Posting of IPS officers to CRPF is disliked by the latter and is detrimental to the important officer-man camaraderie in CI environment but is glossed over because of the IPS lobby.

Training: There are multiple aspects to training. First is the training of the CRPF which despite all the brouhaha is poor to say the least. It is for this reason that the same mistakes are being made time and again at the cost of precious lives. The recent Sukma ambush has proved this the umpteenth time. The short forays into Abu Majh area are hardly going to shake the Maoist citadel especially with the foreign support they are getting. Then is the question of joint training. Take the example of Mumbai, where the MARCOS, NSG and Force One are located who would be called upon to respond to a 26/11 type situation but have never actually undertaken a joint exercise.

Conversely, post 26/11, the entire security sector of Indonesia (armed forces included) undertook a national level counter terrorism exercise for three days. In our case, such a national level exercise would be scoffed at under the pretext that it would create public scare – an excuse to avoid the hard work, planning and required coordination. For that matter, the military and the SFF have never exercised jointly.

Special Operations: Special Operations are important internally as well as across the border. Internally, we need to infiltrate the terrorist organisations and go for precision elimination of terrorist leadership and vital infrastructure, other tasks being psychological operations and de-radicalisation. These can hardly be left to individual states but need coordination at the national level in consultation with states. There must be a roll on national level plan.

As for cross-border Special Operations, we have largely been ineffective despite a large number of Special Forces because national intelligence agencies perceive this to be their exclusive domain. That is why we have not been able to hit at the roots of terrorism across the border and have failed to create any measure of deterrence, leave aside a credible one.

CBRN Response: The Tokyo Subway was subjected to Sarin gas attacks by terrorists in 1995, the US to Anthrax attacks in the early 2000s and chemicals have been used more than once against civilians in Syria. The ISIS has reportedly captured some 88lbs from Mosul and more significantly, a 1.5 kg uranium mine was recovered by the Indian Army from Assam early last year. What India needs is to be prepared for chemical, biological or radiological terrorist strike, against which there appears to be no thinking. We do not appear to be giving any thought in this direction at all. The manpower for the NDRF is through three-year deputation from CAPF primarily from the CRPF. Not only is there total lack of specialisation, the equipment for disaster relief in event of CBRN strike is little both in terms of detection and post strike assistance.

It is obvious that the public in affected areas will be abandoned to their fate, as it had happened during the Bhopal Gas Tragedy in 1984; 30 years hence, we still have not learnt any lessons. The magnitude of such a terrorist strike requires appreciation of likely target areas, holistic efforts to stymie it including the foreign roots, deployment of resources for detection and post strike assistance and public education and rehearsals. Placement of resources, public education and periodic rehearsals incorporating the citizens is an essential part.

Manning of Borders: All government-level task forces have consistently recommended the concept of “One Border, One Force”. If then we continue to deploy the ITBP in sensitive areas such as Depsang and Chumar in Ladakh without placing them under the command of the army, it is nothing but obduracy, obstinacy and consolidation of turf at the cost of national security. On top of this has been the authorising procurement of two helicopters by ITBP as mentioned above. The Government would do well to place all national borders under the MoD setting aside the established order of previous governments facilitating smuggling, infiltration and illegal infiltration for obvious fiscal and political gains, latter increasing the vote-bank.

Private Security: The private security industry in India born in the 1960s with a handful of players, is estimated to cross Rs. 40,000 crore by 2015 as per FICCI estimates. The number of private security guards has crossed five million already. For skill development in the Private Security Sector (PSS), the Security Sector Skill Development Council was formed in 2011 incorporating many top-level private security companies as also represented by as also represented by members from NSDC, CAPSI, CII, FICCI and Army Welfare Placement Organisation (AWPO) amongst others.

It aims to transform the PSS from an unorganised industry to an organised one by taking initiatives on developing the driving forces of knowledge and skills to address the interests of all stakeholders of the industry. But such skill development is a gigantic requirement which needs persistent efforts. This five million plus resource of the PSS must be integrated into the security sector both for intelligence gathering and on-the-spot incident response.

Conclusion

Challenges to India’s security are mounting by the day. The governance of India’s security sector needs to be seen in the context of its external and internal vulnerability. Integrated, comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) must be preceded by a comprehensive needs assessment to identify critical gaps and potential links across sectors. Governance is unlikely to improve across the board anywhere in the short term and political patronage to terrorists cannot disappear overnight either, especially in the absence of resolute and focused action against such a nexus. Presently, our SSR though progressing appears more akin to the blind man’s bluff. Indeed, we have a very long way to go.