Thus all four thresholds will be impacted to a degree. The extent of the impact would not be so much as to breach any of these individually, but cumulatively the impact could be an in-conflict lowering of the nuclear threshold. The psychological impact of the broad front war – one liable to be lost – on a decision maker has to be taken into account. Even if the conflict were to start with India set on terminating it before the threshold is breached, an intelligence watch would require to be maintained on the possibility of in-conflict lowering. What are the possible reasons that could prompt Pakistani nuclear first use?
First, ‘first use’ should be taken as having been ruled in by Pakistan; since, simply put, it has not been ruled out by that state. Second, its nuclear capability is deemed essential by it to redress conventional asymmetry. The capability was acquired for this purpose in the first place. If the asymmetry is proved to be of telling proportion in the dynamics of an ongoing conflict, then the capability would be leveraged. At first would be rhetoric and nuclear signaling; failing which a nuclear strike cannot be ruled out. Third, Indian aims, even if limited at the outset and studiously maintained as such, would likely include a suitable degradation of Pakistani military capability.
“First use” is ruled out here as the least likely option. The least likely manner of “˜first use would be through “˜first strike, for the simple reason that it does not have “˜first strike capability.
The aim would be such attrition as to render the Pakistani Army impotent post-conflict, not so much with respect to the Indian military, but within Pakistani polity. This would enable an Indian exit strategy and help address concerns that prompted the conflict in the first place. Knowing that it would be finished as a corporate entity were this to occur, the Pakistani military may countenance retrieving the situation through running the extreme risk of escalation.
How then could Pakistan use its nuclear capability? Nuclear signaling would continue right through the conflict beginning in with the preceding crisis period. The nuclear context would thus already be set by the time the capability is exercised. “First use” is ruled out here as the least likely option. The least likely manner of ‘first use’ would be through ‘first strike’, for the simple reason that it does not have ‘first strike capability’.
‘First use’ here is taken as introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict situation. This is not to be confused with ‘first strike’, which technically means an attempt to take out the enemy’s retaliatory capability. Next is a counter value ‘assured destruction’ equivalent salvo against Indian population centers. This would leave its own cities exposed to like response in case India’s retaliatory capability is not degraded. Since Pakistan does not have enough numbers to do both, it stands to be destroyed as a state and society. The third option is a ‘decapitating strike’ attempting to take out the Indian leadership.This has limited possibility of success considering that the strike would be well into the conflict by which time the Political and Executive Council of the Nuclear Command Authority and the alternative chain of command would already be ensconced in the Nuclear Command Post and Alternate Command Post respectively. Such a strike has the greatest chance of success only as a ‘bolt from the blue’ attack at the outset of a war and in the crisis period itself. Such a possibility is remote considering that unrestrained retaliation would inevitably result once Indian command and control resources mobilize to cope with a leaderless situation. In any case, India has now acquired a more proactive strategic doctrine and contemplates being first off the block in any future conflict.
What then are the feasible options in a possible conflict scenario? These in descending order of likelihood are: limited counter value targeting; limited targeting of a mix of counter value and counter force; counter force targeting; operational level usage against Indian forces in Indian territory; tactical usage against Indian forces in Pakistani territory; and lastly nuclear use without any explicit military purpose but solely as a measure of nuclear signaling. The likelihood of limited nuclear attacks is lesser owing to the escalatory risk and the certainty of and vulnerability to retaliation. Given the imbalance in numbers, India’s retaliatory capability can never be degraded enough to levels at which Pakistan could escape ‘unacceptable damage’ in punitive response.
The expectation is that Indias nuclear doctrine of “˜assured retaliation with “˜assured destruction levels of punitive response would stay Pakistans nuclear hand.
Therefore, all that Pakistan has left as options are use against military targets at tactical and operational levels and demonstrative nuclear use. Demonstrative explosions are not quite attacks but would have a major strategic impact in terms of focusing conflict termination efforts, particularly of the international community. They, however, cannot be termed nuclear ‘first use’ since these would not be targeting Indian forces or territory. Operational level targets on Indian territory, such as airfields and concentrations of follow on forces, would have greater escalatory potential than tactical targeting on own territory in a defensive mode. Therefore, the latter is the most likely form of nuclear ‘first use’.
Would Pakistan be deterred from nuclear ‘first use’ in this manner? The expectation is that India’s nuclear doctrine of ‘assured retaliation’ with ‘assured destruction’ levels of punitive response would stay Pakistan’s nuclear hand. Popularly, the doctrine is deemed to be one of punitive retaliation in ‘massive’ quantum to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’ to the adversary. In assuring this, India has acquired second strike capability with respect to Pakistan. This article questions the extant wisdom in querying, firstly, whether this would stay Pakistan’s nuclear hand; and, secondly, whether this is indeed the correct interpretation of India’s nuclear doctrine.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine Reconsidered
India’s nuclear doctrine, as explicated in Sub Para 2 (iii) of the press release of the Cabinet Committee on Security of 4 Jan 2003 states: “Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”1 This means that the ‘assured retaliation’ promised by India would only be of ‘assured destruction’ levels in case of first strike by the enemy. As assessed above, this is the least likely manner of ‘first use’ since Pakistan does not have ‘first strike capability’.
Please wait...
