Indian Defence Review

Care had not been taken at higher levels to verify the claims in accordance with the realities on the ground before preferring them at the negotiating table. The exaggeration might have been the result of faulty map reading in a few cases, but mostly it was the outcome of a desire on the part of local commanders to show greater areas of occupation, hoping that nobody in the first instance would verify its accuracy in inaccessible areas, and when the snow melted they would be able to physically occupy these areas, The position of this untenable ground was embarrassing indeed for Bhagat, but with his tact and persuasion he did India well. Most of the claimed areas conceded were in the lake area of Minimarg and the stony waste of Turtok.

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As a result of the occupation of territory on either side of the international border, its demarcation had been disturbed at places. Some boundary pillars were damaged, and a few were completely obliterated by the action of war. To restore the status quo ante, joint teams were formed to fix the missing pillars through surveys and erect them afresh, while the repair of the damaged and repainting of the existing pillars had to be undertaken. Accordingly, the work was accomplished in Gujarat, Rajasthan and Punjab, but when the time came for doing so in Jammu and Kashmir Pakistan resiled after having originally initiated the proceedings.

To keep prisoners away from sensitive border areas, it was decided to organize some 50 camps in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.

In the Jammu area, the Pakistan representative wanted the international border to be recognized only on the ground but did not want the boundary pillars restored. When India insisted that this portion of the border should be treated at par with other parts of the international border, Pakistan shelved the proceedings altogether, thus keeping its option open to treat it as disputed territory. Since the occupied territories had been returned, Pakistan was under no compulsion to accept the Indian version and took refuge under the clause of the Simla Agreement which allowed bilateral arrangements “without prejudice to the recognized position of either side.”

The line of control has remained as disturbed after its ratification as it was before as the erstwhile ceasefire line. The line is not demarcated on the ground, and as such its sanctity is ensured by its recognition, purely by use of prominent landmarks available in the area. The change of troops holding forward posts, and the different interpretation of maps by both sides, result in frequent civilian intrusions and military transgressions, leading to exchange of fire and unnecessary casualties on both sides. The tranquility of the border areas remains disturbed, and because of lack of security large tracts of cultivable and forest land remain unexploited. Since the ratification of the Simla Agreement the Karachi Agreement remains superseded, and the ground rules, which prevented close contact of opposing troops, are no longer operative. As a result the frequency of clashes between patrols has increased.

The position of the UN observer group is peculiar. On the Pakistani side, the line of control continued to be manned by them, while on the Indian side they are idling. Repeated efforts were made at the sector commanders’ level to evolve military arrangements to stabilize the line. It was proposed that some temporary demarcation, without prejudice to any future settlement, be resorted to for easy recognition by troops manning the line, as also by civilians residing in the area. Pakistan however insists on its continuance in its present state.

“¦occupation of territory on either side of the international border, its demarcation had been disturbed at places. Some boundary pillars were damaged, and a few were completely obliterated by the action of war.

The Pakistani side advocates the use of observers for settling local disputes while India suggests bilateral settlement of such issues. The opposing sides hold flag meetings to settle local disputes after border incidents, but they usually end in a mutual exchange of accusations. Bilateralism has not so far helped stabilization of the line, which continues to be disturbed. And the political status of the Kashmir dispute remains unaltered.

Consequent on the unilateral ceasefire of 17 December 1971 in the west, and the signing of the instrument of surrender by Gen Niazi in the east, a sizable number of Pakistani troops and civilians fell into Indian hands as prisoners of war. A total of 91,596 prisoners surrendered to the joint command of India and Bangladesh, and out of them some 74,271 were in uniform, comprising regular elements of Pakistan’s three services, the rank and file of paramilitary organizations and policemen. The remaining 17,325 were civilians belonging to the Pakistan administrative services and their families.1

In the western theatre, about 1,014 uniformed personnel belonging to the services and paramilitary organizations were captured by the Indian forces. In addition, there were 51 civilian internees, consisting of Pakistani citizens who happened to be visiting India at the outbreak of hostilities.

In Bangladesh, the prisoners had surrendered to the respective sector commanders wherever they were operationally engaged. The Indian planners had not visualized such a mass surrender, and as a result the administrative machinery to look after them took time to organize. They were generally removed to the nearest cantonment and confined there under heavy guard.

Bengali tempers were running high and armed guerillas were intent on taking their revenge on them. The entire population, earlier kept in check under the heel of the Pakistani jackboot, turned their pent-up wrath on the Pakistani soldiery, accusing them of genocide, loot and rape.

The Pakistani side advocates the use of observers for settling local disputes while India suggests bilateral settlement of such issues.

Day by day, the atmosphere was getting more vitiated and charged with hatred, leading to stray sniping at the prisoners’ camps. But there were no casualties. In Dacca, the situation was aggravated by hordes of armed guerillas seeking to avenge war crimes and lack of sufficient strength with the Indian Army to protect the prisoners, especially in the first to days of liberation. On account of this the local commander in Dacca allowed the prisoners to keep their personal arms till adequate security arrangements could be made. This invited sharp comment in the foreign and Indian press. The immediate task of the Indian fords was to evacuate the prisoners from Bangladesh. There was also adverse comment in the Indian press about some senior military commanders fraternizing with their Pakistani counterparts in captivity. Onlookers felt it was strange that adversaries in a war which had ended only two days before should meet and behave with such cordiality and understanding, and they started talking about the “Generals’ Club.”

What they failed to appreciate was that about 25 years earlier the higher commanders on both sides had belonged to the same army, and some possibly to the same units, and as such comparing notes on the events since partition was understandable. But in this case it was perhaps carried too far. Niazi was given the same honor and privileges he enjoyed in command, and this was uncalled for, especially in an atmosphere charged with hostility. Indians were apt to step out and display their “fair-minded” and “humane” treatment of the enemy beyond the limits of prudence, and this created unsavory impressions. It would have sufficed to show such normal courtesies to the vanquished as admissible under the Geneva Convention.

To keep prisoners away from sensitive border areas, it was decided to organize some 50 camps in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. Cantonment accommodation lying vacant because troops had moved out to participate in the fighting was barricaded and modified to house them. A large infrastructure of administrative staff to run these camps was set up at short notice, and about 25 paramilitary and territorial battalions were mustered to provide security.

The position of the UN observer group is peculiar. On the Pakistani side, the line of control continued to be manned by them, while on the Indian side they are idling.

Movement to these camps started soon after the ceasefire, by both surface and air transportation resources, and the last prisoner left Bangladesh about the first week of February. It goes to the credit of Indian organization that the entire evacuation ran like clockwork, and there were no incidents of escape en route. Efforts were made to keep the basic homogeneity of units intact in captivity for better discipline and humane management.

Creature comforts in the way of food, clothing and accommodation were provided strictly in accordance with the Geneva Convention, at times at the cost of our urgent requirements. For instance, the entire stock of blankets with the Indian Army was issued to the prisoners while our troops had to be outfitted for winter by urgent procurement of substandard blankets from the market.

Facilities were provided for worship in each camp. Copies of the Quran were distributed freely. Public address systems were installed to broadcast news BBC, Radio Pakistan and All India Radio as well as musical programmes. Senior officers were allowed the use of transistor radios. Along with selected newspapers, a news bulletin specially published for the prisoners in Urdu was distributed freely. They were encouraged to write to their families in Pakistan and arrangements were made for ex-change of mail through the International Red Cross. In fact, so zealous were the Indians in making the prisoners comfortable that members of the International Red Cross committee commented after visits to various camps that the “treatment of prisoners was consistent with or even better than the Third Geneva Convention to the extent that Indian troops guarding the prisoners and elsewhere were housed and fed under less comfortable conditions.”

The prisoners were not obliged to do any work beyond maintenance, and commenting on the entertainment facilities the committee said that “everything was spotless.” At the back of each ward, there was a recreation room with indoor games, English and Urdu books, newspapers and magazines. Film shows were held from time to time. Radio Pakistan’s daily news bulletins were broadcast over the camp public address system.

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Commenting on the facilities for worship, the committee said “there was a mosque and an imam in each enclosure. Prayers took place five times daily. Every facility was afforded to the Muslims for prayers.” The discipline among the prisoners was good but there were a few attempts at escape.1 Some escapees found their way back to Pakistan, a few sought refuge in Nepal, and the others were recaptured. The total number of successful escapes was however only 24, which was insignificant considering that there were more than 90,000 captives in all.

On the other hand, the Indian prisoners in Pakistan were housed in the civil jail at Lyallpur along with criminals. Living conditions were very poor and facilities for worship and recreation were virtually nonexistent.

There were also four incidents of mob violence2 in which the prisoners tried to overwhelm their guards, seized their arms and made a break for freedom. These outbreaks were controlled by the timely use of force. Although Bhutto made much of these incidents by dubbing them “wanton attacks by brutal Indian guards on the unarmed prisoners,” the courts of inquiry appointed to investigate the incidents concluded that the use of force was unavoidable under the circumstances. In these incidents 31 Indian officers and other ranks were injured.

On the other hand, the Indian prisoners in Pakistan were housed in the civil jail at Lyallpur along with criminals. Living conditions were very poor and facilities for worship and recreation were virtually nonexistent. The Red Cross superintending team did not visit the jail until some months had elapsed, in which time some improvements had been made. Seriously sick and wounded repatriated to India however spoke well of the medical attention the Pakistan authorities provided and felt that on the whole their treatment was ethically correct and humane. After the conflict, India declared 1,006 personnel, believed to by taken prisoners of war, missing. Pakistan accepted the existence of only 639 as prisoners. Four of these died in captivity, and the rest eventually returned to India. Some personnel declared missing in the first instance, in the absence of positive proof of death in action, had since rejoined their units or were found later, wounded.

The number unaccounted for is 274. The Pakistan Government has denied any knowledge of them and stressed that it had no more Indian personnel in its custody despite the fact that those who were repatriated reported having seen some of the missing men in Pakistani prisons. Pakistan assured India that it would make another thorough search or the missing. The result of this search has brought no results so far.

The continued detention of about 90,000 prisoners affected Pakistan and India differently. Their racial composition was approximately 70 per cent Punjabi 20 per cent Pathan and Baluchi and 10 per cent Sindhi and others. West Punjab, the main recruiting ground, was badly affected. It was said that there was not a single family in the province which was not involved one way or the other. With bread winners detained in India, these families clamoured for continuance of pay and allowances for their upkeep.

After the conflict, India declared 1,006 personnel, believed to by taken prisoners of war, missing. Pakistan accepted the existence of only 639 as prisoners. Four of these died in captivity, and the rest eventually returned to India.

Politically, Bhutto, having taken over a shattered country, did not want the prisoners back to add to the many other problems confronting him and his country. But to muffle the voices of dissatisfaction he decided to look after the families. Tikka Khan, who had himself been a prisoner in World War II in German hands, went about this task with rare zeal. The families were given the full entitlement of soldier’s pay and allowances. Liberal concessions were offered for the education of their dependants’ children and proper arrangements were made for housing and attendant facilities such as purchase of rations and canteen stores. Welfare committees were formed and went from house to house on fact-finding missions. They dealt with individual and collective problems on the spot.

It must be said to the Pakistan Government’s credit that it looked after the prisoners’ families well, while on the Indian side there was only routine lip service. The measures Tikka Kha adopted satisfied the families at least for a while. On the other hand, India’s expenditure on the upkeep of the Pakistani prisoners was mounting, and with a sagging economy the Government found this hard to sustain.

Up to 31 January 1974, India had spent more than Rs 323 million on the upkeep of the prisoners. With about Rs 30 million required for the prisoners’ pay, their upkeep was costing India about Rs 10 million a month. Besides, the accommodation meant for India’s troops was occupied by the prisoners. Our troops were perforce living under canvas or other temporary housing arrangements. This was affecting their morale as the feeling grew among them that the prisoners were better looked after than they were.

Despite public professions to the contrary, India definitely attempted to use the continued detention of the prisoners as a bargaining counter for political aims, especially for problems connected with the recognition of Bangladesh. Prisoners were divided into two categories, those captured in the western theatre and others who surrendered in Bangladesh. After the Simla Agreement was ratified there was no justification for holding on to those captured in the western theatre, and these prisoners, along with the sick and wounded, including civilians and totaling about 2,653, were returned as they did not come within the purview of the joint Indo-Bangladesh Command. Initially, Bhutto was under strong political pressure at home to get the prisoners back, and the greater his apparent keenness to do so the better bargaining counter it provided India at the negotiation table. Shrewd politician that he was, Bhutto decided to play it cool on this issue. Having muffled dissatisfaction among their families, he accused India of using the prisoners as a human pawn in a political game. He asserted that under no circumstances could he be expected to sell Pakistan’s interests for their release. It would be an insult to the soldier’s patriotism, he argued.

To effect a major breakthrough in the triangular settlement in this regard, New Delhi and Dacca made a joint offer to Pakistan on 20 November for repatriation of over 6,000 women and children held in prison camps

As a result, the prisoners became a wasting asset for India. Bhutto made it known that he would wait till India got tired of looking after them, and his attitude became menacingly embarrassing for India. That is why the Indian negotiators failed not only to get Bhutto to recognize Bangladesh but also to settle the repatriation of the Bengali families stranded in West Pakistan. And in this respect the Simla accord did not yield the political gains it was aimed to achieve in the end.

There was also the question of Bihari Muslim families settled in Bangladesh who, because they collaborated with the Pakistan Army in the conflict, were finding the atmosphere there rather hostile, and at the same time the new Bangladesh regime was keen on getting rid of them. But all these questions had to wait till Bhutto found it expedient to recognize Bangladesh. As a result, the prisoner issue was delinked from the delineation of the line of control and the withdrawal of troops from the occupied territories.

To effect a major breakthrough in the triangular settlement in this regard, New Delhi and Dacca made a joint offer to Pakistan on 20 November for repatriation of over 6,000 women and children held in prison camps in return for similar facilities to Bengali women and children stranded or detained in Pakistan.3 This move was intended to demonstrate the readiness of the two countries to undo the consequences of the last conflict provided Pakistan was willing to reciprocate.

The size of the Bengali community in Pakistan was estimated to vary from 25,000 to 400,000. The number to be moved out was large indeed. Dacca wanted them to be handed over at the Indian border, from where they could be transported to Bangladesh. Overruling an earlier rejection by officials, Bhutto accepted the offer and in turn offered to release 10,000 Bengali women and children held in Pakistan. Bhutto’s acceptance was accompained by the hope that it would result in an early solution of the “humanitarian problem” of all prisoners of war and civilian internees.

The planners had visualized a mass exchange of 90,000 prisoners of war and the exchange of Bihar, and Bengali Muslim families between Pakistan and Bangladesh. They proposed five points of exchange where the Pakistan railway system provided connecting links, but their Pakistani counterparts accepted only one delivery point at Wagah for the exchange on both sides. The ostensible excuse offered was lack of logistical infrastructure in other places, but it appeared that Bhutto was not politically ready for speedy repatriation.

The first exchange took place at Wag ah on 1 December 1972,1 when India offered 540 Pakistani prisoners of war, including 51 civilians, captured in the western sector. In return, Pakistan repatriated 617 Indian prisoners, including ten Air Force officers and 89 men of the Border Security Force, four of the Jammu and Kashmir Militia, and 17 civilians. India had still to seek a plausible explanation for its 274 personnel missing on the western front. On the other hand, Pakistan alleged that some 900 of its missing in the conflict remained to be accounted for.

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But this was preceded by repatriation of the sick and wounded in aircraft provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross, in which some 320 Pakistani servicemen and civilians were exchanged for 70 Indian personnel. This was followed by the movement of women and children, but then came a stalemate. This appeared to irk India more than Pakistan. Once again, on the initiative of Mrs Gandhi, New Delhi and Dacca offered a package deal under which 195 prisoners of war and civilian internees would face trial in Bangladesh on charges of war crimes. The Pakistanis in Bangladesh were also to be exchanged for Bengalis forcibly detained in Pakistan. It was hoped that these proposals, if faithfully implemented, would further the process of normalization in the subcontinent and would go a long way in solving the humanitarian and other problems arising out of the armed conflict of 1971.

The Pakistan authorities reaction to this offer was reluctant and conditional acceptance.

The package deal fixed the end of May 1973 as the date of the trials. It proposed that a special tribunal comprising persons of the status of Supreme Court judges would hear the cases, which would be conducted in accordance with universally recognized judicial norms. Eminent international jurists would be invited as observers. The prisoners to be tried were charged with serious crimes, including genocide, breach of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, murder, rape and arson. The accused were promised facilities to arrange for their defence and to engage counsel of their choice, including foreigners.

The Pakistan authorities’ reaction to this offer was reluctant and conditional acceptance. The reiterated that normalization had been obstructed by India’s continuing to hold in illegal captivity over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees, despite the cessation of hostilities 16 months ago.

Quoting the Geneva Convention of 1949 on treatment of prisoners of war, Pakistan argued “it was the obligation of the detaining power to release and repatriate prisoners of war without delay after cessation of hostilities.” The obligation was unilateral and unconditional. The principle involved was basic to international law and any compromise on it, open or disguised, could set a calamitous precedent.

The Pakistanis in Bangladesh were also to be exchanged for Bengalis forcibly detained in Pakistan.

As such, the Government of Pakistan could not be expected to agree to or acquiesce in conditions which were irrelevant and unrelated to the repatriation of the prisoners. In addition, they questioned the competence of the authorities in Dacca to try any of them on criminal charges. According to the established principles of international law, only a competent tribunal set up in Pakistan had jurisdiction in this matter since the alleged crimes were committed in Pakistan and the persons charged were Pakistani citizens. It would therefore be repugnant to national sovereignty to surrender exclusive jurisdiction in this regard.

Bhutto offered to constitute a judicial tribunal of such a character and composition as would inspire international confidence. He also warned the authorities in Dacca that if they started trials as announced this would poison the atmosphere and seriously retard the establishment of a climate of peace and reconciliation, an urgent necessity for the welfare of the people of the subcontinent. Bhutto claimed that on his part he had shown restraint even to the extent of refraining from exercising Pakistan’s right to try Bengalis in Pakistan against whom there was irrefutable evidence of subversion, espionage and high treason. The terms of the statement issued simultaneously in Delhi and Dacca would not enable this restraint to continue.

Pakistan went to the International Court of Justice for an interim injunction against the transfer to Bangladesh of the 195 prisoners charged with war crimes. India challenged the courts jurisdiction to entertain the Pakistani complaint but this issue remained unresolved.

As regards the Pakistanis in Bangladesh, he argued that it was unique for an ethnic, linguistic or political minority to be persecuted, offered an option under pain of loss of job, property or even life, and arbitrarily expelled from its place of domicile, thus obligating Pakistan to receive its members. Addressing the international community, Bhutto said he felt distressed at “the tragic suffering of the victims of this prejudice and bigotry” and urged the community to persuade the authorities in Dacca to protect the basic human rights to which these people were entitled. In pursuance of its right, Pakistan went to the International Court of Justice for an interim injunction against the transfer to Bangladesh of the 195 prisoners charged with war crimes. India challenged the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the Pakistani complaint but this issue remained unresolved.

No substantial agreement was achieved by the three countries regarding the prisoners of war. At the humane level a trickle of repatriation continued through Wagah under the supervision of the International Red Cross, covering compassionate cases and the sick and wounded. According to an Indian Government spokesman, 2,264 persons had been repatriated by 11 July 1973, and of them 1,208 were sick and wounded. About the same time, 127 stranded Bengalis were flown to Dacca from Pakistan by a chartered aircraft, followed by 337 the next day. The trickle had started, but the major part of the problem remained unresolved until official level talks held in Delhi and Islamabad ultimately led to an agreement on 28 August.

The agreement envisaged simultaneous repatriation of all Pakistani prisoners except the 195 Bangladesh wanted, the repatriation of all Bengalis from Pakistan, including 203 threatened with reprisal trials, and the return to Pakistan of a substantial number of Pakistanis living in Bangladesh. The 195 prisoners were to be held in India and not tried while the three way repatriation was on.

The accord visualized a role for India in tripartite talks to discuss the fate of the 195 at a later date. By stressing the simultaneity of repatriation and retaining custody of the prisoners Dacca and New Delhi enjoyed an advantage in the event of a subsequent dispute over the number of Pakistanis in Bangladesh who, according to the terms of the agreement, should go to Pakistan but might not have been included among the “substantial” number to be repatriated initially.

The first phase of repatriation concluded on 30 September 1973. A total of 2,000 Bengalis, 2,600 Pakistanis and another 1,680 Pakistani prisoners, civilian internees and their dependants were repatriated. Repatriation of Bengalis from Pakistan and Pakistani nationals from Bangladesh was facilitated by an airlift the UN provided while the Pakistani prisoners, internees and their dependants were transported by train to the Wagah check post. The agreement made India responsible for working out the time schedule for repatriation in consultation with Bangladesh, Pakistan and international agencies. After the close of the first April phase the subsequent phases were speedily executed, and by 19 1974 some 78,416 out of the total Pakistani prisoners of repatriated. war and civilian internees in India’s protective custody had been repatriated.

India spent about Rs 350 million on the upkeep of the prisoners.

Meanwhile, Pakistan had recognized Bangladesh in February 1974,2 against the backdrop of the summit meeting of Islamic nations in Lahore, thus paving the way for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to attend the meet and generally preparing for a reconciliation between Dacca and Islamabad. A tripartite meeting,3  as visualized by the earlier agreement, to decide the fate of the 195 charged with war crimes followed, and an agreement was signed on 9 April.

In the light of the conciliatory moves by both parties, and in particular the Pakistani Prime Minister’s appeal to the people of Bangladesh to forgive and forget the “mistakes” of the past, the Bangladesh Government decided not to proceed with the trials as an act of clemency. It was agreed that the 195 accused should be repatriated along with the other prisoners. In respect of the non Bengalis in Bangladesh, Islamabad cleared the movement to Pakistan of those who had been domiciled in West Pakistan or were employees of the central government or belonged to the families of employees, or were members of undivided families, irrespective of their original domicile. Hardship cases were also cleared on merit.

The chapter regarding prisoners closed with the repatriation of the last group at Wagah on 29 April 1974.4 Gen Niazi was the last of them to leave Indian soil and was seen off with due ceremony by Indian military commanders. According to conservative estimates, India spent about Rs 350 million on the upkeep of the prisoners.

Bhutto went to Simla as the head of a defeated nation. Half his country was irrevocably lost and about 5,500 square miles in the other half were under Indian occupation. More than 90,000 Pakistani soldiers were languishing in India as prisoners of war as opposed to no more than 700-odd Indian prisoners in Pakistan. India held such an advantage as a victor nation that Bhutto’s detractors felt that India was in a position to dictate terms of peace to Pakistan. Some arrogant opponents of Mrs Gandhi in India also suggested that the fruits of victory must be extracted to the maximum in the way of war reparations, 1 hat the Kashmir problem should be solved permanently and the international border adjusted to make it more defensible.

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In the end, it must be said to Bhutto’s credit that he won what his armies had lost on the battlefield with patient and shrewd diplomacy. When the last prisoner returned to Pakistan he boasted: “I promised to get the occupied territory vacated by India. I did that. I promised to get the prisoners back. Although it took some time, I got them back, and I even stopped the infamous war trials. I have stabilized the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir without compromising on the main issue.” As for recognizing Bangladesh, he said, “it was only a question of legalizing the existence of a reality, but it was done at a moment of our choosing and not at anybody’s dictation.”

Bhutto said: “I have stabilized the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir without compromising on the main issue.”

As for using the trained manpower released by repatriation, Tikka Khan had had his own views, which he expressed in an interview with the West German television network in July 1973. He said: “When they come back, we will treat them as heroes. We will try and counter-brainwash them. Then we will send them to see their relations. Then we will reactivate their formations.”

He continued, “… in East Pakistan, they have surrendered in units and formations, so we will reactivate their units and formations. Of course, if at any stage we find that their loyalties have been affected, we will take other action in that respect… Some of them may not be fit for further service. In that case we will probably retire them. As regards their promotions, well, they will take their place according to seniority, provided of course that they are cleared for promotion.”

Although the shortfall in numbers created by the loss of the formations in former East Pakistan have been more than amply made up, those units and formations to which the prisoners belonged have not been reactivated. If we tried to soften the attitude of the prisoners towards their captors, this appears to have been interpreted as a sign of inherent Indian weakness. If their Indian captors sermonized on the benefits of democracy as evidenced by their humane treatment, and this contrasted with the ills of military dictatorship, they were wasting their sermons as the products of the military junta, who enjoyed all the privileges of rulers, could not reconcile themselves to a democratic regime. If Indians tried to sell their economic development, the prisoners could easily point to the abject poverty that still stalked the Indian countryside. They could perhaps be impressed by the comparative freedom of our press, but that does not wash brains. Tikka Khan did not fear on that account.

Bhutto appointed a commission presided over by a judge to inquire into the circumstances of the military debacle and apportion blame where necessary. The commission’s proceedings are reported to have been completed after hearing the statements of returned prisoners of war. The findings have not been made public, but these are probably no different from those given by Fazal Muqeem in The Crisis of Leadership. From recent senior appointments in the Pakistan Army it appears that those cleared have been rehabilitated and promoted. In this regard, the appointment of Maj Gen Nazar Hussain Shah as Quartermaster General and the promotion of Brig Tajumul Hussain as Major General in command of a division are significant. Presumably, some assimilation has been effected in the lower ranks as well. And Niazi and others like him must have got their home orders without undue publicity.