As regards India’s problem of maintaining the families which had fled from Sind to Rajasthan, Gujarat and Kutch and were residing either in Indian-occupied territory or in refugee camps in India, Swaran Singh said: “Pakistan has decided to send Rana Chander Singh, a member of the Sind Provincial Assembly, and two members of Parliament from Tharparkar to visit the area, even when it is under occupation of the Indian Army, to reassure the people, who are still residing there, and also to invite a number of their prominent leaders who are currently in India, with a view to persuading the affected persons to return. The President of Pakistan has also assured our Prime Minister in his letter that these affected persons would not only be welcome to return to their homes, but would be assured of safety of life and dignity as Pakistan nationals.”
The Simla Agreement was worded in such generalities that each side could interpret it to suit its own interests. Because of this vagueness, the delineation proceedings between the two military commanders got stuck even before they started, necessitating the official level meeting within 20 days of the ratification of the agreement. Meanwhile, from the time of the ceasefire, there were alleged violations along the line of control with the aim of improving the respective defensive posture of each side and generally to keep the line disturbed. UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim referred them to the Security Council on 13 May 1972,1 clarifying the attitude of both countries to the use of UN agencies for observing the ceasefire.
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He asserted that both sides claimed different lines of control when fighting stopped and the UN observers, without freedom of movement, had not verified the new line. He brought to the council’s notice that India had filed no complaints with the observers on the spot and, unlike Pakistan, was withholding cooperation with them. The observers did not enjoy freedom of movement on the Indian side. The report of alleged Pakistani violations were filed by India directly with the UN Secretariat and not with the observers stationed on the Indian side.
India has restrained from sending to you lists of ceasefire violations by Pakistan in the firm belief that if Pakistan is indeed ready and willing to settle difference and disputes between the two countries in a truly friendly and cooperative spirit direct bilateral negotiations provide the best means.
Samar Sen, India’s permanent representative at the UN, wrote in replying to Waldheim’s assertions, that “while the efforts towards peaceful negotiations are continuing, Pakistan has been making repeated allegations of violations of ceasefire without any mention of the fact that many of these incidents have been satisfactorily settled at flag meetings between the local commanders. Thus in March-April alone, 32 generally successful flag meetings took place to settle disputes and differences relating to the ceasefire. India has restrained from sending to you lists of ceasefire violations by Pakistan in the firm belief that if Pakistan is indeed ready and willing to settle difference and disputes between the two countries in a truly friendly and cooperative spirit direct bilateral negotiations provide the best means. Some of the flag meetings were held at the Indian initiative and others at the request of Pakistan.”
He further explained that “when the local commanders could not settle their differences they were solved by reference to flag meetings at higher levels. Additionally, facilities for direct communications are available between the military headquarters. in both countries. A bilateral and effective machinery thus exists for maintaining the durability of the ceasefire, and has been successfully used.”
On the military plane, there were ten meetings between Gen Bhagat and Gen Hamid Khan between 10 August and 7 December 1972, when the line of control was finally delineated. The differences which stalled the proceedings for almost four months were broadly of four kinds. Firstly, they concerned discrepancies in areas claimed to have been lost or gained by either side up to the ceasefire of 17 December, and these could be reconciled easily between the local commanders on the given guideline and did not present much of a problem.
Secondly, there was the question of territories annexed after the ceasefire, like that of the capture of the Kayan posts by Pakistan on 5 May. Pakistan contended that India was also guilty of such acts at various places and the whole question should be dealt with on equitable terms. The issue was resolved by Pakistan’s vacating the posts and parts of the Tarkundi forest in the Rajauri sector, with some adjustments on the Indian side. Thirdly, Pakistan claimed 12 small pockets of defacto control covering about nine square miles. It argued that although these areas lay on the Indian side of the erstwhile ceasefire line they had been under the administrative control of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir almost from 1949.
These areas generally lay in narrow valleys between spurs jutting out of the main ridges held by Indian posts towards Pakistan-occupied territory. The difficult terrain, the lack of accessibility to the Indian rear areas, and the general fear of passing through minefields and forward posts, led the local population to lean on Pakistan for their subsistence. The delineation embraced the changes brought about as a result of war and did not cater for administrative encroachments. But a verification proved the Pakistan claims to be on the whole correct. As such, de facto control of areas up to six square miles were conceded after a ground survey.
Notes:
- Asian Recorder, Vol XVIII, No 24, “UN-Secretary-General’s Report on Kashmir,” p. 10814.
Finally, there was the vital problem of interpreting the international border as applicable to Jammu district. Pakistan accepted the existing border between the Ravi and the Chenab as this suited its interests since the larger part of the occupied territory in Chicken’s Neck and the Shakargarh bulge lay in the region. But it contested the international border west of the Chenab as part of the ceasefire line. The line of 1949 ran well west of Manawar Tawi till it joined the international border running east to west near Moel village.
The conflict of 1965 had brought the Pakistani occupation as deep as Jaurian village, but the status quo ante was restored under the Tashkent Agreement. The 1971 conflict resulted in extending the Pakistani occupation right up to Manawar Tawi and the village of Thako Chak lying on the Indian side of the border between the narrow strip covering the confluence of Manawar Tawi and the Chenab. The Pakistan representative insisted that Thako Chak, a hamlet, should be treated as lying across the line of control and not on the basis of the border.
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