Indian Defence Review

In this regard, using Moscow as a channel of communication, Bhutto suggested a summit meeting with Mrs Gandhi as early as possible. He emphasized the need for the first meeting to be at the political level for a proper assessment of the situation and creating the framework for further implementation at the official and other levels. He felt that starting a dialogue at the official level would not work as the bureaucrats tended to be rigid and the advice they tendered introduced “needless complexities.”

Accordingly, after an exchange of formal notes between New Delhi and Islamabad, a meeting was arranged between emissaries of the respective heads of state to draw up the agenda for a summit. D.P. Dhar representing India and Aziz Ahmed Pakistan met at Murree at the end of April 1972 and agreed on the modalities and agenda of a summit to be held at Simla towards the end of May, but which eventually came off at the end of June.After a five-day meeting, Bhutto and Mrs Gandhi signed the Simla Agreement.1 It outlined the steps to be taken to promote friendly relations between the two countries and establish durable peace in the subcontinent. In addition to several political and economic steps, the military steps required to be undertaken were:

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From the very beginning India strove to withdraw the Kashmir issue from the UN with all its connected commitments and substitute direct negotiations between the two countries.

At a news conference held immediately after signing the Simla Agreement Mrs Gandhi admitted that though nothing very definite had emerged from the summit she was not pessimistic. It appeared that she was impressed by the internal difficulties Bhutto was said to be facing. Considering him better placed than any other Pakistani politician to deal with his country’s postwar problems, weighed down by her own economic burden of fielding armies on the border in a perpetual state of war readiness, and the upkeep of a sizable refugee population in the west, as well as the expense of maintaining the prisoners of war, it was felt that she had resiled from taking a firm stand and preferred to go along with Bhutto’s step-by-step approach, hoping to serve India’s interests in the process.

From the very beginning India strove to withdraw the Kashmir issue from the UN with all its connected commitments and substitute direct negotiations between the two countries. By delineating the line of control resulting from the ceasefire India hoped that the Karachi Agreement, arrived at earlier through the aegis of the UN, would automatically lapse. The observer group would as a result become redundant and would eventually be withdrawn.

After the line of control was delineated and militarily stabilized, an understanding was expected to emerge on Kashmir, and the issue would them be withdrawn from the UN. This would certainly take time, but India was prepared to take the first step. Since any precondition linking withdrawal of troops from the territories across the international border would amount to arm twisting, especially when India had an advantage over Pakistan in terms of area, the process of withdrawing troops was delinked from delineating the line of control so far as the agreement was concerned.

As regards prisoners of war and civilian internees, these were of two types; those who surrendered in East Pakistan to the joint command of India and Bangladesh; and those captured in the western sector. India contended that the future of the majority of prisoners, who had surrendered in Bangladesh, could not be decided without the concurrence of the government of that country, and that was not possible till Pakistan formally recognized Bangladesh.

Bhutto had his reservations. Notwithstanding the agreement on the line of control, he was not willing to withdraw the Kashmir dispute from the UN, nor was he prepared to rule out third-party participation in solving it.

Mrs Gandhi also referred to the Geneva Convention under which prisoners of war could be tried for war crimes. The Bangladesh Government had declared its intention to bring those responsible for genocide and other inhumane acts to trial. Since the repatriation of the majority of prisoners depended on the recognition of Bangladesh, the issue was shelved for consideration later under Article VI of the Simla Agreement.

Bhutto had his reservations. Notwithstanding the agreement on the line of control, he was not willing to withdraw the Kashmir dispute from the UN, nor was he prepared to rule out third-party participation in solving it. Although he believed in bilateralism, he said “we are living in a small world and it would be unrealistic to think that we can put a curtain round the subcontinent.” This implied that Bhutto accepted bilateralism so far as it served Pakistan’s interests, and yet wanted to keep open the option of third-party mediation when bilateralism no longer suited Pakistan.

About the prisoners of war, he was certain “they would have to be returned sooner or later,” and he depended upon the “humane considerations of India not to use them as a bargaining lever.” As for the recognition of Bangladesh, he gave the impression that his country was prepared to recognize realities, but at an opportune moment, and for this adequate preparation of public opinion in Pakistan was necessary. He made it known that the war crime trials in Dacca would make things difficult for him at home.

In passing, he beseeched Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to look beyond the immediate present as many larger issues lay ahead. Any hasty step, however attractive and politically expedient at the moment, might mar the chances of future reconciliation. He felt that those suspected guilty of crimes should be tried in Pakistan itself, under international supervision if required.

On the political plane, the severest criticism came from Atal Behari Vajpayee, then a Jana Sangh member of Parliament. He said that before the Simla summit Mrs Gandhi had promised the nation a “package deal,” but she had been out-manoeuvred by Bhutto to adopt a gradual approach. Vajpayee said: “In the process, important issues, such as vacation of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir, war damages, settlement of pre-partition debts, evacuee property, and the burden of looking after the refugees before the liberation of Bangladesh have been bypassed.”

It appeared that Bhuttos immediate concern was the withdrawal of Indian troops from Pakistan-occupied territory. So far as the prisoners of war were concerned, he believed “India cannot keep the prisoners indefinitely.”

He further asserted that the agreement would mean that “India should give up some 5,000 square miles of Pakistani territory while Pakistan would continue its illegal occupation of 30,000 square miles of Indian territory in Kashmir.” According to him, “this amounts to a gross betrayal of the sacrifices of our jawans. The Government has started losing at the negotiation table what the brave jawans won on the battlefield.” Instead of consolidating the military victory to provide a lasting peace, he alleged the Government had through this agreement relapsed into a state of “self-delusion under ritualistic homage to peace, noninterference and friendship.”

Defending the Simla Agreement, External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh said that a gradual approach, starting with the withdrawal of troops to the international border and the delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir, would generate the necessary confidence for the growth of friendly and peaceful relations between the two countries to enable them to tackle other major issues. The Government also claimed that the agreement did away with third-party involvement and brought all issues, including Kashmir, to be settled through bilateral negotiation.