Military & Aerospace

India’s Indigenous Submarine Design Dilemma
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Issue Vol 27.3 Jul-Sep 2012 | Date : 17 Sep , 2012

INS Chakra

The defence shipyards have not as yet come up to Navy’s expectations, particularly in respect of productivity standards. Time and cost overruns have become a perpetual problem. Some of these could be justified with legitimate explanations; others need to be urgently addressed. Technological modernisation, skill up-gradation and trade structure review are long overdue. Hopefully, the new private shipyards coming on stream would create the competitive compulsions to expedite this process. To inculcate a healthy competitive spirit the private shipyards need to be provided, similar encouragement and a level playing field.

The persistent long-term naval objective of establishing indigenous surface ship design and build plan has now started bearing fruit. From the 1950s, the Navy commenced training its design engineers in all relevant disciplines, including Naval Architecture in UK. It also resolutely nurtured the defence shipyards. Every Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), since independence, has been fully supportive of this objective and has proactively, steered through the ambitious plan. Today the order books of all defence shipyards are full. Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. (HSL), a Public Sector Unit (PSU) has also been added to the Defence PSU basket. By now, the Navy can proudly claim to have designed at least seventeen class of ships and built beyond eighty ships indigenously and is well on its way to do the same with a nuclear powered submarine and an aircraft carrier.

The indigenisation process in respect of submarines has not been satisfactory.

The defence shipyards have not as yet come up to Navy’s expectations, particularly in respect of productivity standards. Time and cost overruns have become a perpetual problem. Some of these could be justified with legitimate explanations; others need to be urgently addressed. Technological modernisation, skill up-gradation and trade structure review are long overdue. Hopefully, the new private shipyards coming on stream would create the competitive compulsions to expedite this process. To inculcate a healthy competitive spirit the private shipyards need to be provided, similar encouragement and a level playing field.

It is encouraging to see that the following defence contracts have already been awards to:

  • Alcock Ashdown (AAGL) for six survey vessels.
  • Pipavav Shipyard (PSL) for five OPVs.
  • ABG Shipyard for the training ship.

Alcock Ashdown

Putting on hold, the recently announced Public-Private Sector partnership between MDL and Pipavov Shipyard (renamed Pipavav Defence & Offshore Engineering Ltd.) does not augur well for the industry.

Also, in spite of the support given by the Navy – AAGL seems to be going under. The disinvestment proposal is being pursued but is yet to find a suitable taker. Hopefully, this is just a temporary glitch.

The Submarine Perspective

The indigenisation process in respect of submarines has not been satisfactory. The late start imposed by the government policy was the initial cause. The government policy of denying submarine acquisition to the Navy under its obsession of treating the submarine as an offensive weapon platform delayed the induction of the submarine into the Navy by over two decades.

Pipavav Shipyard

The first submarine was commissioned into the Navy only in the late 1960s. Till then, even for anti-submarine training for surface ships, the Navy was dependent on the Royal Navy to make a submarine available during the Commonwealth Joint Exercises. For that reason building of an indigenous submarine and design/construction aspirations were kept on the back-burner.

Building of an indigenous submarine and design/construction aspirations were kept on the back-burner…

Once the submarine induction began, the dormant plans for developing indigenous capabilities were resurrected. Officers undergoing post-graduate training on naval-architecture in the UK and the USSR were encouraged to take up submarine design projects at the academic level. At that stage, the Navy had no formal plan to design or build submarines. Meanwhile serious deficiencies were also observed in the ability for even undertaking and preparing pressure hull repair schemes for the Medium Repairs (MR) of INS Khandheri. These shortcomings were progressively attended to, both at the level of academic training at the Naval Academy in Leningrad and technology transfer through Repair Technical Documents (RTDs) from Soviet shipyards.

By the eighties, the Navy had formulated a long-term plan for its Submarine Arm. In a study published after his retirement, the late Admiral A K Chatterjee, former CNS, recommended a force level of twenty conventional and six nuclear submarines. By then, the Submarine Arm was well matured and had mastered the exploitation and maintenance skills on the I641K submarine, acquired from the USSR. The Navy had also finalised its requirements for the next generation of 877EKM submarine from the Soviet Union. Within the service, the consensus to develop an indigenous submarine design capability had already taken root. Accordingly, the original objective with the acquisition of Howaldswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) Type 1400 SSK submarine – included the transfer of design knowhow, along with the Transfer of Technology (TOT) on production, operation, maintenance and repairs.

ABG Shipyard

For the above purpose, a multi-disciplinary design team comprising of about twenty-five design specialists received design training, under Professor Aben Gobbler’s unit at Kiel/Lubek in Germany for over twenty months. They were given access to relevant software, design data, empirical formulae and linked values of design coefficients. To earn their diploma, the team had to prepare a concept design of a submarine, to a given Qualitative Requirement (QR) and take it up to and submit a complete preliminary design. This team has been the backbone of other Submarine Design Groups (SDG) with the Navy.

The design team had the confidence of undertaking any modification work that could come up during the service life of the boat. They also considered themselves capable of taking on a single hull submarine design ab initio. Since such an attempt would have been for the first time in India, validation of the design and linked tank trials would perforce have to be undertaken by a design agency with established track record. Unfortunately, taking forward of such a strategic objective got derailed due to the political/contractual fall-out linked to the alleged Bofors/HDW scam. Naturally, the goal post also got shifted not only on the submarine construction programme but also on any long-term plan foreseen earlier.

One limitation that the Navy ran into was the mismatch between what was received and the need of the hour…

Fortunately, the timing coincided with the launch of the indigenous ATV nuclear submarine programme. It became convenient to redeploy the core element of the design team to this priority project. One limitation that the Navy ran into, in respect of exploiting the design know-how technology acquired against the SSK project, was the mismatch between what was received and the need of the hour. Such a contingency could not have been foreseen. In that context, Western expertise was in the area of single hull submarine. Whereas, due to its own compulsions, India’s immediate requirements at that time were for a double hull design.

Nuclear Submarine Option

In 1971, the surfacing of just one Soviet nuclear submarine in the Indian Ocean was sufficient to neutralise the US carrier battle group deployed there to intimidate India from continuing with its objective of helping the Bangladesh liberation movement. This single event served as an eye opener to Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister (PM) of India. The strategic significance of a nuclear powered submarine was driven home to the PM. Soon thereafter, she initiated the feasibility study on an indigenous nuclear propulsion plant for a submarine. This initiative has now been converted into a reality. INS Arihant, the first indigenous nuclear powered submarine, is presently undergoing basin trials and will soon be subjected to extensive harbour and sea trials. Hopefully, this year, INS Arihant will be a part of the nuclear triad in India’s deterrent strategy. The timeframe for the execution of this project could have been considerably compressed had we taken a pragmatic and proactive action before the collapse of the USSR. Just imagine the strategic implications of having an indigenous second strike capability before 1995. Someone should take stock of the cost of the opportunity lost due to the delay.

INS Arihant, the first indigenous nuclear powered submarine, is presently undergoing basin trials…

In the mid 1980s, — INS Chakra I, a nuclear-powered Charley class submarine with cruise missile capability (SSGN) was also leased out from the Soviet Navy.

The primary role assigned to it was for training and imbibing operation/maintenance skills. The expectation was that during the lease period, India would be able to design and build an indigenous nuclear powered submarine of her own. That proved to be an unrealistic expectation. Hence, on expiry of the lease period, INS Chakra was returned to the USSR.

In December 2011, the INS Chakra II a Nerpa class SSGN was taken on lease from Russia for a period of ten years and has joined the fleet now. This will dove-tail into the operationalisation programme of the indigenous nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) Arihant and will be progressively joined by additional SSBNs already in the pipeline.

It is heartening to note that in the case of conventional submarine design capability acquired from HDW, measures were taken to keep the knowledge alive and kicking for future use and not allowed to fall by the wayside as it happened in the case of MDL building skills. The Naval Design Bureau has had an institutionalised system in place to archive all such design knowhow imbibed by the individuals and the establishment. Though the original design team is no more available to the Bureau – the wherewithal is not lost and can be retrieved and built up on, at any time needed.

Scorpene Submarine

Though at that stage no formal concrete proposal for a long term submarine acquisition programme was on the table, the Navy did not let its guard down. Naval Architects, undergoing post-graduate professional courses at Greenwich in the UK and at the Soviet Naval Academy, Leningrad, were encouraged to take up submarine design as a project assignment. That continued during the period of induction of I641K and 877EKM submarines from USSR.

At the time that the thirty-year, long-term submarine acquisition plan took shape, the option for carrying forward the HDW programme for indigenous design of a conventional submarine had been closed. Meanwhile, the proposal for additional twin streams of submarine construction programmes – one on the East coast and the other on the West coast had emerged. At the time, the expectation was that the next collaboration agreement would take care of any deficiencies observed in the HDW contract so that the follow-on submarine programme could be of genuine indigenous design.

In hindsight, any deficiency observed from the SSK project should have been taken care of, in the follow-on submarine acquisition project (i.e. the Scorpene project with Direction des Construction Navale (DCN) France. It seems, however, that we have not made use of that opportunity to the extent that we ought to have.

Similar to the HDW submarine contract – the Scorpene contract also provided for transfer of a comprehensive set of design know-how documents. This package was considered adequate to enable our designers to undertake any modifications and even venture into design of the next generation of single hull submarine. The catch is believed to be on account of being denied access to the linked compendium of submarine equipment and component data/specifications, along with its vendor particulars.

Development of Indigenous Ancillary Industries

In spite of the existence of the Submarine Arm for more than four decades, India has failed to encourage the development of any indigenous production base for submarine ancillaries. In the absence of such a capability, access to detail particulars of such imported components was considered a crucial element needed for systems design. A separate Government to Government Agreement was being insisted upon by the vendor for any such transfer of information. The Government failed to appreciate the importance of such an input and did not pursue it aggressively enough. Bearing in mind the national interest in attaining and perfecting an indigenous submarine design capability, this should have been included as a strategic objective of the project. This could have been obtained as a part of the main contract or even against an offset obligation. In this context, the advice of the professional members was discounted by the Acquisition bureaucrats on the Board.

India has failed to encourage the development of any indigenous production base for submarine ancillaries.

Even at that stage, a separate Government to Government Protocol to the original agreement could have achieved the objective. Additional cost involved would need to have been adjusted against the Scorpene offset obligations.

In contrast to the above cases in India, one needs to learn a lesson from the Korean experience. Korea began the construction of a submarine type 209 in collaboration with HDW much after India went in for the type 1400 submarine. Today, Korea has already graduated to exporting submarines to Indonesia.

Failing in the above objective, instead of waiting for another opportunity to open up against the next-generation conventional submarine acquisition programme (Project 75I – which may not go in favour of France) – an out-of-the-box solution should be found by making a piggy-back attempt against an ongoing mega project with France. In such cases of cross project transfer of offset assets, the biggest hurdles are more likely to arise from objections from the direct customers – IAF and HAL, rather than the suppliers. This only emphasises the need for a National Offset Management Agency.

But for want of this specific know-how, the Navy would have been on the threshold of a breakthrough in acquiring this capability of national importance. In case DCN is unwilling to find an out-of-the-box solution to this predicament, both DCN and HDW should be taken out of reckoning for any future contracts.

Further opportunity on this count will become available again with Project.75.I. In case, the option suggested against an ongoing mega French defence acquisition project does not work out then – this opportunity must not be allowed to slip by. All deficiencies in design know-how transfer must be clearly identified. All avenues must be pursued, inclusive of using the offset provision and making full use of the multiplier factor. In this case, it should be a full bore Joint Venture (JV) design, development and production contract. Validation of indigenous design should be made a contractual obligation.

Having failed on two occasions from different sources in Europe to achieve a genuine submarine design knowhow transfer – it is time for us to move on and accept the ground reality that such a transfer is not possible due to strategic commercial consideration of the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). In the process of moving on from this predicament, the following needs to be given due weightage:

  • In the Indian context — a pragmatic and professional view needs to be taken on the pros and cons of selecting a double hull design against a single hull submarine.
  • Due to compulsions of circumstances – a conscious decision be taken on accepting the implications, if any, of foregoing the single hull design option for the present.
  • Wouldn’t it be more pragmatic to consolidate and build on the double hull design capability already acquired in the process of designing Arihant and take it forward to meet our conventional submarine requirements also?

All deficiencies in design know-how transfer must be clearly identified.

  • The Naval Design Bureau in Delhi is already familiar with the working environment of the potential JV partner and has built up a high level of mutual confidence. The JV partnership Agreement must fully cover all aspects of design, development and construction of a conventional submarine to the Indian Navy’s QRs.
  • The next stage would be to meet the thirty-year long IN submarine programme and also meet the import requirements of friendly neighbouring countries.

Another serious issue to be taken by the horn relates to building up of a fully fledged HRD plan to cope with the above reality. A pragmatic view must be taken to get the shipyards to gear up to take on their legitimate share of the design load. Private firms must be given the opportunity to compete on a level playing field. L&T has already established its credentials as a reliable source for submarine hull construction and integrated system design. They could be serious contenders for taking on this aspect of future submarine building programmes. The main handicap they have is the absence of a captive shipbuilding infrastructure. Interim innovative solutions can be found for such contingency also.

The Navy should not fall into the temptation of accepting the responsibility of carrying the design exercise through to the working drawing stage. For one, it will not be able to build up the cadre both in number and skills within the desired timeframe nor will it be able to provide the continuity required in performing the function efficiently. Given the opportunity the private sector would take on the challenge and deliver results.

A Missed Opportunity

As seen from above, the absence of an industrial complex capable of delivering conventional submarine parts and non-inclusion of critical documentation for the same, as part of the original contracts for HDW and DCN submarines has rendered a well-strategized naval plan, for developing a design and development capability, to a naught. The onus for which can once again be squarely laid on the narrow-minded approach of the bureaucratic institution in the Defence Acquisition Organisation.

Validation of indigenous design should be made a contractual obligation.

This brings to the fore another parallel attempt made earlier which could have partly compensated for the deficiency highlighted:

  • In the mid-1980s, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) had established the Defence Machinery Development Establishment (DMDE) and the Machinery Test Centre (MTC). These establishments were tasked to develop and test machinery and systems for an indigenous special submarine programme. The task included all submarine parts pertaining to the secondary propulsion, ventilation, air-condition, hydraulic, pneumatic, steering, stabiliser, diving and surfacing system. Most of the submarine system parts required would have been functionally identical to the parts of submarine in service except that size and power ratings would have been different.
  • In the late 1980s, the recommendations were made to extend the scope of DMDE and MTC to include development of all engineering equipment and components required for the submarines in commission also. This was not conceded to on security considerations.
  • At that time the USSR was committed to supply RTDEs including manufacturing drawings and detailed material specifications for all engineering machinery and system components for projects I641K and 877EKM submarines. Majority of the documents for the I641K were already in place.
  • The concept of patents and proprietary rights was almost non-existent in the Soviet jargon. Resorting to reverse engineering with the parts available on the shelf and RTDs would have raised no eyebrows. In any case, the Soviet practice required the shipyards to produce such spare parts in house.
  •  Had the DMDE started a parallel line for development and production of specialised submarines parts for I641K and 877EKM, three decades later a flourishing ancillary industry would have been available to take on all submarine requirements for the existing and future conventional and nuclear submarines. Crores of rupees could have been saved against the import of Current Repairs (CR) and Medium Repairs (MR) spares kit.
  • As brought out earlier, along with the HDW contract for SSK, a compendium of documents listing the range of equipment, machinery and parts that form the submarine system were provided along with specifications and vendor details for each. Similar documents have been provided for the Scorpene submarine also. These data should have been sourced to develop a range of industrial complex even under the offset obligations. The CCP approved long-term submarine building/acquisition plan – could have been used as a bait to attract greater private sector participation.

The shipyards must be geared up to take on their legitimate share of the design load…

  • The growth of the Indian automobile auxiliary industry illustrates the possible advantages in taking such a route.
  • The Korean model could have been yet another option.
  • Working in closed water tight vertical silos has prevented exploitation of the commercial/industrial potential of the country and has left the design and development programme in a limbo – the price one will continue to pay for demolishing an established institutional professional arrangement for small parochial sectarian gains.
  • The status of the in-house professional institutions must be restored. Give these institutions total overall responsibility for managing their respective technologies including:
  • Research & Development
  • Induction and life time management of technology
  • Professional Training & HRD plans
  • Authority Holding Sealed Particulars (AHSP)

Note: Being a part of the Integrated Service HQs – they would still continue to be professionally responsible to the Navy.

Cost Benefit Analysis

A deeper examination of all the above cases would indicate that had a cost-benefit analysis study of the options available at that time been undertaken, the situation would have been totally different. These instances once again illustrate that the bureaucratic leadership has yet to go beyond the bazaar bargaining mentality. Their negotiating skills are limited to bargaining for a percentage cut syndrome. Most of bidders come well prepared to deal with such a situation. To highlight the pitfalls, some independent authority like CAG/PAC should undertake a deep case study of these specific cases.

It would also be observed that all the achievements identified in the above narrative were managed in spite of the development of indigenous submarine design capability not being enshrined in the long term submarine induction programme, as a policy objective. Maybe the acquisition bureaucrats would take shelter under such an excuse for their myopic attitude on the subject.

References

  1. R.Adm. AP Revi IN (Retd) “Naval Acquisition Matrix” IDR Vol. 21(4), Oct. 2006, p. 82.
  2. R.Adm. AP Revi, “Arihant: The Annihilator.” IDR Vol. 24(4), Oct. 2009, p. 43.
  3. R.Adm. AP Revi, “Naval Academy & HRD Challenges ahead” USI Journal, June 2009.
  4. V.Adm. Rajeshwer Nath, “Design Review of Naval Platforms” IDR Vol. 25. Jan. 2010.
  5. Interview with IDR Editor:
  • R.Adm. RM Bhatia, “Submarine Construction Represents a Core Strategic Capability.”
  • V.Adm Rajeshwer Nath. “Project 75.”

6.  Procedings of National Maritime Foundation Seminar – 21–22 Nov. 2007:

  • R.Adm. NP Gupta, “Strategic and Options — Warship Building in India.”
  • Comde R Gosh, “Integrated Quality for Higher Productivity — The Way Ahead for Defence Shipbuilding.”
  • Cmde. Sujeet Samaddar, “Offset Absorption Road Map For Indian Navy — Adding Arsenal To Armament”.
  • Cmde HS Kang. “Challenges in Shipbuilding Infrastructure.”
  • SP Ravindran. GM (Technical) BEL “Technology Inflows — Issues, Challenges and Methodology.”
  • Xavier Marchel. Senior Vice President DCNS France. “Warship Construction — An Experience Of Transformation.”
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3 thoughts on “India’s Indigenous Submarine Design Dilemma

  1. the navy needs to to induct 12 scorpenes the last few with AIP, BUILD GERMAN216OR 218 8TO10 AND THEN FINALISE A TOTAL INDIAN DESIGN FOR CONVENTIAL SUBS . THE SSNS AND SSBNS NEED SEPERATE LINES AT VIZAG , MDL AND L@T SHIPYARD BE THE CONVENTIONAL BUILDING YARDS
    WHILST VZAG BUIDS THE SSNS AND SSBNS . A 12 TO 15 YRS OF DEDICATED EFFORT WITH TIME AND MANPOWER IS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE TOTAL INDEPENDANCE FROM RUSSIAN AND WESTERN SOURCES EXCEPT FOR COMPNENTS AND SOME SYSTEMS .THE CONSTRAINTS OF MONEY CAN BE SOLVED BY DELAYING THE IAC-2 .

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