Geopolitics

India's hollowness and Pak’s perpetual war path
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
Issue Net Edition | Date : 29 Aug , 2014

Worse, the cutting edge fighting units were deficient of, besides ammunition, their basic war-equipment: infantry battalions short of machine guns, armoured regiments short of tank fitments, artillery regiments deficient of gun accessories and engineer regiments short of assault bridges, to mention just few examples. Life-cycle stocks of ammunitions – missiles, mines and explosives, fuses, power-packs etc. – rather than being replaced, had their ‘life extended’ repeatedly without due inspection and testing, in disregard to its consequences.  That was the state which came to be described within the Army hierarchy as “Hollowness” – not that it raised any heckles among the wise men in power.

After the War of 1971 it was clear that Pakistan could never wrest Kashmir through conventional military aggression. Consequently, she adopted another method…

At this juncture, while the service top brass were compelled to pass time under this state of affairs, the stage was taken up by some arm-chair security experts who went over-board in chanting the American mantra of future warfare.  ‘Information warfare’, ‘battle field transparency’, ‘precision attack’, ‘cyber war’, ‘force multipliers’, ‘re-organisation’, etc, were hotly discussed in articles and seminars, with nary a prospect of ever putting these into effect in a governing system so chary of the military. In fact, such propositions had the opposite effect; security policy makers deduced that conventional warfare had become redundant and the political purpose of war could be adequately served by the missiles produced by the DRDO! As a corollary, justification was contrived to endorse the state of ‘hollowness’ in the Army and limit its engagement just to the counter-insurgency role. As complacency set in the Government, the mood of indifference flowed into the national intelligence agencies as well as the field army formations. Thus the whole lot seemed to have disassociated from their charter of updating information of the happenings across the Line of Control.

All this while, Pakistan and her fiercely fundamentalist militants were watching, with intent.

Pakistan’s Game Plan

In 1998, another defeat was staring at the Pakistan Army in its proxy war. Moreover, India’s nuclear weaponisation had forced Pakistan to shed what was an exposed duplicity, to go officially nuclear. As a state which is accountable to its army, whose empire is in turn sustained by attempts to undermine India – even if dishonoured in defeat every time – it was impossible now for Pakistan to resist the temptation of taking advantage of India’s military ‘hollowness’. India’s focus on economic build-up, and ready ‘strategic asset’ of brainwashed so called ‘jehadis’ added to the attractiveness of the scheme.

The game plan was evident. After the War in 1965, Pakistan realised that India would not be shy of adopting her preferred military options to defeat any aggression.  After the War of 1971 it was clear that Pakistan could never wrest Kashmir through conventional military aggression. Consequently, she adopted another method – that of exploiting India’s internal fault-lines. A long proxy war followed, first in Punjab and then in Kashmir.  Armed incursion across the Line of Control was the second phase of this plan, which was meant to be followed up with conventional military attacks in due course under a backdrop of nuclear blackmail. India of the 1990’s, never credited with strategic fervour in any case, helped the matter by degrading her military strength to such an extent that Pakistan was sanguine of success of her venture against any reckonable threat from the Indian armed forces.

Young officers and men rose to the occasion to wash the sin of ‘hollowness’ that had been perpetrated in the South Block and acquiesced, if helplessly, by their formation commanders.

Intrusion and its Eviction

By May 1999, the Pakistan Army had prepared well enough to pose to India such a stratagem of a military challenge that would leave the latter with no satisfactory solution to ameliorate. After carrying out due logistic preparations over a year and a half, some well equipped and religiously poisoned terrorists were grouped with predominantly ‘volunteers’ from the regular army as well as  the Northern Light Infantry, to be inducted across the Line of Control through the Gultari, Shangruti and Chorbat La  Sectors of the Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK)3. As summer approached and the deep snow-covered high altitude mountains became traversable, these heavily armed and well provisioned contingents of infiltrators crossed the Line of Control to occupy the heights dominating the life-line road axis running from Srinagar across the Mushko Valley, Dras, and Batalik in the Kargil Sector and beyond to Turtuk in the Sub-Sector West, which lies South of the Siachen Glacier.

The story hereafter is too well known to be repeated here. Suffice to state that:-

  • The intrusion was detected by sheep-herders. Apparently, winter aerial observation patrols over the Line of Control had not been carried out purposefully, and the Army may have been delayed in patrolling and re-occupying the winter vacated posts.
  • Top formation commanders had erred in viewing this intrusion as but a minor infraction which would be cleared out with just a sleigh of hand.
  • Probably to cover their lapse, the Army hierarchy chose to hurriedly commit troops, marshalling them from nearest areas to evict the well organised enemy that had entrenched itself in extremely rugged heights. Artillery guns were moved from all over and lots of ammunition were collected by scraping at bits of stocks found from here and there. There seems to be a rush to win back the heights as early as it could be reckoned.
  • Young officers and men rose to the occasion to wash the sin of ‘hollowness’ that had been perpetrated in the South Block and acquiesced, if helplessly, by their formation commanders.
  • The Air Force found itself ill-equipped to make a difference in high-altitude warfare. Yet, once committed, they fought gallantly while finding means to overcome the deficiencies.

…how was it that the Air Force found itself untrained and unprepared to fight over high-altitude mountains. Was it unaware of the terrain over which India must fight to preserve its integrity.

What however, may be found jarring to the nation’s politico-military conscience are some questions that point to ‘consensual neglect’ of our territorial integrity – economic limitations or military stagnation, whatever be the stated cause:-

  • One, as to how come none of the top commanders, barring just one tantrum-prone  brigadier, were indicted for such a grave lapse in handling military responsibility;
  • Two, why could not we build up more deliberately to destroy the intrusion while harnessing winter and snow, just couple of months away, to freeze and starve the intruders;
  • Three, how was it that the Air Force found itself untrained and unprepared to fight over high-altitude mountains. Was it unaware of the terrain over which India must fight to preserve its integrity;
  • Four, how come that the principle of ‘political control of war’ was allowed to transgress its sanctified provisions by constraining the armed forces from temporarily crossing the Line of Control, thus forcing own troops to forego better approaches to attack the enemy from the rear.

No doubt, there must be good reasons for the Indian Armed Forces to adopt the course that they eventually did. However, dissected to its bare bones, doubts arise that the political and military leadership, both ordained to preserve as much as possible the lives of its soldiers, chose to evict the enemy by bartering young soldier’s lives and limbs. The doubt may be taken seriously if lessons are to be imbibed.

It is time we realise that Kashmir is only the first of Pakistan’s objectives; call for a separate Punjab, Bengal, Assam and Lakshwadeep are to follow.

Pakistan’s Perpetual War-path

Even if we comfort ourselves with Pakistan’s defeat, the Kargil intrusion was a masterstroke which made us attack our own areas and suffer substantial losses in men and material while the aggressor remains immune and smug till date.

Our strategic shortsightedness has landed us in a most unenviable position.  Pakistan continues to enjoy the fruits of her aggression in 1947-48, occupying one-third of a state which had legally joined the Indian Union.  She disregards the UN call to withdraw from POJK while demanding that India complies to the call for a promised ‘plebiscite’.  And yet our home-grown peace-peddlers propose that the Line of Control – a ‘line of aggression’ in fact – be accepted as the inter-national boundary! Over the past 50 years, Pakistan has followed a single point agenda, that of relentlessly hammering away at the foundation of our secular, democratic way of life.  She has targeted the loyalty of our people, infiltrated our institutions with saboteurs, spread a poisonous informer network across the country, exploited every opportunity to embarrass India, indulges in inciting our friendly neighbours and continues a blatant war of propaganda. And yet we expect her to follow the path of mutual understandings!

It is time we realise that Kashmir is only the first of Pakistan’s objectives; call for a separate Punjab, Bengal, Assam and Lakshwadeep are to follow.  It is also the time to see that our intelligence set up is yet imperfect, our military institution is lame and our defence  bureaucracy is  not equipped to perform its responsibilities.

Notes:

  1. Referencing defence budget as percentage of GDP may work for economists, statistics being a tool to buttress any argument one way or its opposite. But it is  an obfuscating  practice among military  planners because it does very little to influence enemy’s designs to which they have to respond. For the record, had fallen below 2 percent of a rather modest GDP at that time.
  2. Perhaps that was the time when loose habits started gaining space into the military ethos.
  3. An army officered para-military force at that time, the Northern Light Infantry was, with much fanfare, absorbed into Pakistan’s  regular army in recognition of its service in that very intrusion across the Line of Control which Pakistan denies!
1 2
Rate this Article
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee

former Commandant Officers Training Academy, Chennai.

More by the same author

Post your Comment

2000characters left

14 thoughts on “India’s hollowness and Pak’s perpetual war path

  1. Having served from TRI-JUNCTION OF ( then )BURMA-EAST PAKISTAN-INDIA,
    when INSURGENCY of MNA of LAL DENGA,EX-AOC HAVILDAR,in jungles of MIZORAM was just rrupted , 1971 INDO-PAK WAR,( on WESTERN FRONT -where entire DIVISION WAS ASKED TO STAY PUT,EVEN AFTER cease fire,(stayed in occupied territory
    for more than 16 months ), TELANGANA AGITATION,MORADABAD RIOTS,BLUE STAR ( pre___post POLITICAL HARAKARI, SIACHEN GLACIER DAYS,( MAY 1985-APRIL 1988 ),BHAGALPUR RIOTS ( 1989),i must say,2LT to MAJOR days,have given me REAL LIFE TIME EXPERIENCE !
    Came in contact with CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION almost at all places.
    I must say,the CANDID VIEWS expressed by GENERAL Sir,are of PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE !
    I SALUTE YOU Sir !
    Major Ravi Joshi ( CORPS OF SIGNALS )
    DOB-08-81942,Born on the eve of QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT !
    { BORN NOT TO QUIT }

  2. why do the generals bear the burden for indias defence when the MOD BADA BABU IS RESPONSIBLE FOR IT . WILL A COURAGOUS CHIEF AND HIS FIELD CDRS RECOMMEND REORGANISATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AS THE FINANCE , MOD BABUS CANNOT FIND THE MONEY . REDUCE TO 500000 AND BE BETTER EQUIPPED , PAID AND AMMUNITIONED RATHER THAN BE SLOGGING WITH OUDATED EQUIPMENT , POOR SALARIES AND STILL INADEQUATE INJURY AND PENSIONS .

  3. A very well written article. The author has also had practical exposure at the working level as to how the MOD and DRDO function.

    When the economy was in doldrums at the time of PV taking over as PM, he having handled the MOD earlier was aware that Military could be asked to wait for some time and he was capable of avoiding a major flare up in the near future. He had handled the external affairs also before.MMS was the FM. Unfortunately our higher leadership did not fight hard enough after the economy was stabilised.

    As far as DRDO is concerned they have had some positive contribution but in other cases it was only empire building at the cost of services. Simple question- why was the Bofors spares not indigenised? Accountability was totally lacking. There are numerous examples. Again the Services did not pressurise them adequately. SLR-how long to develop & produce. NAG ? DRDO was taking and taking credit for Prithvi.
    When budget was not adequately provided for preventing cold weather casualties in J&K, it was only when DGMO sent a note that the responsibility of casualties is not that of the Army but that of Ministry, was fund released in a weeks time.But these are exceptions. A study of utilisation of budgeted funds will high light how the files will be put on a snails pace till RE stage and then after FY ends amounts surrendered to adjust else where. MOD will repeat the,” Service headquarters has not been able to utilise the funds allocated”

    Army HQ has its own flaws and we have not had a Chief who could correct the system.Question is should we only go by the principle of seniority in appointing a Chief? It is essential that the Services also get their house in order-NFU was introduced in 5th CPC and no one bothered. 6th CPC implementation has had the worst impact on the Services where the Depts/Orgs were a mixture- Service officers suddenly were fighting for their place-MES,DRDO, BRO.ADG draws a higher pay than DG! Veteran think tanks have to play a role.

  4. OK, we have a choice. Continue to blame the past governance for failing or pen down a new doctrine. Starting with the goal, anything in the defense architecture that does not support stronger India, reject and replace. This means most of the bureaucracy that has grown like weeds in the absence of strong leadership. Stop fearing the armed forces of coups and start trusting professional development at the highest levels of command and control like in US and NATO nations. In the new world, there is less and less secrecy about arms and equipment. Most of the salient features of new weapon systems are available on the google and u-tubes. China is in bed with Russia on the most advance jet fighter technologies, and therefore India’s technological secrets are available to China when India procures fifth generation fighters with Russian collaboration. The difference therefore, boils down to capacity and skill to deliver punch. Weapons technologies, whether outsourced or procured in house, will be increasingly similar to the aps on the personal computer. It is the user and the application of such app that will remain the deciding factor. India’s work is cutout in terms of developing the first response strategy, management of this strategy and the tactical response parameters to operate under the strategy. This is where work must start with earnestness and the new government has a clean sheet to pen the ideas while the nation is waiting.

  5. An excellent and well meaning analysis which should serve as a wake up call to both the politico executive and the military hierarchy…instead of pointing fingers at each other, the urgent need is to address the issue and not personalities…a complete revamp of the system is required to restore the balance…the MOD needs to be scrapped in entirety, the DRDO should be taken out from the MOD and work under the Ministry of Industries, as it is eating most of the Defence budget…the men in uniform need to develop some spunk and spine and exert themselves to take a stand, where and when it matters….we need soldiers in uniform and not bureaucrats or future governors/ambassadors…its high time the ones in higher levels of hierarchy stop taking any nonsense from the civil establishment…but to start we have to introspect and reflect and clean the house within

  6. hello we are humans i don’t know why these 2 countries always fight while they have mostly common things colors,natures,languages and much more.But on small things they despite each other i think we need to leave war and go for peace.

    • Don’t you know they are separated by religion. One is an aggressive religion, came from Arabia and enslaved a nation in the seventh/eighth century, when peace had prevailed there for a millennium. People in India had lost skills of war fighting at Gautama the Buddha’s advice and had become passive. They were enslaved and murdered for seven hundred years, pretty well the same way as ISIS in Iraq is murdering people of different religions.

      British put an end to it in the eighteenth century to economic exploit the people in a different way. After independence the Pakistanis see the same dream of enslaving the nation as their kind saw in the seventh and eighth century. Kashmir issue or river water fight etc. are mere excuses to continue the fight. The real intent to rule over all of India one more time. They have lost three times but would continue as long as it takes, unless of of course they are annihilated first.

      Now in a nut shell, did you get your answer.

  7. Spend beyond one’s means and bankrupt the nation.

    Also please realize, the defence procurement delays begin the day the GSQR are written. It is forty years old procedure designed to bureaucratize the procurement process and added delays. It also allows corruption and bribery to creep in. If GSQR is specifically written to acquire hardware and follow it with ammunition and spares from abroad, it leaves no money to procure additional items. If an India made item is offered it is sent thru infinite tests and ridicule. Army exercise hands off policy on Indian items and pushes the clumsy GSQR to the limit to eliminate the local made item.

    Armed forces have holes in what they have been doing in last fifteen years. Other than critical of DRDO or Ordnance factories etc. they have not provided any useful input.

    Get smart Indian armed forces, there is a new man incharge at the helm.

  8. Excellent article. The only solution is to completely demolish MoD (like the Planning Commission) replacing it with a Department of Defence staffed by military professionals directly under the PM. The CCS note sent by DRDO is another attempt at commercialization and empire building. DRDO focus must be R&D not money making. DRDO-DPSU’s-OF need to be restructured injecting users (military) at every level including management and decision making. PM’s call for foreign investment and technology in defence sector has been quietly undermined by restricting FDI to 49% and not streamlining the DPP to enable absorbing foreign technology and make the defence sector lucrative enough.

  9. An excellent analysis. I hope and pray that the decision makers take note of it and the issue of hollowness is addressed on priority. In fact when Gen VK Singh had raised this issue with the PM, instead of addressing the issue people who were in the power, particularly in MoD and immature media bayed for his blood. I hope that the present hierarchy shows more maturity and necessary sagacity to address the issue.

  10. “Pakistan continues to enjoy the fruits of her aggression in 1947-48, occupying one-third of a state which had legally joined the Indian Union.” – Not fully accurate, since in 1971 war they overran Indian defences in the Chamb sector. And the territory there in Chamb is in their possession ever since. It is beyond my understanding why the corps commander there (Gen Sartaj Singh?) did not mount a counterattack to dislodge the Pakis from there and recover that territory. From my reading of the 1971 war analysis by various military related personalities, which have appeared over time in the open, I get the impression that the Indian Army made a poor showing on the western front in spite of having the edge in armaments over the Pakis (Gens Candeth, Shastri and others war direction and conduct?). Also, the callous attitude of the Army Chief in the initial phases of the Kargil episode as reported in the media points to a glaring lapse in performance on the part of the Army. It is true that the politicians and the bureaucrats are ruining the system all over, but the Armed Forces efficiency efficiency may not be up to the standard even with their resources in possession. For Siachin, they failed to occupy the base at the ground level although for snow-bound mountains there supply is a big problem at the top, but a post at the ground level would make life and military position far more manageable. So there are failures by all concerned, including the military.

  11. Gujral as PM reduced effectiveness of RAW to please Pakistan. Mummohan as Finance Minister drastically cut Defence Ministry budgets, and the results are for us to see. As for Mummohan as PM, he watched every minister LOOT India. What good Mummohan is, Deaf,dumb,Blind ???

More Comments Loader Loading Comments