Indian Defence Review

The Kargil war identified certain inadequacies in the functioning of our Higher Defence Organisation. Subsequently, the Kargil Review Committee enumerated the need for a thorough review of the national security system and recommended instituting the post of CDS. After the report of the Group of Ministers was submitted, substantial reforms did take place in the armed forces.

The Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CISC) to the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee was appointed on 01 Oct 2001 and HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was created by a Govt. of India letter dated 23 Nov 2001. The staffs of the erstwhile DG DPS and JS (Mil) were merged with HQ IDS and it started functioning wef 01 Feb 20021. However, in Nov 2005, the present Defence Minister, in Rajya Sabha indicated that a decision regarding the appointment of CDS could only be taken after holding wider consultations with various political parties.

Requirement of CDS and Unified Structures

One of the major lessons of the 1965 and the Kargil War was inadequate joint planning. The reasons cited for this inadequacy were lack of joint structures necessary for operational planning and lack of unity of command in operational and intelligence activities at the national level. There is no doubt that the three services are proficient in the planning and conduct of operational art in their own individual spheres and have acquitted themselves exceptionally well in UN Peacekeeping Operations and exercises with USA, Russia, UK, China and Singapore. however, when it comes to formulation of strategic art and the conduct of joint operational art, there are serious inadequacies. There is no single agency that links all elements of nation-state with military strategy and military strategy with operational art.

The application of force should not be based on individual aspirations of only one service.

The management of national security involves a synergism of varied functions that ranges from evolving a security philosophy and a security strategy to evolving and implementing military strategies, designing and conducting campaigns and ultimately executing combat operations by identified forces. The application of military power needs to be in conformity with the overall national security objectives and in support of the desired end state formulated for specific operations. Without having a clear end state for conflict termination, the campaign planning would meander through various stages of force application before achieving success or failure by hit and trial methods.

However, this would not be an efficient way of applying military power. The stated objectives need to be achieved efficiently with optimal application of appropriate force. It may be possible that the end state could be achieved by the employment of only a single service, at the same time, it may need two or more services or an integrated application of the military forces alongwith all elements of national power. Most contingencies would require a focussed approach by all elements of the state. Thus, there is a need to institute structures that evolve an integrated approach.

The application of force should not be based on individual aspirations of only one service. The strategic decision, the determination of clear military and political end state and the planning for strategic and joint operational art needs an interface between the political establishment, bureaucracy and the armed forces. The Chairman, COSC does not have the institutional backing or the time to conduct this vital function as he wears two hats, one as Chairman, COSC and the other as the Chief of his own service. This function can only be carried out by a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who is not inhibited by his own service tasks or loyalties and assisted by an integrated operational institutionalised structure.

There is no single agency that links all elements of nation-state with military strategy and military strategy with operational art.

In the present environment, the individual services carry out operational planning at the Command HQ level. The plans rather than being joint, are based on single service appreciations to achieve the stated objectives and overlaying the application of the other service to suit own requirements. Hence the plans are based more on creating a feeling of “mutual co-operation” to achieve strategic objectives rather than based on a jointly appreciated integrated course of action. It is for this reason that more often than not the plans are focussed mainly towards gaining real estate and territorial accretions quickly, as leverage tools rather than to focus on achieving strategic objectives in the most optimal manner, even if it implies employing out of box techniques.

Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi, PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC has indicated that joint war fighting is not about fighting the war with equal opportunity but about recognising the unique competencies and capabilities of each arm and service, to make each entity interoperable and utilise the strong points of each service for the combined operational benefit to achieve military objectives2. This is where the crux of operational planning lies.

Eisenhower in a memorandum had earlier written “The many organisations…. cannot possibly operate at maximum efficiency and effectiveness as long as  “co-operation” alone dictates their employment, no matter how sincere a purpose may inspire the co-operative effect”3.  In a senate hearing later, he further stated that “co-ordination by co-operation is ineffective and in my conviction the only team that could have won the European war was a unified command”4. The Indian working ethos is essentially hierarchical5; unless there is a hierarchical structure that facilitates forcible joint planning, it is difficult to achieve it by co-operation alone. The hierarchical orientation highlights the need for a five star CDS and not a three or a four star as envisaged earlier.

Joint war fighting is not about fighting the war with equal opportunity but about recognising the unique competencies and capabilities of each arm and service.

The future battlefields are likely to be vastly different; they would be non linear, digitised, highly mobile, transparent due to availability of multiple sensors belonging to different services and would possess integrated C4I2.6 The long ranges, of the weapon systems and their inherent overlaps with the operations of platforms and systems belonging to the other two services would entail the requirement of an integrated environment to manage them efficiently and optimally and to reduce the probability of fratricide. Thereby, reiterating the need for a unified structure to create an interoperable integrated environment.

The traditional concept of national security has undergone significant fundamental changes. It is no longer synonymous with military strength but includes internal cohesion, economic strength and technological prowess7. This is compounded by the changing nature of modern warfare. William S Lind has identified four different generations of wars. The first generation related to concentrating manpower with the help of line and coloumn tactics, the second to concentrating firepower with the help of artillery, the third to manoeuvre tactics and employing airpower and the fourth generation to asymmetric wars focussing on collapsing the enemy internally8. Presently, our organisational structures are focussed towards fighting third generation wars.

The intertwining of world economies is making traditional conflict more distant and a terror war more relevant. There is therefore a need to re-structure our armed forces to tackle more efficiently the asymmetric threat that is omnipresent today. In India, this type of warfare is personified by the mushrooming of pan Islamist militant outfits that find direct or indirect links with radical organisations, development of Naxalite and left wing instabilities and proliferation of armed violence9 led by criminal elements enjoying political patronage. The different examples include Delhi bombings in Oct 2005, killing of innocents by Naxalites in Feb 2006 and Varanasi attacks in Mar 2006. These asymmetric threats need a different force structure and an integrated response that links paramilitary elements, police forces and other arms of political power with the armed forces.

The IDS presently is oriented more towards preparing Long Term Perspective Plans (LTPP), budgeting plans, net assessments and joint doctrines. Even LTPP is mostly an overlay of individual service specific requirements rather than being based on a jointly appreciated need for an optimised force structure to tackle emerging threats or to take into account the aspirations of India becoming a regional power in the near future. There is an urgent need to identify a long term force structure development strategy to ensure that the armed forces are geared towards tackling threats that range from asymmetric to NBC.

India’s rapid economic growth has made the world take notice of our emerging capabilities. This is reflected in the recently concluded nuclear deal with the US. Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi has highlighted that “the area of interest for us today extends from the Eastern coast of Africa in the West, Sumatra to the East and the entire Indian Ocean to the South. The Indian armed forces now need to re-organise, re-equip and train themselves for contingencies stretching much beyond our frontiers”10.

At the core of being a regional power, rests the condition of acceptance by the international community of priority rights and responsibilities of intervening within the region. Intervention would then be a ‘right’ as well as a solemn responsibility11. India’s growing economic and military might would require our armed forces to be increasingly employed in Out of Area Contingencies (OOAC). There is thus a need to institutionalise those structures that prepare us to undertake our rightful future responsibilities. The lack of CDS and a unified operational structure stands out sorely in performing this vital function.

Levels of Warfare

The strategic level of warfighting constitutes the political strategic level and the military strategic level. The political strategic level is where national security strategy is formulated and it includes NSC, CCS, SPG, NSAB and NSCS. On the other hand, the military strategic level formulates the military strategy and acts as an interface between the political, diplomatic and economic arms on one hand and the three services on the other. The other levels are the operational and tactical levels related to the employment of various arms and services to achieve strategic objectives.

Present Structure of Operational Commands

The Indian Army is divided into six operational commands, the Northern Command (NC) at Udhampur, Western Command (WC) at Chandimandir, South Western Command (SWC) at Jaipur, Eastern Command (EC) at Kolkata, Southern Command (SC) at Pune and Central Command at Lucknow. On the other hand, IAF currently has five operational commands, namely Western Air Command (WAC) at Delhi, South Western Air Command (SWAC) at Gandhinagar, Southern Air Command (SAC) at Trivandrum, Central Air Command (CAC) at Allahbad and Eastern Air Command (EAC) at Shillong.

The Indian Navy is deployed under three area commands; Western Naval Command (WNC) at Mumbai, Southern Naval Command (SNC) at Kochi and the Eastern Naval Command (ENC) at Vishakhapatnam12. The operational commands of the three services are not co-located. Further, the area of responsibility (AOR) covered by Western Air Command equates to the combined AOR’s of NC, WC and SWC of the Indian Army.

Theatre of Operations : Case Study of US and Australia

US Commands. The term theatre of operations is defined in the American field manuals as land and sea masses to be invaded or defended including areas necessary for administrative activities incident to the military operations. In the western concept, the European Theatre of Operations was used to refer to all military activity in Europe whilst Pacific Theatre of Operations was related to the Pacific Ocean13.  Hence, the inherent meaning of Theatre of Operations relates to large contiguous land or sea areas where synergised operations take place.

A Unified Command is a command with a broad continuing mission. It operates under a single commander and is composed of two or more services14. The US Regional Combatant Commands have geographical areas of responsibility. They conduct the strategic direction of all US military operations within their designated AOR. The five regional unified commands are US Atlantic Command, Central Command, European Command, Pacific Command and Southern Command. In addition, they have functional commands such as US Space Command, Special Operations Command, and the Strategic Command. For Special Operations, a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) is formed to plan, rehearse and execute operations regardless of their geographical location. In 1986, the US Govt brought the Goldwater Nichols amendment to ensure complete jointness despite Joint Chiefs of Staff being in place since 1947.

Australian Theatre Command. HQ Australian Theatre (HQ AST) was established in June 1997. The aim was to separate the Australian political strategic level from war fighting, discontinue the adhoc approach to co-ordination and control of operations, institute unity of command at the operational level and provide a standing capability for planning campaigns, operations and specific activities. HQ AST does not have any forces permanently assigned to it. Appropriate forces are allocated to the Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) by the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) for specific operations15.

The CDF maintains full command over the Australian Defence Forces (ADF).  However, the service chiefs command their respective services and are responsible to raise, train and sustain them. When the CDF orders the conduct of an operation or a campaign, he directs the service chiefs to assign appropriate forces at a specified level of capability to COMAST. The AST has component commanders from the individual services. They provide expert advice concerning the operational employment of the assigned forces. This arrangement ensures appropriate theatre focus with emphasis on initiation, sequencing and manoeuvring series of joint operations. HQ AST houses component commanders’ alongwith adequate number of permanent staff. This organisation is permanently available under the Theatre Command.

Some US articles lament that Air power is undervalued in the US joint doctrines and war plans. Land forces dominate the Theatre Commands (TC) with strong influence.

The HQ AST is also supported by the Australian Joint Intelligence Centre (ASTJIC) and the 1st Joint Movement Group that is responsible to secure civil strategic lift assets. The ASTJIC provides fused intelligence picture of the theatre. The Joint Operations Command reports directly to the CDF, thus bringing under his command, Strategic Operations Division, HQ AST, HQ Northern Command (NORCOM) and Deployable Joint Forces HQ. NORCOM is a permanent joint HQ and during operations is tasked with vital asset protection, surveillance and covering operations.

Analysis of US and Australian Theatre Commands. Analysis of the two command structures highlights some commonalities. Both are structured for joint application of force generally for OOAC’s and in support of the multinational forces rather than for homeland defence. The aim is to provide a unified command for operational employment of joint forces. Though the appointments and staff for planning and conduct of operations is permanent in the Australian model, the forces are allotted by the individual service HQ based on a joint appreciation of the impending threat. Whilst Americans have global aspirations, the ADF is employed more in support of multinational forces. In both cases, the meaning of theatres relates to large contiguous masses that translate itself to the size of continents. In our context, our war on terror is fought generally within our country and our most immediate concerns relate more to homeland defence. Hence, we need to look at structures that take care of threats ranging from asymmetric to conventional wars fought in a nuclear environment and focussed more to our subcontinent.

Limitations of Western Concept. Even with the employment of Theatre Command concept, the problems between Lt Gen Clark and Lt Gen Short affected campaign planning in Kosovo operations. In Op Anaconda too, senior Army Commanders were widely criticised by their air and naval counterparts for not co-ordinating with them effectively during the weeks preceding the commencement of the conflict16. Thus clearly highlighting that unified structures can only facilitate forcible co-operation this far but the true test of actual jointmanship lies in dismantling established mindsets.

Some US articles lament that Air power is undervalued in the US joint doctrines and war plans. Land forces dominate the Theatre Commands (TC) with strong influence. The belief is wide spread that “boots on ground” are more important than precision strikes. The ground forces definition of a joint operation is one in which they are supported by air power, the notion that air power might achieve anything alone or with land or sea forces in support is heresy. Maj Gen Charles D Link of USAF states that Airpower not in support of land forces is considered ‘unjoint’17. Own structures would need to find solutions for these limitations.

Options For Unified Command Structures. The options for unified command structure comprise developing Joint Theatre Commands at the Army Command HQ level or developing geographically based Theatre Command structures or evolving a TC at the national level that provides a unified command structure that integrates the operational employment of the three services as part of India Strategic Theatre (IST). Ideally, the chosen structure should be such that it requires bringing about minimum changes to the existing organisations and yet achieves the desired integration to co-ordinate a jointly evolved strategic art at the operational level.

First Option. The first option of developing TC’s at the Army Command HQ level would entail the theatre, for example, NC/WC/SWC (Army) to be restricted to an AOR of 150-200 Km by 150-200 Km on both sides of the border. This implies that the airpower assets would be distributed in penny packets within these Commands on three to four airfields located within their AOR. The IAF’s combat strength has effectively come down to 30 Squadrons18. Though technologically more potent, the reduced numbers limit the decentralisation down from the existing IAF Command Area of Responsibility to the Army Command AOR’s. Further, during the initial stages of the war, the primary air campaign is Counter Air Campaign. This campaign ensures that land and naval operations are carried out unhindered. These operations are executed centrally at the present IAF Command level to optimise employment of limited resources. Distributing scarce air assets at several TCs would result in significantly degrading the overall combat potential of the IAF19.

This option would also cause substantial Air Space Management problems as several missions of this theatre would over fly other theatres due to location of targets or for tactical routing purposes to cater to the long reach of modern Air Superiority Fighters. This reach has been further enhanced with Air to Air Refuellers that themselves are centrally controlled by Air HQ and are based at deeper airbases. In addition, the strategic fighters such as Su-30 aircraft too are likely to be based outside the AOR of the TC to incorporate survivability aspects.

During the course of the war, the focus may change from one theatre to the other and there may thus be a need to employ higher quantum of air effort centrally towards tackling emergent situations there. If under different TCs, it would become difficult to co-ordinate and employ air assets that over fly different theatres in a focussed manner on day to day basis. Even when the US/Australians employ air power in TCs, the numbers of combat aircraft employed range from 1200 to 2780 (Kosovo Operations – Gulf War I) and size of the theatre encompasses more than two countries. Hence this option for developing TCs is considered absolutely unsuitable.

Second Option. The second option visualises the formation of five geographically based Theatre Commands, viz combining Army’s NC, WC and SWC as Western Theatre and co-locating the joint TC HQ overseeing these three Army Commands with HQ SWAC linked to HQ CAC. Similarly, developing the second theatre at the Army’s Southern Command level that co-joins HQ SC with IAF’s SWAC/CAC and SAC and IN’s WNC/SNC/ENC to form the Southern Theatre, the third theatre as A&N Command and the fourth theatre as the Eastern Theatre with appropriate integration of Air and Naval Commands. To cater to internal Maoist and Naxal problems, there may be a need to additionally form a Central Theatre that links HQ Central Command of the Army with HQ CAC of the IAF.

The linkages with the police and paramilitary forces to tackle asymmetric threats should be established at these TCs. Appropriate representatives of these forces too should be available here. Further, the individual operational commands of each service should be electronically linked to other contiguous operational commands of their own service. For example, HQ NC of Army should be electronically linked with HQ WC and similarly for other commands. In addition, there would be functional commands such as Aerospace Command and Strategic Forces Command. However, this TC option would still need a unified structure above it to evolve strategic art and to establish strategic focus.

There is a need for a five star CDS that provides strategic direction and formulates strategic art alongwith other components of national power. The Chairman, COSC neither has the time nor the institutional authority for the same.

Though airpower employment could be co-ordinated more effectively in this arrangement, the strategic assets and the tri-service OOACs would need to be co-ordinated at a level higher than these theatres. Further, emergent situations and national emergencies would require strategic co-ordination as the resources and assets that are tied down to these geographical locations would need flexibility to cater to situations prevailing in other theatres or existing at the national level.

Third Option. The third option is to create a unified command structure at the national level, viz the IST. Like the Australian model, it would need to consider the entire Indian subcontinent as a theatre and could be named as India Strategic Theatre. Located at HQ IDS, it would have a standing capability of the three components (land, air and sea) with their planning staff under the CDS. The forces would not be permanently attached but could be allocated to this Joint HQ based on the requirement originated from jointly appreciating an imminent threat. This arrangement would thus provide flexibility to tackle threats that encompass the entire conflict spectrum from asymmetric to NBC.

The service chiefs though continuing to raise, train and build their individual services would still provide expert advice on operational matters to the CDS. Whilst the nitty gritty of planning campaigns would lie with the component commanders at HQ IST, the service chiefs would remain part of the joint appreciation and planning process to formulate strategic art. Hence, they would not be isolated from the operational decision making process. Further, this arrangement still ensures that the service chiefs who are yet in the loop of operational planning would know what focus to give towards training own forces in peace time to achieve the desired operational capability. Under the CDS, would lie the Standing Committee formed by the three component commanders of    Lt Gen or equivalent rank and their staff from the three services.

The CDS should be one rank higher, on rotation from the Army, the Navy or the Air Force and should be one of the erstwhile service chiefs after completing his tenure. The points of dispute between the service chiefs or those that arise in the Standing Committee would be resolved by the CDS. This necessarily entails that CDS should shed his earlier service uniform. He could be called as Marshal of the Armed Forces. In fact, he and his staff should wear a different uniform that personifies the joint image that they are projecting. This model ensures that there is a standing capability available during peace time that plans and conducts joint operations as well as tackles emergent situations even humanitarian that need inter services co-operation. Yet, the model does not diminish the authority of the service chief’s. They are involved in the planning and conduct of a joint campaign or an emergent situation as an intellectual participant and a decision maker.

In this model, though the identification of strategic focus would be easier and the OOACs and emergent threats could be tackled better, but one major limitation still remains, and that is how does one co-ordinate joint operational art in the different operational commands of the three services in home land defence and how does one provide an integrated environment that houses weapon systems and equipment of the three services that have their own inherent overlaps and uses with the other two services?

Option Best Suited to Indian Conditions

All models have their limitations, but a dispassionate review of these models would highlight that a combination of the second and the third option would centralise strategic and operational art whilst retaining the decentralised structure for execution. For homeland defence, this combined option would exemplify this decentralisation, where Military Strategic Planning Process takes place at the HQ IST located at HQ IDS, but the execution takes place at the existing operational Command HQ of the individual services. However, these operational commands would need to be linked sectorally as mentioned in the Second Option. Instead of calling the integrated operational commands as TCs, they could now be termed Sector Commands.

There would however be a need to construct a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) at or near Delhi where the operational staff of HQ IST would be co-located. The JOC too would need to be electronically linked to all operational commands of the three services.

The anomaly of a lack of link between various operational commands of the three services to form Sector Commands can be resolved by electronically linking HQ NC/WC/SWC of the Army with the existing HQ SWAC/CAC of IAF (Western Sector), HQ SC of Army with HQ SWAC/CAC and SAC of IAF and HQ WNC and SNC/ENC of Navy (Southern Sector) and HQ EC of Army with HQ EAC of IAF and HQ ENC of Navy (Eastern Sector). The Central Sector could also be formed to tackle internal asymmetric threats. In addition, there would be a requirement in the Western Sector to post three representatives of HQ NC, WC and SWC of Col/ Brig rank to HQ WAC operation centre to co-ordinate land warfare for their individual commands. These representatives should be in addition to the Command Ground Liasion Officer (GLO). On the other hand, AOC Advance HQ at individual Army Commands would continue to assist them in identifying air application priorities. The disputes if any during the execution stage could be resolved at the HQ IST level. This method would ensure minimum changes to the existing operational structures whilst optimally co-ordinating joint operational art.

There would however be a need to construct a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) at or near Delhi where the operational staff of HQ IST would be co-located. The JOC too would need to be electronically linked to all operational commands of the three services. The combined intelligence information obtained from all arms of the nation would need to be fused to form one composite picture. In addition, the fused information of various Air Force, Naval and Army Commands should also be available here. Appropriate representatives of police and paramilitary forces beside home ministry should be available at the JOC both for combined intelligence collation and analysis and to tackle asymmetric threats at the national level that require armed forces’ support.

HQ ANC, NCA and Strategic Forces Command too would need to be co-located alongwith HQ IST at the Joint Operations Centre. They would directly come under the CDS. Aerospace Command and Civil Air Movement Group (to co-ordinate civil air assets  for operational utilisation and for air space management) would however, function under the Air Force Component Commander for providing integrated Aerospace and Ballistic Missile Defence. At the same time, for OOAC and natural calamities, appropriate forces would be allocated to a Joint Task Force (JTF) constituted under the CDS by the three component commanders. The JTF Commander would be nominated from the appropriate service that is dealing more intimately with these operations.

The transformation towards a unified structure should take place in a phased manner. The first phase should electronically link the various operational commands sector wise, and the second phase should establish Sector Commands and form the JOC at the IDS alongwith the CDS, three component commanders and their staff. The first phase should be completed by 2008 and the second by 2012. The Indian Armed Forces would then be ready to undertake emergent contingencies at home and abroad.

Conclusion

After the Kargil war, significant reforms have taken place in the armed forces with the formation of HQ IDS, A&N Command and Strategic Forces Command. However, the issue of CDS and a unified structure for combined appreciation and conduct of joint campaigns is not yet addressed. There is a need for a five star CDS that provides strategic direction and formulates strategic art alongwith other components of national power. The Chairman, COSC neither has the time nor the institutional authority for the same.

There is also a need to establish Joint Operations Centre at the IDS, which encompasses the three components of the armed forces, NCA, Aerospace Command, A&N Command and SFC and provides standing capability to plan and conduct campaigns and operations to tackle emergent situations without having a permanent force deployed under it. The various operational commands of the three services should be electronically linked sector wise to cater for wide spectrum of threats. This would assist in jointly executing operational art and promote development of an integrated environment.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made: –

The entire Indian subcontinent should be considered as one theatre and be named India Strategic Theatre.

Notes

1. Information related to CISC and HQ IDS has been obtained from their website available on Google search.

2. Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi, Indian Air Force in the evolving security environment, Air Power Journal Vol 2 No.4 Winter 2005, pg 6.

3. Dissertation by Col Vijay Singh(LDMC 35), Necessity of Integrated Theatre Commands in the Indian context.

4. Ibid.

5. Dr. Subhash Kapila, India’s Chief of Defence Staff: a perspective analysis, Paper No. 250.

6. Report on the Group of Ministers on National Security, Chapter II: Challenges to the management of national security.

7. Ibid.

8. William S Lind, The changing face of war: Into the fourth generation, Marine Corps Gazette October 1989 p 22-26.

9. Report on the Group of Ministers on National Security, Chapter II: Challenges to the management of national security.

10. Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi, Indian Air Force in the evolving security environment, Air Power Journal Vol 2 No.4 Winter 2005, pg 4.

11. Dissertation by Col Vijay Singh(LDMC 35), Necessity of Integrated Theatre Commands in the Indian context.

12. Information about Indian operational commands obtained from Bharat Rakshak and www.defenceindia.com.

13. Definitions obtained from Wikipedia the free encyclopedia.

14. Chapter 2, 2-2 Unified Command (under Command and Control Special Operations), US Manual.

15. The information about the Australian Theatre and their command structure is obtained from X:\temp|treloar.doc, The Australian Theatre, Air Vice Marshal RB Treloar.

16. Was Operation Anaconda ill fated from the start? Army analyst blames Afghan battle failings on bad command set up, Washington Post.

17. John T Corell, Oct 1997 Vol.80 No. 10, The headwinds of Traditional Air Force Operations not in support of land forces are considered unjoint.

18. IAF Combat Fleet down by nine sqns, New Delhi, 19 Oct 2005 an internet news article.

19. RV Phadke, India’s Higher defence Control Organisation, Strategic Analysis : A Monthly Journal of the IDSA.

20. Capt Bharat Verma, “The Chief of Defence Staff”, article in IDR, Vol 20 (2).