Geopolitics

Indian and Chinese Covert Efforts
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Issue Vol. 31.3 Jul-Sep 2016 | Date : 21 Oct , 2016

RAW does not have the adequate number of agents who are not of Indian ethnicity (just as China has few non-Han agents). It has scant cover for operations in China since so few Indian companies are active in China. The exception is the Tibetan ethnic group. According to the Indian press, China press-gangs Tibetan refugees in Nepal to spy on India23, and it is true that a few ethnic Tibetans have been caught spying for China (such as Pema Tsering). But there are far more engaged in spying on China. There are over 100,000 Tibetans in India; they are politically motivated, and ethnically and linguistically they blend in with Chinese Tibetans. They are rarely caught.24

RAW does not have the adequate number of agents who are not of Indian ethnicity…

One agent gave an account of his activities to Indian media.25 His ethnicity is unknown –a Sikh-sounding name ‘Raghav Singh’ was given but this is not his real name – and he described observing Chinese military activity in October 2012. He and his colleague claimed to have been shot at by the PLA and described escaping through a pine forest, where they were lost for three days before reaching base camp “with a great piece of intelligence”. Ethnic Tibetans from the region close to the Chinese border are employed by Indian intelligenceThe Sri Lankan newspaper ‘The Sunday Times’ has alleged that RAW helped unite the opposition to defeat Mahinda Rajapaksa. The Chinese also hold this view. The Indian government had been concerned about the influence of China on Sri Lankan affairs. But when Mahinda Rajapaksa called an election, he lost to Sirisena, who loosened ties with China.26

If RAW masterminded regime change in Sri Lanka, this was an impressive piece of work but it could be counter-productive. China’s intelligence services viewed these developments with unease and envy, and there have been calls for China to try the same thing.

India has also succeeded in persuading Myanmar to allow it to operate there. In June 2015, Indian paratroopers carried out a strike action against insurgents based there. Intelligence that facilitated this mission had been obtained by RAW in cooperation with Myanmar. This is complicated by the fact that Chinese timber companies operate in the Kachin region, bribing both the Kachin independence army and the Myanmar commanders there.

There is even a possibility that China will begin to engage in covert operations.

If the RAW is to play an effective role against China, it needs to professionalise and develop more expertise in intelligence rather than focusing on pulse-quickening operations led by anti-terrorism agents. It also suffers from breakdowns of cooperation, which affect other arms of the security services. For example, Bihar police refused to cooperate with the Intelligence Bureau (IB) in seeking remand of Yasin Bhatkal (a terrorist leader) in 2013, and the State police refused to join the Advance Security Liaison (ASL) exercise with the IB and Gujarat police. The creation of the National Technical Research Organisation, the Defence Intelligence Agency and so on, led to an overlap of agency activities27, and turf wars resulted in wasteful expenditure.28

Apart from the lack of detailed intelligence on China’s political attitudes and scant ground intelligence, there are gaps in India’s knowledge of China’s capability in the border areas. For example, India is unsure of the locations of DF-21 missiles. The Indian government also often exaggerates the threat from China. In 2005, the Indian government conceded that its own reports of China turning the Coco Islands in Burma into a naval base were incorrect.29 And China’s huge construction projects in Gilgit-Baltistan (a region of Kashmir) need to be watched in greater details.

To improve professionalism, in 2015, India began to examine the feasibility of recruiting not just for RAW but also the IB and DIA through a single organisation, and to do so on the open market, just as the CIA and MI6 have been doing for some years. If successful, this could help its China intelligence, as the expertise needed is unlikely to be available through traditional RAW recruitment.

China’s intelligence services also need reshaping and are in need of a stronger focus on India. Its problems are different: overconfidence deriving from tales of the 1962 War and a consequential feeling that there is no need to worry about Indian capabilities. China’s propaganda, intended originally to motivate ordinary Chinese, has shaped the thinking of experts.

One India expert in China pointed out that Chinese intelligence has very few India specialists.

Recruitment for the spy services in China remains restricted. Applications for cadre positions are made typically from China’s schools of politics and law, or from police schools, and many applicants spend their early years on political education to ensure their loyalty to the Communist Party. The MSS misses out on the tremendous pool of talent across China.

The MSS is going through a slow-burning leadership crisis. Three of its Vice Ministers have been purged over the last three years: in 2012, Lu Zhongwei; in 2014, Qiu Jinand in 2015, Ma Jian. The current MSS Chief is Geng Huichang, an official with no field experience who worked his way up to the MSS from the CICIR, the MSS’s academic front. He is due to retire by 2017 and there are choices to succeed Geng. It has been claimed that this will lead to a “gaping hole of experience in the top echelons of the ministry”30, although in fact nothing suggests these men were indispensable. The problem is complicated as purges have affected the efficiency of the MSS by exacerbating an existing situation: a desire to toe the party line at the expense of effective work.

Another problem faced by Chinese intelligence is that the fanaticism that once motivated party members in China has gone. Chinese propaganda is not motivated by any kind of idealism – rather a crude pragmatism. Political idealism is, in the 21st century, more evident in the CIA than the MSS.

The two countries are in a difficult situation; their size and proximity make it inevitable and necessary that they compete, cooperate, and share, but their ignorance has led them to miss opportunities to profit from each other’s experience, wealth and talents.

Despite this apparent apathy in the MSS, the possibility of a US-India military relationship has generated fears of encirclement in Beijing.31 With or without the MSS’s help, PLA Intelligence will push more aggressively on India. There is even a possibility that China will begin to engage in covert operations. At least one Chinese commentator believes China should support the pro-China elements in Sri Lankan politics.32

Yet China is a long way from having this capability. One India expert in China pointed out that Chinese intelligence has very few India specialists. They focus on Japan and the US, and then Europe. He himself does not speak Hindi, and yet is one of China’s premier experts on India – making him a living example of the lack of specialism. Relying on military intelligence alone is no substitute for a functional and effective civilian intelligence networks.

The two countries are thus in a difficult situation; their size and proximity make it inevitable and necessary that they compete, cooperate, and share, but their ignorance has led them to miss opportunities to profit from each other’s experience, wealth and talents.

Kevin Kelly, founder of Wired magazine, has commented that a surveillance society is inevitable – but that it should not be feared in itself.33 Surveillance, and by extension, espionage can bring benefits. There is no substitute for development of trust through tourism, trade and so on, but these cannot be forced. By analogy with Kelly’s theory, ignorance of each other’s behaviour leads to demonisation of the other side. Every step taken by the counterparty is interpreted in the worst light possible and used as a pretext to behave aggressively. Real friendship between the two countries is not yet possible, and so they need to obtain information about each other by other means. Those other means are efficient intelligence and espionage which both countries need to improve.

Notes

  1. Beyond 1962: How to Upgrade the Sino-Indian Relationship, by Peter Martin, April 19, 2015, accessed at www.apcoworldwide.com/blog/detail/apcoforum/2015/04/15/beyond-1962-how-to-upgrade-the-sino-indian-relationship
  2. confuciusinstitute.unl.edu/institutes.shtml
  3. Though RAW’s extreme reluctance to hire Muslim Indians causes difficulty. See “Why Intel Agencies are wary of Hiring Muslims and Sikhs” by Brijesh Singh, in Issue 37 Volume 11 of Tehelka, 2014-09-13 accessed at www.tehelka.com/the-bias-against-minorities-in-intelligence-recruitments/
  4. As opposed to SIGINT (signals intelligence, gathered by intercepting messages)
  5. 中国人民解放军总参谋部
  6. 中央军事委员会联合参谋部
  7. 战略支援部队
  8. 最神秘的部队——总参二部揭秘 (The Most Mysterious Army: Revealing the secrets of 2 GSD) published by anon. post accessed at bbs.tiexue.net/post_4875336_1.html
  9. Anon. source in MSS
  10. sinodefence.com, accessed at www.sinodefence.com/overview/organisation/gsd.asp
  11. The Indian Express, May 24, 2013, accessed at www.indianexpress.com/news/suspected-chinese-spy-arrested-from-dharamsala/1119797/
  12. The Great Claw of China, by Saikat Datta, in Outlook, 7 February 2011, accessed at www.outlookindia.com/article/the-great-claw-of-china/270223
  13. A leaked Stratfor email shows analysts Matt Gertken and Sean Noonan expressing doubt about Indian press reports on this subject https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/19/1977040_-ct-fwd-re-eastasia-fw-os-india-china-ct-2-1-chinese-agents.html
  14. The Defence Manual of Security (restricted) issued by the UK’s Ministry of Defence, Annex F; accessed at https://file.wikileaks.org/file/uk-mod-jsp-440-2001.pdf
  15. RAW in-charge in Beijing recalled after honeytrap probe, The Times of India, Jun 22, 2008, accessed at timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/RAW-in-charge-in-Beijing-recalled-after-honeytrap-probe/articleshow/3152582.cms
  16. 印度将召回在华“王牌”女间谍 (India to recall top female spy in China) [article originally appearing in 环球时报 (Global Times) dated 25 June 2008, accessed at epaper.usqiaobao.com:81/qiaobao/page/1/2008-06-25/A07/69351214386467374.pdf
  17. Nigel Inkster (2010): China in Cyberspace, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 52:4, 55-56, IISS
  18. Tracking Ghost net: Investigating a cyber espionage network, Information Warfare Monitor, March 29, 2009. accessed at www.infowar.monitor.net/ghostnet
  19. How Chinese hackers snooped on Indian defence agencies for over 10 years, by ET Bureau, Economic Times, 7 May, 2015 accessed at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/how-chinese-hackers-snooped-on-indian-defence-agencies-for-over-10-years/articleshow/47188880.cms
  20. Bill Gertz, Inside the Ring: Terrorists’ Antics, The Washington Times, May 16, 2012, accessed at www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/16/inside-the-ring-terrorists-antics/?page=all
  21. Sarabjit Singh, and the spies we left out in the cold, by Praveen Swami, Firstpost, May 2, 2013, accessed at www.firstpost.com/india/sarabjit-singh-and-the-spies-we-left-out-in-the-cold-734703.html
  22. RAW: India’s External Intelligence Agency, by Jayshree Bajoria, in Council on Foreign Relations, November 7, 2008 accessed at http://www.cfr.org/india/raw-indias-external-intelligence-agency/p17707
  23. Intelligence: Chinese Spies Slip Into India, Strategy Page, June 13, 2013 accessed at www.strategypage.com/htmw/htintel/20130613.aspx
  24. According to Prof. Zhang Jiadong of Fudan University’s US Research Centre, espionage by ethnic Tibetans in China is India’s prime source of intelligence on the frontier and has resulted in strategically useful information.
  25. The spies on the enemy line, by Yatish Yadav, New Indian Express, dated 13th September 2013, accessed at www.newindianexpress.com/magazine/The-spies-on-the-enemy-line/2013/09/13/article1780478.ece
  26. 斯里兰卡真会抛弃中国转投印度吗?(Will Sri Lanka really abandon China for India?) by 陈光文 (Chen Guangwen), in his blog 陈光文军情观察 (Observing Military Matters), 19 January 2015, accessed at cgw316.blog.sohu.com/307602090.html.
  27. RAW: India’s External Intelligence Agency, by Jayshree Bajoria, in Council on Foreign Relations, November 7, 2008 accessed at http://www.cfr.org/india/raw-indias-external-intelligence-agency/p17707
  28. India’s Special Operations Capability By Air Marshal Narayan Menon, Indian Defence Review Issue Vol. 26.3, Feb 9th, 2014, accessed at www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/indias-special-operations-capability/
  29. Chinese Military Bases in Burma:The Explosion of a Myth, by Andrew Selth, Griffith Asia Institute’s Regional Outlook, No. 10 of 2007, accessed at www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/18225/regional-outlook-andrew-selth.pdf
  30. The Dragon’s Eyes and Ears: Chinese Intelligence at the Crossroads, by Peter Mattis, in The National Interest Magazine, January 20, 2015, accessed at nationalinterest.org/feature/the-dragons-eyes-ears-chinese-intelligence-the-crossroads-12062
  31. www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1214.pdf
  32. 斯里兰卡真会抛弃中国转投印度吗?(Will Sri Lanka really abandon China for India?) by 陈光文 (Chen Guangwen), in his blog 陈光文军情观察 (Observing Military Matters), 19 January 2015, accessed at cgw316.blog.sohu.com/307602090.html.
  33. Why you should embrace surveillance, not fight it, by Kevin Kelly, Wired, October 2014, accessed at www.wired.com/2014/03/going-tracked-heres-way-embrace-surveillance/
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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Nicolas Groffman

writes on China, practised law in Beijing and Shanghai and conducted the first ever enforcement of a Hong Kong court judgment in Mainland China.

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