Geopolitics

India-US Relations: Future Trajectory
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Issue Vol 24.4 Oct-Dec 2009 | Date : 16 Dec , 2011

The confidence of the Indian establishment that India–US relations were set on a steep upward trajectory has eroded noticeably with President Obama replacing President Bush. Even though personalities can make a difference, it is a mistake to give exaggerated importance to their role in forging longer-term relationships between countries.

In open, democratic societies a broader consensus involving political institutions, the corporate sector, interest groups, the media, etc is necessary to give durability to the quality and direction of an external relationship. In the case of India and the US, some structural factors influence the relationship, transcending the political changes that occur periodically in the two countries at election time.

The US eyes a share of the very sizeable Indian defense market as a trust dividend from the nuclear deal. Despite concerns about the unreliability of the US as defense supplier because of the ever present risk of sanctions “¦

The US is a global power whereas India is not, which makes the relationship inherently unequal. This is a sensitive issue, as India is a big country, physically and demographically, and wants to retain its independence in the foreign policy domain. Its “nonaligned” spirit, as distinct from adherence to a grouping that has lost much of its relevance in the changed international context, remains alive. This limits the degree to which it can align itself with US foreign policy interests and achieve that level of congruence the US would expect between the policies of the two countries.

The US has no experience in dealing with countries as equals. Its military power is overwhelming and its economic power remains central to world economy. This largely enables it to set the terms of its relationship with others. It has abiding belief in the superiority of its political and economic values and their eventual universalization. It frequently extends the applicability of its domestic laws to foreign countries. For the US, its ultimate security lies in others accepting its leadership, its values and the international order that it has established.

Those opposed are pressurized, contained, sanctioned in various ways, or, in worst cases, subjected to military force. Even the policy of engagement with adversarial or recalcitrant powers is predicated on making them interested stakeholders in the US dominated global system.

India is a rising power, seeking a change in the status quo. It wants to be accommodated on equitable terms into the international system, without contesting US pre-eminence. Its decision to go nuclear has given it international stature, but not enough, as its comprehensive national power still lacks a critical mass. With its sustained high economic growth making it a credible market for international business, India, for the first time in its independent history, is becoming a serious economic player internationally. This should help it eventually to enter the big league.

What then can be the nature of the partnership between a global power and, at best, a regional power? Can it be a true strategic partnership? If yes, what would be the content and the geographic scope of such a partnership? If it is issue based, covering the common challenges confronting the international community, is there a community of interest specifically between India and the US that transcends India’s status as a developing country and that of the US as the most industrialized one?

Pakistans strategic ambitions threaten Afghanistans independence. Its source of influence in Afghanistan is the very forces whose extremist ideology needs to be defeated. The success of the Taliban in Afghanistan will entrench this ideology even deeper in the region and its baleful influence will be felt in Central Asia, India and even Pakistan itself.

On most strategic issues, Indian and US positions remain apart. At the bilateral level, the nuclear deal and US championing of the NSG waiver constituted a breakthrough on a highly sensitive strategic issue, but because the deal got embroiled in serious domestic political controversy in India and, in the eyes of many, was overlaid with several non-proliferation conditions that put constraints on India’s freedom of action in the future, it has not foreclosed all problems. Already there is concern in India about President Obama’s renewed emphasis on non-proliferation issues and how this might affect the nuclear relationship between the two countries.

The logic of Obama’s initiatives goes in the direction of difficulties with India, and the challenge is to have the exception made for India constantly underwritten by the US as it pursues its non-proliferation goals. The Prime Minister has already felt it necessary to state that these goals notwithstanding, the US has assured him that it is committed to the implementation of the nuclear deal in toto. However, our underlying concern was expressed in our official reaction to the September 24 Security Council Resolution on universalizing the NPT, that Obama himself godfathered, in language reminiscent of the era of non-proliferation polemics between us and the rest of the world.

The Prime Minister’s own speech on September 29 in New Delhi at the International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was in part a polite rejoinder to the thrust of the latest US initiative in the Security Council. These US initiatives are coming at a time when India’s exceptional status has not been sufficiently consolidated internationally and even the bilateral agenda with the US is unfinished.

Steady progress in defence ties can be expected, despite the complexities of US laws. The armed services of the two countries are holding major military exercises on land, air and the sea, though the Indian Navy has reportedly been denied permission at the last minute to participate in a planned trilateral amphibious exercise with the US and Japanese navies at Okinawa, presumably with China’s sensitivities in mind. The US eyes a share of the very sizeable Indian defense market as a trust dividend from the nuclear deal.

Despite concerns about the unreliability of the US as defense supplier because of the ever present risk of sanctions if Indian and US policies clash over sensitive issues, India has placed orders on high value US military equipment such as transport aircraft and maritime reconnaissance aircraft, etc. The US has high hopes of winning the 126 multi-role combat aircraft tender, which if it did would transform the nature of India–US defense ties.

But the political furor over the End User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) points to peculiar difficulties in doing defense business with the US. This will most likely stall progress in the other two agreements being processed – the Logistics Support Agreement and the Communications Inter-operability and Security Memorandum of Agreement, that for critics is intended to draw India into a soft alliance with the US.

At a pinch, it may be possible to conceive of Taliban like elements that may not be anti-West, but that they will not be anti-India, especially under the influence of Pakistan, is hard to imagine. The conduct of the Taliban in the case of the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane to Kabul is a reminder.

At the regional level, India–US relations have not been able to overcome the problems of the past. The larger thrust of the Obama Administration’s policy towards Pakistan as well as Afghanistan risks damaging India’s vital interests. India is not responsible for the rise of Taliban activity in Afghanistan, and has no wish to be dragged into the Afghan imbroglio on Pakistan’s terms. Despite assurances to the contrary, the US’ underlying receptivity to Pakistan’s concerns about India’s rising profile in Afghanistan remain, and have resurfaced in General McChyrstal’s most recent assessment that “increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures”.

India believes that it has the right to be present in Afghanistan to the extent the Afghan government desires, and cannot accept any curb on this right by Pakistan or any other country. It has more reason to want to protect its interests in Afghanistan than any other geographically distant country, as it is more vulnerable to religious terrorism than many others, with the added problem that Pakistan has used Afghan territory in the past to train terrorists for operations against India and this threat can revive with Afghanistan in the grip of the Taliban.

Pakistan’s strategic ambitions threaten Afghanistan’s independence. Its source of influence in Afghanistan is the very forces whose extremist ideology needs to be defeated. The success of the Taliban in Afghanistan will entrench this ideology even deeper in the region and its baleful influence will be felt in Central Asia, India and even Pakistan itself. The process of democratization in Afghanistan, of creating some semblance of a liberal society there, will be defeated.

In this context, India has very strong reservations about the US/UK strategy to incorporate the moderate Taliban into the governing structures of Afghanistan. In tactical terms, the attempt to divide the Taliban, of weaning away some of its supporters, of shrinking the base of insurgency in Afghanistan, are understandable. President Karzai has clear interests in broadening his Pushtun base even if it means making gestures to retrograde religious forces. If breakaway elements credibly end their links with extremist Islamic forces, these overtures would be less worrying. But India’s concern is the willingness of the US and others to live with Taliban like ideology so long as the forces espousing it are not anti-West.

For India, the principal danger comes from the spread of extremist religious ideology which, whether it is anti-West or not, is seen as destabilizing for the region as a whole. A political solution in Afghanistan that accommodates those espousing Sharia is particularly disquieting for a secular country like India, the main country in the region, with a billion strong population, and over 150 Muslims already under pressure from extremist forces in the neighborhood.

At a pinch, it may be possible to conceive of Taliban like elements that may not be anti-West, but that they will not be anti-India, especially under the influence of Pakistan, is hard to imagine. The conduct of the Taliban in the case of the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane to Kabul is a reminder. The protection given to the reprehensible Taliban leadership in Pakistan all these years, the US reluctance to act against it even when its whereabouts are known, and the availability of arms and ammunition to its cadres raises many questions.

India aspires to be a permanent member of the Security Council, and although it has the declared support of France, the UK and Russia (Chinas opposition is understandable given the adversial undercurrents in the relationship), US support is not forthcoming. Again, while US allies like France and the UK support Indias inclusion in the G-8, the US is silent.

India’s problem with the US’ Afghanistan policy is that it relies on the very force in Pakistan to help find a solution that has manifest responsibility for the steady deterioration of the situation there, as well as unrelenting confrontation with India. Making the Pakistan military the lynchpin of the Afghanistan strategy is also inconsistent with the stated objective of promoting democracy in Pakistan and peace with India. The hand of the Pakistan military has been greatly strengthened by the large scale military aid already given to Pakistan, with more in the offing.

Political voices in the US have already complained that a large part of compensatory funds earlier given to Pakistan has been used for strengthening its offensive capability against India rather than in bolstering its counter-insurgency capacities, a charge General Musharraf has publicly confirmed. In a sense this is a false debate because even counter-insurgency capabilities such as attack helicopters, night vision devices, signaling equipment, etc strengthen the Pakistan militarily against India.

The US’ unwillingness to make its military assistance conditional on Pakistan credibly dismantling the infrastructure of terrorism on its soil directed at India, on the ground that it would stiffen Pakistan’s reluctance to cooperate with it in dealing with the Afghanistan situation or accelerating Pakistan’s slide towards a failed state, opens a serious gap in the interests of the US and India in the region. India cannot be comfortable with a hostile Pakistan armed by both the US and China. The attachment of a “no terrorism” rider and a monitoring requirement to the latest $7.5 billion aid package for Pakistan approved by the US Congress is, however, a step in the right direction.

On the issue of terrorism, despite the rhetoric that it is a collective threat that must be faced jointly by all countries, and that no distinction should be made between terrorism directed at one country or another, India and the US have not been able to reach a common understanding on how to deal with Pakistan’s use of terror as a political instrument against India. While exhorting Pakistan to do more against terrorism emanating from its soil, and acknowledging the dubious role of the ISI in maintaining terror links, the US still seeks to shield the Pakistan government from accusations of official complicity, preferring to shift the focus to terrorist groups supposedly outside the control of the government.

Pakistan is projected as a victim of terrorism itself, obfuscating the fact that while Pakistan is involved in terrorism against India, the opposite is not true, and so the problem of terrorism facing the two countries is radically different. The US push for greater intelligence-level cooperation between India and Pakistan disregards this basic fact. The US has been helpful up to a point in seeking action by Pakistan against those responsible for the Mumbai attack; counter-terrorism cooperation between Indian and US agencies has greatly improved.

Internationally, the US is not as yet ready to give substance to its professed interest in a strategic relationship with India. The rhetoric remains that the US sees India as a global player, etc,

India is still hoping that the US will exert pressure on Pakistan in the Mumbai case – as the Indian Home Minister’s just concluded visit to Washington indicates — but this hope will be belied as Pakistan has earned more room for itself politically to withstand any US pressure by acting against the Pakistani Taliban in Swat. Pakistan’s handling of Hafiz Saeed’s case demonstrates its intention to buy time, to resort to legal quibbles and stratagems, and not arraign him seriously.

Internationally, the US is not as yet ready to give substance to its professed interest in a strategic relationship with India. The rhetoric remains that the US sees India as a global player, etc, but India’s aspirations to play a greater international role are not yet supported. India aspires to be a permanent member of the Security Council, and although it has the declared support of France, the UK and Russia (China’s opposition is understandable given the adversial undercurrents in the relationship), US support is not forthcoming. Again, while US allies like France and the UK support India’s inclusion in the G-8, the US is silent. The Obama Administration is unlikely to move forward on these issues.

During Bush’s Presidency, US interest in building India as a potential counter to China – although not stated overtly – was more palpable than is the case now. US concerns about China’s rise may still exist, but the serious economic recession in the US, for overcoming which it requires China’s financial back-stopping, calls for greater engagement rather than friction with it.

President Obama is encouraging China to play a supportive role in stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in promoting an India – Pakistan dialogue, unmindful of India’s view that China is the source of much of its strategic problems vis-a-vis Pakistan. All in all, in the current conjuncture, India’s strategic salience might diminish in the eyes of the Obama Administration.

On WTO, the signs of some flexibility from the Indian side with the change of ministers might be welcomed by the US, but any perceived concessions on agriculture by India could create serious political problems for the government domestically. On Climate Change, India is trying to ward off increasing pressure from the US and the EU by agreeing to external scrutiny and more frequently reporting on voluntary, but not legally binding, emission cuts, but this may not provide the breakthrough needed for an agreement between industrialized and developing countries.

At Copenhagen, the Obama Administration may need concrete commitments by India on emission ceilings for improving the chances of its own environmental legislation – considered inadequate by its western partners who are looking for US leadership on the issue – through the Congress, but India’s flexibility is limited as it cannot afford to permanently sacrifice its development objectives. Any bullying of India by the US Congress on this issue will create wrinkles in the bilateral relationship. Already the wires are being crossed between India and the US in Climate Change negotiations because of India’s new inclination to make some concessions and political inability to do so transparently.

The challenge before India is to leverage US strengths to its advantage, give an increasing stake to the US in India, but protect Indias vital interests and independence of action.

Along with these mixed perspectives on Indo–US ties in the future, the Obama Administration’s efforts to assure India that it intends building on the existing relationship and not downgrading it should be noted. Clinton was late in visiting India, but tried to compensate for it by omitting Pakistan from her itinerary. The invitation to Prime Minister Singh to visit Washington in November – the first state visit the US President shall host – is part of the exercise to signal continued high interest in India, and pander to its ego.

A new bilateral dialogue architecture has been set up between the US and India, with annual meetings at the level of Foreign Ministers. The CEO’s Forum will be expanded to widen the engagement between entrepreneurs on both sides. There is serious intent to expand educational cooperation with private sector participation, science and technology collaboration in innovative technologies, and cooperation in agriculture, health, energy, clean technologies, etc. These soft areas of Indo–US cooperation hold good promise, especially as US corporations recognize India’s human and technological potential.

There is no other country that has such wide sectoral interests in India as the US. With the Left no longer in a position to obstruct the economic reform agenda of the UPA and keep it under pressure on its perceived pro-US policies, the new UPA government has freer hands. However, with the global economic downturn and the impact of the recession on economic activity in general, whether exports or investment, and the revival of protectionism as governments try to protect jobs at home, the overall environment has become less favorable for deeper economic reforms.

The US–India Joint Business Council has an impressive spread sheet of what India and the US can do together in the economic area. But, apart from the agenda being rather one-sided, with the focus on US expectations in terms of accelerating the pace of economic reforms, the canvas is too wide, not sufficiently prioritized, and requires in many cases changes in Indian legislation, etc, which would be a time consuming process.

It is entirely possible that the India–US relationship may acquire in due course some of the dynamism of the US–China relationship on the economic side because of high Indian growth rates, the potential of India’s human and technical resources and increasing US investment in India, and that, unlike in the Chinese case where the relationship has undercurrents of competition for power and influence exacerbated by differences in political systems and values, the engagement with India may be eventually more comforting mutually.

The challenge before India is to leverage US strengths to its advantage, give an increasing stake to the US in India, but protect India’s vital interests and independence of action. The US has to be engaged positively, but without illusions that our respective strategic interests in the foreseeable future will become convergent equitably.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Kanwal Sibal

is the former Indian Foreign Secretary. He was India’s Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia.

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