Indian Defence Review

Manifestation of the China Threat

Logically, China would prefer to ‘squeeze’ India through the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy; nibbling territory, psychological bullying, military posturing, economic blackmail and stoking up the internal fires of India. But, there is also this view of a cross-section in the West that China may not hesitate from using tactical nuclear weapon(s) to force India into territorial submission. However, what is certain is that should conflict happen, China will exploit all five domains of aerospace, land, sea, cyber and electro-magnetic. Sun Tzu had said, “The essence of warfare is creating ambiguity in the perceptions of the enemy.”

To this end, China is likely to optimise her considerable cyber warfare capabilities not only to attack command and control networks but also cripple the country’s critical infrastructure. Using her continuous border surveillance cover, she is likely to make full use of PGMs and Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs), space-based assets and stealth platforms, both manned and unmanned and even psychotropic weapons, if developed by then. Her penchant for outflanking moves and manoeuvers as demonstrated in 1962 will, in all likelihood, be replaced through the third dimension, attacking and holding ground in depth.

Implications of a Mountain Strike Corps

In viewing the Mountain Strike Corps, the urgency of its raising needs to be viewed in the context that China is effectively hedged in the East by US Asia Pivot Policy and in the West by the countervailing interests of Eurasia despite her investments in the Central Asian Republics (CAR). What is most crucial to China is the ‘open’ South, which can also be her nemesis. Therefore, her increased belligerence and attempts to grab as much territory as possible to soft-pad her underbelly. That is the reason China wanted a new agreement – the BDCA that India foolishly agreed to including most devastatingly agreeing to not shadow intruding Chinese patrols.

But the fact is that dissident groups inside China can eschew overt political protest for covert sabotage, hacking, swarming and systems disruption while minority elements, particularly Muslims and cults such as Falun Gong will gravitate toward terrorism and criminal enterprises to fund their activities. The first car bomb in Beijing though crude and blast close to a CCP office in North China, are only pointers.

An equally vital issue is that it would be naïve to view the Mountain Strike Corps in isolation as mere addition of 90,000 troops can hardly make a dent as mountains absorb manpower at unbelievable rates. While the Mountain Strike Corps would pose a ‘threat in being’, the real impact will be felt by China when a number of associated issues are addressed. The location of the Mountain Strike Corps formations should be such that it offers quick mobilisation but does not give away the intended thrust lines. Then is the vital issue of building border infrastructure, lack of which has actually encouraged Chinese intrusions. The BRO had been tasked in 2006 to construct 73 strategic roads that were to be completed by 2012 but only a fraction of this has been implemented. Unfortunately, the quality of BRO works has also deteriorated over the years and new roads constructed lose their surfacing in just one winter – more because of corruption than the vagaries of weather. Then is the total void of planning alternative routes. Roads reconnoitered by the Indian Army to bypass communication centres for faster mobilisation are not cleared for stupid reasons such as felling of trees.

Next is the requirement of surveillance. This cannot be restricted to border surveillance but must go in depth right up to the objectives of the Mountain Strike Corps but beyond to the area of interest including the areas from where enemy interference to the Corps thrust lines, as well as the flanks. This must be on 24×7 basis throughout the spectrum of conflict and must optimise Human Intelligence (HUMIMT) aside from all other forms of intelligence. India needs to optimise its satellite-based surveillance, UAVs and stealth drones. Command and control networks and weapon platforms would need to work in a cyber and electronic warfare-intensive setting.

The formation must have adequate potent firepower and punch; PGMs such as the Brahmos and DEWs. The artillery requirements need to be built up early, similar to positioning required armour for speedy thrusts where terrain permits. An effective air defence cover would be a vital need. While it is not known whether the inordinately delayed proposed procurement of 145 x M-777 ultra-light Howitzers from the US also cater for the Mountain Strike Corps. Knowing the system, it is unlikely this requirement would have been taken into account. It would, therefore, be prudent to work on this, in addition to speeding up indigenisation of the Bofors gun.

The third dimension will come into play in a major way including for capture/establishment of air head(s) and subsequent follow-up of troop induction, with Special Forces inducted much before the outbreak of hostilities. Synergy between the Indian Army and the IAF would be of vital importance in Strike Corps operations. Not only will the IAF need to blast the enemy out, it would need to establish an EW corridor for successful airborne operations. The Army Special Forces and the Special Frontier Force battalions must train for simultaneous operations in Tibet including influencing the border area populations, as being done by China.

Concurrently, we must develop the capability to control the fault lines in China (which are many) by employing our Special Forces covertly in Xinjiang, Tibet and Gilgit-Baltistan in conjunction the Mountain Strike Corps. Special Forces provide us the tools to address non-traditional challenges by providing a silent and effective medium to achieve our security objectives. Special Forces are a vital element of national power possessing capability of enormous freedom of action in methodology of execution of assigned operations and should be fruitfully employed to meet any challenge. The key lies in achieving strategic objectives through the application of modest resources with the essential psychological component. This would not only tie up the PLA in knots, it would also be a befitting response to China’s nefarious designs on our territory.

On balance, the Mountain Strike Corps must have capacity (inbuilt and supported) for: information dominance and information assurance; ability to paralyse enemy C4I2 infrastructure; stand-off weapons to pre-empt enemy attack; adequate mix of DEWs and PGMs; ability to disrupt enemy logistics and sustenance including the Qinghai-Tibet rail line; mix of hard-kill and soft-kill options; layered air defence; improved ISR and communications systems, and fully networked forces.

At the national level, we need to push for across-the-board military integration at the operational and tactical levels and develop state-of-the-art technologies in spheres of space, cyber-space, stealth and smart technologies, improved nukes, lasers, intense lasers and plasma, nano-technology and robotics. In fact, we need to network all elements of national power.

Conclusion

China’s past history is laced with aggression and blatant disregard to world opinion. The PLA is well ahead of the Indian Army and this ever-widening gap, if not checked and bridged, will catapult Chinese adventurism. We should expect no respite from increasing Chinese pressure. China-Pakistan are hand in glove in waging asymmetric war against India and the situation is likely to get increasingly volatile inadvertently egged on by US-China and US-Pakistan equations and heightened Chinese aggressive posture. India needs to be prepared for a Chinese thrust into Arunachal Pradesh. We should have the capacity to thwart that and go for North Tibet employing not just the Mountain Strike Corps but all elements of national power.