Indian Defence Review

AN-32

The Mi-8 and the AN-32 were the main ‘workhorses’ in Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka. The Mi-8 fleet flew well over 35,000 sorties lifting over 100,000 troops and 5,700 tonnes of load. Similarly, the AN-32 fleet flew more than 6,200 sorties lifting over 150,000 troops and 8,400 tonnes of load. This air effort was augmented by the IL-76, AN-12 and HS-748 in the fixed wing category and by the Mi-17 and Chetak in the rotary wing category. The efforts by these fixed winged aircraft amounted to carrying out over 800 sorties lifting 24,000 troops and 3,900 tonnes of load. Similarly, the rotary wing augmentation contributed towards flying over 500 sorties lifting 600 troops and 25 tonnes of load. A total of 500 sorties were flown by Akbar during these operations. Towards PR/IRLS tasks in this operation, the Canberra and Jaguars flew 107 sorties which included ten sorties by night.

Helicopter operations during the involvement of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka can be divided into two phases. The first phase, from October 10 to 31, 1987, merits special attention. In this phase, the Liberation of Tamil Tigers Elam (LTTE) fought more in conventional terms. As the LTTE realized the defeat looming ahead, it switched to classic low intensity guerrilla warfare. On October 05, 1987, when 12 LTTE personnel committed suicide by consuming cyanide while in custody of the SLA, it was evident that the LTTE and the IPKF were on a collision course. The general atmosphere in the after­math of this mass suicide became very tense. Political initiatives had not been able to resolve the issues or con­vince the LTTE that the IPKF would be able to look after their interests. The LTTE decided to take up arms against the IPKF, which had been inducted only three months earlier to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In a series of incidents, Indian soldiers began suffering casualties due to sniper fire and mines. The LTTE used claymore mines and Improved Explosive Devices (lEDs) to blow up vehicles and tanks. Hand grenades and other explosives were also thrown at isolated IPKF posts.

It became evident that the present strength of one Infantry Division was over-stretched and would not be able to cope with the situation. In fact, at one stage, even Jaffna airfield, the main lifeline of the IPKF, was insecure. It was, therefore, decided to substantially augment the IPKF. From October 03 to 05, 1987, a round-the-clock airlift was organised for the induction of 340 (Ind) Brigade Ex-Trivandrum and 36 Infantry Division Ex-Gwalior.

On October 09, 1987, when the Chief of the Army Staff, General Sunderji visited HQ 54 Infantry Division at Jaffna for a first hand assessment of the situation, he ordered immediate offensive action against the LTTE as well as the induction of additional troops.

On October 10/11, 1987, the Jaffna Operations commenced as planned and the concept of operation was:

1. Capture Jaffna town by employing maximum resources
2. Simultaneously seal off the Northern peninsula and cut off land and sea routes
3. After clearing Jaffna town, clear the outlying areas and remaining peninsula up to Elephant Pass and the islands
4. Destroy militants and maintain pre­ssure on Vavuniya, Mannar, Kilinochi and Mullaitivu districts of the Northern Province

The LTTE adopted the following multi-tier system of defence for Jaffna town:-

1. Three lines of defence along the major road axes
2. An inner line of defence covering the fortified areas of town itself
3. Fortified posts on water tanks, rooftops and high trees in built-up areas and along crossroads
4. Mobile vans with machine guns

The above operation was to be undertaken in phases with no timeframe laid down. However, when the offen­sive began on October 10, 1987, there was a great hurry to capture Jaffna town and this put tremendous pressure on the local commanders.

Special Heli-borne Operation (SHBO) — October 11 and12, 1987

When the Jaffna Operations commenced, the total helicopter assets available there were four Mi-8s. On the night of October 11/12, 1987, a night SHBO was planned in conjunction with a multi-pronged advance by other ground units, the objective being the capture of LTTE strongholds near Jaffna Univer­sity. The SHBO involved heli-lift of two companies – one each of para-Commandos and Sikh Light Infantry in five lifts.

Mi-8

The SHBO could not achieve the planned objectives due to enemy resistance and resultant battle damage. During the third lift, all helicopters came under heavy ground fire. The pilots continued with the mission and pressed on for repeated landings to ensure link-up by the ground forces. This was despite the fact that the helicopters were continuously being fired at and took many direct hits. By the time the last helicopter landed back at Jaffna at midnight, all four Mi-8s had suffered extensive Category B1 battle damages. The pilots, who had made heroic efforts in successfully flying by night, flew their crippled machines back to Jaffna airfield. Fortunately, none of the crew members were injured. The recovery of these helicopters, which entailed main rotor blade changes besides major structural and electrical repairs, was another technical achievement by the IAF. The first helicopter was ready for action on October 19, 1987. Subsequently, a detachment of 11 R&SU was positioned at Jaffna for immediate repairs to the battle-damaged helicopters.

A thorough post-operation analysis of the above SHBO brought out the following. No joint briefing was carried out for this mission. The Landing Zone (LZ) planned by HQ and marked on its map was different from the one marked on the Task Force Commander’s map. It had been jointly recced in the daytime in a Chetak helicopter by the Task Force Commander (TFC) and the Ground Force Commander (GFC) at 3,000 feet. Unfortunately, the GFC was killed in action that night and the Landing Zone ambiguity was never resolved. HQ insisted that the troops were landed at the wrong Landing Zone while the TFC maintained that his helicopters had landed precisely at the LZ indicated by the GFC during the recce. A joint briefing would certainly have prevented such a situation. The two Landing Zones were at least two kilometres apart although there had been a number of distinctive features besides a linear feature (Jaffna – KKS railway line) for their positive identification separating them.

Other factors that emerged during the post-mission analysis were:-

• The TFC was not aware of the Ground Forces objectives, its defence or any other form of intel­ligence about it. He was not even aware that the Landing Zone chosen and recced by him and the GFC was, in fact, surrounded by the very objective of our ground forces – the multi-storied University building. The IAF Base Commader at Jaffna at that time, an expe­rienced Mi-8 pilot, somehow did not involve himself at all with the planning and other aspects of this opera­tion and there were serious shortcomings in briefings, tactics and intelligence.
• The approach and take-offs for all five lifts were planned in the same direction. This gave the LTTE enough time to position automatic weapons on the top floor of one of these buildings and direct accurate fire on the helicopters as they came abeam.
• Due to the total lack of dedicated tele-communication, the above helicopter operations were not controlled or even monitored by the Ops Room (AF) of HQ, SAC.

Establishment of Joint Operations & Intelligence Room (AF)

After the above incident, an officer of the rank of Air Commodore was appointed and was directed to coordinate and exercise full operational control on behalf of HQ, SAC over all air operations undertaken in connection with Operation Pawan. The joint operations centre (AF) was suitably staffed and communication with the island bases was established for this purpose. Suitable directives and SOPs were immediately issued to regulate subsequent Mi-8 and Mi-25 operations in Jaffna and elsewhere in Sri Lanka.

The Mi-8 force, now substantially augmented, played an extremely crucial role in the rest of Jaffna operations. In addition to the classic SHBOs, it also carried out a number of ferry missions to heli-lift troops from one axis to another as also across lagoons and islands since the roads/waterways were totally unsafe at that time. The same force simultaneously had to provide operational logistic support also to own troops advancing on a different axis. Operating conditions throughout this phase were most trying.

The qualitative contribution of the Mi-8 to the Jaffna opera­tions cannot be measured in precise terms. Undoubtedly, it had a decisive role and an impact on the conduct and final outcome of operations. During this phase, surface movements were totally denied to own ground forces. The Mi-8s were the only means available for movement/re-deployment of troops, their re-supply and in fact, every other task. During this phase, the limited Mi-8 fleet flew 720 sorties lifting 570 tonnes of load and 6,700 troops.

Tactics employed by the Mi-8s, perforce, had to be suited to the pattern and concept of ground operations. During this phase, ground operations were launched as multi-pronged frontal assaults on Jaffna town employing large forces. The SHBOs planned during this phase, entailed simultaneous heli-landing of at least a company size force. This meant up to four Mi-8 landing within a small zone. Later, ground formation commanders were prevailed upon to plan the induction of smaller groups in order to avoid concentrating too many helicopters in a restricted landing area. This aspect assumed importance as own ground forces started closing in onto Jaffna town and suitable Landing Zones were not easily available. With the lessons of the night of October 11/12 in mind, the helicopter crew was briefed accordingly on routeing, transit height and approach/lift-offs. Experience during this phase of operation, both for our aircrew and ground forces, led to further refinements in tactics. At this stage, use of attack helicopter as escort or to provide suppressive fire was not thought of.

Induction of Mi-25 Gunships

The Mi-25 or Akbar as it is popularly known in the IAF was inducted into the Jaffna operations on October 23, 1987. The first Akbar mission was launched from Jaffna on October 25, with the target as Jaffna jetty. The armament expended in the first mission was rockets and 12.7mm guns. The results were almost immediately apparent because the LTTE was forced to stay away from the roads and waterways. All their movements became restricted to night. LTTE intercepts indicated that they would take cover as soon as the sounds of an Akbar were heard. The use of gunships wrested the initiative from the LTTE who, till then, had total freedom of movement both on the roads and over waterways. Since no other movements by road or waterways were permitted at that time, the identification of targets from the air was relatively easy during this phase. Any visible vehicle/boat was promptly dubbed hostile and effectively engaged by Akbar. A number of search and strike as well as pre-planned sorties were mounted against the LTTE. Targets engaged by the Akbar ranged from small bands of militants to moving vans, tractors and motor cycles. Even speed boats in lagoons and coastal waters were not spared. Pre-planned missions were organized against huts, bunkers, jetties and jungle hide-outs.

Most of the attacks carried out by Akbar proved deadly and accurate. These included successful attacks on ammunition dumps, warehouse, buildings, boats and vehicles. The mopping up operation commenced only after the capture of Jaffna town. The first mission was launched on November 06, 1987, when four 250kg bombs were dropped in three level passes from 900m AGL. All four bombs hit within 75 metres of the intended target, an LTTE hide-out, and effectively destroyed it. The most successful Akbar mission, however, was over Chavakachcheri on October 28, 1987, in which a strong LTTE hide-out consisting of a large number of barracks was totally destroyed, killing an unspecified number of militants. In November 1987, when mopping up operations were in progress in the Jaffna penin­sula, Akbar was very effectively utilised with guns and rockets. The maximum physical damage was inflicted on the LTTE during this phase. In later operations in jungles because of civilian movements of personnel, vehicles and boats, it had become impossible to distinguish militants from civilians.

The effectiveness of Akbars, particularly in the search and strike role, can be best judged by the radio intercepts and interrogations. The fact that this weapon system forced the LTTE to move only by night is itself, an indication of its effectiveness. This way, it also helped in bringing about a shift in initiative from the LTTE to our ground troops. Besides causing severe physical casualties, this helicopter had tremendous psychological impact on the LTTE. The extensive damage caused to them, particularly to their forti­fied strongholds, greatly assisted and perhaps hastened the process of forcing the LTTE to abandon Phase I of direct confrontation with the IPKF and switch to Phase II of guerrilla tactics.

PHASE II: November 01, 1987 – March 1990

After the Jaffna operations, the main LTTE cadre dispersed in to the jungles of Vavuniya and Batticaloa Sectors and changed over to guerrilla type of warfare. Their main concept of operating during this phase was to avoid direct confrontation with the IPKF and have no organised resistance. They adopted hit-and-run tactics and planned ambushes using mines and IEDs extensively.

An overall appreciation of the changed situation was carried out by the IPKF, HQ. Based on this, the concept of operations was revised as ‘move out and search out LTTE offensively’ which included cordon and search operations, raids on LTTE hide-outs, ambushes, control measures such as curfews, spot checks, roadblocks and patrolling in selective areas and recovery of arms/ammunition based on information/interrogation.

To meet the above tasks, the level of ground forces was greatly increased during this phase. Also, immediately after the Jaffna operations, there were massive redeployments of units, almost all by air. The orbat of own ground forces during Phase II is given below:-

Four Infantry Divisions with HQs at Palali, Trinco, Vavuniya and Batticaloa as under:-

• 46 Infantry battalion, 3 Commando battalions and 2 regiments of mechanized battalions
• One regiment each of Armoured (T-72) and Artillery (field guns)
• Support units of Engineers, EME, Signals, Supply and Ordnance

Phase II operations were confined mainly to the jungles of Vavuniya with sporadic operations mounted in the Beirut forests of Batticaloa Sector. The LTTE concentrated mainly in the Mullaitivu District which encompassed the towns/settlements of Oddusuddan, Nedukeni and Alampil which are areas consisting of thick tropical jungles with very tall trees (60 – 70 feet) and secondary growth making visual acquisition of targets from the air virtually impossible. There are innumerable jungle tracks and water holes called kulums. The LTTE established large number of training camps in this area.

IL-76

Air Force Elements (AFE): Phase II

The greatly increased strength of our ground forces and the enlarged scope of ground operations necessitated corresponding changes/increment in our AFEs also. It was, therefore, decided to upgrade Trinco to a full fledged Base Support Unit. Till then, a small detachment of three officers and 26 airmen commanded by a Squadron Leader was functioning there under the overall control of Base Commander, Jaffna. Similarly, it was decided, in principle, to have an IAF Liaison Officer and a small detachment each at Vavuniya and Batticaloa. Vavuniya was later upgraded to the status of a full fledged Base Support Unit in August 1988.

During the first five months of Operation Pawan, the command structure for the control of air operations was not clearly defined. There was a continuous ‘see–saw’ between HQ, SAC and Air HQ in this regard. The matter was resolved only after December 22, 1987. Detailed Admin Directives were issued by HQ, SAC and under C-in-C’s direction total command and control structure for various AFEs involved in Operation Pawan was clearly defined and laid down. Tele­-communication between HQ, SAC and the island bases, which was non-existent till then, was established on top most priority to enable the former to exercise proper control. Similarly, maintenance, logistic support and admin back up facilities at the designated support bases/units were streamlined and geared up. The living and working conditions of personnel deployed in Operation Pawan were also improved signi­ficantly by proper regulation of various funds and works services. The above measures greatly enhanced IPKF capability in the region and its ability to sustain high rate of helicopter utilisation.

In order to meet the anticipated requirements of Phase II, Air HQ boosted the strength of Helicopter Units (HU) waiving manning restrictions. With the arrival of additional HU, other heli­copters belonging to different units were withdrawn from the area. The two HUs, were now required to amalgamate their resources and ensure the availability and serviceability of at least eight to ten out of twenty helicopters on the island at all times.

A total re-organisation of second line servicing had to be done to meet the challenges of Phase II. To save in fructuous flying hours on ferries to and from the mainland, it was decided to set up a 50-hour servicing facilities centrally at Trinco for all Mi-8s on the island. Later, engine change and major snag rectification facilities were also added. During the first eight months, a total of 43 fifty-hour servicing was achieved by CR&SS Trinco. A very commendable effort indeed, considering the constraints there. The efforts of CR&SS Trinco in turn enabled the IPKF to meet its operational commitments during the critical period of Phase II, when the average monthly utili­sation of the Mi-8 for Operation Pawan alone exceeded 500 hrs.

Employment of Mi-8: Phase-II

Majority of the troops carried by Mi-8s were Commandos inducted during SHBOs which entailed heli-landing at unknown, unpre­pared and often unrecced Landing Zones (LZs) under the most trying operational conditions. The helicopters also came under ground fire on many occasions during such inductions. On one occasion, a full combat battalion was re-deployed in a matter of two to three hours.

Jaguar

The Mi-8 also carried out limited armed missions with rockets although their effectiveness was limited. Having one of their own helicopters armed during inductions/de-inductions certainly added to the confidence level of our Mi-8 crew. In one case of rocket firing by Mi-8 in the Vishvamadu forest, as many as seven casualties were inflicted on the LTTE, as confirmed by a radio intercept. But prior to firing in an area, the crew could not see any activity on the ground due to forest cover. The fitment of machine guns on special brackets mounted on its side port holes was also tried out but was found impractical due to poor visibility for the machine gun operator and the danger of hitting one’s own helicopter.

Employment of the Akbar

The employment of the Akbar changed significantly during this phase. The classic ‘search and strike’ missions of Phase I could not be continued because of serious identification problems. During Phase I, no vehicular movements or plying of boats was permitted. Anything seen on the road/ over waterways was presumed to be hostile and promptly engaged. This situation totally changed when vehicular/other movements were permitted in order to restore normalcy. There was no way a militant van/tractor/boat could be distin­guished from air from those of other civilians and a number of engagements of doubtful targets had to be aborted. An Air/Naval Liaison Officer was present on all Akbar missions but the problem of identification was never resolved. Akbar was employed in the following roles:-

1. Suppressive fire in general area of the intended LZs for one’s own tactical helicopters
2. Area bombing/strafing of known LTTE jungle hide-outs. This employment had to be restricted to areas where there was no civilian habitation
3. Armed escorts/CAPs to tactical helicopters engaged in SHBOs
4. Close air support to own troops from ‘On Call’ ready position manned on ground at forward helipads

The overall employment of the Akbar, however, was some­what restricted due to its limited availability. A total of three Akbars were in circulation of which only two were available on the island at any given time. There was, however, no shortage of armament stores during Phase II.

To augment the gunships, ATGM helicopters were moved into Jaffna on February 19, 1988. It was initially intended to utilise this weapon system against militant boats. However, it was not found to be practical to utilise this helicopter because of the technical limitations of its equipment particularly the missile batteries. The helicopter could not be kept on runway readiness indefinitely with its missiles loaded. The warning time normally available to engage a militant boat was extremely short and was certainly not enough for the helicopters to be loaded and launched after receipt of a warning. There were no other useful pin-point hardened targets for this weapon. The helicopter, therefore, was used to augment the helicopter resources on the island for communication duties and casualty evacuation. Limited use of these helicopters in armed role was, however, made during Operation Checkmate, when suspected arms caches were engaged by it. It was recommended to be withdrawn from the theatre in June 1988 but the Army was keen for it to stay on. The detachment was finally withdrawn in January 1989.

The tactics followed by our helicopters during this phase were largely the same as those evolved during the latter part of Phase I. The threat of small arms had a definite influence on our tactics with regard to routing, transit height circuit pattern, approach and lift-off. During this phase, the concept of an Akbar escort and CAP for SHBOs was extensively tried out with great success. The escorting Akbar either carried out suppressive or prophylactic fire around the intended LZ of the main Mi-8 force or maintained CAP during their phase, as pre-briefed. Over unrecced LZs, especially near jungle edges, suppressive fire was invariably planned and effected.

The tactics adopted by the IPKF had tremendous impact on the counter-insur­gency phase of these operations. The inherent flexibility of the Akbar and its ability to bring fire at short notice together with the tactical mobility provided by the Mi-8 proved beyond doubt, a real force multiplier. Because of the guerilla tactics of the militants, the organic weapons of eight to ten kilometre range with the ground forces could not be utilised fully or brought to bear in time. By the time own field guns, with road clearance and allied problems, could be brought close enough, the ground situation had changed. The Akbar then became the only means of ready fire power available. The physical and psychological impact of this weapon system on the militants aside, the effect on the morale of own troops at the sight of an Akbar coming in to provide them much needed close support and well-direc­ted fire power, can not be quantified. The other invisible impact of this aircraft was the feeling of security it provided to the Mi-8 crew and Commandos inside, while heli-landing at unknown and unprepared LZs. These personnel were secure in the knowledge that the escorting Akbar had sterlised their intended Landing Zone or was readily available should they require it during their critical and vulnerable insertion phase. The classic example was the incident on June 23, 1988, near Alampil in which the Mi-8, while carrying out a heli-induction, came under heavy ground fire. The escorting Akbar immediately went in and fired at the militants in the general area. Subsequent intercepts and own ground sources confirmed this highly effective engagement by the Akbar.

On March 26, 1988, an emergency message was received from Jaffna that an LTTE boat with militants aboard was fleeing from Karainagar, an island off Jaffna Peninsula, heading directly north towards Point Calamere. It was suspected that Mahatiya, the LTTE military boss, was also onboard. The initial reports were given by the SL Navy. An Akbar was launched immediately but it was appreciated that by the time the Akbar caught up with it, the boat would have entered Indian territorial waters. A decision was sought and given to engage the boat as long as it had not touched the Indian coastline. However, initial contact was lost by the SL Navy ship and the Akbar, though in R/T contact with the SL ship could not establish visual contact with the fleeing boat. The incident, neverthe­less, put a fear in the LTTE that we meant business. There were no more reported incidents of such daylight attempts by the LTTE.

In order to check their clandestine movements under cover of darkness, it was decided to attempt night strikes by the Akbar under artificial illumination. Canberra aircraft were tasked for the flare drop. The first Akbar night mission was launched on August 02, 1988, in Palk Bay in the general area of Mannar – Devil’s Point coastline. In the first mission, however, both flares did not light up. Subsequent successful missions were launched on August 05 and 09, 1988. Three more missions were mounted in the same month, two of them along the East Coast near Mullaitivu. However, persis­tent bad weather, serious problems of disorientation over the sea under near dark night conditions and RV difficulties forced the cancellation of further missions. Another factor which compelled the IPKF to call off night strike missions was the perennial problem of identification. It proved an extremely difficult task and defied an effective solution throughout Phase II.

In the absence of latest maps of the Operation Pawan area, PR sorties were mounted to cover the entire area of our interest. For this purpose two Jaguars and a Canberra were positioned on a required basis at Bangalore and Hyderabad respectively. A direct tele-communication was provided for this purpose. For IRLs tasks, two MiG 23 Bn aircraft were also moved to Trivandrum for a short while in January 1988. However, worthwhile information that could be extracted from the IRLS prints was extremely limited and the aircraft were withdrawn after a week. The coast to coast mosaic made by our PR Canberras proved extremely useful to our ground formations for planning purposes as no other accurate maps of the area were avai­lable. The Sri Lankan series quarter and one inch maps were of 1939 vintage. The Indian metric maps were made available only in August 1988.

The tactical photo recce capability of the Jaguar could not be utilised in the classic sense because of the nature of terrain and type of ground operations. However, individual photos of suspected hide-outs provided lot of useful information, in particular, the presence of tractor tracks indicating movements of militants in the area.

The LTTE indulged in number of bold and suicidal attacks on the IPKF posts including a broad daylight attack on August 25, 1988, at about 1410 hrs on the TAC, HQ of 7 Brigade at Neetikaikulum in which one AOP Chetak was totally destroyed with a direct hit from an RPG while another Chetak parked next to it suffered struc­tural damage due to debris. An armed Mi-8, standing by on call at Mallaitivu was launched against the LTTE. The Mi-8 was overhead Neetikaikulum within ten minutes and fired rockets in the likely area of escape under direction of the orbiting AOP Chetak. The GOC asked for Commando troops to be inducted in immediately to comb the area. This was done within twenty minutes. Despite failing light and bad weather closing in from all sides, the Mi-8s carried out a successful induction. In addition, one of the Mi-8s, airborne for routine air maintenance in the area was diverted to a nearby post to bring in additional troops in order to re-inforce the Neetikaikulum garrison. The quick response of the Mi-8 crew was a blessing.

On the same night, two more attacks were carried out on the HQs of two of the battalions which were deployed in a two-tier cordon, consisting of some 2,000 troops, around the suspected LTTE camps in the area as part of Operation Checkmate Ill. It was surmised that the LTTE, in a desperate attempt to break out of the cordon, was launching these last ditch attacks on IPKF posts. To prevent this break-out, additional troops were inducted by Mi-8 early next morning. It was during this phase of Operation Checkmate on August 23, 1988, that the largest ever induction of troops (over 750) was carried out by the Mi-8s in a day.

The Mi-8 and the AN-32 were the main ‘workhorses’ in Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka. The Mi-8 fleet flew well over 35,000 sorties lifting over 100,000 troops and 5,700 tonnes of load. Similarly, the AN-32 fleet flew more than 6,200 sorties lifting over 150,000 troops and 8,400 tonnes of load. This air effort was augmented by the IL-76, AN-12 and HS-748 in the fixed wing category and by the Mi-17 and Chetak in the rotary wing category. The efforts by these fixed winged aircraft amounted to carrying out over 800 sorties lifting 24,000 troops and 3,900 tonnes of load. Similarly, the rotary wing augmentation contributed towards flying over 500 sorties lifting 600 troops and 25 tonnes of load. A total of 500 sorties were flown by Akbar during these operations. Towards PR/IRLS tasks in this operation, the Canberra and Jaguars flew 107 sorties which included ten sorties by night.

Helicopter operations during the IPKF’s deployment in Sri Lanka can be termed as highly successful. The IPKF was very close to complete success when, due to political considerations, it was withdrawn. Our forces had learnt their lessons well from past experience and applied it with great effect. What is extremely creditable is that the IPKF did not lose any helicopter totally due enemy action barring one due to the attack on the heli-base.