Indian Defence Review

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Trump are expected to meet on the sidelines of the fourteenth meeting of the G20 to be held from 28 to 29 June 2019 at Osaka, Japan. The meeting is crucial in a way that it comes at a time when US has created uncertainties and a disorderly atmosphere in the world by dumping multilateral agreements unilaterally, provoking and disrupting relations with its allies and applying unreasonable and aggravating economic pressures on countries that it calls ‘Rogue Nations’. US has also initiated a ‘Trade War’ with China which has the making of translating into a ‘Technology War’ with implications for the entire world. Escalation of trade war into a confrontation between US and China has the potentials of sucking India into the row.

Though US has been calling India its ‘closest ally’ and a ‘major defence partner’, India has not been spared its share of unacceptable demands affecting its economy, relations with other countries and larger trade interests. US’ attitude towards India’s interests and concerns till now, the way it has dealt with its close allies and its commitment to international agreements do not inspire much confidence in its reliability. The question is how is US likely to act in future in the light of its present attitude towards relationships in general, it’s likely comportment with India under conditions that affects its self interest or when India is threatened. Is it worth getting closer to the country at the cost of our larger interests and our relationship with the others and to what extent?

In this article it is intended to bring out a few examples of US’ behaviour in dealing with countries to understand the possible situations in which India may be forced into and their implications for India’s larger interests.

US’ Attitude towards India

US has been pushing India for over a decade to sign the three ‘fundamental agreements’ which ostensibly promotes interoperability between militaries and guide sale of cutting-edge weapons and communication equipment. India signed the ‘Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)’on August 29, 2016 while the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) was signed during the Indo-US 2+2 dialogue on September 06, 2018. The third agreement, ‘Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial cooperation (BECA) is yet to be signed. 

While linking sale of cutting edge weapons to India signing logistic arrangements is clearly illogical, the question of interoperability between militaries of India and US are farfetched unless India intends to become a front line state of the US, reminiscent of Pakistan in its war against the erstwhile Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The results of this arrangement and the damage it has done to Pakistan are there to see. As for LEMOA, it is the US military which is likely to access Indian facilities in the Indian Ocean for refueling and replenishment purposes in its operations against China. The circumstances that are likely to present themselves in a war situation in a future date and the desirability of providing logistic support to either militaries engaged in a war cannot be predicted or determined at this stage. The cost of providing logistic support to one of the two countries engaged in war has its implications for India.    

As for COMCASA, it purportedly allows India to procure specialised equipment for encrypted communication for US origin military platforms like C-17, C-130 and P-81s. The question is isn’t the vender expected to provide reliable communication equipment as per specifications if so demanded and contracted for? With India wanting to promote ‘Make in India’ and one of its major Public Sector Enterprise involved in manufacturing high technology communication equipment, what is wrong in procuring commercially available communication systems specially tailored to meet our requirements in these platforms? Communication interoperability between the militaries of India and US is redundant and undoubtedly compromises India’s communication security.   

Despite these implications India signed these fundamental agreements signaling a very close partnership with the US startling the world.  Has US shown any understanding of these compromises in its dealings with India?  

Trade Issues

In a move which was nothing more than symbolism, US rechristened its ‘Pacific Command’, the ‘US Indo-Pacific Command’, underscoring the growing importance of India in US’ scheme of things but chose to repeatedly delay the much touted 2+2 dialogue. The meetings was scheduled for April 2018 between the Defence and the Foreign Ministers of India and US and address the growing differences over the Iran Nuclear Deal and the brewing tariff war between the two countries. The postponements were seen as a sign of growing attenuation of US’ interest in India relations and Trump’s move back to US’ erstwhile AfPak centric South Asia Policy resulting in US moving closer to Pakistan at the cost of India relations.

In March 2018, US announced a 25 percent tariff on imported steel and a 10 percent tariff on imported aluminum that hurt India. US granted exemption to Argentina, European Union, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico and S Korea but chose not to accede to India’s request for relief.

After putting India on notice of its intent to terminate the country’s designation as a ‘beneficiary developing nation’ under the key Generalised System of Preference (GSP) trade programme on March 04 2019, US Administration withdrew GSP benefits to India with effect from June 05, 2019. During the meetings after India was put on notice, US had demanded that India allow imports of agriculture, milk, and poultry products from US. Obviously US chose to ignore India’s domestic interests and compulsions. With US remaining adamant, India has decided to impose retaliatory tariffs on import of 29 US products.

While on a visit to India, US Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross besides accusing India of imposing restrictive trade policies that burden foreign companies, warned that any retaliatory tariffs by India in response to US withdrawal of some trade privileges from India will not be appreciated. While US sees no problem in imposing tariffs on other countries unilaterally, it expects others to comply with its dictates without any retaliation.

India’s relations with Iran

US unilaterally pulled out of the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) popularly called the Iran Nuclear Deal reached between Iran and the P5+1 and endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Consequently on November 05, 2018, US reimposed sanctions on Iran that had been lifted under the JCPOA.

The question is will US that unilaterally withdraws from an international agreement endorsed by the UN Security Council and brokered by seven countries remain committed to bilateral agreements with India? What if it abandons agreements at a crucial moment and remains a mute spectator as it did in the case of Philippines when in 2012 China effectively seized control of Scarborough Shoal and built artificial islands in the reef and militarised them despite US and the Philippines signing a mutual defense treaty in 1951 and written assurances? US dumped its pet project Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Is there any guarantee it will stay put in its Indo-Pacific strategy?   

US sanctions re-imposed on August 7, 2018 is a part of a larger move to cut off the country from the international financial system.  US sanctions are extra-territorial, implying that in addition to prohibiting US persons and entities from doing business with Iran, non-US firms and financial entities that do not comply with US sanctions could also be cut off from the American-controlled global financial system. With a view to choke Iran’s economy, import of oil from Iran was also made sanctionable from November 04, 2018.

Inflicting sanctions on third countries based on its domestic laws which are brought into play to impose sanctions on a country to which it is opposed, are illegal. There are no legal bases to justify such application. UN General Assembly resolutions here, here and here have condemned them as “coercive measures” and has called for the immediate repeal of unilateral extraterritorial laws that impose sanctions on companies and nationals of other States.

US which granted temporary waiver to India and seven other countries to purchase Iranian oil was finally withdrawn in May 2019. India imports 10 percent of its oil from Iran which provides 60 days of credit for purchases, a facility not available from other suppliers such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Nigeria and the US. Iran also offers attractive insurance and shipping terms.

Should India accept such illegal actions at the cost of the country’s economy and energy security interests and still try to build closer relations with the US which amounts to the country becoming a ‘Junior Partner ‘of US? 

At a time when Iran is in dire need to sell its oil for survival, India ending oil purchases will have serious repercussions for India’s relations with the country and our ambitions of land connectivity to the North through Chabahar port. To add fuel to fire US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley on a visit to India urged India to reconsider its ties to Iran.

India’s larger interest lies in maintaining cordial relationship with Iran at a time when it is under tremendous economic pressure due to sanctions. Being a peninsular country with road connectivity limited to the East, which also is yet to be fully developed and operationalised, speeding up the Chabahar Port project besides linking up with the International North South Trade Corridor (INSTC) to connect with Central Asian Countries, Russia, Europe and Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan will reduce travel time compared to the present shipping mode of transportation, spur India’s trade, and boost economy.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif during his visit to Islamabad in March 2018 is said to have welcomed Chinese and Pakistani investment in Chabahar. Under conditions of US sanctions, investment by China in Chabahar would be preferred by Iran as that would speed up the port project helping Iran overcome its present economic situation. Earlier in January 2016 Pakistan and Iran had also decided to lay railway track to connect Gwadar with the Iranian port city of Chabahar. Piqued by US Trade war, last week Chinese President Xi Jinping had stated in Bishkek that Beijing was ready to join efforts with Tehran in promoting a steady development of bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership. That could have implications for India-Iran relationship and our Chabahar ambitions.   

India agreed to help Iran expand Chabahar port way back in 2003 to construct two terminals — a multipurpose cargo terminal and a container terminal. Progress slowed particularly as Western nations imposed sanctions on Iran and a dispute over payment of $30 million exercise duties on port equipment imported into Iran.

Threat of Chinese BRI demolishing India’s hopes for Road Connectivity to the North

The Iranian government has supported the Belt and Road Initiative and has been in discussion with the Chinese government on the issue. Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Ali Larijani during a visit to China with a parliamentary delegation, in an address to a gathering of professors and students of Renmin University of China in February 2019 had conveyed the Iranian Parliament’s readiness for using the parliamentary potential of Iran to take forward mutual cooperation in the One Belt, One Road project.

Iran’s geographical location which acts as a link between Chinese Western provinces and Europe with access to Persian Gulf makes it an important element in the China-Central-West-Asian Economic Corridor (CCWAEC) of the Chinese BRI project. Railway connections from Turkey westwards and ground transportation network connecting Tehran to Central Asian countries, Afghanistan and China makes it a desirable candidate for China’s BRI.

There is already a direct freight train between China and Iran. The rail route, also known as the New Silk Road, stretches 2,300 kilometers from Urumqi in western China’s Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region to Tehran, connecting Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan along the way, cutting transportation to 14 to 15 days, compared with 45 to 50 days by sea. 

The almost complete absence of American influence and the availability of cheap crude oil in Iran, draws China into a closer relationship with Iran, as a strategic partner. Even under sanctions Chinese investments made its way to Iran, strengthening Sino-Iran relationship.

Considering these possibilities, by demanding that India end import of oil from Iran and reconsider its relations with Iran, US has shown utter lack of understanding of India’s interests and concerns. It is more than obvious that US’ actions are exclusively self interest oriented. Can India depend on US?

US threat of Sanctions for Purchase of S-400 Missile Systems from Russia

US enacted the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in August 2017 to target Russia, Iran and N Korea. The Act prohibits other countries of the world from entering into defence contracts with these countries.  

India inked a $5 billion deal for the purchase of five Regiments S-400 Advanced Triumf long-range anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia in October 2018 defying US warnings of sanctions. Since then US has been cautioning India on purchase of missile systems from Russia. The Senior State Department official for South and Central Asian Affairs Alice G Wells went to the extent of telling the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee for Asia, the Pacific and Nonproliferation that at certain point India has to make a strategic choice about the type of weapon systems and platforms it is going to adopt.

Presently numbers of aircrafts in India’s Air Force has depleted considerably due to delays in procurement. With the aging of aircrafts such as MIG 21, MIG 27 and MIG 29 in the present fleet, the numbers are expected to go down further. S – 400 weapon system by virtue of its range, coverage, and the number of targets it can track at any one time and engage will free India’s Multi – Role Combat Aircrafts to carryout air to ground missions instead of being tied down exclusively to achieving air parity, thus filling up the gap in our existing capabilities. Should we at this stage abandon purchase of these missile system cowed down by US threat just to please the country?

Despite taking Washington into confidence on the purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, a Senior State Department official told a group of reporters on May 31, 2019 that India should not assume that it will get a waiver from US sanctions if it went ahead with the purchase of S-400 Russian missiles and added that the purchase could also hamper the future of Indo-US defence relationship. Obviously that was a threat. As of today the issue of US sanctions to punish India for the purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia still hangs in balance.

Unilateral withdrawal from International Agreements   

US made a unilateral announcement in February 2019 that it is pulling out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). The pact is an arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union signed in December 1987. The Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate and permanently give up all their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers.

By dumping the agreement, US hopes to deploy conventional ground-based, intermediate-range missile systems (GBIRs) against China which the INF Treaty prohibits the US from fielding. Due to range restrictions these missiles will have to be positioned in countries neighbouring China. Deploying offensive missile systems in their respective territories is not to the liking and interests of its allies Japan, S Korea, Philippines and the others in the Indo-Pacific region or elsewhere.

Should US not have consulted the Governments concerned before withdrawing from the treaty? Will US now attempt to force deploy these missiles in these countries? What if US threaten India with some such actions contrary to its interests against China in the process of containing that country?

Few examples of US threat to Europe and their deteriorating relations

Trump believes European members contribute very little towards NATO and get all the rewards while US is getting a raw deal due to economic costs of supporting the military alliance. During a NATO summit on July 12, 2018, at a closed door meeting Trump is said to have threatened the members by saying “I can do whatever I want because this alliance has no legitimacy,” and “spending must be raised by January 2019 or the US will go it alone”. On the second day of the conference, a meeting about plans for induction of Georgia and Azerbaijan to NATO which Trump had turned into one about NATO funding, Georgian and Azerbaijani leaders had to be asked to leave the room, and an emergency meeting called.    

The irony is, though Trump cries hoarse about economic costs of supporting NATO alliance and threatens to withdraw from the alliance, the Trump administration seems to have warned its NATO partners that additional moves toward establishing an independent defense entity through the European Union (EU) would be a “poison pill” for the Transatlantic alliance. What right does the US have in any action that EU may decide to initiate towards any independent Security arrangements they may wish to create to protect themselves?

On March 28, 2019, the WTO Appellate Body announced its ruling on Boeing, vindicating the EU’s position that the US hasn’t acted to comply with WTO rules on the issue of support to the company. On April 08, 2019, the Trump administration intensified pressure on the EU to end what it termed ‘harmful subsidies’ for the aircraft manufacturer Airbus. It released a list of European goods worth USD11 billion that could be hit with punitive tariffs with possible negative impact on the bilateral EU-US agreement on mutual tariff reductions.

Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear deal has not gone will with its NATO alliance partners and signatories to the JCPOA including Britain, France, and Germany. All the three countries have made it clear that they would not go along with the US in re-imposing economic sanctions on Tehran and have wowed to preserve the Iran Nuclear accord citing multiple inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certifying Iran’s compliance of the accord.  These countries have been making efforts to protect Iran from the effects of the US sanctions.

The worst came when sometime in mid 2018 Trump administration without even showing the courtesy of informing the EU in advance, downgraded the diplomatic status of the EU mission in Washington from that of an Embassy to International Organisation. The head of the delegation who was listed as an ambassador by the Office of the Chief of Protocol now stands downgraded, in the State Department’s list of the diplomatic order of precedence to that of a “heads of delegation.”

If US could treat the European Countries, its long standing allies and partners in this manner, will India be spared? Are we as a nation prepared to accept such indignities?

Conclusion

Trump came to office with no significant foreign policy objectives relating to US’ relationship with India other than business interests and to talk India into becoming its front line state in its efforts to contain China. Independent decisions by countries based on their national interests are unacceptable to the US inviting threat of sanctions. One is not even sure as to what will invite the wrath or some retaliatory action as it happened at the end of G7 meet held in Jun 2018 in Canada when Trump refused to sign the summit communiqué over Canadian Prime Minister’s unwillingness to include a sunset clause in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).           

Chinese threat to India’s Northern borders and Indian Ocean besides China-Pakistan nexus are often cited as the reason why India needs to enter into a military alliance with US. Will US which till today has not even supported India’s claims against either Pakistan or China militarily intervene or fight alongside India’s military? US remaining silent during Doklam standoff is an eye opener.  Maintaining freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean and open airspace in the Indian Ocean region is a matter of interest to all the countries of the world which use these medium for transportation and not India’s alone. India becoming a US proxy in its efforts to contain China is not in the larger interests of the country. India’s emphasis under these circumstances lies in strengthening its economy, internal coherence and building military capacity. India will do well to maintain balance in its relations with the major powers.

Following Chinese President Xi Jinping-Modi meeting on the sidelines of SCO meet held in Bishkek between June 13-14, 2019 and the directions issued to the Special Envoys of both the countries to speed up discussions for a settlement of the boundary dispute, India needs to take forward the issue of resolution of the boundary question stressing the need for urgency in settling the issue in the larger interest of regional peace. Settling the border dispute with China will provide space for India to concentrate in other developmental issues.