Indian Defence Review

Recent events in Pakistan, including the special forces assault on the Abbottabad compound in which Osama bin Laden was hiding and living, the attack of PNS Mehran in Karachi and many more have once again raised the issue of the ability of the Pakistani state and more particularly the army to control militant extremism. It has also raised several questions, both internal to the armed forces and otherwise, on the primacy of position of the Pakistan army as the saviour of the nation.

Essentially, the challenge before the Pakistani army and in turn the state is the war on terror. Filled with conflicting interests and contradictory policy implementation, the war on terror cannot hope to succeed unless, the military and the ISI change its strategy”¦

Presently, a weak civilian government has little say in the affairs of the armed forces and therefore, the only concern is that of internal debate and dissent on Pakistan’s policies vis-à-vis the terrorist-militant elements that are deeply entrenched in society. It also raises questions about Pakistan’s role in the war on terror and the contradictions that afflict this policy

Essentially, the challenge before the Pakistani army and in turn the state is the war on terror. Filled with conflicting interests and contradictory policy implementation, the war on terror cannot hope to succeed unless, the military and the ISI change its strategy of “support and yet denial” the game will not last long. In due course, the Frankenstein element will emerge stronger and then the state will find it difficult to protect itself and more dangerously the nuclear weapons that could create havoc, if it finds its way into the hands of these militant elements.

When General Pervez Musharraf handed over the reigns of power to General Ashfaq Kayani in 2007, the former knew that he would not only protect him, but also the interests of the Pakistan Army, portrayed as the saviour of the state. Not only has Kayani served both interests well since that time, but he has also built himself as the quiet negotiator who masterminds foreign policy for Islamabad, especially with the US.

What has changed this scene somewhat is the assassination of the al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in a surprise US Special Forces attack codenamed Operation Neptune Spear in May 2011. This has been compounded by the attack by Pakistani Taliban on PNS Mehran in Karachi and the killing of the journalist Saleem Shahzad, suspectedly by the Inter Services Intelligence [ISI].

“¦some of this senior Corps Commanders had strongly opposed the beginning of the Drone attacks within Pakistan. This continues to be and may well become a factor in Kayanis own future as the debate rages on how to protect Pakistans sovereignty with regard to the US war on terror.

The targeted killing of senior Pakistani journalist Saleem Shahzad, the bureau chief of the Asia Times online website was the third major blow to the security of Pakistan. These three events have thrown Pakistan into a cauldron. The impact of this is being felt in many ways within the armed forces and outside it.

Kayani in Power

General Kayani is the fourteenth chief of the Pakistan Army. He was promoted as Vice Chief of Army Staff in October 2007. A month later he became the Army Chief after General Pervez Musharraf retired. Among Kayani’s first pronouncements’ in January 2008, after his ascent to power as army chief, was a directive which ordered military officers not to maintain contacts with politicians. A month later he ordered the withdrawal of military officers from all of Pakistan’s government civil departments.

The US hand in the extension of Kayani and the compulsions behind it are very clear. The American view was that their comfort level working with “Kayani-Pasha-Haqqani” trio was quite high therefore it was decided that General Kayani would stay for another year.

In March 2008, General Kayani confirmed that the Pakistan’s armed forces would stay out of politics and support the new government. He told a gathering of military commanders in Rawalpindi that “the army fully stands behind the democratic process and is committed to playing its constitutional role.” These comments came soon after the the Pakistan People’s Party [PPP] won the 2008 elections and formed a coalition government.1

Kayani’s own position as Army Chief has been debated and discussed among the Corps Commanders and there have been serious differences of opinion among the top leadership about the extensions given first, to Kayani and then to Shuja Pasha. What irked many Corps Commanders was the fact that the US leaned on the civilian leadership to give a three year extension to Kayani and not one as was proposed.

The US hand in the extension of Kayani and the compulsions behind it are very clear. The American view was that their comfort level working with “Kayani-Pasha-Haqqani” trio was quite high therefore it was decided that General Kayani would stay for another year.2

The US logic was that since Kayani had ‘developed strong working relations with his American counterparts’ it will be “in the best interest of the operation not to change leadership mid-stream.” On his part, General Kayani is said to have assured the Obama administration that his army would play in their “own sandbox” and not disrupt the civilian setup.3

The other issue of discontent within the leadership has been the extent of cooperation with the US in targeting the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership and cadre operating within Pakistan. In fact, even during General Pervez Musharraf’s tenure, some of this senior Corps Commanders had strongly opposed the beginning of the Drone attacks within Pakistan. This continues to be and may well become a factor in Kayani’s own future as the debate rages on how to protect Pakistan’s sovereignty with regard to the US war on terror.4

What were the reasons for the civilian government to persist with Kayani? There were several reasons, some transparent and others not so. First, the general impression is that he is a professional and one who wants to stay away from politics. Second, the need to ensure continuity in Pakistan’s war on terror and linked to this is the American decision to back Kayani. The US decision was based on their experience of Musharaff assisting them in the war on terror. From a position of stalemate, Kayani managed to turn the tide in 2008-2009 in operations against the Taliban. In addition, Kayani sought to restore the image of the army taking measures to improve the lot of the foot soldier. All this not only improved the sagging image of the army as the saviour and protector of Pakistan, but also made Kayani a sought after man to broker political deals.5 He did this and much more, but quietly, in keeping with his tendency to maintain a low profile.

All these factors were at play and known in the public domain. But beneath the veneer of government choice lay Kayani’s own perception that his continuance was essential for the survival of Pakistan. In this, Kayani had the backing of his Corps Commanders. This was because Kayani had packed the Corps Commanders with men of his choice.6

The presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan reflects very poorly on both of them.  The number two ranking al Qaeda figure, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other members of the Taliban in Afghanistan, are widely believed to be on Pakistani territory.7 A few days after the Abbottabad raid, Kayani stated that ‘he’ would not tolerate a repeat of the US covert operation that killed Osama bin Laden, warning that any similar action would lead to a reconsideration of the relationship with the United States. He termed the US raid on the compound in Abbottabad where bin Laden was eventually killed, as a “misadventure.” Kayani then said that another similar raid would be responded to swiftly, a promise that seemed intended to tell the public that the Army was capable of stopping the Americans trying to capture other senior figures of the al-Qaeda. These statements came after Kayani’s meeting with his Corps Commanders at their monthly conference at the Army Headquarters at Rawalpindi.

“¦Kayani took queries for three hours after a 45-minute address to the 5th Corps in Karachi. The questioners focused on the perceived affront in Abbottabad “” and why Pakistan, in the words of one officer, did not “retaliate.”

Within the Pakistani establishment, there was anger at the American decision to carry out the raid on their own. Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir said at a press conference that Washington should abandon the idea that Pakistan was complicit in helping bin Laden hide. But Bashir did not elaborate, only saying that the ISI had a “brilliant” record in counterterrorism.8 Among other things, Kayani told his Corps Commanders that any similar action, violating Pakistan’s sovereignty, “will warrant a review on the level of military /intelligence cooperation with the US.”9 While admitting shortcomings in developing intelligence on the presence of bin Laden in Pakistan, the conference highlighted that the achievements of Inter Services Intelligence, against Al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates in Pakistan, have no parallel.10

The Killing of Bin Laden and the Pakistan Army

In April 2011, Kayani went to the Kakul Military Academy to greet passing out cadets. There he claimed that Pakistani security forces “have broken the back of terrorists” and that the Pakistan Army “was completely aware of internal and external threats to the country.”  It is ironic that Osama bin Laden’s compound was a mile away from the parade ground where Kayani spoke.11

Members of Pakistan’s army have said little publicly about the US operation that killed bin Laden and other events. But interviews with officers suggest that there is an internal debate and ferment. The impact of recent events on an expanded Pakistani effort against Islamist militants will clearly be felt in the coming weeks and months.

This unrest forced the army chief to visit many military establishments to answer questions about the American raid that killed bin Laden and the role of the Pakistan army. According to the Washington Post, Kayani took queries for three hours after a 45-minute address to the 5th Corps in Karachi. The questioners focused on the perceived affront in Abbottabad — and why Pakistan, in the words of one officer, did not “retaliate.”12

The slain journalist Syed Salmeen Shahzad claims in his new book that Islamization of the Pakistan army is only at the middle and higher level, which implies that it is only the committed who could have leaked privileged information.

In a meeting with US Senator John Kerry, Kayani is said to have relayed the “intense feelings” of the rank and file.13 A US news daily reported that a young army captain who was guarding the Abbottabad house in which bin Laden was staying was “perplexed” by the killing. He articulates the view that it was impossible for his own men in uniform to have “overlooked” the presence of bin Laden in that area. At the same time, he expresses support for his superiors in the hope that a few of them might have hidden bin Laden. After all many of his own friends and colleagues had died while fighting al Qaeda operatives in South Wazaristan and FATA.

Even more interesting is the view being circulated in Pakistan that bin Laden was not killed by US special forces, but that he died of natural causes in Afghanistan. And that he was brought to Pakistan and “killed” there to embarrass Islamabad.14 The shock that Pakistan got when bin Laden was killed has now been replaced by an effort to gloss over the lapses and contradictions that abound policy making in Pakistan.

The Attack on PNS Mehran

An editorial in the Dawn makes the point that no militant organization has since the attack on GHQ in Rawalpindi in 2009, shown such audacity and meticulous planning as witnessed in their blitz launched on PNS Mehran in Karachi on 23 May 2011. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan  said the strike was a reprisal attack for US raid that killed Osama bin Laden. The attack raised the stakes immensely for the security forces to guard against future attacks on military installations, also raising the specter of a terrorist strike on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.

That it is not the first time that militants have targeted the Pakistan Navy and its establishments is well known but less understood is the ferocity with which the latest attack on Karachi took place. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan claimed that its force of 8-20 armed men had attacked the base.15

It was a well planned military operation, with the target was chosen for its value, intelligence gathered about its location and internal layout. The arrest of former SSG commando Kamran Malik, his brother and his accomplice may have something to do with the revelation of internal layout plans, but the larger problem is penetration of the armed forces by terrorist/fanatic elements. The slain journalist Syed Salmeen Shahzad claims in his new book that Islamization of the Pakistan army is only at the middle and higher level, which implies that it is only the committed who could have leaked privileged information.

Shahzad is reported to have claimed to feel threatened by the ISI because of a report he had filed in October 2010 about Taliban leader Mullah Baradar being captured in Karachi by the authorities with U.S. help. He had been questioned by the ISI then.

In the aftermath the international media rightly flagged the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. An Associated Press write up states that “A serious breach of the security perimeter could lead to calls for a unilateral American move to secure the Muslim world’s only nuclear weapons … while that is unlikely, a scenario that includes more attacks on Pakistani security installations, possibly nuclear ones, is not.”16

Killing of Saleem Shahzad

The disappearance and killing of Saleem Shahzad at the end of May was the second issue that impacted on the military and in particular, the ISI. His disappearance occurred two days after he wrote a story for Asia Times Online saying that the al-Qaeda had attacked the naval base in Karachi on 22 May 2011 after talks had broken down between the al Qaeda and Pakistan navy. In his report, Shahzad claimed that al-Qaeda had carried out the attack in retaliation for the arrest of naval officials suspected of links with the terrorist group.

Shahzad is reported to have claimed to feel threatened by the ISI because of a report he had filed in October 2010 about Taliban leader Mullah Baradar being captured in Karachi by the authorities with U.S. help. He had been questioned by the ISI then. After that meeting, Shahzad had sent an email to Human Rights Watch researcher, Ali Dayan Hasan, articulating his fears. As a result, the general perception is that it is the ISI which had a hand in doing away with an inconvenient journalist. According to Hameed Haroon, President of the All Pakistan Newspaper Society, Shahzad had received at least three death threats from various ISI officers in the last five years.17 Eight months ago, when Shahzad wrote about al-Qaeda and Taliban he was summoned to the ISI headquarters for an interview.18

In his book ‘Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11: Inside the Taliban and Al Qaeda’, released 10 days before his death, Shahzad showed how the 26/11 attack plan was originally planned in an ISI special cell, and then abandoned. He shows correspondence that proved a former major and LeT operative Major Haroon Ashiq had picked up the plan from Ilyas Kashmiri, and then took charge of the logistical planning of the 26/11 attacks.19

Continued…: General Kayani and Future of Pakistan – II