Indian Defence Review

Let me start by being the devil’s advocate and making two points to this audience. One: that this seminar is about “Aerospace Power” and not “Air Force Power”. The army and the navy, therefore too, have a stake in it, even though it may be a relatively small one.

History has repeatedly confirmed that air power is decisive in conflict, and there can be little doubt that “aerospace power” will certainly dominate the battlefield. However, by itself, airpower has not been able to prevail in any conflict. Look at WW II, Vietnam, Gulf Wars I and II, Afghanistan and lately in Lebanon. A major limitation of air power is that it is inherently transient; you can operate “through” the medium of air but not “from” it. Therefore, in a conflict, you cannot do without what the army calls “boots on the ground” and the navy refers to as “forward presence”. We all, therefore, need to move together participatively or jointly.

While the Arab-Israeli wars and the conflicts on our own subcontinent contributed a great deal to the repository of air warfare knowledge and experience, it is the deployments of air power in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf that opened a radically new chapter in air power.

We cannot look at the world through monochromatic lenses, because each nation and each region is faced by its own set of challenges. And just as there is no single panacea for all problems, we need to define a future for aerospace power that is relevant to our conditions and environment.

Aircraft were used in offence for the very first time in 1911, when the Italians bombed the Turks in Tripoli from the air. And WW I was only three weeks old when the first aerial combat took place over France.

This war was to be the first and last major conflict of the 20th century in which infantry made horrendous sacrifices for gaining or losing a few yards of territory; the total casualties of this war, to machine gun fire, poison gas and barbed wire, exceeding those in all previous conflicts put together. Although extensively deployed, aircraft played a generally defensive and not very crucial role in the outcome of war, perhaps due to lack of doctrine and experience.

All too often in history, the conclusion of each conflict has served as a prelude to the next one, and so it was with WW I. The script of WW II was said to have been written in June 1919, in the peace Treaty of Versailles, and the inter-war years were spent by strategists working out ways to fight future wars with minimum casualties. And of course, air power offered the greatest promise in this area.

Few events in the history of air power, which can be termed as defining moments because of the momentous impact they had on the course of aerial warfare; World War I and its aftermath are:-

Asymmetric wars involving terrorism, low intensity conflict, and insurrections are going to be far more frequent than conventional wars between nation states. A major challenge for air forces will, therefore, be to adapt some of the advanced capabilities at their disposal to sub-conventional applications

Between the Great wars there were many wars. The French, Italians and the British experimented with air power to put down insurrections in their colonies. Interestingly, as far back as 1922, the RAF was practicing a concept called “air control” in Iraq to avoid committing ground troops against the local tribes. The Spanish Civil War and the Sino-Japanese wars were the proving grounds for new flying machines as well as new aerial tactics.

All this was a useful prelude to WW II. Three different events during World War II which were to have far reaching implications with regard to employment of air power are:-

The Vietnam War constituted a watershed for deployment of air power in the 20th century and beyond. It saw a decade and a half of slowly escalating conflict, in which huge air assets were committed and the US lost over 8500 aircraft and helicopters. Smart weapons were tried out for the first time, and tactics evolved for jet fighters, bombers and attack helicopters, which were to transform air warfare.

While the Arab-Israeli wars and the conflicts on our own subcontinent contributed a great deal to the repository of air warfare knowledge and experience, it is the deployments of air power in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf that opened a radically new chapter in air power, as far as stealth, precision weaponry, information dominance and C4ISR are concerned. In fact, the future can be said to have started in the last decade of the 20th century.

The defining moments that have been highlighted were significant in that they contained seminal lessons, both positive and negative, and were instrumental in the formulation of air power doctrines and strategies, and in shaping its future. Most of these lessons were learnt and internalised by practitioners of air power, but humans are imperfect; and there are probably still many mistakes, which get repeated, and many lessons that are re-learnt again and again.

The army and the navy presume that air power is just an extension of their artillery, and the air force, should therefore be the handmaiden of land and maritime forces.

The Kosovo operations and the recent Israeli campaign against the Hezbollah in Lebanon, with the subsequent resignation of the Chief of Defence Staff Lt Gen Dan Halutz would possibly throw up their own lessons.

Closer home, the growth of our own air force has remained intimately linked with India’s evolution as a nation state, and her slow but steady graduation from somewhat utopian ideologies in the early years after independence, to the harsh world of realpolitik today.

One of the few Services worldwide, which was born as an independent air force, the IAF was cast deliberately by the British in the role of a tactical army support arm. It grew up in the shadow of the Royal Air Force, which retained for itself, the fighters and bombers as well as the strategic responsibilities in this theatre.

The fledgling RIAF was thrown headlong into conflict within ten weeks of our independence, when Pakistan made an attempt to snatch away the state of Jammu & Kashmir by force. Our Spitfires, Tempests, and Dakotas, deployed with imagination, and flown with great skill and daring in difficult weather and terrain, performed a vast array of missions, which resulted in the invader being expelled from most of our territory.

Since 1947, we have seen four major conflicts; and in each case the IAF’s crucial contribution to the nation’s defence has been marked by visionary leadership, innovative strategy and outstanding gallantry in the air.

What happens in space is a pressing issue, which affects all three Services, and must be addressed with urgency.

Post-independence, while absorbing state-of-the-art equipment from diverse sources, the IAF has ensured that its doctrine kept pace. In consonance with emerging geo-political realities and the nation’s security needs, the IAF has been shaped by its leadership so that today it is a strategic force, honed to a fine professional edge.

Airpower has been undergoing a steady process of transformation and major drivers have been the quest for low observability (or stealth) and greater precision in weapon delivery. The effectiveness of airpower has thus seen manifold enhancement, and today a single F-117 can achieve as much destruction as squadrons of B-17s or F-105s used to earlier.

It is now apparent that the future will bring everything that science fiction writers visualised in books, and George Lucas used to show on screen. Real time cockpit information, directed-energy weapons, space-maneuvering vehicles, space based radars, and extensive applications of bio and nano-technologies are all just round the corner. Above all, information dominance will set the rules of the game. According to the USAF doctrine: “In the 21st century it will be possible to find, fix, or track and target anything that moves on the surface of the earth. This emerging reality will change the conduct of warfare and the role of air & space power.”

Asymmetric wars involving terrorism, low intensity conflict, and insurrections are going to be far more frequent than conventional wars between nation states. A major challenge for air forces will, therefore, be to adapt some of the advanced capabilities at their disposal to sub-conventional applications, so that they retain their relevance.

An interesting concept is multilateral aerospace cooperation. The USN has been proposing a similar concept, which they call the “1000 Ship Navy”. But we have to remember that maritime forces have the advantage of inhabiting a medium in which they can live and operate for long durations. As I mentioned earlier, air forces can only transit through the air but will need overseas operating basis to function multilaterally. But I am sure that ways and means can be found to make multilateral aerospace cooperation viable.

After a few flip-flops between “air power” and “aerospace power”, the USAF has finally settled for “air and space power.

There are legacy of issues which have dogged most air forces of the world, and led them to wage a sustained struggle to assert their individuality vis-à-vis the other Services.

In what has now become a classical dilemma, the army and the navy presume that air power is just an extension of their artillery, and the air force, should therefore be the handmaiden of land and maritime forces. Surface forces, both on land and at sea are traditionally most concerned about the “immediate threat” in the theatre or battlefield, because they could come under enemy fire in a matter of hours or even minutes. Commanders on land and at sea, therefore tend to develop “tunnel vision” which is restricted to their own, limited, areas of responsibility.

The average airman therefore has a conviction, that as long as hostile air elements are prevented from interfering with our surface operations, its tactical deployment should be accorded a lower priority. They feel that the vast potential of air power is best appreciated by an airman and best exploited strategically.

We cannot convert people to see things our way, by standing on podiums and hectoring them. This is a viewpoint that needs be understood, discussed, and appreciated by all those in uniform, so that a consensus can be evolved and implemented on the battlefield. It is an imperative because air power is acquiring rapidly escalating capabilities in terms of reach, presence, striking power and information dominance, and will be the key to joint operations.

Another new frontier looming large before us, which could present great opportunities as well as challenges is space. The Air Chief has of late, been emphasising the need to focus attention on this field, and recommending the formation of an “Aerospace Command”. The recent reports of an anti-satellite weapon test in our immediate neighbourhood have served to validate the Chief’s concerns, and one must complement him on his vision and foresight.

Reconnaissance and surveillance too are benign applications of aerospace power in peacetime. It can also make a big contribution to the war against terrorism and LICO.

Today, space capabilities provide us communications, position-fixing, navigation and time, missile-warning, as well as weather and reconnaissance facilities. The future will see growing dependence on space for facilities, which have a crucial impact, as much on military operations as on economic and commercial activities globally. Therefore, what happens in space is a pressing issue, which affects all three Services, and must be addressed with urgency.

But we need to tread with caution here, because the subject is beset with complexities. “Aerospace power” can mean one thing if it is just about C4ISR, and something altogether different if it implies weaponisation.

Many mundane and pedantic arguments can be put forth for and against separating air from space, but let us remember that after a few flip-flops between “air power” and “aerospace power”, the USAF has finally settled for “air and space power”. Of course they have issued a completely separate doctrine, which deals with Counterspace Operations.

Although militarisation of space is a fait accompli, weaponisation of space remains a very vexed issue in international forums. The recent joint statement by President Putin and Premier Manmohan Singh expressing their strong disapproval is a clear indicator that they do not want weapons in space.

Navy takes great comfort from the IAFs trans-oceanic reach and lethal punch, soon to be supplemented by airborne command and control platforms, and perhaps even space capabilities.

The challenge of space must be taken on headlong, but it is necessary that transition from the concept of “air power” to that of “aerospace power” must be preceded or accompanied by sufficient analysis, discussion and debate with the object of evolving a doctrinal rationale and underpinning. War is not an exclusively military affair, and we must be careful to ensure that the political establishment is acquainted with all the nuances of aerospace power.

The term “power” in our minds is usually associated with explosive ordnance and target destruction. But actually it is not always so, because during peace, which fortunately prevails most of the time, aerospace power can apply itself to many benign applications too.

As the IAF has demonstrated over and over again, airmen can deliver emergency relief, humanitarian and medical aid, and food and supplies, to not just one’s own countrymen, but also to friends and neighbours. They can also undertake refugee evacuation, disaster relief, search & rescue, and peacekeeping missions with equal ease. Reconnaissance and surveillance too are benign applications of aerospace power in peacetime. It can also make a big contribution to the war against terrorism and LICO. The essence of air power lies in its flexibility and versatility that permit it to switch roles and to access any part of the globe in a few hours.

The Navy too are stakeholders in aerospace power. We know that in the years ahead, our maritime forces are going to operate in the furthest reaches of the Indian Ocean. The Fleet Air Arm is going to be spread thin and our carriers cannot be everywhere all the time. Under these circumstances, the Navy takes great comfort from the IAF’s trans-oceanic reach and lethal punch, soon to be supplemented by airborne command and control platforms, and perhaps even space capabilities.