Indian Defence Review

The operation commenced at 2150 hours on August 25 on schedule as per the new plan. The rain-sodden ground being slushy, progress was slow resulting in the attack on Sank being daylighted and contact was broken on the morning of August 26, with the enemy to enable preparing for the second attack the same night. The second attack by 1 PARA was pressed home at 2230 hours on August 26. ‘B’ Company led by Major (later Lieutenant General) Ranjit Singh Dyal charged up the slopes of Sank followed by ‘D’ Company, supported by artillery fire. Enemy troops rushed forward from their trenches and opened fire with MMGs, LMGs and other small arms but effective fire from the attackers forced the enemy to fall back to his trenches.

By 0430 hours on August 27, ‘B’ Company had reached within 450 metres of the enemy positions, where they formed up in front of the enemy positions at Sank and charged frontally. In a daring platoon attack, enemy MMGs and LMGs were silenced as closing up troops showered enemy emplacements with grenades and bullets. The enemy withdrew to Sar and Ledwali Gali features leaving 16 dead but managed to evacuate about 100 wounded. As a follow up, 1 PARA soon captured Sar, Ledwali Gali, Sawan Pathri, Agiwas, clearing the area South of Sank including Point 10033, thus capturing all allotted objectives.

The progress along the right prong (Uri-Bedori-Kuthnar Di Gali-Kiran-Haji Pir Pass) could not keep pace with the left prong. The massive Bedori feature was heavily defended by the enemy. With Bedori still in enemy hands and the delay in capture of Sank having alerted them, the enemy had begun moving a regular brigade into the bulge. 1 PARA, therefore, was tasked to go for the Haji Pir Pass though it was not the original task allotted to them. The only chance of success at capturing Haji Pir Pass lay in a frontal attack through a re-entrant that ran North of it. The risk was that the advance would be under observation by the enemy.

A company strength column of 1 PARA was formed under Major Ranjit Singh Dyal for the task. The approach involved a climb of over 1,220 metres, and it had to be done during the hours of darkness. The force starting from Ledwali Gali was to infiltrate through Hyderabad Nullah on the night of August 27 and 28 and capture Ring Contours 1194 and 1094 to proceed further, descending from Ledwali Gali into the Hyderabd Nullah in heavy rain and under intermittent enemy fire, which was silenced through artillery fire and quick physical action by a platoon. Climbing along the Hyderabad Nullah and later directly to the Pass, the column surrounded a house and captured one LMG, nine rifles and ten personnel of Azad Kashmir Militia.

At 0430 hours, the company hit the old Uri-Poonch Road. Here, the troops were given a much needed short break in the cold and bitter morning. At 0600 hours, the column was again on the move. Moving along the road, it reached 700 metres short of the Pass at 0900 hours. The enemy was surprised to see the 1 PARA column and opened up with MMG fire from the Western shoulder of the Pass and with LMG and rifle fire from the Pass area itself. Major Dyal ordered two platoons to climb up the spur, assault the enemy from the Western side of the Pass and then roll down to eliminate the LMG and rifle fire on the Pass. The enemy could not withstand this daylight daring attack and withdrew in confusion to a feature to the West of the Pass.

Soon the LMG on the Pass was silenced and by 1000 hours on August 28, the formidable Pass fell to the column of 1 PARA. The enemy did try to counter attack but could not succeed. The capture of Haji Pir Pass by 1 PARA was a remarkable achievement, an example of excellent leadership, the element of surprise and the ability of our troops to quickly regroup and continue attacking. On August 29, information was received that the enemy was regrouping some 2,000 yards South-west of the Haji Pir Pass. A column of 1 PARA under Major A.S Baicher made a daring daylight attack descending nearly 1,000 feet to get to the other side of the Nullah. Hand-to-hand fighting erupted but stunned by the ferocity of the attackers, the enemy panicked and fled leaving behind bodies of eight of their comrades, identified from 20 Punjab. Further attempts at counter attack by the enemy failed. The surviving members of Pakistan’s 20 Punjab then retreated and took up positions on two tall hill features; Points 8786 and 8777 which overlooked a long stretch of the Uri-Poonch Road. Point 8768 was subsequently captured by 1 PARA in the face of heavy resistance.

Simultaneously, following the stalemate at Bedori, the feature was being attacked again and was finally captured by 10 Punjab by 0600 hours on August 29. The battalion then moved to Kuthnar Di Gali and further on to Kiran. The link up at Haji Pir Pass through the right prong by 19 Punjab was achieved on September 01.

Operation Faulad

‘Operation Faulad’ aimed at sealing the Haji Pir Bulge from the South. The enemy had many fortified picquets on numerous hill features between Poonch and Kahuta, which effectively dominated the Poonch-Haji Pir track, the most formidable posts being Raja and Chand Tekri picquets held individually by battalion strength enemy. These posts served as the main pivots and staging camps for all infiltrator activities in the Poonch Sector. On the night of September 05 and 06, 1965, a simultaneous attack was launched on both these posts. Under heavy fire and hand-to-hand fighting for over two hours Raja and Chand Tekri were captured by by 2 SIKH and 3 DOGRA respectively. These two massive features dominated most of the area, East of Betar Nullah, along which ran a track that linked Poonch with Haji Pir Pass. The capture of these picquets was necessary not only to seal off the Haji Pir Pass area but also for the destruction of the two major bases of the enemy operations. The link up with 93 Infantry Brigade eventually took place on September 10. The entire Haji Pir Bulge was thus captured by Indian troops. This closed the mouth of the Bulge and sealed the Haji Pir Sector, ceasing all enemy resistance East of Betar Nullah. On September 01, 1965, Pakistan had launched ‘Operation Grand Slam’ with a view to capture Akhnoor but this was yet another fiasco.

Pakistani Blunder

‘Operation Gibraltar’ may be termed a bold operation that was well coordinated through multiple infiltration routes. However, it was also stupid since its failure lay in the basic presumption that that the population of Jammu and Kashmir would side with them and rise against India. It failed miserably despite limited local support in some pockets of the Srinagar Valley and Mandi area South of the Pir Panjal Range, only resulting in sporadic violence other than its use for embedding contacts for future use. The blunder may be attributed to the hallucinations of Ayub Khan and his Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, with their juniors not raising much opposition.

Had the Haji Pir Pass remained with us, the distance from Jammu to Srinagar through Poonch and Uri would have been reduced by over 200 kilometres…

The Tashkent Agreement

Indian and Pakistan forces withdrew to their respective positions, as prior to August 05, 1965, in accordance the Tashkent Agreement signed on January 16, 1966 under Russian brokerage. It will never be known what pressures, if any, were brought upon Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri since he died under mysterious circumstances the very next morning and though his body was brought back to India, no autopsy was conducted.

The Indian media did hint at the possibility of an international conspiracy. But even if there were no pressures on Prime Minister Shastri and there was no international conspiracy, the Prime Minister possibly signed the agreement in good faith and hoping for good neighbourly relations with Pakistan in the future. What is known is that Prime Minister Shastri had wanted talks with Ayub Khan at Tashkent itself, the day after signing the Tashkent Agreement, the aim being to extract a promise from the latter never to use force again. But that meeting did not take place because he passed away. However, a promise of this nature would not have made much difference given Pakistan’s history of deceit and broken promises. Under the Tashkent Agreement, the strategic Haji Pir Pass and its adjacent areas were thus returned to Pakistan. Had the Haji Pir Pass remained with India, the distance from Jammu to Srinagar through Poonch and Uri would have been reduced by over 200 kilometres and Pakistan’s major infiltration routes would have remained blocked.

Beyond 1965

50 years have gone by since the capture of Haji Pir Pass by India and its return to Pakistan under the Tashkent Agreement. Where did we go wrong? We have had Parliament resolutions that Kashmir is an integral part of India, and rightfully so because the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir was acceded to India by the then ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh through an Instrument of Accession signed on October 26, 1947, post massive Pakistani infiltration. The CFL had been drawn under the 1949 Karachi Agreement under aegis of the UN Commission. It was Pakistan (not India) that breached the CFL through massive infiltrations by her Gibraltar Force and ‘Operation Grand Slam’.

The 1949 UN Resolution called for plebiscite, categorically ruling that first Pakistan must withdraw all its security forces from territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan not only reinforced her security forces in Jammu and Kashmir but also changed the demography of area through large number of settlers from the plains, which continues to date. So there was no reason for India to return the Haji Pir Pass or for that matter any captured territory as citing the above could have thwarted any international pressure including that of the UN. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was strong willed. Therefore, one possible reason would have been the bureaucratic advice he got sans any strategic sense – the bane of India’s defence from independence till date. The military certainly did not want the strategic Haji Pir Pass and surrounding areas returned, laying open the Haji Pir Bulge for infiltration again.

China noted India’s vacillation from the time of partition and did not think twice about invading and occupying Tibet and Aksai Chin, taking over the Shaksgam Valley from Pakistan, nibbling our territory across the Himalayas, particularly in Ladakh, and now claiming the whole of 90,000 sq. km. of Arunachal Pradesh. Pakistan remains emboldened with the support it receives from China, the United States, Saudi Arabia, OIC and now even Russia. Post 1965 was the 1971 Indo-Pak War. Despite having some 92,000 Pakistani Prisoners of War, India failed to extract a written agreement over Kashmir from Pakistan. How could we agree to a verbal assurance from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto when he, along with Ayub Khan, was the main architect of the Gibraltar Force and ‘Operation Grand Slam’ during 1965?

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While enabling the birth of Bangladesh, we also missed the opportunity of straightening out the issue of the Siliguri Corridor or resolving the final border with Bangladesh. But then as Lieutenant General R.S Dyal once said, “Our people never read maps.” How do you expect a bureaucrat to read a map when he has no sense or education of matters military? So, Pakistan continues to exercise the state policy of terror, a proxy war against India with 42 terrorist training camps in POK, instigating sedition and waiving of Pakistani flags at rallies in the Srinagar Valley while Sartaj Malik, the NSA of Pakistan declares that Pakistan should not target those terrorist organisations that do not attack Pakistan. So, we have a rogue country, Pakistan, as a neighbour, being pampered by China and the US with all the military hardware and financial largesse while we still do not have an effective deterrent in place against sub-conventional and asymmetric war despite being subjected to terror for some three decades.

Conclusion

What have we learnt post Pakistan’s Operations Gibraltar and Grand Slam during 1965? Apparently, not much as we still are without a strategic culture. India’s higher defence structures do not match the 21st century conflict scenarios. The military is still kept outside strategic planning and decision-making on matters military. Generalist bureaucrats man the Ministry of Defence and the users (military) are deliberately kept out of the planning, decision-making and even design levels of the defence-industrial complex.

India is still without a National Security Strategy while national security objectives remain undefined and comprehensive defence review is yet to be undertaken. India is still without an effective deterrence against Pakistan’s proxy war. The question is whether the present government can cure the Parkinson’s disease afflicting the defence of the country.