Indian Defence Review

The word ‘Siachen’ means ‘the place of white roses’. This may be a rare linguistic irony to confer such an exotic name to a place devoid of any sign of life. Siachen is the world’s largest non polar glacier and thus also referred as third pole. Indian army has lost 849 men and officers till date mostly to the elements. In the early hours on 3rd February, 2016 near at a site near the Bana post located at an altitude of 19,600 ft, 10 soldiers were buried under 30 ft snow after an avalanche hit the post. Prime Minister in his tweet saluted the brave soldiers so did other political parties expressing their condolences. This matter ‘remained in our consciousness for a while and then it was business as usual.

Similarly in the year 2012, about 135 soldiers of the Pakistani army and civilians were buried in an avalanche at Gayari in Siachen. Both Indian and Pakistani armies take immense pride in mentioning that Siachen is the highest altitude battlefield in the world. Indian’s spending to maintain troops in the Siachen area is comparatively higher because they are on glaciers and, therefore, have to be supported by fleet of helicopters. The Pakistanis have, on their side, developed a road network to support their base camps.

But why these two poor countries are blowing their money, resources and killing their men for getting the control of something which does not add to the vitals of their national interests? One Retd General has said “Siachen has become embedded in the Indian public consciousness as a symbol of national will and determination to succeed against all odds. Siachen has acquired a sanctity of its own, which is part folklore, part military legend, part mythology, and a substantial measure of national pride.”

Prateek Joshi writes in his article ‘The Battle for Siachen Glacier: Beyond Just a Bilateral Dispute’

“The politics surrounding Siachen’s history and Karakoram mountains relate to its discovery during the Great Game-era ,the rivalry which brought the Russians close to the northern frontiers of India.

It is the combination of natural and strategic factors which went into the making of the Siachen policy by the British administration. The combination of these two factor was what Curzon termed as making a ‘scientific frontier’ while describing frontiers. In the colonial era, mapping the frontier regions was majorly characterised by covert reconnaissance missions which were purely scientific in nature carried out with the motive of studying the vulnerability of routes through the mountain passes that could be taken over by the Russians.

The purpose of these cartographic missions to study the vulnerability of passes and watersheds on frontier mountains areas ( which includes the Hindukush Mountains and Trans-Himlayan regions like the Karakorum and Pamir)before demarcating linear borders became an integral element of the colonial frontier policy.

Despite the demarcation of the Wakhan corridor in 1895, the exact boundaries of frontier zone still lay undefined as the Indus watershed had not been explored completely. While exploring these Trans-Himalayan highlands, the frontier policy would be aimed at defining the borders in a way that would be justified not only on the grounds of their strategic advantage but also on the basis of the features of the terrain. There is a ‘subconscious’ historical pattern India has followed in securing the glacier.

It makes an interesting case to analyse the ‘natural’ and ‘strategic’ strengths of the Siachen region’s topography, which makes India’s preference to define the LoC along the Saltoro Ride crucial to defend the region. While the natural strength of the Saltoro Ridge as the border is elaborated by the manner in which Siachen was ‘discovered’ by the British, the strategic strength of holding Siachen lies in placing troops at dominating positions along its passes as India stands surrounded by Pakistan (to the west) and China (to the north)in this region.”

It is not that efforts were not been made for demilitarization of this area. Siachen, with an area of over 2500 Sq. km, has a dispute on the location of 150 Km long Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) that passes along Soltoro ridge flanking Siachen glacier to its west. In 1989, it is also said that India and Pakistan had come close to a resolution to this conflict. However, post Kargil in 1999, India has insisted on the authentication and demarcation of current military position on Siachen as the chances of redeployment of troops by Pakistan after demilitarization cannot be ruled out.

Although thirteen rounds of diplomatic negotiations on Siachen have taken place between India and Pakistan, the issue remains unresolved. This is partly because of the military logic of Gebirgskrieg coming up against the political desire for a settlement.

“Gebirgskrieg” is the unique theory of mountain warfare. It was first developed during the Austria- Hungary War (1915-19) in Dolomites ranges on Alpine front. This propounds the importance of holding heights, the impossibility of victory and the static nature of the front and a candid admission that maintenance of the status quo is the only achievable military objective, for both sides. Also, the resolution of this conflict is unlikely to be due to victory or a successful offensive, but only as a corollary of other developments. The treaty after the end of the First World War finally led to the closure of the Dolomites front.

General J.J. Singh of the Indian Army was quoted as saying

“In 2005, my first year as chief, we suffered just two fatalities, way lower than a similar formation in a peace-time location in the plains would on average … There was, simply no reason to give up this position of advantage unless the AGPL [Actual Ground Position Line] was authenticated. If Pakistan did not authenticate the AGPL, it could cross it again — and we’d have to send up our boys to die”. 

In the aftermath of the Gayari avalanche of April 2012, the Pakistani Prime Minister and their Army Chief were in favour of some settlement on Siachen. This was followed by a statement by the Defence Minister in the Indian Parliament that the Government was pursuing “meaningful talks” on Siachen. Just two weeks later, the cover story in the leading English magazine in India asked, “Could the PM gift away to Pakistan what Army has won?” The article included allegations that the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was willing to sell out the strategic heights in return for a Nobel peace prize. Any chances of a political resolution from the Indian side were effectively finished from then on. 

Shyam Sharan former Foregin Secretary writes about the Siachen negotiation in his book ‘How India sees the world’:

“Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had asked me to work on this Agreement but had also insisted that I obtain a consensus on it from all the key stakeholders in our own system. I did many rounds of consultations, both at the senior bureaucratic and ministerial levels in the ministries of defence, home and fiancé (whose members are part of the Cabinet Committee on Security [CCS]. The Army Chief General J.J Singh and the intelligence chiefs were also brought on board.

The technical details of the Agreement, including the points and timing of redeployment, the phases of which it would be implemented and the structure of the monitoring mechanism, were actually worked out at the army headquarters by the director-general of military operations. The draft agreement, along with the annexures, were then put together in a note to the CCS for approval so that it could be presented as a proposal from the Indian side at the India-Pakistan defence secretary level talks scheduled for May 2006. The note had been examined and agreed to by all the relevant stakeholders and agencies. The CCS approval was, therefore, expected to come as matter of course.

When the CCS meeting was held on the eve of the Defence Secretary-level talks, the then national security advisor (NSA) M.K. Narayanan launched into a bitter offensive against the proposal, saying that Pakistan could not be trusted, that there would be political and public opposition to any such initiative and that Indian’s military position in the northern sector visa-visa both Pakistan and China would be compromised. J.J. Singh, who had happily gone along with the proposal in its earlier iterations, now decided to join Narayanan in rubbishing it. The ministers of home (Shivraj Patil) and defence (Pranab Mukherjee) decided to play it safe and proposad the deferment of its consideration until further study. My defence of the deal became a voice in the wilderness.

The Prime Minister chose to keep silent and not step into the fray, perhaps for good reason. Narayanan, at one point, suggested that Siachen be taken off the agenda of India-Pakistan talks entirely and that this should be communicated to the visiting Pakistani defence secretary at forthcoming talks. I resisted this strongly, pointing out that this would mean the unravelling of the entire dialogue process of years, since Siachen had been on the agenda for over two decades.

At this stage Pranab Mukherjee fortunately stepped in to support me. He pointed out that Rajiv Gandhi himself had agreed to include Siachen in the India-Pakistan dialogue and it should remain part of the agenda. This was solemnly endorsed by the others. But the opportunity to finally resolve a long-standing issue and a constant source of bitterness in Pakistan was lost.” 

There is a section of intellectual, media and army veterans who have now started questioning the continuous presence in Siachen with such a high rate of causalities and the expenses involved. There has not been any single shot fired since 2003 but still soldiers are dying because of hostile terrain, severe climatic conditions and high altitude related diseases of frostbite, chilblain, pulmonary oedemas etc.

But the hardliner military strategist version would tell you that the army preparedness cannot factor natural calamities in the reckoning of costs to life and property. According to them, ‘the natural calamities can strike anywhere that includes tsunami at sea level. So to can happen avalanches at high altitude. No cost is too high for the national security and pride. Siachen is a matter of pride, a badge of owner and the macho image of both the armies. They have instituted special medals for Siachen tenure to their military personal. This is a perfect ground for a soldier to lay down his life for the motherland and be the part of regimental history and his village folklore.

The best way to stop war is to keep the armed forces at the best of their operational readiness.’ “Demilitarization means ‘handing over’ Siachen to Pakistan”, our military strategists would tell you. We have army experts on TV channels evocatively making out a case for surgical strikes in Pakistan to dismantle terrorist camps in the aftermath of Pathankot airbase attacks where we lost our seven soldiers. At least they fought and killed the terrorists from Pakistan. Herein Siachen, we have lost nearly a thousand of our best troops, buried under the snow, without killing a bird on Pakistani side. No one is to be blamed for the loss of these precious lives? Can peace be ever given a chance and will there ever be a ‘farewell to arms‘ in Siachen?”