Chinese attempts to constrain India are exemplified in their support for Pakistan. This forces India to also look westwards while engaging with China and ties up valuable resources in anticipation of a two front war. China’s extensive development of multimodal connectivity all along its borders and inside the neighbouring countries for facilitating trade flows, energy supplies and movement of arms and armada is another aspect of containment and psychological dislocation of the adversary. This attempt at creating a ring of anti-Indian influences could rightly be inferred as strategic encirclement and containment of India, to sub-serve its strategic global ambitions.
In the event of a conflict we could expect China to choose the time and place of initiating hostilities in accordance with the earlier mentioned concept of ‘wu wei’. They would aim to limit, mislead and control India both through the military and political realm. As an element of surprise, a crucial pre-war element could be a highly capable cyber attack as part of its strategy to carry out psychological paralysis of the adversary and manage conflict. This would be followed by managing the flow of information to the extent that if India still wants to persist continuing with the conflict, it would invite a risk of war, potentially involving the nuclear element as well. A high level political strategy of prevention would likely be put in place to convince India of the futility and high risk of going to war.
China thinks strategically and acts decisively; the Chinese military modernisation programme is the biggest manifestation of this “¦
Should India not be deterred, China is likely to begin the conflict with a heavy ballistic and cruise missile attack as the next step in conflict management to destroy command and control centres and inflict damage on communication and logistic nodes. The political commissars and the Central Military Commission (CMC) could be expected to play a vital role in the conflict as also in formulating the nature of operations.
Is India prepared to meet a Chinese military threat is the question that obviously comes to mind. There have been misgivings in certain quarters of India’s ability to withstand a Chinese attack. Of late, New Delhi has shown concern over China’s increased defence spending and has stated that China’s armed forces modernisation needs to be “monitored carefully” for implications on India’s defence and security. While it would be imprudent to underestimate Chinese capability, a lack of understanding of one’s own strength is also fraught with grave consequences. In the current context, while a great deal more needs to be done in improving defence preparedness, the Indian Armed Forces are totally capable and competent to repulse any Chinese misadventure across the high Himalayas.
There can be no two opinions on how deadly cyber warfare can be in terms of crippling or destroying an adversary’s economic, communication and strategic networks and infrastructure. The Chinese have exceptional capabilities in this regard which they will put to good use in a conflict situation with India. But Indian capacity too is not insignificant and the application of this capability over the Tibetan plateau would degrade Chinese offensive capability to a considerable extent. It must be noted that the Indian Army is geared up for operating in a digitised battlefield and its information systems are quite secure from hostile strikes. As per the statement of Lt-General P Mohapatra, the Indian Army’s Signal Officer in Chief, the army has put a very secure network in place which cannot be tampered with. The General also stated that various cryptographic controls have been put in place and there are training activities to ensure that no loss of information takes place.
While overall Chinese air power has a tremendous edge over India, what needs to be considered is how much of the PLAAF can be applied in a conflict across the Indo-Tibetan border. China has many security related concerns of greater import than its concerns with India which would necessitate the deployment of adequate quantity of PLAAF for its Mainland security. Also, the quantum of air effort which can actually be employed from the air bases existing in Tibet will give out the net quantum of force which is available for application against India. It must however be noted that the payload of aircraft get reduced while taking off from high altitude bases. PLAAF operations from Tibet would hence get degraded to that extent. As Indian aircraft take off from bases at sea level, India should be able to maintain a reasonable air deterrent against any invading force.
Could we have a National Security Advisor from the defence services rather than from the civil bureaucracy or the police services? These issues need to be debated.
A major component of Chinese offensive forces has to be built up largely from the Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions in the mainland. The terrain in the Tibetan plateau with its concomitant communication network will play an important role in this build up. The time taken to induct such a large sized force robs the operation of any element of surprise. The lines of communication being limited are also extremely vulnerable to interdiction by air and missile attack. Indian capability in ensuring a high degree of battlefield transparency over the Tibetan Plateau will make it impossible to hide large troop concentrations and logistic nodes further adding to the attacker’s vulnerability from aerial and missile attack. Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq give us a glimpse of how devastating, economical, and precise they can be, if they are supported by airpower. Airpower tackling the depth formations and strategic reserves will ultimately deliver the highest dividends. Considering the improvements in endurance and weapon carrying capability, the aircraft will also be capable of multi-tasking.
To support their ground offensive, China would have to deploy a vast quantity of artillery within 15 to 30 km of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The lie of the ground in the mountainous terrain as existing along the LAC is such that the artillery would have to deploy near existing roads and tracks, making use of reentrants and folds in the ground. It would be well nigh impossible to conceal these gun locations making them viable targets for own aerial attacks. Destruction of a large part of the adversary’s artillery would seriously jeopardise his ground offensive, which could then be defeated in detail.
Finally, mountains give tremendous strength to the defensive. For troops that are well dug in, an extraordinary amount of combat superiority would be required to overrun the defences. India has adequate holding forces to stave off even determined Chinese assaults and with the addition of two extra mountain divisions in the region, this capability will only get enhanced. In the Tawang Sector, which perhaps would have the greatest importance for China, the battle will be waged in a narrow 40 km corridor between the tri-junction of India-Bhutan-Tibet and the glaciers which lie further east. While the conflict will be bloody, there will be no repeat of 1962. At best, China can hope for a pyrrhic victory with marginal gains and at worst a humiliating defeat. But the probable end result would lie somewhere in between.
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