Military & Aerospace

Employment of Rotary Wing Platforms in Battle
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Issue Vol. 29.3 Jul-Sep 2014 | Date : 07 Jan , 2015

Boeing AH-64D Apache

Apart from other roles, insurgencies in Malaya, Kenya, Zimbabwe, French Indo-China and Algeria saw helicopters being used for troop induction into and extraction from combat zones, rudimentary fire support to ground forces and surveillance. Most operations were confined to daytime and in relatively clear weather due to equipment limitations. In almost all scenarios, there was a marked asymmetry in terms of technology and equipment in favour of conventional forces. Some success in these operations led to the assumption that with the added advantages of hover capability helicopters were relatively invulnerable when compared to fixed wing aircraft.

Rotary wing platforms such as helicopters are additions to the tools of warfare…

Rotary wing platforms such as helicopters are additions to the tools of warfare and a further refinement of the heavier-than-air machine concept. Just as World War I ignited the explosive growth of fixed wing aviation, World War II gave the impetus for the development of the helicopter, although its use in that conflict was minimal due to technology constraints. A flying machine with agility, hover capabilities and the ability to operate from small platforms was required and the helicopter appeared to meet these needs. All subsequent conflicts have seen the employment of helicopters in military roles. Korea saw the first induction of helicopters in some numbers in a conventional full-blooded conflict between regular armed forces. Medical evacuation or Casualty Evacuation (Casevac), logistics re-supply, troop deployment on a limited scale because of platform constraints, communications, visual reconnaissance and combat Search and Rescue (SAR) both on land and at sea, were the main roles. These were all combat support roles.

Apart from other roles, insurgencies in Malaya, Kenya, Zimbabwe, French Indo-China and Algeria saw helicopters being used for troop induction into and extraction from combat zones, rudimentary fire support to ground forces and surveillance. Most operations were confined to daytime and in relatively clear weather due to equipment limitations. In almost all scenarios, there was a marked asymmetry in terms of technology and equipment in favour of conventional forces. Some success in these operations led to the assumption that with the added advantages of hover capability helicopters were relatively invulnerable when compared to fixed wing aircraft.

US military action in Vietnam saw helicopters playing a more active role in combat as air-to-ground weapon delivery platforms…

In most of the scenarios in these operations, the insurgent forces did not have ground-based Air Defence (AD) capabilities other than small arms. Helicopters therefore operated in a totally benign environment with no air threat whatsoever. An exception was when the French in the Dien Bien Phu valley in North West Vietnam drew the North Vietnamese into a pitched battle with the aim of destroying them with superior firepower. The Viet Cong accepted the challenge and overran French defenses ending the latter’s military involvement in this part of the world. Let alone helicopters, fixed wing aircraft could not operate effectively in close air support or resupply roles against the AD artillery of the Viet Cong.

US military action in Vietnam saw helicopters playing a more active role in combat as air-to-ground weapon delivery platforms. Over North Vietnam with deployed radar controlled AD artillery and Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) plus fast jet interceptors, offensive helicopter operations were not carried out. Combat SAR and raids by Special Forces in relatively low threat areas were the limit of heli-borne operations. Over South Vietnam in a more benign threat environment with no air threats and ground based AD confined to infantry weapons and light Anti-Aircraft (AA) guns, helicopter gunships began to be used for area suppression and close air support. The concept of the Airmobile Division with nearly 450 helicopters became a reality. This gave ground forces commanders an unprecedented degree of mobility and combat flexibility. The caveat was that the air threat to helicopter operations had to be virtually eliminated and the ground-based AD environment had to be suppressed. Night operations were also undertaken. The US and allies lost over 5,000 helicopters. Most combat losses were due to ground fire from relatively small calibre weapons. The ability to fly slow, hover and loiter had a flipside in that it increased vulnerability. By virtue of its design itself, the helicopter is more vulnerable to enemy fire. It is pertinent to mention that barring the SAM systems in the North, no precision guided weapons were deployed by the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong.

Mi-24

During the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the first dedicated Soviet gunship, the armed and armoured Mi-24, was deployed along with armed Mi-8 troop transports. Opposing them were light automatic, medium and heavy machine guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and some captured Soviet light AD gun systems with no radar target tracking capability. Subsequently, Stinger Infrared (IR) SAMs were used by the Afghan insurgents. Soviet helicopter losses were around 350, majority to unguided guns and RPGs. This conflict again revealed the vulnerability of even armoured helicopters to ground fire from relatively unsophisticated low-caliber unguided weapons.

During the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the first dedicated Soviet gunship, the Mi-24, was deployed…

The 1973 Yom Kippur conflict saw the Arabs deploying sophisticated SAM systems to provide an umbrella of protection to their ground forces engaged in offensive action. The Israelis used fixed-wing fast jet aircraft extensively in the close air support role with air strikes being preferred over artillery. Attack helicopters were considered too vulnerable. The Arab SAM defensive shield provided protection as planned for a limited period against Israeli air strikes and took a heavy toll on Israeli aircraft. Unlike in the 1967 war, the Israelis were not able to fully neutralise the ground-based AD systems of their opponents in the expected timeframe. The difficulty in suppressing sophisticated ground based AD systems and their lethality even against fast jets was a lesson learned at high cost. Helicopter survivability in such a situation would have been far worse. Subsequent use of attack helicopters by the Israelis in Gaza and Lebanon has been in areas where the AD environment has been under total Israeli control.

The Iraqi Desert Storm operations in 1991 saw battles between regular armed forces. Ground-based forward Early Warning (EW) radars were targeted by attack helicopters at night to punch holes in the Iraqi forward-based AD surveillance coverage just before the fixed-wing aircraft attacks went in. Close air support was attempted only after ground-based AD systems were neutralised from medium altitudes. Thereafter, aircraft and attack helicopters flew missions using both Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) and unguided munitions including guns. This war finally proved that low-flying even at high speeds at night would not reduce losses to modern AD systems to acceptable levels. Degrading ground-based AD systems became a prerequisite to conduct of close range fire support to ground forces after which attack helicopters were used in close air support roles.

It was at sea that the helicopter came into prominence based on the lessons of World War II…

Cold War Scenarios

Faced with the threat of numerically superior armour exercising a first strike option, NATO planners began to rely on air power to win control of the air over the battlefield and then attack enemy armour with ground attack fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters in order to blunt their advance and buy time. The problem in the NATO context was in the mission.

At low levels in daytime at gun firing ranges almost every weapon on the battlefield could be brought to bear on the aircraft or helicopter and no amount of armour plating could protect against such volumes of fire. Soviet armoured formations were very heavy with SAM assets and radar controlled rapid-firing AA guns. While the lethality of aircraft and helicopter weapons were not in doubt, the survivability of the launch platforms was the issue. These doubts and the emergence of stand-off PGMs and night target acquisition systems resulted in changes to the concept of operations to stand-off weapons delivery from medium altitudes by day and night till such time as ground-based AD capabilities were significantly degraded. The concepts were never validated in combat between forces with comparable AD systems. Special operations, troop deployment, communications & control posts, Casevac and logistics resupply were support roles ideally suited for helicopters in the Cold War era.

KAMOV-31 of Indian Navy

Maritime Aspects

It was at sea that the helicopter came into prominence based on the lessons of World War II, especially in the anti-submarine role. Anti-submarine measures to safeguard NATO sea supply lines relied heavily on carrier-based aircraft and helicopter submarine hunting platforms. The ability of the helicopter to operate out of restricted spaces and to hover makes it an ideal anti-submarine platform for search and acquisition of undersea targets and for attacks with near impunity since the submarine itself cannot attack a flying machine. In addition, the helicopter could use active sonar for searching without the risk of revealing its position unlike submarines and surface ships. In the area of mine counter measures also the helicopter could undertake mine sweeping with minimal risk unlike surface ships.

Just maintaining control over the helicopter is a challenge at high altitudes…

Increased effectiveness of the combination of high speed, high altitude bombers and surface ships armed with anti-ship missiles make warships more vulnerable. This combined with carrier-based strike aircraft are the air threats facing navies today. To counter this, Airborne Early Warning (AEW) is essential and for a carrier group operating far outside the reach of friendly shore-based aircraft, AEW and AD of the carrier groups had to be with organic assets. Size limitations of aircraft that can be operated only from super carriers as well as space constraints on the carrier mean that large aircraft cannot be embarked and only a limited number of smaller aircraft can be taken onboard. Helicopters and tilt rotor hybrids with AEW capability are the best solution for smaller carriers although their radar coverage would be constrained by altitude limitations of the platform. Replenishment at sea is and inter-ship transfers are roles tailored for helicopters. SAR has been a major role since the Korean War days. Helicopters also provide much needed mobility to forces in amphibious operations and air support to ground forces at the beachhead if fixed-wing assets are not available, provided the air threat is manageable. Even small ships can have an air component for a multitude of tasks including surveillance, rescue, missile guidance and data relay.

The Indian Scenario

The concepts relating to employment of helicopters in combat that have been tested in the field, have taken place in situations of asymmetry as far as technological capabilities of opposing forces are concerned. This also holds true to some extent for support operations both at sea and on land. Extrapolating these concepts and the few results available from battle scenarios in our context, benefits only the helicopter manufacturer. Lessons and tactics refined in asymmetric warfare situations elsewhere may be of use to us in low-intensity conflict operations such as counter-insurgency operations. They will not hold good in conflicts between matched adversaries. We are faced with two potential adversaries with home grown or acquired technological capabilities at least equal to us. Marked asymmetry of forces in our favour as far as technological capabilities go will not exist across the board in a military conflict with the important adversaries in the region.

Attack helicopters are best used in small numbers against specific value targets in surprise attacks…

Two most important natural factors beyond the control of any military force are terrain and weather. Weather affects military operations to an extent determined by the technological capabilities of weapons systems. We are finally acquiring a night and adverse weather helicopter capability. Helicopters are usually more vulnerable to extreme wind and turbulence because of their very design and inability to fly above severe weather areas. Terrain is the one factor that is of far more importance in our areas of conflict than is the case elsewhere. Our land borders in the North are at altitudes that are often higher than that of the highest mountain peaks in most parts of the world. Aircraft performance in terms of power and lift decrease with increase of altitude. In the case of helicopters, this degradation is far more pronounced. Just maintaining control over the helicopter is a challenge at high altitudes. Maneuverability for combat operations becomes close to impossible. Our helicopter gunships could not even get over the passes to approach combat zones during the Kargil operations. Like most combat helicopters, they were designed for operations at much lower altitudes. The sad fact is that this limitation was not even known to some of our ground forces commanders, leading to inter-service squabbles still going on 15 years later.

Attack helicopter operations in close support of troops at high altitudes at the limits of controllability do not appear to be a workable proposition. All AD systems including SAMs have greater ranges at higher altitudes, the terrain provides good cover to defenders; it masks the field of vision of both crew and sensors in the helicopter and turbulence, clouding and low visibility restrict operations to a small window of opportunity. To keep out of range of SAMs located on ridges, the helicopter is forced to fly even higher thereby degrading weapon accuracy. These factors affect all helicopters but attack helicopters have to operate in a more hostile AD environment and execute violent manoeuvres for weapon delivery and evasion of ground fire. At most, they can be used for special missions in lower threat AD environments where surprise could work in their favour.

Mobility in the mountains is a big problem, aggravated greatly in our context by very poor surface infrastructure. Medium and heavy-lift helicopters are force multipliers in this area. Troop induction, Special Operations, logistics resupply and Casevac using helicopters become almost imperative in our context. For all this to work we need helicopters with enhanced high altitude capabilities as well as the avionics to operate at night and within limits, in adverse weather. In the plains and deserts, employment of masses of attack helicopters in a dense AD environment in close proximity to ground forces fighting enemy forces with similar capabilities has not been done in actual combat and tried only in simulations. Positive identification to avoid fratricide in the confusion of tank battles is a major problem both for the attack helicopter and ground AD systems. Attack helicopters are best used in small numbers against specific value targets in surprise attacks. The use of Apache helicopters at night against forward AD early warning radars in Iraq in 1991 is an example. In low threat areas, they can be effective in fire suppression roles when escorting troop transport helicopters as well as in the anti helicopter role. The use of helicopters in low-intensity counter-insurgency situations has been dealt with in an earlier article.

Replenishment, SAR, support for amphibious and Special Operations launched from ships – all require helicopters…

At sea, we have a Navy woefully short of submarines, mine counter-measures vessels, deploying obsolete ship-based AD systems for the most part and our carriers at best can embark two squadrons of fighter aircraft. The helicopter fleet is insufficient and obsolete. The shortage of submarines places a greater burden on helicopters for anti-submarine operations for which they are well suited as mentioned earlier, provided they have an effective mix of sensors and weapons. The same is the case for mine clearing operations especially in choke points such as outside major ports. With limitations of carrier size to house and operate carrier borne fixed-wing Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACS), the available option is to use helicopters or hybrid tilt-wing machines as AWACS platforms when surface forces operate far from land-based air cover.

Replenishment, SAR, support for amphibious and Special Operations launched from ships – all require helicopters. Terminal AD against missiles attacks at sea by using helicopters with Air-to-Air Missiles is an option given the poor state of our integral AD systems on ships. Surveillance and interdiction in low-intensity conflicts such as anti-piracy and anti-hijack situations can be done with a mix of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance wherever possible and armed troop-carrying helicopters for physical intervention.

There is a need for all-weather helicopters with night vision capabilities for Special Operations…

Force Requirements

Given the state of our equipment and the likely tasks, we have to prioritise. Acquiring large numbers of attack helicopters for possible deployment in unvalidated roles as flying tanks in an armoured forces conflict just because some other armies have them is a waste of precious resources and is unaffordable. We should stay with limited numbers, centrally controlled and tasked for special surgical operations. Hankering after the US Army, which fielded more helicopters in an Airmobile division in Vietnam than our total inventory of military helicopters, is not a practical approach.

We require helicopters with enhanced high altitude capabilities for use in the mountains including heavy-lift versions, complemented by less powerful versions for operations in the plains. There is a need for all-weather helicopters with night vision capabilities for Special Operations.

* Figures are rough estimates.

Naval requirements include anti-submarine and mine counter-measures variants, AWACS platforms and medium-lift helicopters and armed variants capable of being embarked on carriers as well as on bigger surface ships. Smaller helicopters that can be deployed on smaller ships are also needed. Some assessments available in the open fora of the modernisation and upgrade programme wish-list in terms of numbers gives an idea of its magnitude, making it possibly the biggest rotary wing acquisition in the world.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Gp Capt B Menon

Gp Capt B Menon, former fighter pilot, IAF

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One thought on “Employment of Rotary Wing Platforms in Battle

  1. Gp Capt – a big question – why does the Air Force need to hang on to Rotary Wing assets. Helicopters are mainly used by the Army and are provided by the Air Force. It’s a mismatch, for obvious reasons. The first fall guy in this mismatch (I call it organizational ego) is the training. The Air Force is not able to meet the Army’s training requirements. There is a tremendous shortfall of making assets available for training. To be honest in most cases the Army use trees to practice SHBO training. That’s rather shameful. Secondly the quality of training is poor because the Air Force throws its safety factors in the face of the Army and in the end the training is not realistic, it’s modulated and done just for the sake of doing. I had to sit in the cockpit once to guide the Helicopter to the LZ because the pilot couldn’t find it. I‘ve often heard the Air Force saying in war we will do it. But that doesn’t give the Army the kind of confidence that’s need to plan its operations. There is always a doubt about the Air Forces capability. Empire building must stop, let’s be practical. All Rotary wing assets should be part of the Army. The Air Force can have its share of RW assets as per its requirement purely to perform tasks for the Air Force. I am a Paratrooper and have years of experience in the field of SHBO.

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