Indian Defence Review

Why Not the Armed Forces?

I wish to make a few things clear at the outset. The Armed Forces are India’s Armed Forces. They are the peoples’ forces and are ever prepared to make the supreme sacrifice to protect the people and the country from external and internal threats. The Armed Forces are also aware of the need for civilian control over the military. If they are called to step in to restore order due to bad governance, then they are equal stakeholders in good governance as also equal partners in the well being and development of the country. They must make their views known to the people. Of course, the ethos of the Armed Forces is that after all is said and done, once the government passes an order, it is their bounden duty to execute that order with all commitment at their disposal.

A solution to the Naxal problem needs to include socio-political and developmental aspects also and a pure military intervention will not be sufficient. It is going to take a long time to come to grips with this issue and, in my opinion, a short term, quick fix solution, however attractive, must not be resorted to. Presently, the Armed Forces participation is restricted to the Army and the IAF. Let us have a look at some of the problems involved.

Role, Tasks and Training

The Army and the IAF are meant to annihilate the enemy; the enemy is very clear and unambiguous. They operate on the principle of maximum force in minimum time. The concept of minimum force is very rarely applied whereas in a civil scenario, minimum force is paramount. The Army has been operating in Jammu and Kashmir for decades and has brought the terrorists under good control. But at what cost? Their conventional training has suffered. Their peace to field ratio has suffered, raising morale issues. Their weapons are for war, ill-suited against terrorists. The moment they come in contact with local constabulary, their character rubs off on the soldiers and may cause disciplinary issues.

Intelligence, Air Weapons and Collateral Damage

Insurgents are fleeting targets. Especially in the Naxal context, there is common ethnicity. Air weapons are fired from large ranges which preclude identification of minute targets. Therefore, 120 per cent surety of target intelligence is mandatory to prevent fratricide. We do not yet possess this technology. Our intelligence has never achieved such accuracy. Uninformed people talk of dropping weapons through a window. Of course, the IAF has the capability to fire a weapon through a window 2”x2”. But the load is, let us say 200 kg. When it explodes, it has a lethal 100-metre radius. So whither collateral damage? We do not have low charge or low lethal weapons as yet for air to surface firing. However, such weapons are now emerging on the world stage.

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs)

RPAs or drones, at first glance, seem to provide the answer. They have a lot of limitations. Firstly, they need to be parked carefully, protected from weather and strong winds. In flight, weather and clouding are major hazards. They are ineffective in jungle terrain except with certain payloads. They can detect and track but cannot attack unless they are the UCAV variety. Transit speeds are about 100 to 150 kmph and they are noisy. Modern RPAs with V/STOL capabilities are in the offing and they would better deal with such operations.

Helicopters

Helicopters are a potent force in anti-Naxal/anti-terrorist operations. They can be and are even now being used in a variety of vital roles. Some tasks are recce, surveillance, logistics, insertion and extraction of troops, Casevac, and air drop and re-supply. Choppers are most vulnerable during the take-off and landing phases. In spite of armour, the IAF has lost a gunner to Naxal ground fire because the helipad zone was not properly sanitised. The IAF choppers are in short supply. They provide logistics support to the Army all the year round. Any pull out is likely to increase the load on the others. So is the case with the number of crew.

The Way Ahead

The future does not seem rosy. Governance has been a key issue for the whole country and extra governance to affected areas seems a remote possibility. Political will seems remarkably absent. My only fear is that the leadership might choose a short term, quick-fix solution for puny political gains and complicate the issue further.

It seems almost inevitable that in the not too distant a future, the role of the Armed Forces in such insurgencies will increase. The first to be affected, covertly or overtly, will be the Army.

However, all is not lost. This, too, can be managed. It will involve operations under a central planning agency involving all stakeholders. The chain of command must be clear. Development and socio-political balm must be applied synchronous with military operations. Synergy is the order of the day. Leadership, training, infrastructure and equipment are prerequisites to such endeavours. Some organisations may need restructuring and rejuvenating. In my opinion, it is likely to be an ‘out’ to ‘in’ approach with forces operating out of a few well-protected bases, conducting operations and returning to a safe home. The first priority should be to stabilise easier areas, secure them and then act on the more difficult areas.

Central areas of the country may prove difficult to cordon off. In border areas like Jammu and Kashmir there is scope for a more offensive use of air power. RPAs in conjunction with special mission aircraft such as the C-130J and helicopters with NVDs give excellent results if the target area is well-defined. In Jammu and Kashmir, Red Zones can be implemented on the ground and used to stymie intrusions. Technology will need to be harnessed, especially in communications and imagery to deliver the best results.

Conclusion

We need to understand the primary difference between Naxals and Jihadis. Naxals are basically rural and indigenous. Their ire is against indigenous ill treatment, torture, neglect and mal-governance. The Jihadi, on the other hand, projects the agenda of external powers, with separatism from the Union as the prime objective. Therefore, while one needs to be addressed mainly by winning the hearts and minds, the other needs ruthless execution. God help me and I hope I am wrong. But sometimes in the past I have had a feeling we may be doing it the other way round.

It is primarily in the realm of policing that the Naxal problem falls and is to be dealt with by the police and the PMF who are established for this purpose, leaving the Armed Forces to fight external threats. For the last so many decades, the Armed Forces have been carrying out the additional task in Jammu and Kashmir and to great effect. But they have had to pay a price. Obviously, therefore, they should not be involved further in internal policing. However, we do not live in an idealistic world, hence my fear that our involvement may increase in the future, starting with the Army. Firstly this needs to be resisted strongly. Failing which, we must participate on our terms. Difficult but that is the way the cookie seems to be crumbling.

The solution to the Naxal problem lies in a multi-pronged approach with governance and development taking centre stage. Brute force is definitely not the answer. However, the quality of force applied has to improve. This will entail rigorous training in the strategic as well as the tactical field. Clear lines of command, younger, more motivated commanders, going right up the chain. This will involve knowing the importance of development and the principle of minimum force. This will involve a basic change in ethos. Clear lines of communication and logistics will be necessary along with security infrastructure. The PMFs will have to maintain close liaison with both the Army and the IAF.

There is nothing new in what I have said. There are exemplary police and PMF officers I have known. Then why have these things not happened all these years? Well it has not happened because their political masters are reluctant to make the police independent. Therefore, a last statement: “Once and only once there is strong political will and good governance, will we find the Naxal problem unraveling itself much more easily.”