Some words about naval security in the Indian Ocean region would be apposite. Indian and US navies are doing major exercises in the Indian Ocean area. If cooperation to keep vital sea lanes of communication open, combat against terrorism and rescue operations at the time of natural disasters are offered as reasons for these high profile exercises, and inter-operability is advocated for effectiveness, the fact that Indian commentators talk openly about countering China’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean area as reflected in China’s string of pearls strategy, lends to these exercises a strategic meaning beyond the stated ones.
India’s move to make its presence felt in the seas beyond the Malacca Straits needs to be reflected upon by us dispassionately.
The quadrilateral exercise between India, US, Japan and Australia, along with Singapore, elicited Chinese protests, and the Quadrilateral Initiative petered out in the face of these protests, with the change of regimes in Australia and Japan. Russia too in informal diplomatic conversations noted with some misgiving the import of this exercise. Russia would feel concerned if Indian foreign policy moved towards some form of alliance rather than maximizing its options with all players. Outstanding territorial differences between Russia and Japan in the Far East, as also the sensitivities of China, would make Russia watchful of any Indian role in the area, though the recent security agreement with Japan could be justified by us as a counter to China’s policies in our neighbourhood and aggressive posturing on our border dispute, which adds to distrust of Chinese intentions towards us.
India’s move to make its presence felt in the seas beyond the Malacca Straits needs to be reflected upon by us dispassionately. Are we overextending ourselves? Does the periodic showing of the flag attain the overall results we want? Our natural area of interest should be the waters stretching from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca. Our coastline, ports, naval installations, the EEZ, the Continental shelf, oil and trade flows etc are confined to this area.
Our naval resources are considerable, but not large enough to credibly take on bigger area responsibilities. We have an expansion and modernization programme that will take time and money to implement. China’s economic vulnerability in the Indian Ocean area is far more than our vulnerability across the Malacca Straits. 60 percent of China’s oil supplies are shipped through Malacca. We do not need a “string of pearls” strategy of our own extending to the South China Sea. We are not yet a regional player in South-east Asia and beyond, of the stature where our political weight has to be bolstered by visible military presence. True, our Look-East policy has increased our profile in the region, but it remains at the economic level essentially. These countries may be comfortable with our Navy’s humanitarian or emergency role, but not an obtrusive military role that is likely to disturb equations with Beijing seriously. Australia’s case is an example; even the Japanese government that followed Abe’s became cautious after the Chinese protested against the quadrilateral exercises. Singapore and Vietnam are receptive to cooperation with India and we should respond strategically to opportunities that emerge, but Malaysia and Indonesia would be reticent and the Philippines peripheral in the matter.
If the West fails in Afghanistan, the danger to the Asian region as whole, and well beyond, will multiply manifold. This requires a much firmer handling of Pakistan by the West than has been the case until now.
Apart from a limited independent effort of a strategic nature that we can make in the trans- Malacca region, our presence and significance there is derived from our cooperation with the US Navy. We have to weigh two things. One is that the US Seventh Fleet in the Far East is meant to protect Japan and Taiwan and to deter China. It is risky for us to get involved in these rivalries in the region. Cooperation with Vietnam and Singapore has a different connotation and therefore is politically safer. Two, our naval forays into these areas in conjunction with the US should not expose the gap between our foreign policy and the import of these naval moves. We do not seek US support for our differences with China. So, why in the naval field should we send a different message, in the company of other adversaries of China?
The bilateral India-China problems do not as yet have any direct incidence on the security situation in Asia as a whole apart from the underlying theme of Sino-Indian rivalry. India and China have de-escalated their border conflict by adopting several confidence-building measures. Chinese provocations over Arunachal Pradesh do not impact on the atmosphere in the Asian region. Our unresolved border issue is not seen as regionally destabilizing. ASEAN countries would have noted that India and China are not overtly competing in the region, even though these countries want to balance China’s weight in the region by drawing India more into it.
Our security situation is endangered by Chinese penetration in our neighbourhood, but we have not been able to retaliate in kind in China’s neighbourhood. Myanmar is successfully handling its competing equations with India and China. The Tibetan question is not likely to disturb the peace in Asia, unless at some stage it raises India-China tensions excessively. China continues to bolster Pakistan as an all weather friend, but we have not allowed this to impede at least the growth of India- China ties or CBMs between the two countries. China’s admittance as an observer to SAARC testifies to a pragmatic recognition of the difficulty in keeping China completely out of a collective South-Asian forum.
…there is no overall Asian security environment as such. Disparate regions in Asia have their own specific problems in which all Asia countries are not involved.
Terrorism has emerged as a huge security problem in Asia. Apart from West Asia where it has become endemic, the severity of the problem is being felt in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and China. The epicenter of this terrorism is in our region: in Pakistan and in Afghan areas contiguous to it. The US, NATO and ISAF are involved in Afghanistan where the Taliban are resurgent, inflicting increasing casualties on the international forces there. Pakistan is getting internally destabilized because in its role as an ally of the West in the war against terror, it has earned the ire of local fundamentalists who have begun to spread terror inside the country.
The situation is made more complex by the involvement of Pakistani agencies in extension of clandestine support to Islamic elements in the country backing the Taliban. Pakistan’s descent towards state failure is a cause of worry to the West because of the country’s nuclear status and the danger of its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the terrorists. Pakistan embodies in itself the combined threat of Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The recent terrorist attack in Mumbai by Pakistani elements underscores the grave danger to regional peace represented by these fanatical forces. If the West fails in Afghanistan, the danger to the Asian region as whole, and well beyond, will multiply manifold. This requires a much firmer handling of Pakistan by the West than has been the case until now. The West tries to buy Pakistani cooperation through financial and military aid, which not only encourages Pakistan to persist in its duplicitous policies, it also increases threats to our security.
To conclude, there is no overall Asian security environment as such. Disparate regions in Asia have their own specific problems in which all Asia countries are not involved. The biggest security imponderable in Asia is the rise of China. Japan needs a fresh look at its security. ASEAN has created a stable security environment for itself. Terrorism is emerging as a grave threat in our region. India is facing grave challenges to its security from China, Pakistan and terrorism. Iran’s nuclear ambitions are destabilizing. Central Asian security is principally in the hands of Russia and China. Russia is worried about developments in Afghanistan. In securing the sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean we are in position to play a prominent role, but we should not over extend ourselves east of Malacca Straits. US presence and role in East Asia is positive for our security. The future Afghan, Iran, not to mention Pakistan, policies of the US would have major security implications for us.
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