Geopolitics

Emerging Asian Security Environment
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Issue Vol 24.1 Jan-Mar 2009 | Date : 05 Sep , 2012

To address the security challenges that Asia faces, the question needs to be asked whether any coherent concept of Asian security exists. Is Asia an integrated geographical entity, are its security challenges interlinked across the continent and can structures be established that could address them in their totality? In actual fact, there is no clarity even about the geographical frontiers of Asia.

On the western side, where does Asia end? In Israel? On the eastern side, the position is clearer. Asia can be said to end with Japan. But here too fluidity has been given to the definition of Asia by crafting an Asia-Pacific region. This makes for inclusion of not only Australia and New Zealand, but also accommodates the US in a broader Asian framework.

…the most important development is China’s inexorable rise. This is already changing the balance of power in Asia. A growing power may attract apprehensions, but it also attracts engagement.

The oddity is that the concept of Asia-Pacific excludes South Asia and countries west to it, which constitutes a major part of Asia. A further complication is that the West identifies Asia frequently with countries inhabited by people of Mongoloid stock. India is seen as part of a shared Indo-European identity, particularly in linguistic terms, and gets separated from Asia. Countries to the east of India are seen as forming a more coherent political and strategic space, with China and Japan providing the fulcrum. The US has promoted this kind of discrete view of Asia, as it has suited its political, military and economic strategy. India has been excluded from Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). India was excluded even from Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), until very recently when India attended the latest ASEM meeting in Beijing. Such an illogical approach has held sway despite the obvious fact that India is the second largest country of Asia and has marked the Asian cultural, linguistic and religious identity equally, if not more than China.

We call the Middle East, West Asia, which clearly means that we include it in Asia. There are many who would consider this region distinct from Asia from the security point of view, and in a category of its own because of Israel and the critical strategic importance of this geographical space full of hydrocarbon resources. Whether the Arabs have a strong sense of an Asian identity is not entirely clear. They have, certainly, a much stronger sense of an Arab identity. Egypt, the leader of the Arab world, is an African country. Much of the politics of West Asia has been traditionally influenced by Egypt, though Saudi Arabia’s money diplomacy is skillful and as custodian of the Muslim holy places, its stature is unique. North African countries are all Arab. Dividing the Arab world into Asian and African would, in the eyes of Arab strategists, weaken the unity of the Arab world and disaggregate the holistic view they take of their security. Arab solidarity is distinct from Asian solidarity.

The Arab world has been highly self-centered in its security concerns. It has leveraged successfully its Islamic linkages with Asian countries as well as the broad anti-western sentiments harboured by many of them because of colonial history and manipulation of regional politics by the West, to support Arab causes, especially the Palestinian cause. It has been called upon to give little in return, not the least because Asia is too divided, lacks a common political platform and does not have one single issue, like the Palestinian one, which represents Asia’s conscience and gives it a sense of victimhood vis a vis the West in particular. Even in terms of energy security, the Arab oil producers have been unmindful of the impact of their policies on developing Asia countries.

Japan’s political and military ambitions are not contrary to our interests; they are a problem for China. The security cooperation agreement we have recently signed with Japan is a step in the right direction.

The Arab have benefitted greatly over the years from political support from India for the Palestinian cause, without commensurate political returns on issues of vital concern to it, whether relations with Pakistan, the J&K issue or oil related matters. India’s concern about Israeli security has been essentially pro forma. In recent years the contours of India’s West Asian policies have changed, partly because the Palestinians themselves have relied on US and Europe to find solutions to the Arab-Israeli confrontation and support from countries like India and the non-aligned world has become of secondary importance, and partly because of improved relations between India and Israel. If with regard to Israel, India’s policy has become more pragmatic, so is the case of its stepped up engagement with the Gulf countries where India has security interests that range from its large expatriate population in this region, the sizeable remittances they send back home, trade and access to energy resources.

Terrorism in West Asia directed at Israel has become wider in its operational scope. It has now become a serious security problem for the West because of its continued support for Israel as well as the presence of large Muslim populations in European countries. The US assault on Iraq was seen as one more instance of western double standards in dealing with Arab countries on the one hand, and Israel, on the other. This has greatly aggravated the problem of terrorism associated with religious extremism not only for the US but the western world in general. The first Iraq war leading to the stationing of US troops on Saudi soil led to the rise of Al Qaida, leading subsequently to the September 11, 2001 attacks against the US, which in turn led to US military intervention in Afghanistan, with all the security consequences this has engendered for the South Asian region.

The Iranian nuclear question is raising disturbing questions about the future security of the Gulf region. US, Europe, and even Russia, view Iran’s nuclear ambitions as unacceptable. Israel is pushing for military action against Iran before it crosses the nuclear pale. The Arab countries are greatly concerned, especially in the context of sharper Shia-Sunni rivalry in the region consequent to developments in Iraq. It is hoped that with Obama taking over the reins in the US, and elections in Iran later in the year, the worst would be averted in the region. Iran is pursuing a high-risk strategy, with US and Europe unable to find a counter. Because US is embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan, its capacity to open a third front with Iran, which will aggravate its existing problems in dealing with the situation in the other two countries, is severely limited.

Terrorism in West Asia directed at Israel has become wider in its operational scope. It has now become a serious security problem for the West because of its continued support for Israel…

We now have Central Asia as a recently emerged strategic space, with its own security challenges. On the one hand, these countries, with the protective Soviet cover gone, are now more exposed to threats from Islamic fundamentalism and drug trafficking from Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the other, they are exposed to the danger of being brought into the orbit of a resurgent Russia, which would compromise their independence, and, of course, to the threat of Chinese over lordship. They are largely seen as weak, dysfunctional states, barring Kazakhstan, and as they are land locked to boot, their security environment is peculiarly hazardous.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has sandwiched Central Asian states between Russia and China, with both the giants keeping an eye on each other in this strategic space between them. China is more advantageously placed because of its greater financial resources and therefore pushes its economic agenda. Russia, to maintain its diminshed influence, pushes the security agenda. The US has inserted itself in the region mainly to have access to its hydrocarbon resources, without having to depend on Russia. To achieve this, the links of these countries with Russia have to be weakened and one way to do this has been to accelerate the transition of these countries to democracy, a project that has failed. The US effort to push these countries towards greater linkages to South Asia as part of the US’s Greater Central Asia project is seen with great suspicion by Moscow.

With the continuing turmoil in Afghanistan and fears of Pakistan’s collapse, this policy seems to have lost its immediate thrust, but Russia would watch closely if the feeling of obligation towards the US because of the nuclear deal leads to Indian military involvement in Afghanistan, as some elements in our strategic community seem to be advocating. Such a course of action would be ill advised for India as we would be backing US/NATO/European action in Afghanistan without being in control of policy and the ultimate goals of the intervention. We would have, in the process, created doubts in the minds of Russia, Iran, as well as the Islamic world about the new orientation of our strategic choices. Russia would expect India to determine its Afghan policy in cognizance of the shared interests of both countries in a neutral and independent Afghanistan and in preventing the return to power there of the Taliban. India would be expected to do nothing to weaken Russia’s overall position in the region.

By gaining access to this region in the aftermath of September 11 for the purpose of ousting the Taliban regime and combating terrorism, the US has gained a strategic foothold from which it will not allow itself to be dislodged easily. This enables it to check-mate Russian and Chinese hegemony in the region, a goal to which the Central Asian countries would not be averse so long as the US crusade for democracy does not destabilize the local regimes. The Russians, with Chinese support, have already, within the SCO, demanded the US to put a time frame for its departure from the region. However, this call has lost its insistence lately. On the contrary, reports are appearing about US effort to acquire more base facilities in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in order to reduce dependence on Pakistan for transporting supplies to its troops in Afghanistan.

This will require greater engagement with Russia over the serious concerns it has about US/NATO policies towards it, including installing a missile defensive system in Eastern Europe. Separately, the Russians have cobbled together the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a security organization grouping the Central Asian states as a riposte to US penetration of the region. Oddly, because of the previous status of these countries as part of the Soviet Union, the European security orientation of this region has not vanished. It is, in fact, evidenced by its linkages to NATO and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), with Kazakhstan’s ambition to be the next chairman of the OSCE. India, along with Pakistan, Iran and Outer Mongolia, has observer status in the SCO. There is the Russian hype that the SCO can, when mature, be the kernel of an Asian Collective Security System, a kind of an Asian NATO, but founded on superior principles — more democratic and without the overriding writ of a single power.

The US will remain a part of the security landscape of Asia.

South–East Asia was the first to evolve a security framework of its own in Asia — the ASEAN Regional Forum. India is a member and so are the US and Russia, not to mention China, Japan and South Korea. The management by South-East Asian states of their security environment has been a remarkable success. These countries are diverse ethnically, religiously, linguistically, culturally and economically. They do not have a common history, with most of them having been colonized by different countries in the past. Amongst them are those that have fought the US bitterly and those that have security arrangements with the US. Some of these countries have Islamic orientation and others feel threatened by Islamic elements. Some have regimes that are anathema to the West and yet the organization can absorb the strains arising from that in their overall relations with the West. The ASEAN is creating a peaceful space for itself in which they can maintain their economic prosperity, insulated from great power rivalry.

This fits in well with our ‘Look East Policy’ and our growing engagement with the region. As we have no intention, or capacity, to dominate the region, our interest is to prevent it moving into China’s orbit as China continues its scorching growth, develops its military strength, seeks to protect its sea lanes through the Malacca Straits and leverages its ground strength in these countries by way of local Chinese communities already economically dominant in some countries. We have a growing commonality of interest with Japan, increasingly vulnerable to China’s mounting strength. Japan, of course, relies on the US for security, but this has made it a politically feeble. Japan’s political and military ambitions are not contrary to our interests; they are a problem for China. The security cooperation agreement we have recently signed with Japan is a step in the right direction.

US engagement with China is to control its behaviour, give it incentives to work within the US created international system and not aspire to wreck it.

The outstanding territorial differences between Japan and Russia handicap the former in increasing its independent role in the region. Japan has less diplomatic weight in Russia on this account as it might have had otherwise. This increases China’s relevance to Russia in developing its eastern Siberian and far-eastern territories, especially their oil and gas resources. The harnessing of these resources for China’s future growth is not desirable from the Japanese or Indian points of view. We are partners in Sakhalin 1 and could team up potentially with Japan in developing hydrocarbon resources in that area, provided Russia-Japan relations improve.

Japan faces a major security problem, and so does South Korea, because of North Korean nuclear and missile capability. Just as China gave Pakistan nuclear and missile capability to corner India, it is entirely possible it has given this capability to North Korea to corner Japan. US and Japan have become dependent on Chinese goodwill to resolve this problem, giving time to China to leverage US and Japanese strengths for accelerating its rise as a power. As it grows stronger, China can dispense with the North Korean card. Russia is cooperating in eliminating North Korean capability because of its deleterious impact on the non-proliferation regime, of which it is a staunch supporter.

In the emerging security landscape in Asia, the most important development is China’s inexorable rise. This is already changing the balance of power in Asia. A growing power may attract apprehensions, but it also attracts engagement. China’s double-digit growth rate for well over a decade has integrated it with the global economy far more than India is. It is commonly accepted that China will become the world’s second leading power by 2020, when China expects to achieve its goal of becoming a middle-income country. As China’s interests stretch across the globe, it will want to develop the means to protect them. It is inconceivable that China’s economic rise will not be accompanied by the expansion of its military capabilities. Many in the West believe that China so far has been restrained in the military domain and the expansion of its nuclear arsenal has been slow. On the other hand, the Chinese are seen to be developing certain advanced technologies such as anti-satellite capability, additional nuclear submarines for which a large facility at Hainan is being built, apart from building an aircraft carrier and testing a submarine-launched ICBM.

For us, the US presence and role in South-east and Far East Asia have a positive security dimension as it keeps China in check. We have no reason to be averse to the US-Japan-Australia security cooperation in that region.

China may be inviting engagement and economic bonding, but not political trust or mutually supportive alliances. It has many problems with countries in the region, but its strategy is to neither create a confrontation with others over them, nor resolve them. It is belligerent over Taiwan, yet has built a strong economic relationship with it. With Japan, the underlying tensions are high, yet Japan is the largest foreign investor in China. China has built a strong economic relationship with Australia, which is making Australia well-disposed politically to China too, reflected in its decision to take no further part in the Quadrilateral Initiative comprising of US, Japan, Australia and India. China’s policies are astute and it is getting away with its pretensions of “peaceful rise”. It is too big a country to ignore, too successful economically not to attract partners, too financially strong, with reserves of 1.9 trillion dollars not to have clout, especially now with a financial crisis confronting the world, and too old a civilization not to respect. Its management of the Olympic games has marveled many; its success in winning the largest number of gold medals has demonstrated its capacity to achieve goals it sets for itself, and is a kind of psychological warfare against traditional big powers.

In search for raw materials and markets, China is going into all corners of the globe. It has expanded its presence in Africa from where it has begun to procure oil and commodities. To protect its lines of communication, it is pursuing the famous “string of pearls” strategy of seeking port facilities in countries across the Indian Ocean. For the time being the Indian Navy is the dominant littoral navy in this area. We have to make an assessment of China’s strategic aims and whether in the foreseeable future, it will have the ability to pose a challenge to us in the Indian Ocean, considering that to maintain a credible force so far away from its own territory will not be easy; more so as it will have its hands full in contending with the challenge of the US 7th Fleet, as well as Japan and Taiwan.

India can profit from its engagement with the US without creating overt tensions with China, Russia may not be too concerned.

The US will remain a part of the security landscape of Asia. It is part of US’s declared strategy not to allow a rival power to emerge. US engagement with China is to control its behaviour, give it incentives to work within the US created international system and not aspire to wreck it. The mutuality of interest created between the two is a disincentive to rocking the boat by either side. US has seen that within the framework of this arrangement, it can continue to arm Taiwan and ensure its security, maintain and even strengthen its defence arrangements with Japan and be present militarily in the Korean peninsula, besides being present in South-east Asia as an insurance against any Chinese attempts at hegemony. US and China have found it possible to work together to attempt to denuclearize North Korea, though China’s real calculations, given its record of transferring nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan and its presumed knowledge of the North Korea-Pakistan missile versus nuclear know-how equation, should invite distrust. China is, at one level, not averse to the USJapan Defence Pact as it constrains those in Japan in favour of building an independent defence capability.

For us, the US presence and role in South-east and Far East Asia have a positive security dimension as it keeps China in check. We have no reason to be averse to the US-Japan-Australia security cooperation in that region. One of the unspoken reasons for US’s decision to bend its nonproliferation policy to accommodate India is to prepare for the emergence of a better balance in Asia consequent upon the rise of China. To this extent India can profit from its engagement with the US without creating overt tensions with China, Russia may not be too concerned. It has its own longer-term concerns about China; its decision to give a degree of strategic reach to the Indian armed forces has a China dimension, apart from purely commercial interests.

Some words about naval security in the Indian Ocean region would be apposite. Indian and US navies are doing major exercises in the Indian Ocean area. If cooperation to keep vital sea lanes of communication open, combat against terrorism and rescue operations at the time of natural disasters are offered as reasons for these high profile exercises, and inter-operability is advocated for effectiveness, the fact that Indian commentators talk openly about countering China’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean area as reflected in China’s string of pearls strategy, lends to these exercises a strategic meaning beyond the stated ones.

India’s move to make its presence felt in the seas beyond the Malacca Straits needs to be reflected upon by us dispassionately.

The quadrilateral exercise between India, US, Japan and Australia, along with Singapore, elicited Chinese protests, and the Quadrilateral Initiative petered out in the face of these protests, with the change of regimes in Australia and Japan. Russia too in informal diplomatic conversations noted with some misgiving the import of this exercise. Russia would feel concerned if Indian foreign policy moved towards some form of alliance rather than maximizing its options with all players. Outstanding territorial differences between Russia and Japan in the Far East, as also the sensitivities of China, would make Russia watchful of any Indian role in the area, though the recent security agreement with Japan could be justified by us as a counter to China’s policies in our neighbourhood and aggressive posturing on our border dispute, which adds to distrust of Chinese intentions towards us.

India’s move to make its presence felt in the seas beyond the Malacca Straits needs to be reflected upon by us dispassionately. Are we overextending ourselves? Does the periodic showing of the flag attain the overall results we want? Our natural area of interest should be the waters stretching from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca. Our coastline, ports, naval installations, the EEZ, the Continental shelf, oil and trade flows etc are confined to this area.

Our naval resources are considerable, but not large enough to credibly take on bigger area responsibilities. We have an expansion and modernization programme that will take time and money to implement. China’s economic vulnerability in the Indian Ocean area is far more than our vulnerability across the Malacca Straits. 60 percent of China’s oil supplies are shipped through Malacca. We do not need a “string of pearls” strategy of our own extending to the South China Sea. We are not yet a regional player in South-east Asia and beyond, of the stature where our political weight has to be bolstered by visible military presence. True, our Look-East policy has increased our profile in the region, but it remains at the economic level essentially. These countries may be comfortable with our Navy’s humanitarian or emergency role, but not an obtrusive military role that is likely to disturb equations with Beijing seriously. Australia’s case is an example; even the Japanese government that followed Abe’s became cautious after the Chinese protested against the quadrilateral exercises. Singapore and Vietnam are receptive to cooperation with India and we should respond strategically to opportunities that emerge, but Malaysia and Indonesia would be reticent and the Philippines peripheral in the matter.

If the West fails in Afghanistan, the danger to the Asian region as whole, and well beyond, will multiply manifold. This requires a much firmer handling of Pakistan by the West than has been the case until now.

Apart from a limited independent effort of a strategic nature that we can make in the trans- Malacca region, our presence and significance there is derived from our cooperation with the US Navy. We have to weigh two things. One is that the US Seventh Fleet in the Far East is meant to protect Japan and Taiwan and to deter China. It is risky for us to get involved in these rivalries in the region. Cooperation with Vietnam and Singapore has a different connotation and therefore is politically safer. Two, our naval forays into these areas in conjunction with the US should not expose the gap between our foreign policy and the import of these naval moves. We do not seek US support for our differences with China. So, why in the naval field should we send a different message, in the company of other adversaries of China?

The bilateral India-China problems do not as yet have any direct incidence on the security situation in Asia as a whole apart from the underlying theme of Sino-Indian rivalry. India and China have de-escalated their border conflict by adopting several confidence-building measures. Chinese provocations over Arunachal Pradesh do not impact on the atmosphere in the Asian region. Our unresolved border issue is not seen as regionally destabilizing. ASEAN countries would have noted that India and China are not overtly competing in the region, even though these countries want to balance China’s weight in the region by drawing India more into it.

Our security situation is endangered by Chinese penetration in our neighbourhood, but we have not been able to retaliate in kind in China’s neighbourhood. Myanmar is successfully handling its competing equations with India and China. The Tibetan question is not likely to disturb the peace in Asia, unless at some stage it raises India-China tensions excessively. China continues to bolster Pakistan as an all weather friend, but we have not allowed this to impede at least the growth of India- China ties or CBMs between the two countries. China’s admittance as an observer to SAARC testifies to a pragmatic recognition of the difficulty in keeping China completely out of a collective South-Asian forum.

…there is no overall Asian security environment as such. Disparate regions in Asia have their own specific problems in which all Asia countries are not involved.

Terrorism has emerged as a huge security problem in Asia. Apart from West Asia where it has become endemic, the severity of the problem is being felt in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and China. The epicenter of this terrorism is in our region: in Pakistan and in Afghan areas contiguous to it. The US, NATO and ISAF are involved in Afghanistan where the Taliban are resurgent, inflicting increasing casualties on the international forces there. Pakistan is getting internally destabilized because in its role as an ally of the West in the war against terror, it has earned the ire of local fundamentalists who have begun to spread terror inside the country.

The situation is made more complex by the involvement of Pakistani agencies in extension of clandestine support to Islamic elements in the country backing the Taliban. Pakistan’s descent towards state failure is a cause of worry to the West because of the country’s nuclear status and the danger of its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the terrorists. Pakistan embodies in itself the combined threat of Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The recent terrorist attack in Mumbai by Pakistani elements underscores the grave danger to regional peace represented by these fanatical forces. If the West fails in Afghanistan, the danger to the Asian region as whole, and well beyond, will multiply manifold. This requires a much firmer handling of Pakistan by the West than has been the case until now. The West tries to buy Pakistani cooperation through financial and military aid, which not only encourages Pakistan to persist in its duplicitous policies, it also increases threats to our security.

To conclude, there is no overall Asian security environment as such. Disparate regions in Asia have their own specific problems in which all Asia countries are not involved. The biggest security imponderable in Asia is the rise of China. Japan needs a fresh look at its security. ASEAN has created a stable security environment for itself. Terrorism is emerging as a grave threat in our region. India is facing grave challenges to its security from China, Pakistan and terrorism. Iran’s nuclear ambitions are destabilizing. Central Asian security is principally in the hands of Russia and China. Russia is worried about developments in Afghanistan. In securing the sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean we are in position to play a prominent role, but we should not over extend ourselves east of Malacca Straits. US presence and role in East Asia is positive for our security. The future Afghan, Iran, not to mention Pakistan, policies of the US would have major security implications for us.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Kanwal Sibal

is the former Indian Foreign Secretary. He was India’s Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia.

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