Geopolitics

Eastern Ladakh: Can India Afford the Luxury of Inaction?
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Issue Vol. 28.4 Oct-Dec 2013 | Date : 14 Dec , 2013

Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Li Keqiang and the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh

The Armed Forces are India’s “hard-power” assets and not a tool for diplomacy on the borders. Deployment of an armed force to support a diplomatic effort is axiomatic as it lends strength to diplomacy. Should “soft power” of diplomacy fail, then the will to suitably demonstrate use of “hard power” must not be found wanting. India is a Nation tugging at its leash to surge forward in all arenas of development. Without throwing caution to winds, there is a requirement to be less tentative and more assertive. India’s national interests must be paramount. At stake here are the aspirations of a young generation for a bright progressive future.

“Perform necessary action; it is more powerful than inaction; Without action, you even fail to sustain your own body.”  —Mahabharata

Persisting ambiguity is detrimental to national security interests…

After the eye-catching, sensational headline – “Chinese Army Has Occupied 640 sq.km in Three Sectors of Ladakh”- all is so quiet on the ‘Ladakh Front’ it seems as if nothing happened. Or is it that India has reconciled to accept this loss of territory? Or we ‘The People’ have resigned to the fact of media hyper-ventilation with a lot of salt? A hype which lasts 16 to 24 hours dies down as the sensational “BREAKING NEWS” trans-mutates to “BROKEN NEWS” and is trashed for its glaring inconsistencies.

In the course of the various debates and discussions regarding this particular episode, there were many snide and cynical references to the ‘deferring perceptions of the LAC’. The historical background is that the Indian Police forces were moved into the area in September 1958 after India became aware of the construction of a major road through the eastern portion of Aksai Chin as depicted in a Chinese government pictorial magazine. Construction of this Highway, starting from Kashgar in Sinkiang (now Xinjiang) through Rudokh Dzong to Gartok, had begun in 1956 and was completed in 1957. Though this road did not exist then it was one of the induction routes used by the PLA in 1950 to enter and subjugate Tibet.

As a consequence, India was thus forced to take a decision to protect its territorial integrity, leading to the deployment of Police forces and establishing “check-posts” in the area of its claims. It was a cautious and tentative step with the newly formed Indo Tibet Border Police (ITBP) under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs but under the executive control of the Ministry of External Affairs. Such calculated diffused control ensures that there can be no pin-pointing or attribution of responsibility in event of a failure. By September 1962, a series of “check-posts were set up manned by “civil constabulary, equipped with light arms…..to deal with traders or others going along the recognised routes and to prevent any undesirable or unauthorised persons crossings the border, the check-posts were not intended for any aggressive purpose.”

China has shunned the spirit embedded in the Treaties of 1993, 1996 and 2005, and has been asserting its claims…

These check-posts were strung across from south-east of the Karakoram Pass through Kongka Pass to Pangang Tso stringing out a line that depicted India’s eastern most limits of deployment in Aksai Chin prior to the outbreak of the war. At this time Chinese troops were deployed much further east astride the newly constructed Western Highway on the eastern fringes of Aksai Chin. There was a vast gap between the two forces not-with-standing the Chinese PLA patrolling activities to shadow Indian deployment. Subsequently India staked claim of the Line of Actual Control along this existing line of Posts as also dictated a ‘cut-off’ date. This obviously did not suit the Chinese and they had not taken any cognisance of it. At the end of the 1962 conflict, Chinese troops had penetrated further west beyond the Indian line of “check-posts” which they then claimed as the Chinese version of the line of actual control. Coincidently, this line was also depicting the Chinese line of the International boundary between India and China.

Much prior to the 1962 confrontation, on April 25, 1960, the Prime Ministers of India and China had stated, in a joint communique, that Official Representatives of both governments would meet and consider each other’s claims pertaining to the International Boundary (not the Line of Actual Control – LAC) and make their recommendations for an amicable solution. In this meeting the Chinese presented an alignment of their claimed International Boundary running roughly from west of Karakoram Pass through Kongka Pass, cutting across Pangang Tso, then southwards more or less parallel to the Indus River to Demchok. India presented its claim as depicted on the Survey of India maps available in the public domain then.

On November 21, 1962, when the Chinese unilaterally declared ceasefire ending the conflict, the Chinese troops had reached this “claim line of their International Boundary”. The Chinese also staked the LAC to be this line as reached at the end of the war based on the fact that they were physically deployed along that line. Ipso facto, the Chinese perception of the LAC was now co-terminus with its claim line of the International Boundary with India – de facto making Aksai Chin part of China.

To respond to a dynamic tactical situation there is paramount requirement for a single force to be in control of all elements along the LAC…

While on the other hand, Indian forces had been pushed back from even their stated LAC as it existed prior to the war. Moreover, both these lines, that is, the line of Indian Police check-posts and the Indian forces deployment at the end of the war, were far west of India’s International Boundary in Aksai Chin as had been made public in all maps printed by the Survey of India in 1954. This then contributed to sow the seeds of difference in perception and interpretation of the LAC by India and China.

After the war, in December 1962, a mediation effort by six Afro-Asian countries to resolve the boundary issue between India and China fell through because of China rejecting the clause which required Chinese forces to withdraw 20 km from the positions held by them on termination of the war while exempting withdrawal of Indian forces. This added more confusion to the already existing ambiguity with regard to the alignment of the LAC and the situation has since then persisted. The Agreements that were signed in 1993, 1996 and 2005 enjoined on both India and China to maintain the existing status quo, however ambiguous the claims, while negotiations were underway and this would be without prejudice to each country’s claims. China has shunned the spirit embedded in these Treaties and has been asserting its claims all along the LAC. Their motive could be more loaded than mere assertion of the claimed areas.

India has remained cautious in its bid to assertively dominate the areas up to its claimed perception of the LAC so as not to up the ante and maintain existing status quo while the issue is negotiated at diplomatic and political levels. As a consequence, India has often called for nominating “no man’s land” in areas where there is a common claim by both countries. This is invariably rejected by China and India has unilaterally imposed this restrain on itself. India needs to shed reticence in these matters and re-designate such ‘common claimed areas’ as “both man’s lands” and dominate these with strong patrols on a regular basis.

The landing of the C130J at DBO came four months too late…

The sensationalism generated on the issue of “capture of 640 sq km of territory” and “area denial” by the Chinese in Ladakh to own forces is unsubstantiated. Territory can be denied, militarily, by two means; first, by physical occupation of the area by establishing defensive Posts and second, by holding Posts on the periphery of such an area so as to set up fire bases. From these Posts or fire bases effective direct fire by small arms can be brought to bear over the area to be denied as also to control in-direct fire by artillery, rocket artillery and conventional missiles on to the this area. None of these measures have been put in place or have been put into effect by the Chinese in Ladakh. Indian forces cannot be constrained in their patrolling and domination of any area on this count at least. Since neither of these two contingencies exists on ground, the statements “capture of territory” and “area denial” is more an amateurish reaction only generating an unwarranted hype.

The next issue that needs to be flagged pertains to the ambiguous arrangement of control. The ITBP is deployed under control of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) not the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Neither is it under the operational control of the Army. Since matters pertaining to China are diplomatically sensitive the Ministry of External Affairs would have a substantial say on any issue that can destabilise the relations. The question is then who will give the orders to ITBP to take action in case of a Chinese incursion? When will the Army be asked to take charge of the situation? Has there been a change in the tasking of the ITBP? Is it to be the first line of defence on its own all along the LAC? What support forces have been given to them to withstand a conventional attack by the Chinese forces? Is ITBP to replicate the Army in military character and be tasked accordingly? If that is the requirement then isn’t simply augmenting the strength of the Army a more prudent option?

This persisting ambiguity is detrimental to national security interests. To respond to a dynamic tactical situation there is a paramount requirement for a single force to be in control of all elements deployed in sensitive operational areas along the LAC. Even if implemented, the identity of ITBP (to which they are overly sensitive) will continue to remain intact, as also its hierarchy maintained, as is with the BSF deployed along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan. Such control is an imperative operational requirement for a cohesive deployment and an appropriate, coordinated and timely response to any tactical situation obtaining in the sensitive environment of the LAC.

China may possibly be gauging India’s ability to implement the military strategy of effective “dissuasion”…

India has the “hard power” to respond to any military situation. However it seems to be constrained for want of political reasons. Militarily, the Depsang incursion should have been followed up by a quick demonstration of the Army’s ability to build-up forces and fire power assets. Such an action would have conveyed India Army’s resolve to respond suitably if provoked. It is not the job of tactical commanders in field to think ‘diplomacy’. The military’s weapon is the bullet not the ‘jaws’. The rifle spewing fire should do the talking. The landing of the C130J at DBO came four months too late.

Giving credence to her penchant for detail, China would not have undertaken the Depsang incursion without having had in place adequate reserve forces and firepower assets to back this provoking venture. The Chinese would have surely expected a more solid and substantive military response from India. Or is it that China was sure of a benign response? It is also possible that China is gauging India’s ability to implement the military strategy of effective “dissuasion”.

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The Armed Forces are India’s “hard-power” assets and not a tool for diplomacy on the borders. Deployment of an armed force to support a diplomatic effort is axiomatic as it lends strength to diplomacy. Should “soft power” of diplomacy fail, then the will to suitably demonstrate use of “hard power” must not be found wanting. India is a Nation tugging at its leash to surge forward in all arenas of development. Without throwing caution to winds, there is a requirement to be less tentative and more assertive. India’s national interests must be paramount. At stake here are the aspirations of a young generation for a bright progressive future.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Lt Gen (Dr) JS Bajwa

is Editor Indian Defence Review and former Chief of Staff, Eastern Command and Director General Infantry.  He has authored two books Modernisation of the People's Liberation Army and  Modernisation of the Chinese PLA

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