Military & Aerospace

Defence of the Western Border - III
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Most of these weapons were deployed singly for snap shooting. The Pakistani posts were held in varying strengths from a section upwards.

Malhotra was allotted the task firstly to defend his area of operational responsibility against aggression by Pakistan or China separately or simultaneously. Secondly, to ensure the security of the Srinagar-Leh road, and thirdly to exploit fully all suitable opportunities for local counteroffensive actions against Pakistan, concurrently ensuring that the balanced defence posture was not prejudiced at any time.

The area opposite the Partapur sector was held by Pakistan with one company of Karakoram Scouts, who were later reinforced by one or two companies of mixed Karakoram and Gilgit Scouts. Pakistan had one wing of Karakoram Scouts reinforced by two additional companies in the Kargil sector. It later transpired that Pakistan had hastily mustered some reservists and pensioners to make up the manpower of some posts. The entire sector had about three 75-mm guns, a section of 3.7-inch howitzers and six three-inch mortars. Most of these weapons were deployed singly for snap shooting. The Pakistani posts were held in varying strengths from a section upwards. The defences were however well prepared and likely approaches mined. These posts, located on inhospitable heights, were vacated in winter except for the minimum presence required for security. The Karakoram Scouts, a paramilitary organisation, had a low defence potential, especially when they were not so well equipped in snow clothing to brave subzero temperatures.

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Malhotra had about four companies of Ladakh Scouts in the Nubera valley, one of which faced the Pakistanis and two the Chinese, with one company in reserve. These companies were supported by an ad hoc battery of 4.2-inch mortars. The personnel of the Ladakh Scouts are recruited locally, and by virtue of their hardy upbringing are used to subzero winter conditions. Their knowledge of the land and the people is of great advantage.

Malhotra backed him up by providing relief and additional troops, thereby accepting justifiable risks against the Chinese.

On the initiative of Maj Rinchen, commander of the Ladakh Scouts, whose home was in the Nubera valley, the Biegdangdo company captured the Karakoram Scouts’ posts blocking the entrance to the Shyok valley under Pakistani occupation. He followed this up by advancing towards Turtok. This officer, who had won the Maha Vir Chakra in the Pakistani invasion of Ladakh in 1947-48, was known for his boldness and unorthodox approach to military problems. Emboldened by his initial success, he collected resources and porters to rout the hastily retreating adversary in the style of Zorawar Singh. Malhotra backed him up by providing relief and additional troops, thereby accepting justifiable risks against the Chinese. The advance along the Shyok valley was soon underway.

But as Rinchen’s columns moved steadily forward, as if sucked into a vacuum, its maintenance became a problem, especially so because the track right up to Turtok could be negotiated only on foot or by animals. Thoise, the base for these operations, was itself fed by a precarious airlift by aging Fairchild Packets as the airstrip in the narrow valley could not take bigger planes. The farther Rinchen advanced the more difficult it became for the already overstretched administration to support the column. The helicopter fleet of larger load-carrying capacity was not available at that time. Out of fear that the column would be starved of food and ammunition, Rinchen was halted at Turtok.

This offensive was not planned but was one of those operations which exploited an opportunity war offered.

Meanwhile, Pakistan managed to reinforce its troops and organise defence in the general area of Siari against the frontal Indian advance. After the capture of Turtok, problems of administration and manpower brought operations in the Shyok valley to a halt. Although the companies of Ladakh Scouts in the Nubera valley were relieved by raising a local militia known as the Nubera Guards to reinforce Rinchen, no solution could be found for the problem of providing adequate administrative support. Rinchen advanced about 12 miles in all and occupied several square miles of barren and rugged mountainous country which had no economic or political value to Pakistan.

Book_India_wars_sinceThis offensive was not planned but was one of those operations which exploited an opportunity war offered. Rinchen’s initiative was commendable. At this point, I might mention that I looked after the Ladakh Scouts as Station Commander Leh from 1967 to 1969. In this period Rinchen was in constant trouble because he found military discipline irksome and clashed with authority on many occasions. I had to protect him from the Spartan and holier than thou attitude of my GOC. I always saw some soldierly potential in Rinchen’s apparently rebellious outlook, and I am proud to say that the war amply proved my confidence in him.As a planned operation, it would however have been better to develop the thrust from the Indus Valley across Chrobatla straight towards Siari. This had a great advantage compared with the way the operation was conducted. Firstly, a secure administrative base on the Class 5 road from Khalsi in the area of Hamethang would have eased the maintenance problem as the base could fed from Leh by motor transport. Secondly, securing Siari would have cut off the Karakoram Scouts deployed east of it. The entire Shyok valley eastwards up to Biegdangdo could then have been swept from the rear. And this would have yielded a good crop of prisoners. But the frontal Indian advance was resisted by a systematic withdrawal without many casualties.

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In the Kargil sector, Brig ML Whig commanded 121 Infantry Brigade Group and was operationally responsible for the area. He had some six battalions, of which four were holding the picquet line and two were available as reserve for immediately launching offensive tasks.1 The obvious task was to deny the Pakistanis observation and domination of the Srinagar- Leh road.

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