Indian Defence Review

Jammu, the winter capital of Jammu and Kashmir state and a Dogra stronghold, is of great political importance. Its defence was considered paramount, and to this end the highway linking Jammu with Pathankot needed added security against Pakistani efforts to disrupt it. Pathankot housed the entire base facilities for logistic support of the theatre, including Ladakh. Its security was absolutely vital for sustaining a war in Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistans military capability capability was thus limited to developing a thrust with two or three brigades either in the valley or the Poonch bulge, and a second thrust of the same strength supported by one armoured brigade either in the Chhamb sector or against the Naushera”¦

In addition, the threat of infiltration to the valley and Rajauri and Poonch could not be discounted. As in 1965, Pakistan might endeavour to discredit the state government politically by widespread subversion, sabotage and organised armed revolt, with a view to setting up a Pakistani-sponsored administration.1 Militarily, it might aim at disrupting the lines of communication leading to the battle zone to prevent the movement of Indian reserve formations on mobilisation or the buildup of war material.

The plan of operations seemed to be to deny Pakistani penetration into the sensitive areas of Jammu and Kashmir. In view of the possibility of a preemptive Pakistani strike it was essential that the initial deployment, though dispersed, should be balanced so as to counter a possible Pakistani offensive in the Jammu-Samba-Madhopur-Pathankot sector.

Pakistan’s military capability capability was thus limited to developing a thrust with two or three brigades either in the valley or the Poonch bulge, and a second thrust of the same strength supported by one armoured brigade either in the Chhamb sector or against the Naushera and Jhangar bulge west of the Chenab. Between the Chenab and the Ravi, Pakistan could develop a major thrust with one infantry and one armoured division and would also lose a subsidiary threat of one or two infantry brigades and one or two armoured regiments either towards Jammu-Samba-Madhopur, or towards Pathankot—Amritsar, across the Ravi.

Since India had no intention of resorting to war, the initiative lay with Pakistan to start hostilities at a time and place of its choosing. The proximity of the Pakistani cantonments to the location of the Indian formations helped the Pakistanis preempt any Indian move at will. To meet this threat, Sartaj Singh had a reasonable defensive posture, with adequate regional reserves to meet unforeseen contingencies. He had 3 Infantry Division in the northern sector with some Ladakh Scout subunits facing both China and Pakistan, 19 Infantry Division in the Tithwal and Uri sectors, 25 Infantry Division in the Poonch and Jhangar-Naushera bulges with one brigade worth of reserves near Poonch, 10 Infantry Division in the Chhamb sector, 26 Infantry Division with one armoured brigade covering the approaches to Jammu and Samba, and 39 Infantry Division looking after the Pathankot base.

Since India had no intention of resorting to war, the initiative lay with Pakistan to start hostilities at a time and place of its choosing.

The defence of the sensitive areas of Samba, Madhopur and Pathankot was to be taken over by I Corps on induction to the sector from the hinterland. In that event, 39 Infantry Division was to be placed under its command. A sector had been created for anti-infiltrations operations, particularly in the valley, where paramilitary forces, adequately beefed up with regular elements, were to be used to counter infiltration. I Corps was to launch an offensive in the Shakargarh bulge at an opportune time, depending upon the Pakistani reactions at the start of hostilities. Dovetailed with the main I Corps offensive, Sartaj Singh was to launch an offensive to develop threats on both sides of the Chenab so as to divide the Pakistani strike force between the two offensives and thereby facilitate the main offensive.

XV Corps had put its defensive plans into effect as part of the overall strategy in the west by the end of October. I Corps had arrived in the area and assumed operational responsibility as envisaged in the command plan, and the inter-corps boundary had been readjusted by then and coordination achieved in matters of mutual military interest. The main features of the Indian defensive posture, so far as it could discerned, were pragmatically sound. In view of the difficult terrain in Jammu and Kashmir and the formidable defence potential developed there for over 20 years, an offensive in this theatre would be costly and much too slow in the context of a short war.

The Indian strategy was therefore essentially defensive. The security of the lines of communication with various sectors was to be adequately guarded. Such offensive actions as were to be undertaken would be strictly confined to improving the general defensive posture. Offensive actions in the plains were essentially to be counteractions to meet the Pakistani offensive, and if possible arrest the initiative and secure Pakistani territory whose loss would hurt it economically and politically and provide bargaining power in postwar political negotiations.

Apart from a short sojourn in Burma in World War II, Sartaj Singh did not have any war experience of consequence. He had gone up the ladder in his career by holding successive positions of responsibility, including that of Director of Military Operations, all in conditions of peace. He had an assertive and bulldozing personality which evoked a mixture of responses alternating between grudging admiration and outright fear. He had an intelligent grasp of essentials, the will to overcome both physical and mental hurdles, and always exuded optimism. He found details irksome and disdainfully relegated them to subordinates, which at times threw doubts on his professional soundness. But then he was made to be a commander and refused to reduce himself to the level of staff. And there the distance remained.