Indian Defence Review

The Dragon’s Game Plan

The Dragon has adapted the ancient strategy of t’an shih against India. This strategy strives to achieve long-term goals in thousands of patient slices. Each cut is calibrated to provoke only a minor reaction – more like termites rather than a fire-breathing dragon! This game has been active for over fifty years and gained momentum after Hu took charge and discarded Deng’s advice to remain turret down. The strategy has worked at several levels as elaborated on in the succeeding paragraphs.

Internal Dissension

A Chinese think-tank recently advocated what China has been doing for the last sixty years – fragmenting India by stoking internal dissensions. To cloak her role, she has roped in Pakistan, Myanmar and Nepal to do the actual dirty work. Pakistan’s ISI funnels Chinese munitions and materiel to the Naxals through Nepal. China sympathisers in India in the government, media and academia, support Beijing’s moves like CPM’s support to China in 1962!

The Pakistan Card

To tie India to South Asia, China has armed and supported Pakistan including with nuclear weapons and missile technology. In further defiance of international non-proliferation norms, China has recently decided to build a 1000MW nuclear power plant in Pakistan. This will provide Pakistan with plutonium for its tactical nukes with which it hopes to stymie Indian conventional superiority; somewhat akin to the NATO versus Warsaw Pact scenario.

Seaward Squeeze

China’s string-of-pearls is designed to choke India’s sea-lanes while securing the passage of oil and other natural resources through the Indian Ocean. In February 2013, the China formally took over operations of Gwadar Port in Pakistan located at the entrance to the Gulf of Hormuz. China has virtually pushed India out of Sri Lanka and is set to unveil its carrier-capable Hambantota Port. Bangladesh is next on their radar. India’s efforts to prevent Chinese expansion by reaching out to these two traditional friends have been nullified by sub-regional ‘netas’ whose massive egos and self-interests dwarf those of Bharat Mata. Myanmar has already provided facilities to the PLAN for a Maritime Army and airbase at Coco Islands enabling Chinese submarines to operate close to Indian waters.

Siege of Land Frontiers

China has also successfully besieged India along its land frontiers. The Quinghai-Lhasa railway, which came up after a monumental 22-year effort, facilitated unprecedented infrastructure development in Tibet – highways, airports and military bases. China then wrested Nepal from India’s orbit and plans to extend the railway from Lhasa to Yadong and Zhangmu on two flanks of the Nepalese border. In addition to the Lhasa-Kathmandu road link, the Chinese have built a four-lane concrete highway through Eastern Nepal terminating just a few kilometres from the Siliguri corridor.

During his visit to Islamabad in May 2013, the Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang reiterated the plan to build the China-Pakistan Economic road-cum-rail corridor (Gwadar – Gilgit/Baltistan onto Xinjiang) for which a Chinese division is reportedly located in this restive region.

To the East, exploiting their military dominance over India, China has escalated the depth and frequency of border intrusions – the latest being the 23-km intrusion into the Depsang plateau.

Recently, Chengdu Military Region conducted three major exercises close to the Indo-Tibet border during which its latest fighters validated the use of high altitude airfields in Tibet and Xinjiang.

China has taken control of major Indian rivers originating in Tibet. Zangmu Hydropower Station harnesses the Brahmaputra with five planned dams. The Sutlej has been dammed at Parechu and Indus at Senge-Ali. Since India currently lacks the capability intervene effectively, China has a virtual stranglehold over North Indian rivers.

Diplomatic Manoeuvres

Similar to the gradual slices into India’s land frontiers, Beijing’s diplomatic stance too has made steady inroads into issues of core concerns of India as outlined below.

Package Proposal

In 1960, Zhou Enlai proposed that China was ready to accept the Indian boundary alignment in the East, if India reciprocated in the West. In 1981, after both sides had tried to normalise relations, Deng once again made a similar informal proposal to a visiting Indian Member of Parliament. This time, he added that it would be on the basis of actual control of the borders. India felt that the proposal amounted to legitimising Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin in return for their acceptance of what is already legally in India’s possession. Hence India proposed a sector-by-sector examination of historical records. Thereafter, the Chinese hardened their overall stance.

Tawang Tract

In 1985, Chinese negotiators claimed the Tawang tract South of McMahon line. In 1986 Li Shuquing, Vice Foreign Minister (FM) stated, “The Eastern sector is the biggest dispute and key to the overall situation.” Two years later, Vice Prime Minister Wu Xuequian indicated that India would need to make concessions in the East.

Sumdorong Chu

In 1986, the Chinese intruded across the McMahon Line near Sumdorong Chu. Indian forces moved swiftly and occupied the heights dominating the Chinese positions. Deng Xiaoping warned that China would have to “teach India a lesson” if it did not pull back but Delhi held firm. India’s prompt military response and rare political resolve induced China to soften its stand. A beaming Deng Xiaoping then received the Indian Prime Minister in Beijing in December 1988. The conciliatory approach culminated in Wen Jiabao’s visit in 2005, which was the first ‘Strategic Dialogue’ in the Sino-Indian context. Both sides agreed that a holistic view for a political settlement was the answer to the boundary question. The nitty-gritty technical approach was shed and the Joint Statement agreed that ‘in reaching a boundary settlement the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations…’ India interpreted this to mean that populated border areas would remain with their present nations.

Hu Jintao’s Visit

By 2006, Hu Jintao reckoned that Chinese dominance over India was now secure. Hence, weeks before his Delhi visit, Sun Yuxi the Chinese envoy in Delhi, claimed “…the whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. And Tawang is only one of the places in it. We are claiming all of that. That is our position.” Consequently, the visit ended in banalities, with only vague assurances that various irritants raised by the Indian PM would be looked into.

Intervention in the J&K Issue

During the Hu-Obama summit at Pittsburgh in September 2009, Hu proposed that the, “two countries should push for a proper resolution to regional issues in Korea, Iran and South Asia.” Later that year, prior to the Hu-Obama Beijing summit, the Chinese Vice FM announced China’s willingness to mediate between India and Pakistan, if requested. Hurriyat’s Mirwaiz promptly welcomed China’s role in settling the Kashmir issue, revealing Sino-Pak-Hurriyat collusion. In Dec 2010, Chinese Assistant FM, Hu Zhengyue, while briefing the Beijing press corps ahead of Wen Jiabao’s Delhi visit, lopped off 2,057 km from the 4,057 Indo-Tibet boundary thereby implying that the Tibet-J&K portion did not form part of this border. China had maintained strict neutrality on the Jammu & Kashmir issue right up to the 1999 Kargil War. Hence, this represented a tectonic pro-Pak shift in their position. But it went unchallenged by India. Thus encouraged, the Dragon next established a major presence in Shia-dominated Gilgit-Baltistan.

Li Keqiang Visit

Following the established pattern of previous visits, a controversy was created prior to PM Li Keqiang’s visit. In May 2013, Chinese troops intruded 23km across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to set up a tented camp on the Depsang Plateau. Although they withdrew after some hectic parleys, manoeuvres and unstated Indian concessions, the aim behind the blatant intrusion remains a matter of speculation. If one of the aims was to gauge how far India could be pushed to concede ground in Ladakh, they must have been well satisfied when Salman Khurshid likened the intrusion to acne, thereby discrediting India’s stand regarding the LAC. However, going by established patterns, their larger aim could well be to gradually gobble up the entire DBO sector up to the Karakoram then seize the Karakoram Pass for the Gwadar-Xinjiang Economic Corridor.

Conclusion

India needs to take cognisance of the Dragon’s game plan and adopt concrete countermeasures. Foremost is the need to formulate a strategic vision on dealing with an aggressive Dragon. A review of moves by China in the past reveals that she has always respected India’s firm resolve while taking full advantage of every vacillation. The Indian security establishment therefore needs to cultivate the courage to be resolute, duly synergised with military credibility and assessments. India need to identify ‘red lines’ and share them with the three Services together with clear policies to deal with situations whenever such ‘red lines’ become at risk.

Creation of military credibility requires the defence budget for India to at least be doubled to four to five per cent of GDP. Most importantly, a financially empowered group, including representatives from the Services must be made accountable for taking all security-related decisions within weeks rather than decades, as at present. Inter-departmental turf-wars must also be eliminated. For example, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) guarding the LAC reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and its radio equipment is incompatible with that of the Indian Army. Yet, whenever a significant ‘incident’ occurs, the Indian Army has to be called in. This is a recipe for disaster and must be streamlined in national interest.

Current gaps in India’s conventional and strategic capability, particularly the delay in the operationalisation of the Agni-V missile capable of covering China and the third leg of the triad, have opened a window of vulnerability, which we must endeavour to close as quickly as possible. Therefore, self-reliance in defence modernisation must be achieved as quickly as possible by opening up the sector to the Indian industry in the private sector and foreign collaboration with suitably enhanced FDI.

The answer to the ‘string-of-pearls’ lies in creating a pair of golden fetters – the Southern fetter comprising the Quadrilateral of Democracies and other Indo-Pacific nations – an arc from Singapore to the Kurile Islands is already in place but it needs robust reiteration. This should be complemented on the Asian mainland by a chain of friendly land-powers – Russia, Mongolia, Central Asian Republics and Iran. India should promote strong, multi-dimensional ties with these nations. In addition, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka must be weaned away from Beijing’s embrace. Obstacles created by sub-regional ‘netas’ must be tackled by the national leadership by moulding patriotic public opinion to support national strategy rather than being held hostage to parochial hysteria.

Over the past decades we have constantly tried to mollify the Dragon. In the bargain, we have been inveigled into surrendering our bargaining chips one by one. Therefore, we should now strive to reverse some of this damage. Just as the Chinese have several times changed their stance on Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Jammu & Kashmir, we too must subtly pull back from our commitment to the ‘One-China’ principle, support Tibetan autonomy and the Uyghur’s’ struggle for religious freedom. Taking a leaf from the Dragon’s book, this shift should be gradual and subtle – over years rather than months. Likewise, India should underline historical links with the Minsar Principality around Mount Kailas, which dates back to antiquity. This area is the fountainhead of rivers flowing into the North and North-Eastern Indian plains. Further, in view of Chinese dams on the Indus, Chenab and Brahmaputra, India should negotiate Indian presence on these sites for flood control. For all this, India would obviously need credible military strength, specifically the ability to intervene in Tibet.

The newly-installed Chinese leadership believes in Mao’s dictum, “power grows out of the barrel of a gun”. Hence, Indian response to the Dragon’s game plan also needs an iron fist in a velvet glove.