Geopolitics

Decoding the Dragon’s Game Plan
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Issue Vol. 28.3 Jul-Sep 2013 | Date : 07 Nov , 2013

Over the past decades, we have constantly tried to mollify the Dragon. In the bargain, we have been inveigled into surrendering our bargaining chips one by one. Therefore, we should now strive to reverse some of this damage. Just as the Chinese have several times changed their stance on Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Jammu & Kashmir, we too must subtly pull back from our commitment to the ‘One-China’ principle, support Tibetan autonomy and the Uyghur’s struggle for religious freedom. Taking a leaf from the Dragon’s book, this shift should be gradual and subtle – over years rather than months.

Nehru’s total lack of strategic sense became apparent soon after independence…

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) emerged from a ‘century of humiliation’ in 1949 after years of war against the Japanese and the KMT. From the outset, the new regime set about consolidating its ‘homeland core’. It swiftly seized control over the outlying buffer territories, gateways to invasion of the ‘core’ in times past, including Xinjiang and Tibet. During the Korean War, when the aggressor North Koreans were driven up to the Yalu River, China’s ultra-sensitivity to the buffer sparked its massive intervention which repulsed UN Forces South of the 38th parallel.

After Mao, China was fortunate to have a far-sighted, visionary leader in Deng Xiaoping. He synergised military and governance by combining Chairmanship over CMC with the position of CCP General Secretary and President. Thus, both Hu Jintao and his successor had several years of exposure to Military Affairs before assuming control of the Party, the Government and the CMC. Xi Jinping is the first leader to be elected to all three posts at the same meeting in March 2013. A ‘princeling’, he is a firm believer in the Mao-dictum, “Power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Thus, in the next decade, India could face China’s velvet-cloaked iron fist – such as the Depsang intrusion in April-May 2013.

Deng instituted the four-modernisations, which not only pulled China out of the morass that followed the Cultural Revolution, but also catapulted it to the status of a world-power in just twenty-odd years. While China’s galloping economy was transforming it into the manufacturing hub of the world, Deng advised ‘tanguang-yanghui’ – “Hide your strength and bide your time.” Hence, by September 2008, when the sub-prime crisis hit USA, China held the largest share of US sovereign debt – $618 billion. Sensing that the middle-kingdom’s rise was now unassailable, Hu Jintao shed ‘tanguang-yanghui’ and began flexing China’s diplomatic and military muscle.

China is the only nation to actually demonstrate anti-satellite weapon capability…

As China’s super-charged economy’s appetite for energy and mineral resources swelled, she extended her strategic frontiers in phases. First, China laid claim to the oil-rich continental shelf – the North Pacific adjacent to Japan and Russia, the Taiwan Straits, the East and South China Seas right up to the Strait of Malacca. Later, when China began exploiting the Dark Continent she cast her nets to include Middle East and Africa. In December 2008, a Chinese naval task force unilaterally sailed into the Indian Ocean for anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Rear Admiral Yin Zhou then proposed that the People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) set up a permanent base in the Gulf of Aden to support these operations. In January 2009, Huang Kunlun, writing in the Liberation Daily, articulated the theory of boundless national interests, “Wherever our national interests have extended so will the mission of our armed forces.” By April that year, during PLAN’s international fleet review, a Chinese Senior Admiral had a proposal for visiting US Admiral Keating, “Why don’t you take Hawaii East and we’ll take Hawaii West and the Indian Ocean?”

China’s Military Might

  • One of Deng’s four modernisations – that of the PLA was taken up as a national endeavour. Special emphasis was laid on developing its 2nd Artillery Forces and for the first time in Chinese history, also on transforming the PLAN into a blue water force. Accordingly, the military budget remained consistently above ten per cent of GDP for over three decades. As China’s economy raced to the world’s second spot, the PLA kept apace and emerged as a well-equipped, modern and formidable military in five dimensions – land, air, sea, space and cyber-space. While it is capable of facing up to the USA, the PLA has also developed a doctrine for ‘winning short duration local wars under high-tech conditions.’ China’s defence industry and technology has developed some remarkable weapon systems:On September 25, 2012, China commissioned its first indigenous, ultra-modern aircraft carrier, Liaoning.
  • The hull of China’s first Xia-class SSBN was laid in 1978, launched in 1981 and commissioned by 1983. Its second generation Jin-class SSBN, which was launched in 2004, carries 12×8,000km Jualang-2 SLBMs and poses a 24×7 strategic deterrent to the US and India. Four vessels are already in service and more could be deployed even as the development of its third-generation SSBN nears completion.
  • Development of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles – mini-subs to be used either for swarm-attacks or reconnaissance is at an advanced stage.
  • China has developed the world’s first hypersonic (Mach 10) anti-shipping ballistic missile, capable of targeting a moving aircraft carrier strike-group at long range.
  • China’s fifth-generation stealth fighter, the J-20, made its maiden flight on January 11, 2011, and is expected to be operational in 2017–2019.
  • China is the only nation to actually demonstrate anti-satellite weapon capability.

Modernisation of the Indian Army has made no headway, be it in artillery howitzers or replacement of obsolete air-defence systems.

Indian Strategic Muddle

In sharp contrast, Nehru’s total lack of strategic sense became apparent soon after independence when the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) General Lockhart, sought the Government’s approval for a defence directive. “We don’t need a defence plan. Our policy is ahimsa; we foresee no military threats,” he told the astonished General, “The police are adequate for our security.” Only weeks later, the Army had to be rushed in to save Kashmir. But Nehru remained unfazed. When the Army was on the verge of completely routing the Pakistani invaders from Jammu & Kashmir, he ordered a halt to operations and went to the UN instead thereby creating what has turned out to be a permanent security nightmare.

The British had striven to bolster Tibetan autonomy to reinforce the buffer with China. On November 07, 1950, Sardar Patel warned Nehru about China’s inimical intentions, barely a month after she had invaded Tibet. Ignoring Patel, Nehru conceded China’s suzerainty over Tibet. In January 1951, the Assam government received reports about Chinese armed incursions across the Tibetan border and requested the C-in-C, General Cariappa to staunch the threat. But Nehru chided him, “It is not the business of the C-in-C to tell the PM who is going to attack us where. In fact, the Chinese will defend our NEFA Frontier. You mind only Kashmir and Pakistan.” In 1952, he down-graded India Mission’s status at Lhasa to a Consulate-General and later withdrew military ‘escorts’ at the trade posts at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok. All this without seeking any reciprocity or assurances on the boundary!

Then, in a volte-face in July 1954, he ordered Secretary General MEA to reprint the British-era maps by excluding references to any ‘claim lines’ or undefined borders. These would now depict a clear Indo-Tibet boundary and become the basis for negotiating the boundary question. However, he did not consider it necessary to equip the Army for defence of these new-fashioned borders. Thus, India came to know about the road through Aksai Chin, 200 km within our area, only through an article in a Chinese magazine in 1957.

The neglect of the Armed Forces and their demoralisation under Krishna Menon’s acid tongue came to a head in 1959 with the resignation of General Thimayya – one of the saviours of Kashmir. A shaken Nehru sweet-talked the Gentleman General, appealed to his patriotic spirit and promised to correct all the wrongs, thus deceiving him into withdrawing the resignation. Next morning, he talked disparagingly of him in the Parliament.

In February 2013, the Chinese formally took over operations of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port…

In 1962, Nehru announced to the media that he had asked the Army ‘to throw the Chinese out!’ But the Army Chief was informed later, thereby completely marginalising the Services and triggering the 1962 debacle.

Indian Defence Forces: Apathy and Neglect

After a brief wake-up period during which India successfully withstood two Pakistani aggressions, for 35 years it was back to neglect of the Armed Forces with the defence budget languishing below two per cent of GDP – an eighth of Chinese allocations. The results are stark; a story of Babustani apathy and turf wars, missed deadlines and severe strategic disparities:

  • The Indian Navy, which needs a three-carrier fleet, is down to one – repeatedly-refitted senior-citizen, Viraat. The inordinately delayed induction of the ‘Gorshkov’, has forced Viraat into yet another extension, impairing the capability to protect our sea-lanes.
  • Arihant, India’s first generation nuclear submarine is yet to begin sea-trials. Weapon-trials will ensue and only then would the vessel become operational. Arihant will ultimately carry 12x700km SLBMs. Meanwhile, even the conventional submarine programme has been asphyxiated. Today, we are at two-thirds the submarine-strength sanctioned in 1985, while Chinese capability has made quantum strides.
  • The Indian Air Force (IAF) is down to 31 squadrons and its transport fleet whittled to 40 per cent. This will shrink to 28 squadrons since negotiations are still on for the ten-billion dollar contract for 126 Rafale fourth-generation combat aircraft, first proposed by the IAF in 2001. Hence the aircraft is unlikely to be operationalised for at least another decade. As regards the fifth-generation fighter, the contract for joint development with Russia is yet to be signed.
  • In a replay of the 1959 humiliation of General Thimayya, MoD’s ham-handed dealing of a personal matter compelled the COAS, General VK Singh to approach the Supreme Court in 2012. Then, attempting to embarrass him, the bureaucracy leaked his top secret letter drawing the PM’s attention to appalling deficiencies and obsolescence in the Army’s in-service arsenal. The leak blew the lid off the Government’s neglect of the force and caused a nation-wide furore. Immediate fire-fighting meetings were called by the Minister of Defence to give the impression that long-delayed action was finally being taken. However, one year later the actual state has only deteriorated further.

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  • Modernisation of the Indian Army has made no headway, be it in the regime of artillery, air-defence systems, night fighting capability or attack helicopters to name just very few of the long list of proposals languishing under Babustan’s strangulation.
  • While China has developed first-class infrastructure in Tibet, Babustan has held-up 57 of 73 strategic roads due for completion by 2012-2013 conceding China a major advantage. The Government is belatedly thinking about removing these hurdles.

The Dragon’s Game Plan

China’s string-of-pearls is designed to choke India’s sea-lanes through the Indian Ocean…

The Dragon has adapted the ancient strategy of t’an shih against India. This strategy strives to achieve long-term goals in thousands of patient slices. Each cut is calibrated to provoke only a minor reaction – more like termites rather than a fire-breathing dragon! This game has been active for over fifty years and gained momentum after Hu took charge and discarded Deng’s advice to remain turret down. The strategy has worked at several levels as elaborated on in the succeeding paragraphs.

Internal Dissension

A Chinese think-tank recently advocated what China has been doing for the last sixty years – fragmenting India by stoking internal dissensions. To cloak her role, she has roped in Pakistan, Myanmar and Nepal to do the actual dirty work. Pakistan’s ISI funnels Chinese munitions and materiel to the Naxals through Nepal. China sympathisers in India in the government, media and academia, support Beijing’s moves like CPM’s support to China in 1962!

The Pakistan Card

To tie India to South Asia, China has armed and supported Pakistan including with nuclear weapons and missile technology. In further defiance of international non-proliferation norms, China has recently decided to build a 1000MW nuclear power plant in Pakistan. This will provide Pakistan with plutonium for its tactical nukes with which it hopes to stymie Indian conventional superiority; somewhat akin to the NATO versus Warsaw Pact scenario.

Seaward Squeeze

China’s string-of-pearls is designed to choke India’s sea-lanes while securing the passage of oil and other natural resources through the Indian Ocean. In February 2013, the China formally took over operations of Gwadar Port in Pakistan located at the entrance to the Gulf of Hormuz. China has virtually pushed India out of Sri Lanka and is set to unveil its carrier-capable Hambantota Port. Bangladesh is next on their radar. India’s efforts to prevent Chinese expansion by reaching out to these two traditional friends have been nullified by sub-regional ‘netas’ whose massive egos and self-interests dwarf those of Bharat Mata. Myanmar has already provided facilities to the PLAN for a Maritime Army and airbase at Coco Islands enabling Chinese submarines to operate close to Indian waters.

The Chinese have built a four-lane concrete highway through Eastern Nepal terminating just a few kilometres from the Siliguri corridor…

Siege of Land Frontiers

China has also successfully besieged India along its land frontiers. The Quinghai-Lhasa railway, which came up after a monumental 22-year effort, facilitated unprecedented infrastructure development in Tibet – highways, airports and military bases. China then wrested Nepal from India’s orbit and plans to extend the railway from Lhasa to Yadong and Zhangmu on two flanks of the Nepalese border. In addition to the Lhasa-Kathmandu road link, the Chinese have built a four-lane concrete highway through Eastern Nepal terminating just a few kilometres from the Siliguri corridor.

During his visit to Islamabad in May 2013, the Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang reiterated the plan to build the China-Pakistan Economic road-cum-rail corridor (Gwadar – Gilgit/Baltistan onto Xinjiang) for which a Chinese division is reportedly located in this restive region.

To the East, exploiting their military dominance over India, China has escalated the depth and frequency of border intrusions – the latest being the 23-km intrusion into the Depsang plateau.

Recently, Chengdu Military Region conducted three major exercises close to the Indo-Tibet border during which its latest fighters validated the use of high altitude airfields in Tibet and Xinjiang.

China has taken control of major Indian rivers originating in Tibet. Zangmu Hydropower Station harnesses the Brahmaputra with five planned dams. The Sutlej has been dammed at Parechu and Indus at Senge-Ali. Since India currently lacks the capability intervene effectively, China has a virtual stranglehold over North Indian rivers.

In 1986, India’s prompt military response and rare political resolve induced China to soften its stand.

Diplomatic Manoeuvres

Similar to the gradual slices into India’s land frontiers, Beijing’s diplomatic stance too has made steady inroads into issues of core concerns of India as outlined below.

Package Proposal

In 1960, Zhou Enlai proposed that China was ready to accept the Indian boundary alignment in the East, if India reciprocated in the West. In 1981, after both sides had tried to normalise relations, Deng once again made a similar informal proposal to a visiting Indian Member of Parliament. This time, he added that it would be on the basis of actual control of the borders. India felt that the proposal amounted to legitimising Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin in return for their acceptance of what is already legally in India’s possession. Hence India proposed a sector-by-sector examination of historical records. Thereafter, the Chinese hardened their overall stance.

Tawang Tract

In 1985, Chinese negotiators claimed the Tawang tract South of McMahon line. In 1986 Li Shuquing, Vice Foreign Minister (FM) stated, “The Eastern sector is the biggest dispute and key to the overall situation.” Two years later, Vice Prime Minister Wu Xuequian indicated that India would need to make concessions in the East.

Sumdorong Chu

In 1986, the Chinese intruded across the McMahon Line near Sumdorong Chu. Indian forces moved swiftly and occupied the heights dominating the Chinese positions. Deng Xiaoping warned that China would have to “teach India a lesson” if it did not pull back but Delhi held firm. India’s prompt military response and rare political resolve induced China to soften its stand. A beaming Deng Xiaoping then received the Indian Prime Minister in Beijing in December 1988. The conciliatory approach culminated in Wen Jiabao’s visit in 2005, which was the first ‘Strategic Dialogue’ in the Sino-Indian context. Both sides agreed that a holistic view for a political settlement was the answer to the boundary question. The nitty-gritty technical approach was shed and the Joint Statement agreed that ‘in reaching a boundary settlement the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations…’ India interpreted this to mean that populated border areas would remain with their present nations.

Self-reliance in defence modernisation must be achieved by opening up the sector to Indian industry and foreign tie-ups…

Hu Jintao’s Visit

By 2006, Hu Jintao reckoned that Chinese dominance over India was now secure. Hence, weeks before his Delhi visit, Sun Yuxi the Chinese envoy in Delhi, claimed “…the whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. And Tawang is only one of the places in it. We are claiming all of that. That is our position.” Consequently, the visit ended in banalities, with only vague assurances that various irritants raised by the Indian PM would be looked into.

Intervention in the J&K Issue

During the Hu-Obama summit at Pittsburgh in September 2009, Hu proposed that the, “two countries should push for a proper resolution to regional issues in Korea, Iran and South Asia.” Later that year, prior to the Hu-Obama Beijing summit, the Chinese Vice FM announced China’s willingness to mediate between India and Pakistan, if requested. Hurriyat’s Mirwaiz promptly welcomed China’s role in settling the Kashmir issue, revealing Sino-Pak-Hurriyat collusion. In Dec 2010, Chinese Assistant FM, Hu Zhengyue, while briefing the Beijing press corps ahead of Wen Jiabao’s Delhi visit, lopped off 2,057 km from the 4,057 Indo-Tibet boundary thereby implying that the Tibet-J&K portion did not form part of this border. China had maintained strict neutrality on the Jammu & Kashmir issue right up to the 1999 Kargil War. Hence, this represented a tectonic pro-Pak shift in their position. But it went unchallenged by India. Thus encouraged, the Dragon next established a major presence in Shia-dominated Gilgit-Baltistan.

Li Keqiang Visit

Following the established pattern of previous visits, a controversy was created prior to PM Li Keqiang’s visit. In May 2013, Chinese troops intruded 23km across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to set up a tented camp on the Depsang Plateau. Although they withdrew after some hectic parleys, manoeuvres and unstated Indian concessions, the aim behind the blatant intrusion remains a matter of speculation. If one of the aims was to gauge how far India could be pushed to concede ground in Ladakh, they must have been well satisfied when Salman Khurshid likened the intrusion to acne, thereby discrediting India’s stand regarding the LAC. However, going by established patterns, their larger aim could well be to gradually gobble up the entire DBO sector up to the Karakoram then seize the Karakoram Pass for the Gwadar-Xinjiang Economic Corridor.

Our responses to the Dragon’s game plan also need an iron fist in a velvet glove…

Conclusion

India needs to take cognisance of the Dragon’s game plan and adopt concrete countermeasures. Foremost is the need to formulate a strategic vision on dealing with an aggressive Dragon. A review of moves by China in the past reveals that she has always respected India’s firm resolve while taking full advantage of every vacillation. The Indian security establishment therefore needs to cultivate the courage to be resolute, duly synergised with military credibility and assessments. India need to identify ‘red lines’ and share them with the three Services together with clear policies to deal with situations whenever such ‘red lines’ become at risk.

Creation of military credibility requires the defence budget for India to at least be doubled to four to five per cent of GDP. Most importantly, a financially empowered group, including representatives from the Services must be made accountable for taking all security-related decisions within weeks rather than decades, as at present. Inter-departmental turf-wars must also be eliminated. For example, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) guarding the LAC reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and its radio equipment is incompatible with that of the Indian Army. Yet, whenever a significant ‘incident’ occurs, the Indian Army has to be called in. This is a recipe for disaster and must be streamlined in national interest.

Current gaps in India’s conventional and strategic capability, particularly the delay in the operationalisation of the Agni-V missile capable of covering China and the third leg of the triad, have opened a window of vulnerability, which we must endeavour to close as quickly as possible. Therefore, self-reliance in defence modernisation must be achieved as quickly as possible by opening up the sector to the Indian industry in the private sector and foreign collaboration with suitably enhanced FDI.

The answer to the ‘string-of-pearls’ lies in creating a pair of golden fetters – the Southern fetter comprising the Quadrilateral of Democracies and other Indo-Pacific nations – an arc from Singapore to the Kurile Islands is already in place but it needs robust reiteration. This should be complemented on the Asian mainland by a chain of friendly land-powers – Russia, Mongolia, Central Asian Republics and Iran. India should promote strong, multi-dimensional ties with these nations. In addition, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka must be weaned away from Beijing’s embrace. Obstacles created by sub-regional ‘netas’ must be tackled by the national leadership by moulding patriotic public opinion to support national strategy rather than being held hostage to parochial hysteria.

Over the past decades we have constantly tried to mollify the Dragon. In the bargain, we have been inveigled into surrendering our bargaining chips one by one. Therefore, we should now strive to reverse some of this damage. Just as the Chinese have several times changed their stance on Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Jammu & Kashmir, we too must subtly pull back from our commitment to the ‘One-China’ principle, support Tibetan autonomy and the Uyghur’s’ struggle for religious freedom. Taking a leaf from the Dragon’s book, this shift should be gradual and subtle – over years rather than months. Likewise, India should underline historical links with the Minsar Principality around Mount Kailas, which dates back to antiquity. This area is the fountainhead of rivers flowing into the North and North-Eastern Indian plains. Further, in view of Chinese dams on the Indus, Chenab and Brahmaputra, India should negotiate Indian presence on these sites for flood control. For all this, India would obviously need credible military strength, specifically the ability to intervene in Tibet.

http://www.lancerpublishers.com/catalog/product_info.php?products_id=1345The newly-installed Chinese leadership believes in Mao’s dictum, “power grows out of the barrel of a gun”. Hence, Indian response to the Dragon’s game plan also needs an iron fist in a velvet glove.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Maj Gen Pushpendra Singh

Maj Gen Pushpendra Singh, former GOC, MPB&O Area.

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One thought on “Decoding the Dragon’s Game Plan

  1. The only decoding needed is to build up India’s offensive capabilities for facing off both China and Pakistan should they make a move. Nothing less will create any political or policy advantage for India. What China thinks and does will be in the interest of China and not India. China will continue to play with India like a bully plays with weaklings in the street he lives. The only guilty party for this sorry state of affairs is the current UPA government.

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