Indian Defence Review

 How to deal with China has been a problem for the Indian diplomacy from the day the People’s Liberation Army entered Eastern Tibet in October 1950. South Block (both the Ministry of External Affairs and Defence) has often been on the wrong side of history, especially during the bhai-bhai era. What can be done to give a fresh impetus to India’s engagement with Beijing, while dealing in a more appropriate way with China?

How to deal with China has been a problem for the Indian diplomacy from the day the People’s Liberation Army entered Eastern Tibet in October 1950. South Block (both the Ministry of External Affairs and Defence) has often been on the wrong side of history, especially during the bhai-bhai era. What can be done to give a fresh impetus to India’s engagement with Beijing, while dealing in a more appropriate way with China?

China, An Aggressive Nation

On May 30, The People’s Daily reported that Fu Ying, the Chairperson of the National People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, suggested during a TV show that, “all issues in the seas around China were caused by the provocative behavior demonstrated by China’s neighboring countries.” She, of course, mentioned that Japan, “faces the question of whether it will continue on the path of being a peaceful nation or not.” To put the problem on the neighbour is always the easy way. Fu added that China will not give up on peaceful solutions, “however, strong responses are necessary when facing challenges. This position is also needed to maintain the peaceful and stable order in the entire region.”

India too will have to cope with these strong ‘peaceful’ deeds from Beijing. Fu concluded that, “the position the United States takes on these regional issues will ultimately dictate how the Chinese people view the US and its allies.” These are Beijing’s views.

For Delhi, the principle should be the same when it deals with China; it should ultimately depend on how Beijing behaves with India, particularly on the border and economic issues.

Calling A Spade, A Spade

In the midst of the campaign for the 16th Lok Sabha, a friend asked me, “In your opinion, how should the forthcoming government deal with China?” My answer was, first of all, let us see who the PM will choose to look after Defence and External Affairs and who the next NSA will be.

These were indeed crucial choices and India’s relations with China (and the rest of the world) were linked to this choice. After the nomination of Arun Jaitley, Sushma Swaraj and Ajit Doval, one can presume that these important posts are in good hands; this will certainly make a huge difference. Specifically for China, whoever deals with Beijing needs to have the courage to be frank and straightforward; India should not be scared to ‘hurt China’s sensitivities’ especially when India’s interests are at stake.

In this context, it is interesting to look at the US-China relations. Last month, when the US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited Beijing; Xinhua remarked that Hagel “may well feel after wrapping up his four-day visit to China that Beijing has become more frank with Washington and less hesitant to voice its dissatisfaction with some US moves.” If it is the case, India should learn from China. During Hagel’s visit, several encounters were reported to have been ‘tough’.

A few weeks later, General Fan Changlong, China’s senior Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, while in Washington told Hagel during a joint press conference that the Chinese people, including himself, were dissatisfied with some remarks made by Hagel in Tokyo; Xinhua added: “[Fan’s] unusual harsh tone delivers a clear message: Beijing is resolved to defend its core interests, particularly territorial sovereignty, and will not allow any country to make waves.” Frankness should not be confined to the rooms of Zhongnanhai or South Block, but should be shared with the press and the public. It is something Delhi has never done.

During the Shangrila Dialogue held at Singapore between May 30 and June 01, Wang Guanzhong, the People’s Liberation Army Deputy Chief of General Staff, fiercely defended China’s position in front of the regional defence heads, stating that, “China only responded to conflicts over sovereignty disputes and was never the instigator.” Wang affirmed, “Abe and Hagel’s speeches gave me a feeling that they were singing a duet.”

Interestingly, Wang added that Abe’s speech was full of indirect criticisms of China while Hagel was more direct. “I would prefer Hagel’s approach; if you have anything to say, say it directly.” It is something that the Indian diplomats and politicians have always found it difficult to do: to call a spade a spade. Remember Depsang Plains, a year ago.

Xinhua further explained, “The frankness is expected to reduce the possibility of miscalculation by other countries when they gauge China’s red lines, and consequently reduce rashness in their China policy-making.”

The Indian government, if it wants to deal on an equal footing with China, will have to be frank, straightforward and transparent …and be able to draw ‘red lines’ for India. To take a concrete example, why can’t Delhi openly tell Beijing, “If you are sincere in finding a solution for the border dispute, why can’t you put the maps of your perceived LAC on the table? We are ready to put ours.” Or else, “Please define, what are your historic ownership rights on the Depsang Plains or on Chumur in Ladakh? Why has your perceived LAC moved so much since 1959?” Such questions should be asked frankly and the answers made public.

To take again the example of the US-China relations, Xinhua affirmed, “Regardless of disagreements in various fields, both Beijing and Washington clearly know they are friends, not enemies, and a healthy US-China relationship is a sine qua non for world peace and stability.” Well, whether friends or foes, India and China too should openly voice their differences and let the public know about it. To keep differences under the carpet has always been to Beijing’s advantage. Openness and transparency are probably the best ways to dismiss unsustainable Chinese claims on the Sino-Indian border.

Xinhua concludes, “If hard-nosed politicians in Washington can understand Beijing’s frankness and resolve better, China-US ties will be more stable and the Asia-Pacific region will be more peaceful.” The ‘hard-nosed’ leaders in Beijing will understand Delhi better, if the Indian officials can speak in a straight manner, forgetting forever the emotions of the Panchsheel days. And the Indian public, which is mature enough, should definitely be taken into confidence.

A New Tibet Policy

The tragic 1950 events in Tibet should have triggered a chain of reactions which could have resulted in a well-defined Tibet (and China) Policy. It was not to be the case. In India, the demise of Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister who had a pragmatic view on several security issues, particularly on the Indian borders, cut short the drafting of such a policy. Thereafter, ad hocism prevailed with disastrous consequences still visible more than 60 years later.

During October and November 1950, India had the choice between two directions – either to bend with the ‘East Wind’ and ally with China or stand and defend her own interests. The letter from Patel to Nehru, which could be considered his political testament, was resolutely in favour of the second path.

What probably started the exploration for a Tibet Policy was a report of Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the General Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth. We know of the report’s existence only through a letter that Patel wrote to Bajpai on November 04, 1950. The Deputy Prime Minister tells Bajpai, “The Chinese advance into Tibet upsets all our security calculations. Hitherto, the danger to India on its land frontiers has always come from the North-West. Throughout history we have concentrated our armed might in that region. For the first time, a serious danger is now developing on the North and North-East side; at the same time, our danger from the West or North-West is in no way lessened. This creates most embarrassing defense problems and I entirely agree with you that a reconsideration of our military position and a redisposition of our forces are inescapable.” A few days later, Patel send his well-known letter to Jawaharlal Nehru. The clarity of Patel’s perception and the strategic implications of Tibet’s invasion for India were masterfully outlined.

Six months later, as a first direct consequence of the Government of India’s policy of non-interference, a 17-Point Agreement was forced ‘under duress’ on the Tibetans. The first consequence was that the Indo-Tibetan border in the Western and Eastern sector became the Indo-Chinese border. I recently came across a bunch of old ‘personal’ letters written by some Indian officers posted on the frontiers in the early 1950s. These missives are heart-rending. In December 1950, a few weeks after the PLA entered Tibet, Harishwar Dayal, a senior ICS officer and distinguished diplomat, then posted in Gangtok as Political Officer responsible for Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan, while discussing the Chinese advance towards the McMahon Line with his Indian Trade Agent (ITA) in Gyantse, informed the latter of Sardar Patel’s death, “It is a heavy blow. He was the one person in this Government who had strong realistic view of things, including on foreign relations. Now, we are left at the mercy of the visionaries.” The new government should emulate the pragmatic Patel, not the Nehruvian ‘visionaries’. Does Delhi have a Tibet Policy today? The answer is no. A Tibet Policy should also be a policy for the border areas.

While India has been sleeping, the Chinese have not. Later this year, the train will reach Shigatse (not far from the Chumbi Valley) and China will then continue the line towards Nyingchi Prefecture, North of the Indo-Tibet border. It is not only the train but a four-way road is also under construction. On June 05, 2014, Xinhua reported, “As a main trunk connecting a dozen of key highways in Tibet, Lhasa-Nyingchi Highway bears great significance in building a flexible traffic network covering China’s border provinces as well as upgrading China’s national defence capacity.” It is interesting that the ‘defence capacity’ is mentioned; Xinhua is usually silent on this subject; it is certainly a warning to the Indian Prime Minister who announced his determination to build roads to the borders.

One has to see the recent visit of Prime Minister Modi to Bhutan in this perspective. The new Government should see the Himalayas as one; culturally, environmentally and strategically, the great mountain barrier is one entity. The first step for the new Government is to reinforce India’s defence, while taking along local populations in the mainstream.

Union Minister for Environment, Forests and Climate Change Prakash Javadekar already announced that his Ministry was working on a policy for fast-track green clearance for border roads and defence projects up to 100km from the LAC. A quicker environmental clearance would also give an appreciable boost to India’s newly-created Mountain Strike Corps at a time when several parts of the scheme are blocked. The Indian Express reported that, “close to 80 critical border roads have been stuck for many years due to environmental hurdles. These include crucial GS (General Staff) roads that link border outposts and camps to the main road head. In all, around 6,000km of critical road stretches which were stuck can now be expedited.”

The launch of the Agni-V long range missile adds to the deterrence. It has already made Chinese policy makers ponder. The People’s Daily stated that it reflects India’s, “intention of seeking regional balance of power”. If Beijing wants again to ‘teach a lesson’ to India, it will indeed be a Himalayan task, and what will Beijing gain in the bargain?

The Relation Between Tibet And The Himalayan States

This relation, which for centuries has been vital to India, deteriorated at the end of the 1950s, with the uprising in Lhasa in March 1959 and the consequent flight of the Dalai Lama to India. Thereafter, the Chinese tightened their grip on the Tibetan plateau; this was a tragedy for India’s defence and the Himalayan economy. For centuries, the high passes have been the bridge between India and the Tibetan plateau; both shared a common spiritual search. All this changed in October 1950, when the Chinese troops entered Tibet.

Amongst other measures, the Modi Government should encourage civilian settlements in the border areas. The Indian State should reach each and every pass and bring the basic facilities to the border populations; for this purpose, the infrastructure should be strengthened, it will also enable a stronger defence of the Indian territory.

The Himalayan Populations

For this, it is crucial for India to have the support of the local population in Uttarakhand, Arunachal and Ladakh. In 1962, some villages fully supported the invading Chinese troops. How else could the PLA have built a road from Bumla, the border pass, to Tawang in 18 days? It is not difficult to imagine the staggering amount of accurate intelligence required for this feat. It is clear that China cannot militarily ‘take back’ Tawang. Today, the PLA could at the most occupy a few ‘disputed pockets’ like Samdorong Chu valley, North of Tawang or Demchok in Ladakh, but in the process, Beijing would lose India’s present goodwill and the international respect it earns with its ‘peaceful rise’ policy as well as its integration into the world scene as a responsible State.

Further, it should not be difficult for India to eventually get logistic support from inside Tibet or even in an extreme case, organise a civil disobedience movement in Tibet. Let us not forget that an alien PLA has already to deal with a resentful local population on the Tibetan plateau. The recent immolations of monks and nuns in Eastern Tibet are a proof of this.

Bhoti Language

One measure which could help reinforce the cohesion between Himalayan is the language, man’s best medium of communication and also a reflection of history, culture, religion and politics of a nation or a region. One of the richest and less known languages of India is the Bhoti language. It is widely used not only in Ladakh, Kinnaur, Lahul, Spiti, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh but also in Bhutan, Nepal and Baltistan. Using the same scripts, Bhoti language is closely linked with Tibetan.

Bhoti is the language of the Buddhists of the Himalayan belt. It is the language of the pundits, scholars and saints who criss-crossed the Himalayas generations after generations. It is also the language for the Himalayans people struggling to preserve their identity in a global world. In the same way that Himalayan medicine, Sowa Rigpa, has been acknowledged by the Government of India as one of the indigenous systems of medicine, Bhoti language should be recognised as one of the Indian languages. The time has come to introduce a bill for its inclusion in the Eighth Schedule of Indian constitution. It will go a long way to acknowledge the century-old link between the people of the Himalayan belt and Tibet.

Some Confidence Building Measures

While India is getting stronger and better prepared, some Confidence Building Measures can be discussed with Beijing.

Border Trade: Reopening the Tibet Border

One is reopening the passes, and thereafter, the trade between the Himalayas and Tibet. The process has started, though it is slow.

In 1988, a Protocol for Resumption of Border Trade was signed between India and China; in 1991, a Memorandum on Resumption of Border Trade was agreed by the two countries; it was followed in 1992 by a Protocol on Customs Regulation, Banking Arrangements and Related matters for Border Trade, and a Protocol on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade and finally another for Extension of Border Trade across Shipki La Pass, 1993. The Memorandum between India and China on the Resumption of Border Trade, signed in 1991, stated that both sides have agreed to resume border trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

In the first phase, the border trade referred to overland trade and the exchange of commodities by the residents along the border between the Tibet Autonomous Region of China and the (then) State of Uttar Pradesh; later the facilities were extended to Shipki-la in Himachal Pradesh (1994) and Nathu-la in Sikkim. In 2006, India and China signed a historic agreement to resume border trade through the strategic Nathu La. It had been closed for the past 44 years. The move had also a strategic implication as analysts believe that it signaled Beijing’s implicit recognition of Sikkim as part of India. This is debatable.

The agreement allows residents living on the border areas of the two countries to trade some 29 items mentioned in the border trade agreements of 1991 and 1992 as well as 2003. Border trade remains rather small in volume, but should considerably increase to play a significant role in enhancing bilateral trade and economic cooperation. If less restricted, in terms of items to be traded and licensees allowed to trade, it could contribute to generate opportunities for the export of the commodities across the bordering provinces/states of the two countries. In the future more land ports should be reopened, for example in Ladakh (Demchok), in Arunachal Pradesh (Kibithu) or Uttarakhand (Mana).

Pilgrimage

The Panchsheel Agreement mentions that as both India and China were, “desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India…pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhists faiths may visit the Kailash and Manasarovar Lakes while pilgrims from Tibet may visit Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi.” Today, the immediate need is to open a new route for the Kailash-Manasarovar yatra. Demchok should be easier than the present one through Uttarakhand. Unfortunately, the Chinese side seems overcautious about the project.

In a longer term, if the security risks can be sorted out, pilgrimage such as the old Tsari pilgrimage around the Dakpa Sheri, the Pure Crystal Mountain in Tsari region of Southern Tibet could be reopened for the Buddhist populations of Arunachal Pradesh and the Tibetan Autonomous Region. It would, of course, raise the problem of visas as the Chinese authorities still claim the Indian State as part of ‘Southern Tibet’. A special agreement would be required for this pilgrimage which occurs every 12 years, as part of it is located south of the LAC. However, if allowed, the sacred yatra could greatly help to ‘soften’ the border.

A Greater Trans-Himalayan Cooperation

There are different fields through which the Himalayans have a deeper and closer cooperation with the ‘Tibet world’. One of them is Tibetan medicine. In August 2010, the Indian Parliament officially recognised the Tibetan system of medicine, known as Sowa Rigpa. The Parliament adopted a bill to add the Sowa Rigpa system of medicine practiced in sub-Himalayan region, as one of the Indian systems. The Sowa-Rigpa system of medicine is practiced in Himalayan belt and other parts of the country besides Nepal, Tibet, Baltistan, Mongolia and Japan. The practice and research in this field should be further supported. Regular exchanges between the Sowa Rigpa practitioners in the Himalayan belt and Tibet could be one day organised.

Diplomatic Contacts Between Dharamsala and Delhi

A few years ago, the diplomatic contacts between Dharamsala and Delhi were enhanced when the post of the Dalai Lama’s Liaison Officer (an officer of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs) was upgraded to the rank of Director and a post of Deputy Liaison Officer was created. In the recent years, successive Foreign Secretaries have visited Dharamsala and called not only on the Dalai Lama but also on the Kalon Tripa/Sikyong (Prime Minister) – the elected head of the Central Tibetan Administration.

However, there is still a feeling that ‘we should not upset the Chinese’ and often ministers are reticent to meet the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) officials. In step in the right direction is the invitation to the political head of the CTA for the swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Cabinet. The Chinese ambassador in India was not happy. He protested on the spot and later sent a demarche complaining about the invitation to Lobsang Sangay at the swearing-in function as a guest of the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Incidentally, the Taiwan trade representative (read ambassador) was given a seat in the diplomatic enclosure further infuriating Ambassador Wei-Wei. The Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had to rush to get an assurance from Delhi that India continued adhering to her ‘One-China’ policy. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj eventually reiterated the Indian policy but the message had passed that India too had cards in her hands. Further, India should continue to insist to reopen its Consulate General in Lhasa. It would be an important step to restore the traditional relations. Why can Nepal have a Consulate in Lhasa and not India? Has Nepal had closer contacts with Tibet than India?

These are some of the measures which could be implemented without antagonising the Chinese. In fact, it could be a win-win situation for India, the Himalayan populations and Beijing too. Tensions on the border are good for nobody.