Indian Defence Review

 How to deal with China has been a problem for the Indian diplomacy from the day the People’s Liberation Army entered Eastern Tibet in October 1950. South Block (both the Ministry of External Affairs and Defence) has often been on the wrong side of history, especially during the bhai-bhai era. What can be done to give a fresh impetus to India’s engagement with Beijing, while dealing in a more appropriate way with China?

How to deal with China has been a problem for the Indian diplomacy from the day the People’s Liberation Army entered Eastern Tibet in October 1950. South Block (both the Ministry of External Affairs and Defence) has often been on the wrong side of history, especially during the bhai-bhai era. What can be done to give a fresh impetus to India’s engagement with Beijing, while dealing in a more appropriate way with China?

China, An Aggressive Nation

On May 30, The People’s Daily reported that Fu Ying, the Chairperson of the National People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, suggested during a TV show that, “all issues in the seas around China were caused by the provocative behavior demonstrated by China’s neighboring countries.” She, of course, mentioned that Japan, “faces the question of whether it will continue on the path of being a peaceful nation or not.” To put the problem on the neighbour is always the easy way. Fu added that China will not give up on peaceful solutions, “however, strong responses are necessary when facing challenges. This position is also needed to maintain the peaceful and stable order in the entire region.”

India too will have to cope with these strong ‘peaceful’ deeds from Beijing. Fu concluded that, “the position the United States takes on these regional issues will ultimately dictate how the Chinese people view the US and its allies.” These are Beijing’s views.

For Delhi, the principle should be the same when it deals with China; it should ultimately depend on how Beijing behaves with India, particularly on the border and economic issues.

Calling A Spade, A Spade

In the midst of the campaign for the 16th Lok Sabha, a friend asked me, “In your opinion, how should the forthcoming government deal with China?” My answer was, first of all, let us see who the PM will choose to look after Defence and External Affairs and who the next NSA will be.

These were indeed crucial choices and India’s relations with China (and the rest of the world) were linked to this choice. After the nomination of Arun Jaitley, Sushma Swaraj and Ajit Doval, one can presume that these important posts are in good hands; this will certainly make a huge difference. Specifically for China, whoever deals with Beijing needs to have the courage to be frank and straightforward; India should not be scared to ‘hurt China’s sensitivities’ especially when India’s interests are at stake.

In this context, it is interesting to look at the US-China relations. Last month, when the US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited Beijing; Xinhua remarked that Hagel “may well feel after wrapping up his four-day visit to China that Beijing has become more frank with Washington and less hesitant to voice its dissatisfaction with some US moves.” If it is the case, India should learn from China. During Hagel’s visit, several encounters were reported to have been ‘tough’.

A few weeks later, General Fan Changlong, China’s senior Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, while in Washington told Hagel during a joint press conference that the Chinese people, including himself, were dissatisfied with some remarks made by Hagel in Tokyo; Xinhua added: “[Fan’s] unusual harsh tone delivers a clear message: Beijing is resolved to defend its core interests, particularly territorial sovereignty, and will not allow any country to make waves.” Frankness should not be confined to the rooms of Zhongnanhai or South Block, but should be shared with the press and the public. It is something Delhi has never done.

During the Shangrila Dialogue held at Singapore between May 30 and June 01, Wang Guanzhong, the People’s Liberation Army Deputy Chief of General Staff, fiercely defended China’s position in front of the regional defence heads, stating that, “China only responded to conflicts over sovereignty disputes and was never the instigator.” Wang affirmed, “Abe and Hagel’s speeches gave me a feeling that they were singing a duet.”

Interestingly, Wang added that Abe’s speech was full of indirect criticisms of China while Hagel was more direct. “I would prefer Hagel’s approach; if you have anything to say, say it directly.” It is something that the Indian diplomats and politicians have always found it difficult to do: to call a spade a spade. Remember Depsang Plains, a year ago.

Xinhua further explained, “The frankness is expected to reduce the possibility of miscalculation by other countries when they gauge China’s red lines, and consequently reduce rashness in their China policy-making.”

The Indian government, if it wants to deal on an equal footing with China, will have to be frank, straightforward and transparent …and be able to draw ‘red lines’ for India. To take a concrete example, why can’t Delhi openly tell Beijing, “If you are sincere in finding a solution for the border dispute, why can’t you put the maps of your perceived LAC on the table? We are ready to put ours.” Or else, “Please define, what are your historic ownership rights on the Depsang Plains or on Chumur in Ladakh? Why has your perceived LAC moved so much since 1959?” Such questions should be asked frankly and the answers made public.

To take again the example of the US-China relations, Xinhua affirmed, “Regardless of disagreements in various fields, both Beijing and Washington clearly know they are friends, not enemies, and a healthy US-China relationship is a sine qua non for world peace and stability.” Well, whether friends or foes, India and China too should openly voice their differences and let the public know about it. To keep differences under the carpet has always been to Beijing’s advantage. Openness and transparency are probably the best ways to dismiss unsustainable Chinese claims on the Sino-Indian border.

Xinhua concludes, “If hard-nosed politicians in Washington can understand Beijing’s frankness and resolve better, China-US ties will be more stable and the Asia-Pacific region will be more peaceful.” The ‘hard-nosed’ leaders in Beijing will understand Delhi better, if the Indian officials can speak in a straight manner, forgetting forever the emotions of the Panchsheel days. And the Indian public, which is mature enough, should definitely be taken into confidence.

A New Tibet Policy

The tragic 1950 events in Tibet should have triggered a chain of reactions which could have resulted in a well-defined Tibet (and China) Policy. It was not to be the case. In India, the demise of Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister who had a pragmatic view on several security issues, particularly on the Indian borders, cut short the drafting of such a policy. Thereafter, ad hocism prevailed with disastrous consequences still visible more than 60 years later.

During October and November 1950, India had the choice between two directions – either to bend with the ‘East Wind’ and ally with China or stand and defend her own interests. The letter from Patel to Nehru, which could be considered his political testament, was resolutely in favour of the second path.

What probably started the exploration for a Tibet Policy was a report of Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the General Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth. We know of the report’s existence only through a letter that Patel wrote to Bajpai on November 04, 1950. The Deputy Prime Minister tells Bajpai, “The Chinese advance into Tibet upsets all our security calculations. Hitherto, the danger to India on its land frontiers has always come from the North-West. Throughout history we have concentrated our armed might in that region. For the first time, a serious danger is now developing on the North and North-East side; at the same time, our danger from the West or North-West is in no way lessened. This creates most embarrassing defense problems and I entirely agree with you that a reconsideration of our military position and a redisposition of our forces are inescapable.” A few days later, Patel send his well-known letter to Jawaharlal Nehru. The clarity of Patel’s perception and the strategic implications of Tibet’s invasion for India were masterfully outlined.

Six months later, as a first direct consequence of the Government of India’s policy of non-interference, a 17-Point Agreement was forced ‘under duress’ on the Tibetans. The first consequence was that the Indo-Tibetan border in the Western and Eastern sector became the Indo-Chinese border. I recently came across a bunch of old ‘personal’ letters written by some Indian officers posted on the frontiers in the early 1950s. These missives are heart-rending. In December 1950, a few weeks after the PLA entered Tibet, Harishwar Dayal, a senior ICS officer and distinguished diplomat, then posted in Gangtok as Political Officer responsible for Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan, while discussing the Chinese advance towards the McMahon Line with his Indian Trade Agent (ITA) in Gyantse, informed the latter of Sardar Patel’s death, “It is a heavy blow. He was the one person in this Government who had strong realistic view of things, including on foreign relations. Now, we are left at the mercy of the visionaries.” The new government should emulate the pragmatic Patel, not the Nehruvian ‘visionaries’. Does Delhi have a Tibet Policy today? The answer is no. A Tibet Policy should also be a policy for the border areas.

While India has been sleeping, the Chinese have not. Later this year, the train will reach Shigatse (not far from the Chumbi Valley) and China will then continue the line towards Nyingchi Prefecture, North of the Indo-Tibet border. It is not only the train but a four-way road is also under construction. On June 05, 2014, Xinhua reported, “As a main trunk connecting a dozen of key highways in Tibet, Lhasa-Nyingchi Highway bears great significance in building a flexible traffic network covering China’s border provinces as well as upgrading China’s national defence capacity.” It is interesting that the ‘defence capacity’ is mentioned; Xinhua is usually silent on this subject; it is certainly a warning to the Indian Prime Minister who announced his determination to build roads to the borders.

One has to see the recent visit of Prime Minister Modi to Bhutan in this perspective. The new Government should see the Himalayas as one; culturally, environmentally and strategically, the great mountain barrier is one entity. The first step for the new Government is to reinforce India’s defence, while taking along local populations in the mainstream.