Homeland Security

Counterinsurgency: No Win Situation and Inflexion Point
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Issue Net Edition | Date : 11 Jun , 2014

It has become a popular cliché to describe insurgency and counter-insurgency as struggle for hearts and minds of the people. It must be reiterated that it is also a struggle between hearts and minds, a conflict between lofty goals and realistic expectations. The selection and maintenance of an aim is a crucial first principle of war. But in case of counterinsurgency, there is no enemy and victory is not the aim. The insurgents aim at regime change, the counterinsurgents aim at behavioural change.

‘Morale’ is a major target in all forms of warfare and Napoleon is quoted as having said that it is three times more important than the physical.

Counter insurgency operations are fought primarily to win over the population to one’s own point of view. But for the insurgents, total destruction of the regime is the aim and thus there is an inbuilt asymmetry at the level of application of force. Yet it is wrong to call this an ‘asymmetrical warfare’ as many do.  Essentially, both the insurgents and counterinsurgents envisage and accept the use of force. A truly asymmetrical conflict would be the Gandhian ‘Non Violent protest’, where one side completely abjures the use of force.

Insurgents and counterinsurgents both aim to create a no-win situation for the other. The counterinsurgents thereby hope that the insurgents would give up violence and change their behaviour. On the other hand insurgents hope that it would lead to the collapse of the system, rebellion in the military and eventual victory of the insurgents.

The creation of a no-win perception in the mind enemy  is a major concern even in conventional warfare. ‘Morale’ is a major target in all forms of warfare and Napoleon is quoted as having said that it is three times more important than the physical. But in case of insurgency and counterinsurgency, it is even more critical since physical destruction of the adversary is not the aim of counter insurgents.

While the creation of a ‘perception’ of a no-win situation has both physical and psychological dimensions. Here, skilful management of perception is as important as physical factors.

The first and the foremost facet of the ‘no-win’ situation is obviously the military. The results of an insurgency depend on this psychological battle. If the insurgents believe that they are in no-win situation, then sooner rather than later the counterinsurgents will succeed. But if on the other hand, as in the case of the South African Apartheid regime, counterinsurgents come to this conclusion, and then the insurgents win and effect a regime change. When the no-win is mutual, a compromise is possible through negotiations that would involve give-and-take and partial attainment of objectives for both the sides. If negotiations take place when a clear no-win situation has not been created, often these are mere tactical ploy to gain time. The history of numerous failed negotiations in insurgency situations is a pointer in this direction.

When the no-win is mutual, a compromise is possible through negotiations that would involve give-and-take and partial attainment of objectives for both the sides.

Since almost by definition, insurgents take recourse to tactics of guerrilla war, a massive use of force for a short duration can seldom produce the military no-win situation. Insurgency and counterinsurgency are like a long-drawn-out slogging match, where endurance and resolve to stay on the course matter more than sophisticated arsenal. Shock and awe in a traditional sense is not an option in counterinsurgency, as there are severe restrictions on the kind of force that can be used.

Technically, when insurgents hide in an urban populated area, termed concrete jungles or in actual jungles, the counterinsurgents have the option to blast the entire locality at least in urban areas, in forests even that option is not available. But the issue of human rights of the innocents precludes this in urban complexes. Massive force, disproportionate to the task at hand also violates the principle of legitimacy. This may appear contradictory but so are the principles of war on the use of force, when one talks of concentration of force and economy of force in the same breath.

Since the aim of use of force is to affect behavioural change, this cardinal difference has to be clearly understood, as from this flow the strategy and tactics that severely circumscribe the use of ‘blunt’ instruments and weapons of mass destruction. This also automatically gives primacy to psychological and not physical effect of force.

The counter insurgents have to be extremely careful that in exercising force and coercion, they do not reach a psychological ‘point of no return’, after which force, instead of changing behaviour in the desired direction, produces desperation. This suggests that the use of force must alternate with periods of peace. Thus in order to achieve the  psychological goal of convincing the insurgents that they are in a no-win situation, the force used has to be neither minimum (as in a situation of civic unrest) nor maximum as in case of an all-out war between two states, but adequate. The adequacy of force is in terms of quality, quantity and duration and has it has to be legitimate.

The Vietnam War was lost not in the paddy fields of the Mekong delta but in American living rooms.

If one looks at the history of counterinsurgency and counter guerrilla wars of the last several decades, one can clearly discern an inflexion or ‘tipping point’- an event or an occurrence that changed the ultimate outcome in favour of one or the other side as the result of perception of no-win by one side. Looking at the cases where the insurgents or the guerrillas came up trumps in Vietnam, Afghanistan and South Africa, one can clearly see the impact of these turning points. In the case of the two-decade-long Vietnam war, that point was the Tet Offensive in January 1968.

Coinciding with the Vietnamese New Year, during which generally both sides observed cease fire, the Vietnamese guerrillas launched a successful attack on all the provincial capitals in South Vietnam as well as Saigon and Hue, the two biggest cities in South Vietnam. The attack shook the Americans by its scope and breadth. The earlier optimism of Americans gave way to pessimism and domestic opposition to the war mounted. Militarily the Vietnamese guerrillas suffered huge casualties and American forces quickly regained the cities, but the perception that they could not win this war took root, both in the military and general public in the US. After this it was a matter of time before Americans withdrew from Vietnam. The Tet offensive succeeded in creating the perception of no-win in the minds of the Americans. The end however came only in 1975 when the Vietnamese forces finally captured Saigon on 29th April 1975, seven years after the ‘Tet’ offensive.

The Vietnam War was lost not in the paddy fields of the Mekong delta but in American living rooms. The unprecedented television coverage brought the horrors of war right into American homes, and it is the drying of public support for the war that ultimately led to the military disengagement. The Tet offensive created a situation of no-win in the minds of the general American public.

In the first Afghan War between the Mujahedeen guerrillas and the Soviet Union, the victory came to the guerrillas only in April 1992, nearly three years after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The Mujahideen forces, a bunch of Islamist warriors from all over the world (though the bulk were Pashtuns from Afghanistan and Pakistan) were supported by the Americans, funded by Saudi Arabia and trained and sheltered by  neighbouring Pakistan. But the fall of Afghan regime only came about in 1992 when a powerful warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, defected to the other side. The defection of Dostum was the end result while in all fairness the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 began the process of the end of the Soviet-backed regime. The Vietnam and Afghanistan examples have a lesson in that ultimately the guerrilla forces can only win if the adversary conventional forces desert or defect. The survival of the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan is a pointer in the direction of the power of modern conventional forces. [i]

The no-win situation has an economic dimension as well. In a long- drawn-out conflict, the people in conflict zone suffer untold hardships.

South African ‘no-win’ situation came about essentially due to the loss of international political support. But even in this case, the military dimension cannot be ignored. The defensive victory of the ANC-supported forces in the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in Oct 1987 and the simultaneous loss of air superiority ushered in the perception that the South African apartheid regime was on a losing streak. Many South Africans continue to assert that the battle was actually won by the Apartheid regime. But Nelson Mandela could not disagree more: “Cuito Cuanavale”, he asserted, “was the turning point for the liberation of our continent—and of my people—from the scourge of apartheid”.[ii]

This coincided with the drying-up of political support of Western nations, as the Cold War was winding up and the South African Apartheid regime was no longer an asset but a liability in the rest of Africa.

Many military analysts ignore the psychological effect of a battle on a war. In the case of the Tet offensive of Vietnam War, the battle of Dien Bien Phu lost by the French and the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola, it is material that the insurgents believed that they had won. Battles and wars are after all won or lost in the minds of the adversaries.

The no-win inflexion point in the case of successful counterinsurgencies in North East India was the liberation of Bangladesh in December 1971 that led to the loss of bases and military support that the erstwhile East Pakistan had provided. In the case of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, the assassination of Indian leader and former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 saw a similar loss of support to the Tamil cause. The ultimate defeat of the LTTE came about almost a decade later, but it can be safely asserted that the loss of Indian support was crucial. The ‘Easter Agreement’ of May 1998 that brought to an end the Irish insurgency can be similarly attributed to the lead taken by the U.S. The Irish insurgency in Northern Ireland had sustained itself largely due to the support, overt and covert by the Irish community in the US. The Easter Agreement heralded a change in American attitude and led the IRA (Irish Republican Army) to believe that an armed resistance was no longer feasible. It is true that the economic and political integration throughout the European Union had made the parochial conflict largely redundant. That it spluttered on for such a long time showed the longevity of historical animosities.

When India battles the LWE (Left wing extremism) or Kashmiri militants, it is important to keep in mind the lessons learnt in Vietnam, Afghanistan, South Africa and Sri Lanka.

The no-win situation has an economic dimension as well. In a long- drawn-out conflict, the people in conflict zone suffer untold hardships. Over a period of time, conflict weariness settles in and a yearning for peace is palpable. The mundane chore of raising a family and leading a normal life begin to loom large in people’s consciousness. In the case of South Africa for instance, economic sanctions began to bite and there was flight of capital from the country. The growth rate began to stagnate at less than 1% and big capital and industrialists switched sides and brought pressure on the Apartheid regime to give up its policy of racial discrimination. An economic no-win may produce the desired results, depending on who suffers more deprivations. A bleak economic future can bring to senses even the most ardent revolutionaries. In conversation with this author in May 1988, Mr Ton Luia (then a minister in Mizoram government and erstwhile Chief of  the Mizo National Army) told of the economic privations undergone by rebels while staying in the jungles of Myanmar (the Chittagong Hill Tract or CHT  for short). Talking of the long-drawn-out negotiations with the Indian Government, he mentioned that for an insurgent, a pair of clean trousers was more important than some Articles of the Constitution.

A note of caution is warranted here while dealing with insurgency that has religious motivation. No amount of force or fear of death, destruction or deprivation can bring about a no-win perception if the conflict is seen as one between God (and his true followers) and mere mortals. The only way out in these situations is to get the God or religion on your side.

When India battles the LWE (Left wing extremism) or Kashmiri militants, it is important to keep in mind the lessons learnt in Vietnam, Afghanistan, South Africa and Sri Lanka. We need not re-invent the wheel every time.



[i] The Najibullah regime survived for two years after the Soviet withdrawal and the end of the regime came only when the major part of force under war lord Rashid Dostum defected to the other side. Even the fall of Saigon to Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces was possible only when theSouth Vietnam army en-mass defected. Guerrilla fighters on their own could not achieve this .

[ii] Mail & Guardian on line, 11 July 2007, article on the occasion of 20th anniversary of the battle.


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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Col Anil Athale

Former infantry soldier who was head of War History division, Min of Def, Research fellowships including Fulbright, Kennedy Centre, IDSA, USI and Philosophical Society. 30 years research of conflicts in Kashmir, NE, Ireland, Sri Lanka and South Africa. Author of 7 books on military history.

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