It has been reported that Iranian investigators have been able to collect considerable details regarding this modus operandi, the kind of device used and the organisation behind these attacks from a terrorist who was caught along with the device towards the end of 2010 before he could carry out the attack. On the basis of his interrogation details of which were telecast by the Iranian TV, the Iranian security agencies have alleged that these attacks are being carried out by terrorists of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), an anti-regime terrorist organisation, motivated, funded, trained and equipped by Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency.
Is it possible to devise new security procedures by which high-value targets of terrorists, who do not enjoy the benefit of VIP protection procedures, can be better protected? This is a question which needs to be examined by our security experts.
From the media reports of the February 13,2012, terrorist attack at New Delhi on an Israeli diplomatic vehicle, it is apparent that it had features similar to the attacks on the vehicles of Iranian nuclear scientists”” a shaped uni-directional instantaneous explosive charge meant to kill only the occupants of the car without causing collateral damage and stuck to the rear of the car by a speeding motor-cycle borne terrorist, who managed to get away after his act.
This MO, meant to kill targeted individuals with an explosive device by a motor-cycle borne terrorist without killing innocent civilians, would call for a re-visit to our security procedures for the protection of high-value individual targets of terrorists.
Access control and prior sanitisation through anti-explosive checks are the two basic procedures followed for protecting high-value targets of terrorists. The use of a speeding motor-cycle borne terrorist to attach an explosive device to a car is meant to circumvent access control and prior sanitisation procedures.