After Independence the tribal policy envisaged bringing the tribal population in the development process with the rest of the country as quickly as possible, but without any outside impositions and in conformity with their own cultural ethos. In the process of development Nehru did not want them “to be swamped by people from other parts of the country” and wanted them to “live their own lives according to their own custom and desires”. He was also aware of the importance of keeping the tribes contented as “they live near the frontier of India and some of the same tribes live on the other side of the border, like the Nagas in Burma. They occupy thus a strategic position of great importance, which has grown in many years.
Properly treated and encouraged, they can become a bulwark of our state. Otherwise, they are a danger and a weakening factor.”8 Nehru also visualised the pitfalls in implementing the tribal policy, which he had envisioned and articulated in letters he wrote to his cabinet colleagues and chief ministers. In a letter to CD Deshmukh Nehru commented, “They (Nagas) do not get on very well with the Assamese who, in the past treated them as inferiors. They are not prepared to tolerate any stigma of inferiority from anyone. As friends, they react well.”9 To his cabinet colleagues, he wrote,” We are apt to judge people in various parts of India by the same standards and measure them by the same yardstick. The fact is that they differ in many ways in their customs, ways of life etc. This is particularly so in the North-east areas, where they have been cut off from India. They are a tough and a likeable people. They can be won over by friendly treatment and alienated by any attempt to suppress them or impose different ways on them. I am afraid not many people approach them with sympathy or understanding, we go with our own ideas and presume that they are the best.”10
Nari Rustomji, one of our ablest administrators who served in the North-east for long years, observed in his book, ‘The Imperilled Frontiers’, that the unrest in the North-east has arisen not from any lack of goodwill on the part of the Indian Government but from want of understanding, empathy and sensitivity. His observation captured one of the many reasons for the tribe’s alienation from the plainsmen.
Minimum Force
The operations against the rebels in the North-east have been undertaken with the understanding that they are fellow citizens and not enemies. The rebels have to be won over by actions designed to ‘win their hearts and minds.’ This implied the use of ‘minimum force’. The training manual of the Indian Army emphasises minimum force as one of the cardinal rules of engagement when called out in aid of civil authority. This was originally formulated by the British to deal with situations like crowd control, communal rioting, unruly mobs and violent political demonstrations.
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The scope and meaning of internal security has, however, fundamentally changed over a period of time; it now encompasses aid to civil authority in situations vastly different, which include proxy war and low intensity conflicts where the protagonists are armed with sophisticated lethal weapons. The terms of engagement formulated in the past are no longer valid and needed to be redefined.
Intelligence is the decisive factor in counter-insurgency operations. Conversely, it is equally important to deny information to the rebels, who depend heavily on the civil population not only for intelligence but also for logistic support.
General Shankar Roychowdhury, a former army chief, defines it as ‘adequate minimum force, the adequacy of weapons and firepower for each situation to be determined by the field commander. This included heavier weapons like mortars or artillery whenever required.’11
Ordinary people are, however, to be protected not only from the violence of the rebels but also, to the extent possible, from the collateral damage that is invariably caused in the course of counter-insurgency operations by the security forces. This philosophy was a refreshing departure from the mindset of the colonists of the past.
For example, following the massacre of an American company at Balangiga in Samav Islands in September 1901, Brigadier General Jacob Smith directed that no prisoner be taken and all males over 10 years of age be executed.12 To be fair to the Americans, Smith was court-martialled while the situation in Batangas was the subject of Senate hearing.
Isolating the Populace from Insurgents: Grouping of Villages
Intelligence is the decisive factor in counter-insurgency operations. Conversely, it is equally important to deny information to the rebels, who depend heavily on the civil population not only for intelligence but also for logistic support. This meant isolating the rebels from population centres. The concentration of civilians in guarded areas to deny the guerrillas access to food or other support was not a new idea. The Russians had introduced slow strangulation against the Murids, the fanatical Islamic monastic order led by Shamil in Caucasus in 1840s, cutting guerrillas from population by a cordon sanitaire of military outposts.13 Beckett observes that common approaches were emerging entirely independently in different armies faced with similar difficulties.
The scope and meaning of internal security haschanged over a period of time; it now encompasses aid to civil authority in situations vastly different, which include proxy war and low intensity conflicts where the protagonists are armed with sophisticated lethal weapons.
Thus in the British campaign against the Boers in the latter stages of the South African campaign, the Spanish campaign in Cuba in 1895 and 1898 and the US campaign in the Philippines between 1899 and 1902, all three armies adopted what became known as reconstruction. Ironically, when faced with Filipino insurgency after occupying the former Spanish colony, the Americans themselves were forced to adopt reconstruction. Commanded by Douglas Macarthur’s father, Arthur Macarthur, the American forces began to move the rural population into town in December 1900.
In the province of Batangas, Brigadier General Franklin Bell reconstructed 10,000 people into protective zones and destroyed all crops, livestock and buildings outside the zones.14 These measures may have been acceptable military means by colonial powers to quell insurgencies in the early decades of the 20th century in the subjugated and occupied territories, the political fallout of adoption of such measures against their own citizens would have been disastrous even in the times when human rights was not an issue as it is today.
Drawing on the British experience in Malaya, Indian Army tried the concept of grouping of villages as a means to isolate the rebels from the populace. It was tried out both in Nagaland and Mizoram. In Nagaland it was given up in the face of fierce opposition from moderate Nagas. In Mizoram the experiment produced mixed results. A study of the existing literature on the Indian experience leads one to conclude that the position of the army was some where in between. It was acutely aware of the hardship it caused to the innocent civilians but was desperate to gain information and simultaneously deny it to the hostiles.
Nature of Counter-Insurgency Operations
By its very nature counter-insurgency operations are restrictive, which place impositions on the free movement and daily life of the community.
In Nagaland and Mizoram air power was used defensively, even though for strafing rebel positions, in desperate situations as a last resort to save garrisons from being overrun by rebel forces.
For example, area domination to restrict the freedom of movement of insurgents and to instil a sense of security amongst the populace, cordon and search to flush them out from their hideouts, road opening parties to keep the major roads open for traffic and imposition of curfew along the international border to prevent them crossing over to sanctuaries across the border are steps taken by the military to fight the insurgents. Each of the above type of operations cause impediment to smooth flows of daily life but could not be avoided in situations of active insurgencies.
Employment of Air Power
The use of air power against own people, even though they may be hostiles, has always been a debatable choice. It also went against the established principle of minimum force The Air Force was used in Nagaland for dropping supplies to beleaguered garrisons under threat from hostiles, but its use for strafing was quite another matter.
In Nagaland and Mizoram air power was used defensively, even though for strafing rebel positions, in desperate situations as a last resort to save garrisons from being overrun by rebel forces. Since 1960s, helicopters have been used extensively for movement of troops, casualty evacuation and reconnaissance as integral pert of counter-insurgency operations.
Political and Diplomatic Initiatives
Counter-insurgency operations are politico-military in nature. Political mobilisation and military operations are undertaken side by side to achieve lasting results. In the context of North-east insurgencies, political initiatives have been taken at two levels, internal and external. At the internal level, negotiations have resulted in accords that granted greater political and economic autonomy to the disaffected tribes. At the external level, political and diplomatic steps have been taken to deny safe sanctuaries to the insurgents in neighbouring countries. For example, movement of insurgent groups have been restricted by increased cooperation between Indian and Myanmar security forces.
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