Homeland Security

Counter-Insurgency Operations in Northeast - I
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Issue Book Excerpt: Lost Opportunities | Date : 05 Jun , 2011

Prior to 20th century guerrilla warfare was regarded as purely military form of conflict. It was the weapon of the weak against the strong. The guerrillas employed ‘hit and run’ tactics against their adversaries. This form of warfare was also applied to the role of irregular troops acting as partisans in support of conventional forces. Guerrilla warfare as a means to wage war came into prominence in the last century against colonial occupation.

In the middle of the last century, guerrilla war took a new characteristic when political factors were grafted on irregular military tactics.1 Dissident groups initially in minority and weaker than authorities, would seek power through a combination of subversion, propaganda and military action in the form of guerrilla warfare. The process came to be termed insurgency.2 After the World War II insurgencies became the major threat to governments all over the world.

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Contrary to experience, regular soldiers in most democratic armies believe that they exist primarily to fight conventional wars. Between 1960 and 63 John F Kennedy identified communist inspired insurgency as the predominant threat to American interests. Kennedy’s National Security Action Memorandum No 124 of January 18, 1962 saw insurgency as a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare.3 Modern British doctrine is heavily based on North-West Europe campaign of 1944-45. Yet, out of 94 separate operational commitments between 1945-1982, only 14 were not in some form of low intensity conflicts.

The army was called out in Nagaland to quell insurgency in 1956, and since then it has been involved in counter-insurgency operations not only there but in almost all of North-east in an ever widening area of operations.

Indeed, the British Army’ only significant recent conventional experience has been 35 months of participation in the Korean War (1950-1953) when only five infantry battalions were deployed at any one time, followed by 10 days at Suez in 1956 and 24 days of land campaign in the Falklands in 1982 and 100 hours of land operation in the Gulf (1990-1991).4 The second Gulf War in Iraq has already turned into an insurgent war.

The Indian experience has been mixed. Soon after Independence the army fought a bitter war against the newly created state of Pakistan over Kashmir (1947-1948), followed by a short war of 21 days in 1965, once again over Kashmir, and finally the war with Pakistan in December 1971, lasting not more than a fortnight, but with a decisive victory over Pakistan, which resulted in the creation of yet another state – Bangladesh. In 1962, the Indian Army fought a border war with China, which lasted for about a month in October-November, resulting in India’s humiliating defeat. But only a very small component of the Indian Army was involved in actual fighting. The air force was kept out of the war.

In the closing year of the 20th century, India once again fought a conventional border war with Pakistan on the line of control in the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir, lasting six weeks. The war was confined to a geographical area and only two divisions of the army were involved in combat. As against the intermittent commitment in conventional wars, the Indian Army has been fighting insurgency almost continuously since Independence. The army was called out in Nagaland to quell insurgency in 1956, and since then it has been involved in counter-insurgency operations not only there but in almost all of North-east in an ever widening area of operations.

“¦the situation in the Punjab was brought under control in the early nineties, Kashmir was aflame with insurrection aided and abetted by Pakistan. The proxy war in Kashmir continues till today.

In 1984 the army was called out to restore order in the Punjab and launched the infamous Operation Bluestar, which led to virtual insurgency that was put down at great human and economic cost by the Punjab Police, assisted by the army and the para-military forces. By the time the situation in the Punjab was brought under control in the early nineties, Kashmir was aflame with insurrection aided and abetted by Pakistan. The proxy war in Kashmir continues till today.

In between nearly four divisions of the army were deployed in Sri Lanka to fight the insurgent LTTE in accordance with the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was finally pulled out in March 1990, but not before suffering about 1,100 dead and many more maimed for life in the fighting. The irony was that by the time the force was pulled out, it was detested not only by the LTTE but also by the Sri Lankan Government and the State Government of Tamil Nadu. The casualties suffered by the army in counter-insurgency operations far exceed the sum of figures in conventional wars.

Counter-insurgency operations have provided the staple operational fare for the Indian Army more than any other except, perhaps, the Israeli Army, and yet it has not received the attention it deserves. In most armies counter-insurgency operations are regarded unglamorous, where success cannot be easily measured in decisive battles won and results are not immediately visible. In the Indian Army this attitude is reflected in senior officers aspiring to command formations in areas where they have an opportunity to display their flair for large/small manoeuvres on maps and sand-models, which have lost much of their relevance in the changed world, or formations deployed for defence on the borders where there is little scope for experimentation or creativity.

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A few jockey to escape the daily rigours, hardships and uncertainties of a prolonged insurgent war. But the perspectives are changing and the role of the army is being re-defined. This is how General Shankar Roychowdhury, the former chief of the army and presently member of the Rajya Sabha, perceives the change: “ The proxy war sponsored by Pakistan in Kashmir and its linkages with insurgency and violence in the North-east and elsewhere in the country had involved us in direct and indirect battlefield contact with Pakistan for over a decade now. These externally supported low intensity conflicts had completely redefined the traditional perception of external and internal threats, as also the categorisation of primary and secondary roles of the army, which was the main force dealing with them.”5

Evolution of Counter-Insurgency Strategy

When Naga insurgency broke out in Nagaland in 1956, neither the Indian Army nor the political masters had any experience of dealing with such situations. There was no lack of goodwill for the hill tribes of the North-east amongst the policy-makers of Independent India, which was profoundly influenced by its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Lal Nehru. Yet, when the unrest slowly spread to other parts and soon engulfed the whole of the North-east, the political leadership was slow to grasp the nature of insurgency and evolve a coherent policy, which took a tortuous path – from military solution to winning the hearts and minds of disaffected tribes.

“¦externally supported low intensity conflicts had completely redefined the traditional perception of external and internal threats, as also the categorisation of primary and secondary roles of the army”¦

Soon after Independence, Nehru enunciated what came to be called the ‘Tribal Panchsheel’: “People should develop along the lines of their own genius; Tribals rights in land and forest should be protected; train and build-up a team of their own people to administer and develop. Some technical help, from outside, will be needed. But we should avoid introducing too many outsiders into tribal areas; we should not over administer the area and overwhelm them with too many schemes. Work through and not in rivalry to their (tribals) institutions. Judge results not by statistics or the amount of money spent, but by the quality of human character that is involved.”7 The above broadly constituted the policy framework around which the development of the tribal areas was to be accomplished.

In a reversal of the British policy of keeping the hill tribes isolated from the mainstream of Indian life, Nehru was keen to develop national consciousness amongst the hill tribes of the North-east. There is a view that British deliberately kept the tribes isolated from the rest of the country to preserve them as ‘museum specimens.’ Verrier Elwin refutes this charge in his book ‘Nagaland’ and claims that this has no basis in fact. According to him, there was only one reason why the British did not bring the entire area under active administrative control: it was too much trouble.

After Independence the tribal policy envisaged bringing the tribal population in the development process with the rest of the country as quickly as possible, but without any outside impositions and in conformity with their own cultural ethos. In the process of development Nehru did not want them “to be swamped by people from other parts of the country” and wanted them to “live their own lives according to their own custom and desires”. He was also aware of the importance of keeping the tribes contented as “they live near the frontier of India and some of the same tribes live on the other side of the border, like the Nagas in Burma. They occupy thus a strategic position of great importance, which has grown in many years.

Properly treated and encouraged, they can become a bulwark of our state. Otherwise, they are a danger and a weakening factor.”8 Nehru also visualised the pitfalls in implementing the tribal policy, which he had envisioned and articulated in letters he wrote to his cabinet colleagues and chief ministers. In a letter to CD Deshmukh Nehru commented, “They (Nagas) do not get on very well with the Assamese who, in the past treated them as inferiors. They are not prepared to tolerate any stigma of inferiority from anyone. As friends, they react well.”9 To his cabinet colleagues, he wrote,” We are apt to judge people in various parts of India by the same standards and measure them by the same yardstick. The fact is that they differ in many ways in their customs, ways of life etc. This is particularly so in the North-east areas, where they have been cut off from India. They are a tough and a likeable people. They can be won over by friendly treatment and alienated by any attempt to suppress them or impose different ways on them. I am afraid not many people approach them with sympathy or understanding, we go with our own ideas and presume that they are the best.”10

Book_Lost_OpportunitiesNari Rustomji, one of our ablest administrators who served in the North-east for long years, observed in his book, ‘The Imperilled Frontiers’, that the unrest in the North-east has arisen not from any lack of goodwill on the part of the Indian Government but from want of understanding, empathy and sensitivity. His observation captured one of the many reasons for the tribe’s alienation from the plainsmen.

Minimum Force

The operations against the rebels in the North-east have been undertaken with the understanding that they are fellow citizens and not enemies. The rebels have to be won over by actions designed to ‘win their hearts and minds.’ This implied the use of ‘minimum force’. The training manual of the Indian Army emphasises minimum force as one of the cardinal rules of engagement when called out in aid of civil authority. This was originally formulated by the British to deal with situations like crowd control, communal rioting, unruly mobs and violent political demonstrations.

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The scope and meaning of internal security has, however, fundamentally changed over a period of time; it now encompasses aid to civil authority in situations vastly different, which include proxy war and low intensity conflicts where the protagonists are armed with sophisticated lethal weapons. The terms of engagement formulated in the past are no longer valid and needed to be redefined.

Intelligence is the decisive factor in counter-insurgency operations. Conversely, it is equally important to deny information to the rebels, who depend heavily on the civil population not only for intelligence but also for logistic support.

General Shankar Roychowdhury, a former army chief, defines it as ‘adequate minimum force, the adequacy of weapons and firepower for each situation to be determined by the field commander. This included heavier weapons like mortars or artillery whenever required.’11

Ordinary people are, however, to be protected not only from the violence of the rebels but also, to the extent possible, from the collateral damage that is invariably caused in the course of counter-insurgency operations by the security forces. This philosophy was a refreshing departure from the mindset of the colonists of the past.

For example, following the massacre of an American company at Balangiga in Samav Islands in September 1901, Brigadier General Jacob Smith directed that no prisoner be taken and all males over 10 years of age be executed.12 To be fair to the Americans, Smith was court-martialled while the situation in Batangas was the subject of Senate hearing.

Isolating the Populace from Insurgents: Grouping of Villages

Intelligence is the decisive factor in counter-insurgency operations. Conversely, it is equally important to deny information to the rebels, who depend heavily on the civil population not only for intelligence but also for logistic support. This meant isolating the rebels from population centres. The concentration of civilians in guarded areas to deny the guerrillas access to food or other support was not a new idea. The Russians had introduced slow strangulation against the Murids, the fanatical Islamic monastic order led by Shamil in Caucasus in 1840s, cutting guerrillas from population by a cordon sanitaire of military outposts.13 Beckett observes that common approaches were emerging entirely independently in different armies faced with similar difficulties.

The scope and meaning of internal security haschanged over a period of time; it now encompasses aid to civil authority in situations vastly different, which include proxy war and low intensity conflicts where the protagonists are armed with sophisticated lethal weapons.

Thus in the British campaign against the Boers in the latter stages of the South African campaign, the Spanish campaign in Cuba in 1895 and 1898 and the US campaign in the Philippines between 1899 and 1902, all three armies adopted what became known as reconstruction. Ironically, when faced with Filipino insurgency after occupying the former Spanish colony, the Americans themselves were forced to adopt reconstruction. Commanded by Douglas Macarthur’s father, Arthur Macarthur, the American forces began to move the rural population into town in December 1900.

In the province of Batangas, Brigadier General Franklin Bell reconstructed 10,000 people into protective zones and destroyed all crops, livestock and buildings outside the zones.14 These measures may have been acceptable military means by colonial powers to quell insurgencies in the early decades of the 20th century in the subjugated and occupied territories, the political fallout of adoption of such measures against their own citizens would have been disastrous even in the times when human rights was not an issue as it is today.

Drawing on the British experience in Malaya, Indian Army tried the concept of grouping of villages as a means to isolate the rebels from the populace. It was tried out both in Nagaland and Mizoram. In Nagaland it was given up in the face of fierce opposition from moderate Nagas. In Mizoram the experiment produced mixed results. A study of the existing literature on the Indian experience leads one to conclude that the position of the army was some where in between. It was acutely aware of the hardship it caused to the innocent civilians but was desperate to gain information and simultaneously deny it to the hostiles.

Nature of Counter-Insurgency Operations

By its very nature counter-insurgency operations are restrictive, which place impositions on the free movement and daily life of the community.

In Nagaland and Mizoram air power was used defensively, even though for strafing rebel positions, in desperate situations as a last resort to save garrisons from being overrun by rebel forces.

For example, area domination to restrict the freedom of movement of insurgents and to instil a sense of security amongst the populace, cordon and search to flush them out from their hideouts, road opening parties to keep the major roads open for traffic and imposition of curfew along the international border to prevent them crossing over to sanctuaries across the border are steps taken by the military to fight the insurgents. Each of the above type of operations cause impediment to smooth flows of daily life but could not be avoided in situations of active insurgencies.

Employment of Air Power

The use of air power against own people, even though they may be hostiles, has always been a debatable choice. It also went against the established principle of minimum force The Air Force was used in Nagaland for dropping supplies to beleaguered garrisons under threat from hostiles, but its use for strafing was quite another matter.

In Nagaland and Mizoram air power was used defensively, even though for strafing rebel positions, in desperate situations as a last resort to save garrisons from being overrun by rebel forces. Since 1960s, helicopters have been used extensively for movement of troops, casualty evacuation and reconnaissance as integral pert of counter-insurgency operations.

Political and Diplomatic Initiatives

Counter-insurgency operations are politico-military in nature. Political mobilisation and military operations are undertaken side by side to achieve lasting results. In the context of North-east insurgencies, political initiatives have been taken at two levels, internal and external. At the internal level, negotiations have resulted in accords that granted greater political and economic autonomy to the disaffected tribes. At the external level, political and diplomatic steps have been taken to deny safe sanctuaries to the insurgents in neighbouring countries. For example, movement of insurgent groups have been restricted by increased cooperation between Indian and Myanmar security forces.

Counter-insurgency operations are politico-military in nature. Political mobilisation and military operations are undertaken side by side to achieve lasting results.

The installation of the government headed by Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh in 1996 augured well for India in its fight against insurgent groups. She denied them sanctuaries in her country and restricted their movement. But her defeat in the election held in 2001 and the victory of Bangla Nationalist Party of Begum Khalede Zia dramatically changed the situation in which the North-east insurgents once again established training and base camps in Bangladesh. The importance of sanctuaries across the international borders was highlighted in 1971, when after the defeat of Pakistani forces in Bangladesh, both Naga and Mizo insurgents lost their bases in erstwhile East Pakistan, which forced both the groups to rethink their future.

Loss of sanctuary in East Pakistan and hounded by the army in their renewed bid to send fresh recruits to China through Myanmar, a section of the Nagas, in fact, signed a peace treaty with the Government in 1975, known as the Shillong Accord. The Mizos also signed a peace agreement with the Government of India in 1976 but later reneged due to intense rivalry between the underground factions for supremacy.

Re-organising of Infantry Battalions for Counter-Insurgency Operations

One of the earliest attempts to reorganise the infantry battalions for counter-insurgency tasks was the creation of (I) Battalions in the 1960s by converting some of the existing battalions drawn from some selected regiments. These units were to be permanently deployed in the Naga Hills and Tuensang Area with their personnel being periodically turned over from within their respective regiments.15 The (I) Battalions were to be lightly equipped having minimal motor transport but more radio sets. The battalions did good work but the experiment was given up for unknown reasons.

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The idea was revived again in the early 90s when the requirement of forces for internal security duties increased dramatically due to enhanced threat posed by Pakistan’s proxy war after Operation Bluestar. It was envisaged to raise ‘a paramilitary force with army’s ethos under the MoD, designated as Rashtriya Rifles. Paramilitary forces and their lobby in the MHA vehemently opposed the idea, which was expected.16

Military operations against insurgents by its very nature are bound to result in some harassment and grievance to the general public, despite the best efforts of the troops.

The Rashtriya Rifles had been conceptually visualised as a specialised internal security formation with units constituted of 75 percent ex-servicemen and balance from the regular army. But it didn’t work out as originally conceived. Ever since its inception the force has 100 percent deputationists from the army and has been deployed exclusively in J&K except for a brief period in the North-east.

Composition of the Assam Rifles

Assam Rifles was raised primarily for deployment in the North-east and comprised men from these areas. Over the years, the force earned a well-deserved reputation as the Sentinels of the North-east, for its exemplary services in keeping peace and guarding our North-eastern frontiers. Some years ago, its composition was changed to all-India force and its distinctive character diluted to one of the many para-military forces. It has thus lost its excellent rapport with the local people, so essential for gathering intelligence.

Gen VP Malik, the former army chief, recommends that the force should comprise 60 to 70 percent of its personnel from the North-east.17 He also favours ‘home and hearth’ units or village guards of the type raised in Arunachal in the past. Such units with as many local ex-servicemen as possible should be raised wherever border-holding forces are thin on ground.18

Civic Action: Winning the Hearts and Minds

Military operations against insurgents by its very nature are bound to result in some harassment and grievance to the general public, despite the best efforts of the troops. They have therefore to be balanced by effective civic actions, which touched people’s lives at the grassroots. A bridge over a rivulet connecting two villages, piped water supply and/or water storage tanks, improvement of village roads, construction of playing fields, repair of school buildings, visit by army doctors to inaccessible villages and treatment of patients in regimental polyclinics touched the lives of poor tribesmen and are parts of the campaign of civic action, which the Indian Army has been executing wherever it has been called upon to undertake counter-insurgency operations.

“¦treatment of patients in regimental polyclinics touched the lives of poor tribesmen and are parts of the campaign of civic action, which the Indian Army has been executing”¦

The concept is, however, not an original formulation of the Indian Army. It can nonetheless take credit for implementing it in letter and spirit. It was practised in Malaya in counter-insurgency operations against the communist guerrillas in the sixties by the British forces under General Templer. In the expanding American empire after 1898, civic action went hand in hand with military measures in the Philippines. In keeping with the American penchant for devising new exotic phrases, they called it the ‘attraction’ programme, which included a variety of public works projects to improve communication and health.19 The experiences in communist countries have been different. The methods adopted by them against internal rebellions and dissents in colonies have been ruthless.

Book_Lost_OpportunitiesThe large- scale violations of human rights of national minorities and political dissenters during the Stalinist period in erstwhile Soviet Russia have been documented in many best selling novels by Russian authors, some of which have been made into classic movies by renowned western moviemakers. The operations of China’s PLA in Tibet and Xinjiang are other examples. The crackdown on peaceful demonstration for the restoration of democracy by Chinese students in Tiananmen Square and the brutalities committed on them by soldiers armed with tanks are too recent to recall.

Psychological Operations (Psy Ops)

Psy ops are powerful weapons in the hands of protagonists in any insurgent warfare. The Naga insurgents scored hands down over the administration and the army in the conduct of psy ops. The NNC had developed an expert publicity department headed until the end of 1955 by the charismatic Sakhrie and later by others. The underground propaganda has often been brilliant, carefully crafted to address the psychology of the people, and in sharp contrast to the dull and pretentious publicity work of the government.20 “An idyllic picture, for example, there is no communal feeling, or are there religious differences, no family ever pays tax (except perhaps to the underground), we do not arrest or imprison anyone, and murder is very rare (other than headhunting, of course), somewhat divorced from reality, of a what a free Nagaland was like, was created.”21.

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In a booklet published in 1953, the villagers were told that in the plains, ‘unlike our country land belongs to the state and the people have to pay taxes for land, for house-sites and buildings too, for fisheries and even for forest product. They have a water tax, latrine tax, entertainment tax and road tax. Everything has to be paid for if they have to live in this world. We Nagas pay no tax’.22 The problem of how to raise finances for a separate state did not seem to bother anyone.

The Nagas are very fond of meat and their rice beer, which the insurgents exploited cleverly to gain their support by propagating that the campaign by the Hindus against cow slaughter and Indias policy of prohibition would one day be applied to them.

In Mokokchung, there was a definite attempt to win over the churches by frightening them that the Hindu Government of India would ban Christianity and force the Nagas to become Hindus, and for a time many Christians became alarmed and joined the insurgents.23 The Nagas are very fond of meat and their rice beer, which the insurgents exploited cleverly to gain their support by propagating that the campaign by the Hindus against cow slaughter and India’s policy of prohibition would one day be applied to them.

The administration’s attempt at psy ops was lackadaisical. Occasionally, pamphlets were produced setting out the protections provided to the tribes in the constitution and the many schemes formulated for the development of tribal areas. Even these never got distributed to the target audience and in many cases rotted in the government offices. Occasionally the government littered the jungles with leaflets announcing amnesty as in the Mizo Hills in January 1967. There was no policy to counter the specifics of insurgent propaganda, based on half-truths, other than announcing the allocation of large funds for the development of the North-east, which did not touch the daily life of the common people.

The local factors and the peculiarities of different tribes were seldom factored in the formulation of policy. In the absence of transparency in the utilisation of the central fund, it was seen as bribe by the centre to the insurgents and their sympathisers. The politician-bureaucrat-contractor nexus came to define one part of the tribal scene. The army, however, made civic action an important part of their counter-insurgency operations. ‘To the insurgents, Good Samaritan (name given to civic action programme in Manipur) was a dangerous psychological offensive by the army, which they tried to discredit with all means at their disposal including smear campaign in the local media.’24

Indian Armys record was more humane and practical in similar situation in Nagaland.

Learning from their past experience, the army has lately produced pamphlets, e.g., ‘Bleeding Assam’ that give factual accounts of the amoral life and debauchery which the top leaders of ULFA indulge in the safety of Bangladesh and the brutalities committed by its cadres on innocent people of Assam. Here again, the pamphlets are in English, which is not understood by ordinary Assamese.

Human Rights

Human Rights is a recent phenomenon, but it has been the cardinal principal for engagement for the army for long when called in aid of civil authority, which demanded strict compliance to impartiality, minimum force and good faith. When one looks at the record of human right violations in the last century, it is appalling to read that in the face of emerging guerrilla activity in Boer campaign in South Africa, General Roberts ordered that houses in the vicinity of any railway lines, bridges and telegraph lines that had been attacked should be burned down or blown up. Collective fines were also imposed and Boer civilians were forced to ride on trains as a deterrent against attack.25 Indian Army’s record was more humane and practical in similar situation in Nagaland.

The insurgents exploited the collateral damage to civilian property and death or injury to innocent civilians in encounters with them to tarnish the image of soldiers as trigger-happy.

To avoid ambushes of vehicle convoys, 50 metres on both sides of main roads were cleared of vegetation and undergrowth, which gave road-opening parties a clear view and denied the insurgents ambush sites to hide. And yet, there were cases, fortunately few, when ambushed that resulted in death and injury, soldiers burnt houses, suspected to have sheltered the insurgents, and beat up innocent bystanders or used force that was not commensurate with the situation in the heat of the moment to avenge their dead comrades.

By the very nature counter-insurgency operations are restrictive and cause inconveniences to people and interfered with their daily chores. There was no way how vehicle searches, frisking of individuals, cordon and searches of villages or a group of houses, roadblocks and night curfews in selected areas could be avoided. It was possible to mitigate the inconveniences, but could not be fully eliminated. As the army gained experience, it did all it could to avoid inconvenience to innocent villagers. The insurgents exploited the collateral damage to civilian property and death or injury to innocent civilians in encounters with them to tarnish the image of soldiers as trigger-happy. In most cases the allegations of atrocities by soldiers were exaggerated, if not wholly false.

The Indian Army has come a long way since it was called out to meet the challenges of an extraordinary situation in Naga Hills”¦

This is how Verrier Elwin, who lived many years with the tribes of the North-east and influenced the tribal policy of Nehru, describes the situation: “From the very beginning the rebels made great play with the allegations of atrocities on the part of the police and other security forces. The booklet already quoted, which was issued in 1953 by the Naga Goodwill Mission to Assam, goes so far as to say that the government of India had instructed their Indian Armed Forces to rape Naga women whenever and wherever possible.”26 It also accuses them of stealing food and drink from Naga houses, fruit and vegetable from their gardens and grain from their fields and ‘violating the sanctity of our religion and our custom.’

The Indian Army has come a long way since it was called out to meet the challenges of an extraordinary situation in Naga Hills in 1956. In the early years human right violations, as we understand the term today, were committed not out of any hostility or antipathy towards the Naga people, but soldiers reacted under grave provocation to avenge the death of their comrades, which were invariably spontaneous and seldom pre-meditated.

As communications improved and North-east opened to the outside world and travel restrictions were relaxed, armys interaction with the media also became more frequent.

One of the former Chief of the Army Staff, late General BC Joshi, issued the Ten Commandments for troops employed in counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir and the North-east:

  • No rape.
  • No molestation.
  • No torture resulting in death or maiming.
  • No military disgrace (Loss of arms, surrender, loss of post or imbibing un-army like culture).
  • No meddling in civil administration (land disputes or quarrels).
  • Competence in platoon/company tactics.
  • Willingly carry out civic action.
  • Develop media interaction (use it as force multiplier and not force degrader).
  • Respect Human Rights.
  • Only fear God, uphold Dharma (Ethical mode of life-the path of righteousness) and enjoy serving the country.

The National Human Rights Commission in its 1994-95 report noted: “The Commission welcomes the instructions of the Chief of the Army Staff and Corps Commanders as evidence of growing sensitivity amongst armed forces personnel to human rights matter…. the example of armed forces leadership (in the human rights matter) need to be followed at all levels.”

Media Policy

In the 1950s when insurgency broke out in Nagaland, there was hardly any interaction between the army and the media. There were many constraints. The means of communication were very limited; the existing network of road and railways passed through the then East Pakistan, which became inoperative after partition. The Brahmaputra was bridged only in 1961. The radio and telegraph links were primitive. The existing government policy permitted the army interaction with the media, mainly print and radio (there was no television or multi media then), through the government’s public relation officers, who were very few and not at all trained to handle news or analyse them. All that they did was to give news of ambushes and the encounters with the hostiles. Even these were reported in the national newspapers much after the events.

The insurgents made better use of the opportunities to interact with the media.

The army itself depended on BBC for the latest news and political developments and their analysis. Mark Tully and Subir Bhaumik, the BBC correspondents who covered, (Subir Bhaunik still does) the happenings in the North-east from their base at Calcutta, became known names for radio listeners and enjoyed huge popularity even as some of their reporting was biased against the army. In the absence of news from the official channels, BBC Hindi service became extremely popular and also credible. The situation was redeemed later by reporters of some of the national and local newspapers, who went on to write excellent accounts of their reporting days in the North-east.27

The insurgents made better use of the opportunities to interact with the media. Fortuitously their access to BBC reporters helped them to freely project their views not only within the country, but more importantly to the western public, who had not yet got over the bias against their erstwhile colonial subjects. Some foreign journalists and newspaper correspondents were allowed to visit the principal towns of Naga Hills in December 1960 to see things for themselves, but the insurgent leaders described the visit as stage-managed.28 Almost a year later Gavin Young, a British journalist, who was granted entry into Naga Hills wrote a one-sided perverted account of the situation in Naga Hills on his return to England.

As communications improved and North-east opened to the outside world and travel restrictions were relaxed, army’s interaction with the media also became more frequent. But the old restriction of interacting through public relation officers continued. The army has felt circumscribed by the restriction on interaction with the media even for legitimate reasons to explain its viewpoint on issues for which the best spokesman would be the army itself.

Book_Lost_OpportunitiesTo get over the hurdle the army got around the existing orders and delegated responsibility for direct on-the-spot interaction with the media down to command and corps headquarters in respect of their own theatres and sectors on matters of internal security. Command headquarters, at their discretion, could delegate this responsibility down the line. This was not to the liking of the MoD, ‘who had launched a sort of in-house guerrilla warfare with the army headquarters.’ 29

To be continued…

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

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Brig (Dr) SP Sinha

Brigadier (Dr) SP Sinha, VSM (Retd)

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