Indian Defence Review

Recent views of some Indian experts studying China are persuading the strategic community that China is very likely to attack India in 2012. This view has apparently begun to influence some in the government, too. The underlined some is to emphasize that this is not the dominant view. But the importance of the view is to keep those in charge alert and awake.

Various reasons or evidence have been quoted to bolster this thesis. These include rapid Chinese infrastructures construction and up-gradation in Tibet which support military efficiency, high grade People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercises in Tibet, possible missile back up and even the likelihood of a hard line commander or a crazy anti-India commander opening a front at some point along the India-China Line of Actual Control (LAC).

There appeared to be a syndrome of looking at China’s strategic thinking through a Pakistani prism, speculating that China’s internal problems may induce Beijing to engage in confrontational military skirmish with India to divert internal pressure. This, however, is not China’s strategic culture. They close up when faced with internal political and social challenges.

It is, however, true that China in the last three years at least, has become highly assertive in its Asia Pacific neighbourhood over territorial claims. Low level skirmishes (non-military with Japan over the sovereignty over the Senkaku (in Japan)/Diaoyu (in China) Islands in the East China Sea and confrontations, especially with the Philippines and Vietnam, over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea have intensified. The issue of Taiwan’s return to the mainland is a major issue. The US pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, reinforcement of US-Philippines military agreement, new US-Vietnam contacts which have military overtones are all matters of concern to China.

PLA spokesmen have been threatening military responses to establish Chinese sovereignty over these territories, though the political leadership have recognized their overreach and are trying to reduce tensions. Chinese national strategic interest in the Asia Pacific far surpasses their intentions along the Sino-India border currently. Chinese activities including military, statements from official strategic experts including from the PLA, and official media comments have refrained from threats to India.

This, however, does not mean that China has gone soft over the border issue. Not in the least. They reiterate their position periodically both officially and demi-officially.

Tibet is being militarized aggressively. Old airports have been renovated. Advanced aircraft including SU-27 have been located in Gonga Airport along with Surface-to-Air anti-aircraft missiles. The critical railway is being extended towards the borders with India. Military exercises including ground and air force have been notable for their defensive-offensive joint operations. Most remarkable has been China’s infrastructure construction along the Sino-Indian borders especially in the Eastern Sector.

The PLA studies and simulated exercises over the years have not yielded results encouraging another military adventure against India at the moment. The first conclusion was the 1962 situation no longer obtains. The PLA’s misadventure in Vietnam in 1979 taught them that there is more to winning a war then only sheer armament power. Tactics, planning and morale of soldiers are very important.

Some PLA strategists have suggested that the next India-China war will have to be fought on the ground, air and sea – a much bigger battle concept.

The current Chinese battle doctrine is focused on winning a local war under modern conditions. From the on-going developments it is evident that its Asia Pacific Sea board and territorial claims remain the prime focus. India does not figure in this frame work.

India, however, looms much larger in China’s Asia perspective to start with. Perhaps, China’s founding leader Mao Zedong recognized India’s potential much before the Indians did. This weakness, lack of self-belief and self-confidence among Indians almost across the board, and search for peace where there is none, were handsomely exploited by the relentless Chinese propaganda machinery. It is no secret that the defeat of the Indian army in 1962 was rubbed in by the Chinese propaganda and dent the self-confidence of the Indian armed force. This also affected Indian bureaucrats and political leaders who tended to brush Chinese misdemeanors under the carpet. Recently, the Chinese are using some Indian writers to write on the 1962 war on lines dictated by the Chinese in the Chinese media.

In recent years, whenever the Indian leadership reacted strongly to an issue the Chinese backed down. But even then, appeasement of the Chinese continues. It is alleged that the formation of strike corps for the Eastern Sector was shelved a year ago allegedly in order not to provoke China. The proposal is apparently being reconsidered.

It is evident from the recent Joint Working Group (JWG) on the border and Senior Representative (SR) level talks between the two countries that the Chinese are not willing to resolve the border issue at the moment and it does not suit them. A live border issue also gives China an instrument to needle India periodically.

What the Chinese are doing is to buy time till they resolve the territorial issues in the Asia Pacific region in their favour. Then a more powerful China will seriously focus militarily on the Sino-Indian border, and their strength will depend on India’s capability or the lack of it. India has no time to procrastinate its military preparedness.

Chinese Defence White Papers make it clear that only strength can ensure peace and, on this basis, China’s perseverance in military modernization and preparedness.

China’s encirclement of India strategy, commonly known as the “string of pearls” strategy, an American nomenclature, has been widely discussed. Beijing, of course, denies this allegation. The strategy, however, continues but its effectiveness may have dented to an extent with India’s development including military modernization.