Indian Defence Review

International Space Station

In the study of Geopolitics, scholars have come to accept outer space as the “fourth frontier of war” that has the potential to decide the course of a war. In the highly “informatised” and technologically advanced battles that have emerged in the 21st century, outer space will play a dominant role that will direct military operations and help in making crucial battleground decisions. In this regard, attempts to weaponise space and command this sphere are expected to be adapted by the great powers. The United States and USSR started weaponising space in the in the 1950s and 1960s respectively, and China is now following suit.

What is “weaponisation of space”

Weaponisation of space includes placing of weapons in the outer space, heavenly bodies, weapons that will transit in the outer space or will travel from Earth to attack or destroy targets in the space. Among other ways and means of weaponising the outer space are the placing of orbital or suborbital satellites with the intention of attacking enemy satellites (using kinetic energy), using ground-based direct ascent missiles to attack space assets, jamming of signals sent from enemy satellites, using lasers to incapacitate the enemy satellites, plasma attacks, orbital ballistic missiles, satellite attacks on Earth targets, etc., These can be further classified into direct-energy and kinetic-energy weapons.

Weaponisation of space is different from militarisation of space that includes using of space-based assets for C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). Militarisation of space assists armies in the battleground, whereas the placing of weapons in the outer space, space is itself emerging as a battleground, and is hence also referred to as the “fourth frontier of war.”

An important point to remember is that today’s space-faring nations use their Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System, which includes long-range ICBMs, as an auxiliary system capable of destroying space-based assets. China has been making impressive headway in its ICBM program and in theory, these ICBMs can target U.S.’ Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites.

There have been debates among scholars on the utility of BMD system as ASAT (Anti-Satellite) weapons. However, Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation asserts that there is no meaningful difference between a midcourse ballistic missile defense system and a hit-to-kill ASAT weapon. He argues that  “because midcourse ballistic missile systems are intended to destroy warheads traveling at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, all midcourse ballistic missile defense systems have inherent ASAT capabilities. He asserts that these BMD systems are more effective as anti-satellite weapons than missile defence systems since most satellites are easier to detect, track and target than warheads, which are likely to be accompanied with penetration aids designed to confuse a potential defence.

The difference between BMD and ASATs will be in the software and control algorithms used to detect, track, and home in on a satellite as compared to a warhead.

Washington believes that underlying the various civilian aspects of China’s space programme, there is an active military component to it. A 2015 report prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense suggests that China has invested in advanced space capabilities, with particular emphasis on “satellite communication (SATCOM), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite navigation (SATNAV), and meteorology, as well as manned, unmanned, and interplanetary space exploration.” The report claims that along with its civilian space program, China continues to develop a variety of capabilities designed to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by adversaries during a crisis or conflict, including the “development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers.”

A report prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission states that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recognises that it must deny the use of strategic information about troops movement, incoming missiles, navigation, communication, track and locate ships, etc, along with depriving its opponents the use of its C4ISR system (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). The report goes on to state that “Chinese analysts assess that the employment of space-based C4ISR capabilities by potential adversaries, especially the United States, requires the PLA to develop capabilities to attack space systems. Based on this assessment, Chinese analysts surmise that the loss of critical sensor and communications capabilities could imperil the U.S. military’s ability to achieve victory or to achieve victory with minimal casualties.”

There is considerable merit in Washington’s claims of the dual-use nature of China’s space program. For instance, Colonel Li Daguang writing in his book Space War published by NDU in 2001 recommends that the Chinese should combine military and civilian technology and integrate peacetime and wartime facilities. His rationale was that space equipment is costly to develop and maintain, hence it is important to have civil-use technology that can also be used in military applications.

In June 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke to astronauts at the launch of Shenzhou X manned mission and said that China will take bigger steps in space exploration in pursuit of its “space dream”. He acknowledged that the space dream is part of the dream to make China stronger. “With the development of space programs, Chinese people will take bigger strides to explore further into space,” he said. In another occasion, on the 24th of April 2016, marking China’s first “space day” the President asked scientists to help realise China’s dream of becoming a global space giant. In both the instances, the Chinese President seemed to have benign intentions behind China’s space modernisation and ambitions, however, open source literature available on China’s space dreams points out that the Chinese strategic community sees space as the ultimate high ground on which military success in the terrestrial battleground are based.

Evolution of China’s ASAT Weapons Capability

A brief survey of recent tests by Beijing confirms that China is rapidly improving its counter space program and making advances in its anti-satellite systems. China’s first ASAT test was conducted in May 2005 and has come a long way since. The most prominent of all the test was the 2007 test that destroyed a redundant Feng Yun 1-C weather satellite owned by China, which led to the creation of over 3,000 harmful debris in the space.The test was conducted in the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) approximately 800 kilometres above the Earth.

The latest test by Beijing was conducted in June 2016 in which Aolong-1 spacecraft was launched by Long March 7 rocket. The Aolong-1 is claimed to be tasked to clean up space junk and collect man-made debris in space. However, reports suggest that the spacecraft, equipped with a robotic arm, is dual-use ASAT weapon. The spacecraft is believed to be the first in a series of spacecraft that will be tasked with collecting man-made space debris. Quoting an unnamed researcher with the National Astronomical Observatories in Beijing, the South China Morning Post points out that it is unrealistic to remove all the space debris with robots as there are hundreds of millions of pieces of debris out there in the space, and for the People’s Liberation Army the robot is a potential ASAT weapon.

A 2013 test by Beijing involved its new missile, the DN-2, and the test was conducted in “nearly geosynchronous orbit” where most of the United States’ ISR satellites are located. The direct ascent test, launched from Xichang, reached an altitude of 18,600 miles into space. Another prominent test was conducted by China in 2015 and is reported to be able to destroy US satellites in the space. The test of DN-3 or Dong Neng-3 exoatmospheric vehicle was carried out on 30th October 2015 from China’s Korla  Missile Test Complex. Chinese press reports said the test was a missile defense interceptor flight test. However, The Washington Free Beacon quotes unnamed defense officials saying that the DN-3 is “primarily a direct-ascent missile designed to ram into satellites and destroy them, even if intelligence assessments hold that the weapon has some missile defense capabilities.”

Along with direct-ascent ASAT weapons, China is also believed to develop other space weapons. Beijing’s recent space activities indicate that it is developing co-orbital anti-satellite systems to target U.S. space assets. Co-orbital anti-satellite systems consist of a satellite “armed with a weapon such as an explosive charge, fragmentation device, kinetic energy weapon, laser, radio frequency weapon, jammer, or robotic arm.” Besides the “hard-kill” methods, Beijing is also testing soft-kill methods to incapacitate enemy satellites. For instance, China has been acquiring a number of foreign and indigenous ground-based satellite jammers since the mid-2000s. These jammers are designed to disrupt an adversary’s communications with a satellite by overpowering the signals being sent to or from it. The PLA can use these jammers to deny an adversary the access to the GPS and other satellite signals. Directed energy lasers are also a soft-kill method that could be used in an anti-satellite mission. China has been committing resources to the research and development for directed energy weapons since the 1990s.