Indian Defence Review

Civil Aerospace Industry

India and China both forayed into civil aerospace around the same time following the public route with the central government taking the lead. The similarity ends there. While China followed a ‘beg, borrow or steal’ policy to obtain access to technology which was put to result-oriented use with a formidable state machinery keeping tabs on the progress, Indian public sector was content to bask in self-aggrandizement based on license production of foreign designs. Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) was formed in 2008 with the aim of implementing large passenger aircraft programmes. Based at Shanghai, it is engaged in the research and development, manufacture and flight tests of civil aircraft. The COMAC website claims that it adheres to the principle of “development with Chinese characteristics”, an attempt at projecting China’s claims of self-reliance in aerospace technology. If sceptical views about the ‘indigenous’ content of China’s civil commercial aircraft development programme are disregarded for a moment, the fact remains that COMAC appears set to produce civil airliners that will compete with the leaders in the single aisle market (Airbus and Boeing) as well in the regional jet range dominated by Bombardier and Embraer.

The most impressive of COMAC’s products is the C919, which is in the same class as the Airbus A320 and the Boeing 737. Its all-economy class layout is expected to have 168 seats and the hybrid class 156 seats. The basic version will have a range of 4,075 km while the enhanced version can stretch to 5,555 km. The C919 is reported to have the CFM Leap 1C engine which, like the engines on the Airbus A320neo and the Boeing 737MAX, claims 15 per cent savings in fuel over their previous versions in the same class. The C919 is expected to carry out its first flight by the end of this year.

ARJ21, short for Advanced Regional Jet for the 21st century, is a short/medium range regional jet with a range of 3,700 km maximum take-off weight of 40.5 tonne. It has 90 seats in a full economy class configuration and 78 in a dual-class configuration. The ARJ-21 is also produced by COMAC and is designed to compete against the Bombardier CS100, Embraer 190 and Sukhoi SSJ100. Its first revenue flight took place on June 28 this year.

The Xian MA-60 preceded the ARJ-21 to enter production as an airliner. It is a turboprop commercial aircraft made by China Aviation Industry Corporation (CAVIC). The aircraft first flew in 1993 and was inducted into operations in 2004. The MA-60 is a stretched version of the Y7200A which was based on the Russian design Antonov An-24. It can operate in rugged conditions with limited ground support and has Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) capability. However, it ran into trouble when an MA-60 flown by Myanmar Airlines veered off the runway due to a hydraulic failure.

CAVIC is also working on a new design, the MA-700, with modern turboprop engine technology and performance better than the ATR72 and Bombardier Q400. It is expected to seat 78 passengers with a possible stretched version with 90 seats as also a shorter version with just 50 seats. The first prototype is expected to fly in June 2017, and entry into service is expected by 2019. None of the Chinese aircraft have been able to obtain certifications from the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) or the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) which is a dampener as far as international sales are concerned.

COMAC has ambitions of building larger aircraft and sporadically one reads about a C-929, C-939 and C-959 although the COMAC website lists only the C-919 and the ARJ-21 as products. As a follow through to a 2014 aviation cooperation deal signed during President Putin’s visit to China, COMAC is close to signing a joint venture with Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation for the development of a 250-280 seat plane, possibly an improvement of the IL96.

Space for Development

It is not the intent here to outline the progression of China’s space and missile programmes except to mention that having learnt from the Korean War that a nuclear threat can be debilitating, China decided on the “two bombs and a satellite” dictum and never faltered on the funding for nuclear bombs and its space programme, even during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution. The results are self-evident and even the US and Russia are watching helplessly as China resolutely moves on to overtake them in space. Its launch vehicles are largely derived from its missiles. For example, the Long March 2 is developed from the Dong Feng 4 (DF4) ICBM; the Long March 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are followed by Kuai Zhou (Fast Vessel) in the launcher series.

There is some confusion about the Kuai Zhou launcher which could be the same as Long March 11 added on last year. The initial years were dismal with high failure rates but benefitting from illegal Transfer of Technology from US companies, China got its act together and since 1997, there have been only three launch failures. During 2015, it launched 19 Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs) carrying 45 spacecraft mostly for navigation, surveillance and test purposes. In September last year, a Long March 6 rocket put 20 satellites into orbit like the Indian PSLV-C34 launch on 22 June this year which also placed 20 satellites into orbit.

Between 2012 and 2015, China conducted 68 successful space launches, compared to the 72 by the US. During the current year, China continues to vigorously pursue its space programme with eight launches so far, the latest launch being a Long March 7 on June 25 with a lift-off weight of 597 tonne and a payload of 13.5 tonne, this was the most powerful Chinese rocket ever. In May this year, China launched a Ziyuan III satellite capable of collecting 3-D images of objects 2.5 metres or longer and a deviation of vertical positioning to one metre using an onboard laser range finder. A total of 20 launches are planned for this year.

China has taken a veritable lead in manned space missions. It has its own spacecraft, the Shenzhou and since 2003, has launched five manned orbital missions, the last in 2013, placed three astronauts in orbit and included a spacewalk. Its last two Shenzhou missions entailed docking with the Tiangong orbiting space lab and there are plans to place in orbit a small manned space station in the early 2020s. In 2013, it landed a rover on the moon and plans a mission to bring back lunar samples in 2017, land on the far side of the moon by 2018, and execute a moon walk by 2024.

This interest in the moon is driven by energy security as it has abundant supplies of Helium-3, a light and non-radioactive fusion fuel that is virtually non-existent here on Earth. Estimates suggest there are at least 1.1 million tonnes of Helium-3 on the lunar surface, enough to power human energy needs for up to 10,000 years. With one of the most cavernous appetites for energy on the planet, China realises that access to this fuel source could be a huge strategic advantage. There is also a plan to land a rover on Mars in 2020 which is also the target year by which China wants to have a reusable manned spacecraft ready.

There have also been reports about a programme for the construction of space-based solar power satellites that would beam energy back to Earth. China’s homegrown navigation system, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), is being put into place. According to Yuan Minhui, Director, Beijing Institute of Space Science and Technology Information, China is likely to be building and supplying at least ten per cent of the world’s satellites by 2020. Meanwhile, private companies such as One Space Technology are planning to launch commercial rockets using low- cost models by 2018. Thus China’s space programme appears to be doing admirably well in the civil domain.

Space as a Frontier

China’s space programme is directed by the CNSA which is considered by the US and some other countries as a military organisation although it is a subordinate agency of the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND) which functions under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). The launcher rockets are produced by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology. Satellites are produced by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation; both are state-owned enterprises. The ‘China’s Military Strategy’ document identifies space as the “commanding height in international strategic competition”.

According to a report entitled ‘China Dream, Space Dream’ prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in 2015, “China is pursuing a broad and robust array of counter-space capabilities, which includes direct ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, computer network operations, ground-based satellite jammers and directed energy weapons.” The document avers that Chinese leadership thinks that, “space warfare is inevitable” and that China must dominate it. China has made spectacular progress in peaceful and military uses of space and, while publicly advocating peaceful use of outer space and condemning weaponisation of space, has kept her options open.

The Long March 11 ‘next generation’ launcher, first launched in September 2015, is a militarily-relevant ‘quick response’ system to place into orbit a small payload like a directed energy weapons, satellite jammers and kinetic kill vehicles. A 2013 ballistic missile test to over 30,000 km altitude “could have been a test of technologies with a counter-space mission in geo-synchronous orbit.” An anti-satellite missile system was tested against a non-operational weather satellite in 2007 and reportedly, there have been other tests since then, the last one being in October 2015. An anti-satellite system called Dong Neng is expected to enter active service in the next five to ten years. As part of increasingly complex orbital operations, China is “probably testing dual use technologies in space that could be applied to counter-space missions.”

Some PLA write ups mention tasks in space of “destroying, damaging and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to blind and deafen the enemy in an “informationalised local war”. In 2007, a picture appeared on Chinese internet of an air-launched space plane called Shenlong which can also be rocket launched. Not much is known of this plane; but there are speculations that it might be inducted into the newly formed PLA Strategic Support Force one of whose arms is an Aerospace Army.

According to some experts, Shenlong is being developed as space weapons launch platform, as well as for surveillance, intelligence and early-warning missions. The Hypersonic Glide Vehicle mentioned earlier has already completed six tests and can be considered an operational and inherent part of China’s space power. The Yaogan satellite system has several satellites in place for identifying, locating and tracking an Aircraft Carrier Group on high seas and is an important part of China’s ASBM System. The foregoing is not a complete catalogue of Chinese space capability; but gives an insight into why the US is getting increasingly worried about China’s prowess in space and why India should be doing likewise.

Implications

The rivalry between India and China borders on antagonism and thus the emergence of China as a veritable aerospace power deserves attention. Its military aircraft programmes are of concern because China has definitely stolen the march over us with two fourth-generation and two fifth-generation programmes, their only drawbacks being reliance on foreign power plants for the time being. Estimates project a 50 per cent fourth generation composition of China’s combat aircraft fleet by next year with the proportion increasing steadily thereafter. In contrast, the Indian Tejas Light Combat Aircraft is a case of too late and too little; it does not look likely that we will catch up with China soon, all sloganeering about ‘Make in India’ notwithstanding.

China is also developing its own heavy-lift military transport aircraft and helicopters. The JF-17 co-produced by China and Pakistan for the latter, has put Pakistan on the global aerospace map with a world class, fourth generation combat aircraft to its credit. Potentially, all Chinese military aircraft are candidates for bolstering Pakistan’s air power at minimal cost. Moreover, there is the oft debated possibility of a two-front war that may confront India some day, given the long standing inimical disposition of both China and Pakistan towards India.

In terms of numbers also, the situation is worrisome. China has about 2,100 combat aircraft while India has less than 600. A qualitative analysis is not attempted here nor necessary except to mention that the leading edge of both, the PLAAF and the IAF, have similar aircraft of Russian origin. The consolation is that all of the PLAAF aircraft are not deployable against India and those that are deployed in the large number of airfields in Tibet (reportedly 14) would be handicapped in terms of payload they can carry. This could be redressed in the coming years through in-flight refueling. Currently, the IAF may actually have an edge over the PLAAF in a war scenario.

China’s commercial airliner programmes are unassailably ahead of India’s and will remain so for years to come. China’s space ventures in the civil domain are a cause of envy, but not necessarily concern, except that China offers competition in the area of launching third party satellites. Indian space programme for civil uses is going well and the accomplishments of Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) are a matter of pride for India.

However, in the military uses of space, China is probably ahead of India and details of some of its military and dual use programmes may still be under wraps. Its anti-satellite capability, direct energy weapons and HGWs are cause for concern, not to mention the formidable ballistic missile capability it possesses which represents conventional as well as nuclear potency predicated to the missile capability. India’s newly commissioned GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) system is vulnerable to anti-satellite strikes as indeed are all space-based assets.

Possibly, the most significant aspect of Chinese aerospace clout is the fact that its power structure is designed to bring all assets to bear against an adversary in a coordinated manner under the direction of a centralised command structure. India’s quest for a higher defence organisation acceptable to the military and the bureaucracy is as yet a futile one.

Conclusion

China’s opposition, as the lone dissenter to India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) at the Group’s 26th plenary meeting in Seoul in June was not a surprise. This act falls into the pattern that China has followed in its approach towards India which is one of unyielding antagonism irrespective of levels of political engagement between the two nations. Since Prime Minister Modi’s government came to power, the Chinese Foreign Minister has visited India; India’s Vice President has been to China; President Xi Jinping has come on a state visit to India and PM Modi has been on a three-day tour to China. All the bonhomie displayed during these visits showed that political engagement was prospering, but China kept India on tenterhooks by insidious acts of border transgressions, protests at the presence of the head of Tibetan Government in Exile at Modi’s swearing in ceremony, sporadic raising of the ‘One China’ policy with implications for Arunachal Pradesh and more recently, its opposition to India’s NSG candidature.

Both India and China began their march towards progress almost at the same time and have had an unwholesome antagonism towards each other since the 1962 War. The boundary dispute between the two nations continues to simmer and tense episodes along the border show a steady growth pattern. Against this backdrop, Chinese ascent as a global aerospace power is no longer just a cause for India to envy but also reason for concern and indeed a clarion call for us to harness ‘Make in India’ into an impelling force to capitalise on the excellent work done by ISRO in the space domain while enticing private enterprise to reverse the immense injury caused to our aerospace industry in the years gone past by public sector ineptitude.