Indian Defence Review

Not a single day passes with some mention of China in Indian newspapers, whether it is about China’s internal policies and struggles, an impending trade-war with USA, or China’s geo-political moves to contain India. In a shrunk, globalised world, any happening, untoward or otherwise, India is affected in some way or the other.

Relations between the two nations are marked by mutual distrust, not just now, but even in the past, ever since China inflicted the ignominious and humiliating defeat upon India in 1962. Bi-lateral India-China relations influence and have repercussions, not just within the region of South, South-East and East Asia, but even globally. Smooth relations, without any acrimony would support security and growth in the two nations and surrounding areas too; this, however, is wishful thinking. The past and present of the two nations have continuously produced a convergence and divergence of interests and hence, have impacted relations.

The current leadership of both nations appreciates that it is the present that would be shaping the future, and not so much of the past. Real-time consequences of actions and reactions are, hence, important and need to be analysed prior to undertaking any move. Both the nations are cautious of domestic backlash, to actions that may be perceived as detrimental to national interest. Both nations have aspirations to achieve power, regionally and globally, and have growing economic and military clout; although China is way ahead of India, under the present government, India is on track and has been declared as the fastest growing economy. These are not mere aspirations, but based upon results and actions on ground.

Chinese Leadership Model

The Chinese leadership model is quite unusual; it has two ladders of authority: the Government and the Party, with the hierarchy in the latter, outranking that of the State. In many nations, the ministries of finance and foreign affairs are normally considered to be important and portfolio holders rank immediately below the chief executive. In China, it is not so; the two portfolio holders do not even rank in the top 25! Neither of the two is a member of the Politburo, leave alone the inner sanctum, the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). It may be of interest to the reader that formally the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is controlled by the Party and not the Government!

While Chinese political system appears all too normal, like other Leninist systems, it is hassled by the problem of leadership succession. Of the 11 party leaders since 1921 – seven since the Part seized power in 1949 – only one, Xi Jinping’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, has stepped down from all his posts as per the specified schedule; the rest were either executed or purged!

Chinese politics has trended towards ‘collective leadership’ since the 1980s, when, reacting to the chaos of the one-man show of the Mao era, Deng Xiaoping tried to reform the system into one that would be more predictable, orderly, and comparatively transparent. The norms introduced by him included the reinstitution of the post of the President, which had been removed since 1968, along with a restriction of a two-term limit for him and the Vice President; other changes included mandatory age limits for retirement for members of the PSC and sharing of power by the President with other members of the PSC, particularly the Prime Minister. This, in his opinion, was to avoid concentration of power, which could lead to arbitrariness in governance. There was also the need to make a clear demarcation between the Party and the Government to facilitate succession issues in leadership.

Xi Jinping was ‘elected’ as the paramount leader of the Party, also holding the top position of President, in November 2012. As was expected, he was confirmed for his second term in October 2017, for the Party’s top position and the de-facto President, during the 19th session of the National Congress of the Communist Party. During the session, a new guiding ideology, labelled “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, was written into the Party’s constitution, marking a first since “Mao Zedong Thought” that a living party leader had enshrined into the Party constitution an ideology named after himself.

Since long, every time that China undergoes the nerve-racking task of having to decide on a successor to the leadership of the Party, it leads to turmoil and speculations; so was it this time too during the 19th Congress. For months leading up to the Party Congress, speculations were rife on who would be nominated as the next leader of the party by the 2970 delegates gathered in Beijing for a week-long deliberation session. Xi Jinping did not nominate anyone as a successor to him despite his starting his second and final term in office. When China created headlines globally with the news of the CPC proposal to end the existing presidential terms in early March, the news, therefore, was hardly a surprise to political trend watchers, who were waiting for the timing. Xi, considered to be the most powerful Chinese leader after Mao Zedong, is now the Party paramount leader, the head of the government, head of the government commission that commands the military, and the head of an identical Party body overseeing the over 2 million member force. Xi Jinping has not mentioned anywhere, as to how many more five-year terms he intends to serve, thus making him, in a sense, an emperor for life!

The abolition of the term limits shows the failure of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms to rein in ambitious leaders. Instead of avoiding a concentration of powers, Xi has made himself chairman of everything, without any separation of the Party from the State. All influential members of the Party, who could have been considered as alternates too Xi Jinping in 2012 and now in 2017, have been effectively removed on various charges ranging from corruption and murder. So much for a predictable and orderly succession!

Xi Jinping, as a ‘President for life’ is now expected to pursue a more aggressive and militarily muscular foreign policy, while pushing domestic policies to upgrade a slowing economy. He would also be expected to strongly project Chinese influence around the world, especially in economically backward nations, by doling out generous economic aid and getting them into a debt trap. With all power concentrated into the hands of one man, Xi Jinping has his chosen few to assist him implement his domestic and foreign policies.

India-China Relations: The Immediate Past, Present and the Future

The souring of relations between India and China started way back in history when China walked in to Tibet and India providing shelter to the Dalai Lama and his followers thereafter, and the attack on India in 1962 and annexation of Indian territory, continuing till date. The author will, however, not dwell on these issues in detail, which continue to linger between their smooth relations.

The 21st century was named as the century of Asia, with China and India as the focal points of development. This, however, also raised the question of which nation is to lead Asia as a world power. The India-China equation, which had never really resolved, now came out into the open once again, with each trying to contain the rise of the other, by whatever means possible. The process of cooperation and containment are never really progressed much, as cooperation and containment are not two sides of the same coin! India and China harbour far too many unpleasant memories of the past to permit genuine and steadfast cooperation, or even nuanced cooperation. The tide of mutual suspicion, from both sides, cannot be stemmed, especially when both are vying for the top position in Asia.

In the late 1990s, India and China had a tacit understanding under which both the nations had agreed to exercise restraint in their turbulent relations. Such restraint involved placing the border disputes around Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, which had the potential to escalate rather rapidly, on the slow burner of protracted negotiations, while trade and economic interactions were fast-tracked. Today, however, it so appears, that China was pursuing the concept of strategic patience, without disclosing its intentions, to contain India as a rival in Asia.

Sharing of power may be an alien concept in Chinese thinking, but India’s response, much to China’s surprise, has been unusually strong in opposing Chinese actions. China has initiated several actions to contain India; it established strong economic and strategic links with India’s neighbours – Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal and Maldives. India, however, has been unrelenting in countering China’s moves through establishing equally strong relations with Vietnam, and other SE Asian nations through vigorous pursuit of its “Act East Policy”. It has not changed its opinion on Chinese forays in South China Sea or the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). What really surprised China was the unusually strong stand taken by India during the 70-day face-off at Doka La (also called Doklam) in Bhutan, which ended  only when China blinked!

What Next for India

A foreign policy without a competent political vision, especially in a democracy as in India, is a serious failing. The Indian policy towards China in recent past has been driven more by bureaucrats and military demands, rather than by political vision. Such a policy can lead to missing out on opportunities, as they arise, due to varying geo-political situations. With the aspirations as of a rising global power, India can ill afford to miss out on such opportunities. China as a neighbour with equal, if not more aspirations, and which has a head start as against India, lack of being proactive, and being timid in its China policy can leave India more vulnerable to Chinese belligerence. India, hence, needs to reset its policy vis-`a-vis China.

India is well aware of China’s outreach to Western nations, especially in respect of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the uncertainties that arise out of it. Like Japan and other ASEAN nations, India too feels the brunt of Chinese power projections. It is, however, to India’s credit that it is the lone voice against the BRI, while even countries like France have seemingly embraced it, as was indicated by President Macron during his visit to China in January this year.

Over the past one month or so India has made some conscious efforts to mend ties with China, after the stressed times of 2017. If conciliatory statements by India and China are any indication, the two nations would want “to develop relations based on commonalities, while dealing with differences on the basis of mutual respect and sensitivity to each other’s interests, concerns and aspirations”.

In diplomacy, positive statements help in sending out friendly signals between two nations. Some encouraging actions taken by India in the past few weeks, such as the shifting of venue from Delhi to Dharamsala for the 60th anniversary of Dalai Lama’s exile in India, have been interpreted as an attempt to allay Chinese fears over any overt support to Tibet. This is the second occasion that the present Indian government is trying for a ‘reset’ with China; the first was in 2014, which turned into an embarrassment, when Xi Jinping visited India, and Chinese troops almost simultaneously entered the Chumar region in Ladakh.

In this backdrop, an appeasement of China can, and will definitely be viewed as timidity on the part of India and embolden China further. If India has any cards up its sleeve, it must hold them close, including, if any on Tibet. A sustainable and effective Indian policy towards China will seek to address not just its physical security against war and conflict but also its political interests in the form of its adherence to democratic values and responsibilities.

India must continue its efforts and develop strategic partnerships with Western nations, which have the capability and would help India to take on China. India must qualitatively involve itself in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – Quad, the proposed initiative of India, Japan, US, and Australia – that was resurrected in November last in Manila, after a gap of almost a decade. The Indian response to the Quad has been tepid so far, but it must play an active part in it, without fear of antagonizing China. The second edition of the Quad meeting is likely to be held soon; India, as said earlier, must shed its reticence and display its intentions on ground.

Indian Ocean is central to India’s geopolitics; in the current Maldives crisis China has scored the first round against India. India’s ability and influence in a region that is critical to its strategic interests, is now suspect. India should, therefore, pursue its Act East Policy, and mend relations with neighbours, with renewed dynamism as it is the cornerstone of its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

A strong India in the region will present options to it, which would make China think twice before initiating action against Indian interests. Given the shortfall in its capabilities in comparison with China, and the geopolitical realities of the region, India cannot afford to adopt confrontational attitudes; while moving ahead it must, hence, continue to build mutual trust and normalise relations. While moving ahead economically and militarily, it would be sound Chanakyaniti to live in peace with a neighbour with similar aspirations.