Homeland Security

Capture of India : the Maoist blueprint
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Issue Vol 25.3 Jul-Sep 2010 | Date : 06 Oct , 2010

In 2003-2004 the former Peoples War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre held a series of confabulations to work out their merger. Their Central Committees met five to six times to exhaustively discuss a seminal document, a blue print for seizing state power in India. This document was finalized in Sep 2004 and is called “Strategy and Tactics for the Indian Revolution”. It is a spine chilling document that lays out a comprehensive road map for the Maoist revolution to overthrow the Indian State. The document is remarkable for its insights into the politico-military situation in India. In 2004 it had clearly anticipated the weak kneed and confused response of the Indian State.

The Prime Minister has consistently called Left Wing Extremism (LWE) as India’s greatest internal security threat. The theory however differs sharply from practice. For over a decade, the Indian nation-state has seriously underestimated the Maoist threat and under-resourced the battle against this grave menace. In the Shivraj Patil era, a concerted attempt was made to assert that such a threat simply did not exist. This Ostrich Syndrome led to a decade of neglect which has been fully exploited by the Maoists to consolidate their strength in a manner that is now truly a cause for alarm. It was only the present Home Minister’s most courageous decision to tackle the Maoist menace head on that led to a series of probing actions by the Police and Paramilitary forces in West Bengal and Chattisgarh and other states.

The Indian State has seriously underestimated that Maoist threat for far too long. It should not have taken Operation Green Hunt for us to see the writing on the wall.

The disasters suffered by the CRPF in Dantewada have served to highlight the enormity of the Maoist threat about which the Indian State was in total denial till just two years ago. The present home minister took a courageous non-partisan and nationalist stance (despite egging on by some elements of his own party to step back and blame the opposition State Governments and make political capital out of a looming national disaster). Like the initial probing attacks against the intruders in Kargil, we may have taken inordinately high casualties but these probing attacks have served to find and fix the enemy and give us a very rude indication of the menacing growth in Maoist military power.

Operation Green Hunt has been a serious wake-up call – one which we can ignore only at our own peril. The Indian State has seriously underestimated that Maoist threat for far too long. It should not have taken Operation Green Hunt for us to see the writing on the wall. The Maoist threat is an existentialist threat that deliberately seeks to destroy the democratic Indian polity and its armed forces, create a Peoples Army and seize state power by exploiting the rural-urban fault-line. It will then impose a ruthless dictatorship of the proletariat (millions of people had died in China during Mao’s chaotic rule). A bankrupt ideology that has dismally failed all over the World (and in specific in Russia and China itself) would be imposed on India. The bleeding heart liberals who are cheer leading the Maoist movement now would be the first to be sent to the new Gulags of an Indian Communist State. The remedy would be far worse that the “capitalist disease” it seeks to cure. It would be a civilisational catastrophe that would radically transform the Indic civilization from its traditional spiritual and mystic outlook and its innately democratic and pacifist orientation to an atheist- materialist ideology and a Maoist militaristic vision that is chillingly blood thirsty.

The Maoist Blue Print for Seizing the State

In 2003-2004 the former Peoples War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre held a series of confabulations to work out their merger. Their Central Committees met five to six times to exhaustively discuss a seminal document, a blue print for seizing state power in India. This document was finalized in Sep 2004 and is called “Strategy and Tactics for the Indian Revolution”. It is a spine chilling document that lays out a comprehensive road map for the Maoist revolution to overthrow the Indian State.

The document is remarkable for its insights into the politico-military situation in India. In 2004 it had clearly anticipated the weak kneed and confused response of the Indian State and drawn up plans to strike back in isolated battles of annihilation, destroy the security force “mouthful by mouthful” (as it has in Dantewada) while the State would dither, debate and discuss whether a military response was at all necessary and the Maoists were not simply “Ghandians with Guns”.

“The central task of the Indian Revolution is the seizure of political power. To accomplish this, the Indian people will have to be organised in the Peoples army and will have to wipe out the Armed Forces of the Counter revolutionary Indian State and establish in its place their own state.” “” Maoist document

They are methodically exploiting issues of tribal angst to create Base areas for a long term revolution that will overthrow the Indian democratic State. The document written in 2004 makes chilling reading in the light of all that has happened in the current year. The truth is easily ascertained by going through this original Maoist strategy document. It is spine chilling in its import and its contents must be urgently disseminated in the media and public discourse to alert the nation about the true nature and existential scope of the Maoist threat.

The Document

“Strategy and Tactics for the Indian Revolution” was finalized in 2004 and constituted a cogently analysed road map/blue print for unleashing a Red Revolution in India. A simple citing of some excerpts from this chilling document should serve to highlight the pernicious threat danger that we have underestimated so grossly for so long.

This document is divided into 13 chapters. Chapter 6, 7 and 10 clearly define the Maoist Strategy and long term perspective plan and merit serious study and analysis.

Central Task

Chapter Six highlights “The central task of the Indian Revolution is the seizure of political power. To accomplish this, the Indian people will have to be organised in the People’s army and will have to wipe out the Armed Forces of the Counter revolutionary Indian State and establish in its place their own state.”

This plan to destroy the Indian Armed Forces will need to be noted by military strategists. There is a widespread feeling in the Indian Armed Forces that this is not a secessionist movement and hence the Army may not be needed to deal with it. It is, in fact ,far worse – it seeks to overthrow the Indian state itself. In doing so, it seeks to enlist the support of secessionists in J&K and the North East.

“”¦ the revolutionary situation can become even more favourable for the rapid advance of the peoples war due to several factors such as a war with the neighbouring countries.” “” Maoist document

Chapter Six of this document further states: “Our country is a prison house of nationalities, where some nationalities are engaged in a bitter struggle against the Indian state to achieve their right of self determination.” In 2004 itself the Central Committee of the Maoists had correctly forecasted the constraints of the Indian state in employing military forces against the Reds.

“The strength of the Armed Forces of the reactionaries is quite inadequate in the vast country, and communication system makes it quite inconvenient for the quick movement of the enemy forces.”

“A large part of the remote countryside, most advantageous for the establishment of Red liberated areas from the geographical and military point of view, is inhabited by the discontented and agitated nationalities and tribes who are engaged in bitter armed confrontation with the Indian state.”

“Hence it becomes imperative for the enemy’s armed forces to be deployed in large numbers in even wider areas to contain the armed struggle waged by the various nationalities. Lakhs of enemy armed forces have been deployed since long in Kashmir and the North Eastern states.”

The guideline document continues, “As a considerable part of the enemy’s armed forces will inevitably be engaged against the growing tide of struggles by various nationalities, it will be difficult for the Indian ruling classes to mobilize all their armed forces against our revolutionary war.”

Considering that this was written in 2004, it chillingly anticipated the situation in 2010.

Political and Military Strategy

Political Strategy

Maoist political strategy stems from a concrete class analysis of the present day Indian society. Its chief targets are three fold – Imperialism, Feudalism and Comprador Bureaucratic Capitalism. The struggle, it claims, will be led by the Indian Industrial Proletariat (who will provide the leadership). It will closely ally itself with the peasantry – especially the landless poor peasants, tribals as also the urban petit bourgeois and mobilize the people for an armed struggle and build a People’s Army to overthrow the state.

As per the Maoist document strategic areas are the hilly regions with dense forest cover. They have already secured these with their tribal foot soldiers “¦

Military Strategy

This is premised upon building a People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) and a People’s Militia, establish strong and self-sufficient base areas or liberated areas in the vast countryside (primarily in the deep forested and hilly areas). They will continually expand their base areas in a protracted People’s War. It will surround the cities (like islands in a sea of people). The People’s Liberation Guerilla Army will be transformed into a regular People’s Liberation Army to smash the reactionary Armed Forces and seize political power through the barrel of a gun. The PLA will capture the cities by resorting to Mobile Warfare and positional warfare.

Current Strategic Phase

The document states, “We are presently in the phase of Strategic Self Defence. At present, the revolutionary movement is advancing in a vast belt of peoples war encompassing the extensive areas of Dandakaranya, Jharkhand, Andhra, Bihar-Orrisa border, North Telangana and Koel-Kaimur. We will be able to build these areas into contiguous areas of armed struggle with each area influencing the other.”

Facing Enemy Counter Offensives

When there is a serious enemy offensive in the form of encirclement and suppression campaign, we should not make futile attempts to hold territory. We should disperse in mobile squads and at the same time should carry on attacks from exterior lines, simultaneously with attacks from within the area of encirclement. The tactical counter offensive against the enemy should be carried out in the form of small and big military actions. A “meal is eaten mouthful by mouthful”. By following the tactics of sudden attack and annihilation it is absolutely possible to defeat the enemy and achieve victory for the people in single battles.”

The recent costly ambushes of the CRPF in Chhattisgarh leading to the death of 76 and then 27 personnel are chilling proof of these tactics of annihilation. It indicates how the battle is unfolding entirely in conformity with the Maoist design.

It (CRPF) is excellent for static security duties and guarding VAs/VPs. However as the recent disasters in Chattisgarh have amply highlighted, it is in no position to undertake offensive CI operations in the dense jungle terrain.

External Involvement

Chapter Six states inter alia “However the revolutionary situation can become even more favourable for the rapid advance of the peoples war due to several factors such as a war with the neighbouring countries.”

The Maoists are looking forward to external involvement in this battle, which they feel will greatly help their cause. It also looks forward to the possibility of the emergence of revolts amongst the Police, Para-military forces as well as the Army.

Elections

Since the strategy hinges on the seizure of power through protracted Peoples War – the document highlights that in the name of preparation of armed struggle, participation in elections will only sabotage the revolutionary movement.

Analysis

The document must be thoroughly studied by all those dealing with Indian security. It contains a wealth of details on Strategy, Tactics, Terminology and Methods. There is a crystal clear Maoist perspective plan and strategy that was evolved in 2004 and chillingly anticipated the chaotic response and situation of today.

Chapter 10 talks in detail of building a People’s army. Mao had said, “without a People’s Army, the people have nothing” and “political power flows out of the barrel of a gun”. The Maoist document states ominously, “The exploiting ruling classes will never relinquish or give up power voluntarily. Without smashing the present state machinery and the main constituents of state power, the mercenary armed forces, the instruments of the suppression of the people by ruling classes….. the Indian people cannot establish political power. Hence, in order to completely smash the state machinery, the building up of the People’s Army as the organised armed force of the masses is indispensible.”

There is a clear and palpable menace building out there. The Indian state has so far seriously underestimated the military potential of the Maoist movement. This has allowed it to flourish unhindered and establish its Revolutionary Base in the Red Corridor of densely forested hills of Peninsular India. No Guerilla Army could have asked for a better terrain. We have a serious fight on our hands. Its start point cannot be a thesis that it does not exist at all.

Counter Strategies and Response Options

Having examined the primary sources to comprehend the threat and understand the Maoist roadmap for fomenting a Red Revolution to overthrow the Indian Republic, let us examine our response options. As stated earlier, this serious threat had been underrated and under-resourced for far too long. The Maoist have now succeeded in establishing Revolutionary Base areas in the hilly and densely forested regions of Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar-Odhisha border and in the Gadchiroli Tribal districts of Mahararshtra. Though the leadership is exclusively Urban (and largely of Andhra origin) it has very methodically exploited the angst and suffering of India’s tribal population to recruit highly skilled, natural guerillas for the armed struggle who are formidable fighters in the dense jungle terrain. The strength of the Core Base area in the Chattisgarh-Dantewada forest region has been amply highlighted by the massacres of the CRPF in this area.

Mao had enunciated his strategy in terms of exploiting the three resources of Space, Time and Material. A modern Industrialised State mobilizes all its Material resources for seeking a quick victory in time. It can not afford an extended campaign. Hence it seeks a quick victory in time. The essence of that strategy is to deny the enemy that quick victory and extend the war in Space and Time. Mao used Space to extend the war in time. Mao in fact defined space as square mileage minus a workable communication net work. Thus he said:–

  • 10 square miles of dense jungle/hilly terrain equals 100 square miles of plain with poorly developed communications.
  • 100 square miles of such plains with poorly developed communications network would equal to 1000sq kms of plains with well developed communications.

The Indian Maoist document analyses the Indian terrain in Chapter 7. It says the strategic areas are the hilly regions with dense forest cover. They have already secured these with their tribal foot soldiers who are the best human resource for this terrain.

Considering the seriousness of the threat (as clearly revealed by a study of the Maoist Strategy document) “¦ it  is imperative for the national leadership to understand the gravity and scale of the threat.

The essence of the Indian Counter Strategy therefore would be to:-

  • Strike hard at the narrow, elitist base of the Maoist leadership (mostly urban, middle class intellectuals from Andhra) by employing covert Action teams, and the Army’s Special Forces.
  • Destroy the Revolutionary Base Areas established in the Chattisgarh- Dandkaranya region by concurrent attacks against all bases simultaneously. This will have to be in the form of large scale “Seek and Destroy” operations by very well trained forces in large numbers. To begin with, this may need over two Army Divisions and the Para Military Forces, with the Army focusing on the primary base area of the Chattisgarh forests.
  • Secure the Communication Grid and the Population Centers by deploying a Counter- Insurgency (CI) Grid along the primary Road network in the Red Corridor. This would need a mix of the Rashtriya Rifles and properly trained Central Police Organisations.

CRPF as the Lead CI Force The Group of Ministers constituted to study the Lessons of the Kargil War had designated the CRPF as the lead CI Force of this country. As a result it was mindlessly expanded to over 220 Battalions without changing its basic police ethos, operational philosophy and organizational structure. The CRPF is an excellent add-on police force for aggravated law and order situations (election duties, communal riots, castist violence, civilian unrest etc). It is excellent for static security duties and guarding VAs/VPs. However as the recent disasters in Chattisgarh have amply highlighted, it is in no position to undertake offensive CI operations in the dense jungle terrain. Pushing it into a task it is woefully unprepared for will lead to avoidable loss of life and loss of weapons to the insurgents.

If the CRPF is to perform the lead CI Force role it will have to be radically restructured and transformed by reducing its age profile, changing its operating ethos to functioning as a Battalion (with the Commandant leading the operations) and large scale intake of former Short Service Commissioned Army officers and former Army JCOs/NCOs/men from the SF and Infantry Battalions. The CRPF must be trained by the Army as complete Units and Sub Units and not by ad hoc milking of men from a large number of units. The severe limitations of this force as presently configured, must be clearly understood by the national leadership. More massacres of the Dantewada variety will severally demoralize this force and embarrass the Indian State at the international level. Truly, transforming this force could well take upto 8 to 10 years. No miracles can be expected overnight.

Need For the Rashtriya Rifles Considering the seriousness of the threat (as clearly revealed by a study of the Maoist Strategy document) and the dangerous way in which the campaign has been under- resourced so far – it is imperative for the national leadership to understand the gravity and scale of the threat. The Red Base areas have already been established in the Chattisgarh-Dandakarnya forest region. These will have to be destroyed and this is beyond the current capability of the Police and Para Military Forces. It would be in the interest of the Indian Nation-State to urgently do the following :-

  • Employ Army Special Forces to hunt down and eliminate key Maoist leaders and launch heliborne operations to destroy key Maoist companies/platoons of the PLGA in the Dandakaranya region.
  • Raise up to six additional RR Divisions to secure these Base Areas on a long term basis.
  • In addition employ up to two Army Divisions (preferably those being raised for use against China) for major counter offensives in the critical eight districts of Chattisgarh-Dandkaranya to break the Maoist momentum and cause serious attrition on the Peoples Liberation Guerilla Army.
  • There is simply no getting away from the scale and scope of the counter effort required. India is bearing the consequences of a major youth bulge in its population. Raising 6 to 8 additional Army Divisions will help generate much needed employment. A large proportion of this recruitment must be done from the tribal areas. It will automatically lead to the upward social mobility of the tribals. Dr Ambedkar incidentally was the son of a Subedar Major of the Army’s Mahar Regiment.
  • We will rapidly need to raise forces that are structured and ready for the fight. It will be a futile effort to just raise additional CRPF and then spend 8 to 10 years to restructure and transform them. We urgently need Forces in being. We have underestimated and underresourced our anti Maoist campaign for far too long. Any further drift would be positively dangerous for the country.

The Indian Military must clearly comprehend the Maoist threat. It seeks to smash the Indian State and its Armed Forces by a protracted Peoples War in which it will ally with the terrorists/jehadists in J&K and the insurgents in the North East. Romancing the Maoists should strictly be left to novelists and writers of fiction like Arundhati Roy. We can not afford to lose touch with ground realities. A country must clearly determine the kind of conflicts and wars it will be called upon to fight. The Maoist military challenge is a reality in the ‘here and now’. We can ill afford to wish it away and hope to focus purely on external wars that we may never get to fight. The State could by default lose the looming civil war inside. The Maoists are clearly planning to exploit the situation to the hilt if a war occurs with our neighbours. We can not afford to wait for that dire contingency. The Maoist menace must be tackled well before the situation deteriorates to that stage.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Maj Gen GD Bakshi, (Retd)

is a war Veteran and Strategic Analyst.

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