Pt Jawahar Lal Nehru being shown Zojila by Lt Col Sukhdev Singh, CO 1st Patiala
Strategic Changes due to new inventions
Another Memorandum14 from the War Department’s Joint Secretary to the External Affairs Department in Delhi explains:
In the past the physical difficulties of Tibet’s mountains and high altitude plateau have given India a valuable buffer against aggression. This however cannot be regarded as immutable. In the present war, the jungles on the N.E. [North East] Frontier and the deserts of Libya, previously considered to be military barriers have been overcome by modern equipment and modern inventions. We are faced with the increasingly rapid development of inventions such as rockets and jet-propelled bombs and also of rapid methods of road construction, air transportation and so on. These may reduce the value of the physical buffer: and make it all the more important to maintain as far as possible a political buffer. We do not think, therefore, that this is the moment to suggest giving up a hitherto useful barrier, still less let it fall into the hands of another nation capable of developing it into an offensive base in its own time.
As for the people of Tibet, the Memo describes them as “naturally brave and tough, though by religion pacifist and unmilitary…
An autonomous and backward Tibet had served to keep potential aggressors at a distance from a large part of India’s northern frontier. If a hostile power invaded Tibet, the undeveloped nature of the country would impose delay upon the aggressor, and so give India valuable time in which to make dispositions to meet the threat.
Despite many technical objections or hurdles that such a military exercise could face, the Army headquarters believed that all technical difficulties could be eventually overcome “if it is decided that preparation must be made to drop paratroops in Tibet.”
As for the people of Tibet, the Memo describes them as “naturally brave and tough, though by religion pacifist and unmilitary. They are wholly untrained and unequipped to oppose even the smallest of modern forces, and have never seen modern weapons and equipment, though this could be overcome by training and arousing interest in military matters.”
Though Tibet has no manufacturing resources to enable it to equip its own forces, “the smallness of the forces that can be put into Tibet by possible enemies, and the inefficiency of the Chinese,15 the training and equipping of a small Tibetan force on modern lines would have an effect on any campaign out of all proportion to the size of the force.”
This is an interesting consideration in any study of the 1962 War, though in the case of the Sino-Indian War, it was India which had not the will or the wisdom to be ready to defend itself and use its Air Force.
The Memo also points out another factor:”there is considerable scope for the activities of guerilla bands, preferably led by trained British or Indian officers, in some parts of the country e.g. the sparsely populated North and West.”
Postscript: British disagreements
After being accepted in the first instance, the detailed memo to defend Tibet was rejected by some Air Force Officer.
In a Top Secret letter,16 Brig R.W. McLeod wrote on March 2, 1946 to Maj. Gen. C. S. Sugden, Director of Military Operations (DMO) at the War Office in Whitehall:
I said that our paper on Tibet would be with you shortly. Unfortunately there has been a held-up. The original paper was written in full consultation with Air HQ India, and on the assumption that we should always have at least seven transport squadrons of aircrafts. When our paper, which had previously been approved by A.H.Q. (I) [Air Head Quarters India] was considered by the AOC-in-C [Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief] as one of the Chiefs of Staff, he disagreed (or rather his staff disagreed) with the conclusions regarding air maintenance and air support which had been reached by previous Air Advisors.
McLeod answered: “This may be so, but I say that if we do not have seven squadrons, we cannot go to Tibet at all, and that therefore if we have to consider operations in Tibet they should be based on our plan and additional aircraft from outside India must be placed at India’s disposal if she has to meet the Russians or China in Tibet.”
As a result the appreciation “was thrown back to the J.P.C. for revision and the Air Staff consider that they are too busy on other matters to pay much attention to Tibet, and wish the whole question to be postponed for six months. Personally, I do not agree with this view since I consider that the paper can be amended very slightly and it will then meet the requirements of the new Air Staff,” said Brig McLeod.
According to him, the main point that the Air Headquarters objected to was “we shall not have seven squadrons of transport aircraft and therefore the plan is unsound.” McLeod answered: “This may be so, but I say that if we do not have seven squadrons, we cannot go to Tibet at all, and that therefore if we have to consider operations in Tibet they should be based on our plan and additional aircraft from outside India must be placed at India’s disposal if she has to meet the Russians or China in Tibet.”
The second point was about the impossibility to drop parachutists over 5,000 feet. The General Staff’s officer said: “I entirely agree with this, but I am convinced that it is not an impossible technical problem to drop them at altitude of 12,000 feet. It is in fact simply a question of a larger canopy which is merely a matter of mathematical calculation. If the air is so much thinner, then for any given weight there must be an increased area of canopy in order that the rate of descent is slower. I discussed this question with Raymond Quilter who makes parachutes, when I was commanding the S.A.S. troops in England, and I am sure I am right.”
The last objection was about the technical difficulty of landing and taking off from strips at the height of the Tibetan plateau. Brig McLeod who had a great experience in “Special Operations” commented: “I fully appreciate that this will entail larger strips of increased skills, but I feel certain that the question of length of strips can be overcome by technical developments such as a rocket assisted take off and the converse of rocket acceleration.”
His recommendations were: “I therefore consider that with minor rewording the paper can stand as it is but I am having some difficulty in persuading the Air Staff of this. We have, however, delayed so long that I am sending you a copy of the paper in its present form in order that you may see the general conclusions at which we have arrived and that you will agree that although some alterations may be required to meet the Air Staff, a the majority of the paper can remain unaltered.”
Nehru remarked: “Rubbish. Total Rubbish. We don’t need a defence plan. Our policy is non-violence. We foresee no military threats. Scrap the Army. The police are good enough to meet our security needs.”
Despite the Air Force objections, the paper was accepted by the Commander-in-Chief with some restrictions, as it was impracticable “until such time as the Russians or the Chinese have such aircrafts or rockets it would be extremely difficult for them to operate from Tibet against India.”
The conclusion was therefore: “From a short term point of view the Committee do not consider that there is any practicable means of aiding Tibet against a major enemy or that there is any real threat to India from that direction.”
It however added: “When and if it becomes possible to operate aircraft to and from Tibet, the Committee consider that a plan of the nature of the one under consideration would seem to be the only method by which Aid to Tibet could be given.”
The situation was soon evolving very fast in the subcontinent. On 2 September 1946, an Interim Government of India was formed from the newly elected Constituent Assembly of India; its task was to assist the transition to complete independence.
This council of ministers had most of the powers of a government a Prime Minister (Jawaharlal Nehru) designated as the Vice president of the Council.
But the mood had changed.
Let us remember the reaction of the Prime Minister when the first paper on the threats to India’s security was prepared by the Chief of Staff.
The paper contained recommendations for dealing with the newly independent nation’s security and asked for a government directive on defence policy. When General Sir Robert Lokhart, the Commander-in-Chief took this paper to the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru remarked: “Rubbish. Total Rubbish. We don’t need a defence plan. Our policy is non-violence. We foresee no military threats. Scrap the Army. The police are good enough to meet our security needs.17”
The new Indian government had decided to be the champion of non-violence; Nehru thought he could prove to the world that problems and crises could be solved without recourse to force. The first casualty would be Kashmir, the second was Tibet.
Postscript: after India’s Independence
Ten years later, the guerrilla warfare started in Eastern Tibet, with the support of the CIA. But by that time, the Government of India was not ready to get involved in a full-fledged military operation in Tibet.
However, in the summer of 1949, the Chief of Army Staff sent a young intelligence officer to survey the eventual routes that could be used to bring troops and ammunition in the event of a ‘political’ decision to defend Tibet.
The fact that this covert mission took place and this with the knowledge of K.P.S. Menon, the Foreign Secretary, is proof that in the summer of 1949, the Government of India was still keeping all its options open. In the words of this officer who later became one of the most decorated Generals of the Indian army: “My mission was very simple. It was to see the routes in these areas. In the Army, we always prepared for eventualities. The Army does not decide to go anywhere, but when we are asked to go anywhere, we must know where the routes are.”18
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He made his recommendations, nothing was impossible, after all Younghusband had done it 45 years earlier under much more demanding conditions, but it was a ‘political’ choice.
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over the years china giveing aid topakistan tryeing to enter in tonepal and srilanka and bangladseh. china violteing internatioal law byconstructing road viakashmir tobalouchistan. over theyears china seem thinking india is softstate.
china is communeist country india is democracycountry .the china and india samepopulation threatening india everyoccasion if theystrong coventionally theyhave toinvade taiwan and vietnam and japan.these soverignstates china
threaten against them invade them capture them . whathappen to HITLER
IT WILLNEVER TO CHINA..china willnever succededoccupy any enemy territory
day by day they threatening india china cancapture delhi in twodays .india soliders eating icecream. china canplay plasystation . this kind of attitude bychina
undermininy india army china thinks indias army liketoys.
Even after 5 decades of war with China, India is still not capable of defending itself, let alone Tibet. It may sound harsh, but that is the sad reality. In case of a war with China, India is at high risk of losing territory in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh and North East. Chinese may even be able to capture Kashmir if Pakistan joins the war. The 3 services work in silos and have only recently started working together to integrate the services. However this is being done on a piecemeal basis. India has not made any attempts to stop Chinese proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles to Pakistan. This has created additional problems for India. However, it is India which can really stand out against China and even counter it if the political and military leadership of India work together to identify the goals and strategy in case of a war. If push comes to shove, the military forces should be clear about the political objective. The political objective of India should be to liberate Tibet and East Turkestan. We should ensure that the land link between Pakistan and China is broken. From the military perspective, the services needs to be integrated thoroughly. Appointing a CDS with full operational powers will be the first step. The IDS reporting to CDS, should be responsible for integrating the services broadly under 4 categories. The categories are operational, functional, supporting and admin commands. The Northern, Central and Eastern commands facing China should be grouped under 1 military region. It should be headed by a General/equivalent rank officer. India should rapidly develop & induct long range ballistic and cruise missiles for offensive operations & rapidly modernize air and missile defensive operatiions. India should increase the strength of the army infantry to 2.4 million. Atleast 1.8 million troops should be assigned to counter China. India should induct 3600 fighter jets to counter China and Pakistan. At least 2400 jets should be deployed against China.
The issue of Tibet, also rested with the case that either the Cultural Revolution was ongoing, or that it had ended. It seems, that had China been peaceful internally, or that Mao harbored no doubt about China, not to do with what he saw as an internal situation in Tibet, the Chinese troops would not be required on the mountains that border India and China. Apparently, India had a situation in parliament, also. Indian parliamentarians did not generally agree with what they saw as deliberate policy implementation during the first, and consequent five year plans, and they were both Congressmen, and not. Nehru had to seem, as if he wasn’t anti-national interest himself, to many parliamentarians, also. The discussion with China, weren’t facilitating understanding, and both China, and India, weren’t making the P. M., confident about what both wanted to discuss, and he thought he might be looking at an exercise of one man to perception, trying to up the other, and for a situation that wasn’t seemingly existing, before.
Dear Mr Arpi please keep on writing i hope your prodding might awaken the Indians one to realities of lurking threat but lets hope it is not too late by then
I follow most of your articles but to our when will Indian government awake from its slumber. Arre Arpiji we Indians (Oh! Mr Arpi we Indians ) please publish your articles in national news papers some one might read them . no matter how much you goad us we will remain complacent like the head of the Ostrich. Arre koi kuch karo ( someone please do something)